Watch Report No.17

Watch Report No.17   Dec. 6, 2019

§Japan, and the World, Must Not Abandon the Historic Opportunity for Peacemaking on the Korean Peninsula

The denuclearization and peace process that began in 2018 not only helped avert the looming danger of war which reached its peak in 2017, but also produced an historic opportunity to establish a new order in all of Northeast Asia. However, the failed US-DPRK talks, which have been going on for over a year and a half, threaten to destroy this opportunity. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) had demanded that the US approach Pyongyang “with a new way of calculation” and said that the US had until the end of this year to come up with a proposal to implement the 2018 Singapore Declaration. With less than one month left until the deadline, there has been no sign that the US will respond to the DPRK’s demands. If the US does not respond, the world will lose an historic opportunity for peacemaking on the Korean Peninsula. This failure will be a monumental loss for Japanese citizens, as well.

The DPRK’s Year-End Deadline

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un referred to the year-end deadline in the April 12, 2019 policy speech [1] that he made at the First Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly. The relevant part of the speech is provided here; it is fairly long but gives the context:

Given the deep-rooted animosity between the DPRK and the United States, in order to implement the June 12 Joint Statement both sides should give up their unilateral terms and seek a constructive solution that meets each other's interests.

To this end, it is needed above all for the United States to approach us with a new way of calculation after putting aside the current one.

The United States is talking much about holding the third round of bilateral summit talks, but we are neither pleased nor willing to see summit talks like the Hanoi summit talks re-enacted.

However, as President Trump continuously observes, personal relations between he and I are not hostile like the relationship between the two countries, and we still maintain good relations, and if we want, we can send and receive letters asking for each other's regards any time.

If the United States proposed holding the third round of summit talks after finding out with a proper attitude a methodology that can be shared with us, we would be willing to try one more time.

But in my opinion at this moment, it comes to my mind that there is no need for me to obsess over the summit talks with the United States out of thirst for the lifting of sanctions.

Anyway, we will be patient and wait till the end of this year to see whether the United States makes a courageous decision or not, but it will obviously be hard to get a good opportunity like the last time again.

(Emphases are this author’s.)

To summarize, Kim Jong Un declared that the DPRK would wait until the end of 2019 for the US to make a proposal based on “a new way of calculation,” unlike the unilateral demand the US had made at the Hanoi Summit.

What is a “New Way of Calculation”?

What is the “new way of calculation” that the DPRK called on the US to formulate? Subsequent statements issued by the DPRK shed some light on this.

On June 12, 2019, on the day of the first anniversary of the Singapore Joint Statement, a spokesperson for the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement [2], which also called for “a new way of calculation.” The statement highlighted the DPRK’s criticism of the US for failing to fulfil its obligations under the Singapore Declaration while also demanding the DPRK’s unilateral surrender of nuclear weapons. This indicates that the “new way of calculation” embodies mutual fulfillment of obligations under the Singapore Declaration.

On June 30, 2019, during the historic Trump-Kim Panmunjom summit, both sides agreed to resume working-level talks, through which the details of the “new way of calculation” were expected to be hammered out. Immediately before and after the Panmunjom summit, US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun drew attention by making remarks (including off-the-record remarks) that the US was ready to hold “constructive talks” with the DPRK to make “simultaneous and parallel” progress on the fulfillment of the Singapore Declaration [3]. Biegun’s statements revealed that within the Trump administration, proposals to strike “small deals” with the DPRK were being discussed instead of a “big deal” for which Trump had been pushing. For example, Biegun’s off-the-record remark referred to a possible US commitment to providing humanitarian aid and promoting diplomatic communication by establishing liaison offices in both countries’ capitals, in exchange for a complete freeze of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. In addition, the spokesperson for the US Department of State did not deny that a freeze of the nuclear weapons program was being considered as part of first-step measures [4]. This development may indicate that the Department of State understands that the “new way of calculation” embodies a step-by-step implementation of the Singapore Declaration based on the “action for action” principle on which DPRK has long insisted. If these developments prove to be true, it should mean that the Department of State has an accurate understanding of the “new way of calculation.”

In addition to the “mutual” and “step-by-step” implementation of the Singapore Declaration, the “new way of calculation” requires an important precondition. It is, as Kim Jong Un stressed in his April 12, 2019 policy speech, the US recognition that, although the DPRK “voluntarily took crucial and significant measures including the discontinuation of nuclear tests and test-fires of intercontinental ballistic missiles” and honored the US request to repatriate the remains of US soldiers, the US has not initiated any voluntary measures that are comparable to the DPRK’s concessions. The discontinuance of nuclear tests, while leaving a concern that the process could be reversed, involved the dismantling of a nuclear test site. The downsizing and postponement of US-Republic of Korea (ROK) joint military exercises are perceived to be insufficient to meet the scale of the action that the DPRK has taken.

To summarize the points discussed thus far, the “new way of calculation” can be deduced to entail the methods for making mutual and step-by-step progress on the Singapore Declaration, which can be implemented after the US takes measures that are comparable to the scale of the measures already taken by the DPRK.

Stockholm US-DPRK Working-Level Talks

The working-level talks announced at the Panmunjom summit were initially scheduled to begin in mid-July. After more than two months of delay, on October 5, 2019, the meeting finally took place in Stockholm. However, there was no evidence that any preparatory exchanges had occurred between the two parties.

Rather, during this time period, both the US-DPRK and DPRK-ROK relations suffered a setback amid heightened tensions, as the US and the ROK conducted the joint military exercise “DongMaeng 19-2” (although the name of the exercise was changed) and the F-35s that the ROK Air Force had purchased from the US arrived in the ROK. These were met by the DPRK’s multiple short-range missile tests and test-firing of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

The Stockholm working-level talks were joined by Biegun and Kim Myong Gil, a roving ambassador who had been appointed as a chief negotiator with the US. Immediately after the talks, which lasted for 8.5 hours [5], the DPRK announced that the negotiations had fallen apart, blaming the US for “coming to the negotiations empty-handed.” The US instantly refuted the DPRK’s accusation, stating it had “brought creative ideas and had good discussions with its DPRK counterparts,” adding, “At the conclusion of our discussions, the United States proposed to accept the invitation of our Swedish hosts to return to Stockholm to meet again in two weeks time” [6]. The following morning, the spokesperson for the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated criticism of the US, stating, “the US has actually not made any preparations for the negotiations but sought to meet its political goal of abusing the DPRK-US dialogue for its domestic political events on schedule.” Further, he set tough conditions for a next round of talks to take place, saying, “We have no intention to hold such sickening negotiations as what happened this time before the US takes a substantial steps to make complete and irreversible withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK, a policy that threatens the security of the country and hampers the right to existence and development of its people” [7].

In short, the working-level negotiations failed.

As later statements show, the DPRK has since then changed the language of its demands, by replacing the phrase “a new way of calculation” with the new phrase, “complete and irreversible withdrawal of the hostile policy.” It appears as though the DPRK has shifted gears from practical negotiations, as reflected in the former phrase, toward more political negotiations, as reflected in the latter.

Return to the “Withdrawal of the Hostile Policy”

The “withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK” is the bottom line of the DPRK’s demands on the US, which has a long history.

The post-Stockholm tension between the US and the DPRK remains high as the year-end deadline is approaching. When the US Secretary of Defense Mark Thomas Esper announced the postponement of the US-ROK joint Vigilant Ace air force drills, Kim Yong Chol, chairman of the Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee and former Vice Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, responded on November 18, 2019 saying that a mere postponement was not enough and demanded a complete halt to the drills. He reiterated that denuclearization negotiations would require the “complete and irrevocable withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK” [8]. (Emphasis is this author’s.) When, on November 17, 2019, Trump tweeted at Kim Jong Un, “You should act quickly, get the deal done,” and “See you soon!,” Kim Kye Gwan, adviser to the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, instantly responded, “We are no longer interested in such talks that bring nothing to us,” and “If the US truly wants to keep on dialogue with the DPRK, it had better make a bold decision to drop its hostile policy towards the DPRK” [9]. (Emphasis is this author’s.)

Perhaps more interesting yet is chief negotiator Kim Myong Gil’s November 14, 2019 statement, which included complaints about his counterpart Stephen Biegun. In response to Biegun’s request for the Swedish government to mediate US-DPRK talks, the chief negotiator questioned why Biegun had made such a move without “candidly making direct contact with me, his dialogue partner, if he has any suggestions or any idea over the DPRK-US dialogue,” and declared, “We are ready to meet with the US at any place and any time” if negotiation for solutions to problems is possible, but “I am not interested in meetings” so long as the US is not ready to make proposals and the invitation for meetings is “a trick to earn time.” He added that since the DPRK has already presented a list of demands and priorities to the US, “the ball is in the US court.” He further stated, “If the U.S., failing to put forth a basic solution for lifting the anti-DPRK hostile policy harmful to our rights to existence and development, thinks that it can lead us to negotiations with war-end declaration, which may reduce to a dead document any moment with change of situation, and with other matters of secondary importance like the establishment of a liaison office, there is no possibility of the settlement of the issues” [10]. (Emphasis is this author’s.)

This statement not only demands a halt to “the hostile policy,” but also dismisses the end-of-war declaration as of secondary importance as well as the establishment of liaison offices, which was a much-discussed interim measure during the initial phase of the denuclearization talks, emphasizing the halt to “the hostile policy” as a high priority.

Evidently, the DPRK’s post-Stockholm demands are concisely consolidated into the “withdrawal of the hostile policy.” It is not difficult to see that the economic sanctions imposed on the DPRK, which are often described as “the toughest sanctions in history,” are implied as the worst aspects of the “hostile policy.”

What Japan Must Do

The 2018 US-DPRK and ROK-DPRK summits sowed a perhaps once in a lifetime opportunity for denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Now we are facing a crisis in which the opportunity may ultimately be turning into a failure. During the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Biegun explained that the year-end deadline was unilaterally set by the DPRK and that “the president remains of the view that Chairman Kim Jong Un can make this decision to move forward” [11]. However, taking into account the deteriorating ROK-DPRK relations, the prospect does not allow much room for optimism. The failure of US-DPRK negotiations would be a tremendous loss for the world.

The problems of denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula are problems to which Japan is a party. To this date, Japan has neither apologized to nor compensated the DPRK for colonizing the peninsula. A positive shift in the situation on the Korean Peninsula would likely offer us an invaluable chance to open dialogue for finding solutions to this persistent historical issue. Japanese citizens cannot afford to be bystanders.

Japan must act proactively and explore ways to break the current deadlock for the sake of peace and security in Northeast Asia and the resolution of the historical issues between Japan and the DPRK. Yes, it is possible – if Japan shifts from its dependence on extended nuclear deterrence to a pursuit of a collaborative security framework in the region by proposing the establishment of a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone. In doing so, Japan can help transform the denuclearization and peace processes that currently depend solely on the US-DPRK negotiations into processes of a much broader framework. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

 (Thanks to Toshie OZAKI and Patti WILLIS for translating from Japanese to English and proof-reading.)

[1] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s Policy Speech,” KCNA, April 14, 2019  http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from date in Supreme Leader’s Activities.

[2] United Nations official document A/73/894–S/2019/466

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/165/61/pdf/N1916561.pdf?OpenElement

[3] “(4th LD) U.S. ready for talks with N.K. to make 'simultaneous and parallel' progress: nuke envoy,” Yonhap News Agency, June 28, 2019 https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190628000454325?section=national/diplomacy

And, American internet media ”AXIOS” July 3, 2019 https://www.axios.com/trump-negotiator-steve-biegun-signals-flexibility-in-north-korea-talks-0b1f9a53-2599-49ac-b236-0fa819d175f8.html

[4] Morgan Ortagus, “Department Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, July 9, 2019

https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-july-9-2019/

[5]  Morgan Ortagus, “North Korea Talks, Press Statement,” U.S. Department of State, October 5, 2019

https://www.state.gov/north-korea-talks/

[6]  See 5.

[7]  “Fate of DPRK-U.S. Dialogue Depends on U.S. Attitude: DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson,” KCNA, October 6, 2019  http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  (Search for the article by date. )

[8]  “U.S. Should not Dream about Negotiation for Denuclearization before Dropping Its Hostile Policy towards DPRK,” KCNA, November 18, 2019  http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article by date.

[9]  “Advisor to DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Statement,” KCNA, November 18, 2019

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article by date.

[10]  “DPRK Foreign Ministry Roving Ambassador Issues Statement,” KCNA, November 14, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article by date.

[11]  David Brunnstrom, and Daphne Psaledakis, “Year-end could see return to North Korea 'provocations,' says U.S. envoy Biegun,” Reuters, November 21, 2019

https://jp.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biegun-northkorea/year-end-could-see-return-to-north-korea-provocations-says-u-s-envoy-biegun-idUSKBN1XU232

Watch Report No.16

Watch Report No.16      Nov. 7, 2019

§DPRK’s Short-Range Missile Launches are Reactions to Military Trends in Japan and South Korea

Korea Central News Agency’s (KCNA) reportage of DPRK’s missile launches

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched ballistic missiles in May for the first time in about 18 months, although they were short-range missiles. Since then, including the latest launch of October 31, the country has launched at least 22 short-range missiles in eleven launches. At the end of this Report, those 11 missile launches are listed in chronological order in a chart. (In addition to those launches, the DPRK test-fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on October 2.)

A variety of technological analyses of short-range missile launches have been made. Combining all analyses, it can be concluded that the series of missile launches are generally related to four types of missiles; ① Ballistic missiles closely similar to the Russian Iskander missile, ② Missiles whose exterior is similar to US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), ③ Large-caliber multiple-launch guided rocket systems, and ④ Super-large multiple rocket launchers.

The first half of this Watch Report will technically analyze DPRK’s missile launches and identify that which has been generally ignored in the DPRK’s reportage about the launches.

Contrary to a mistaken perception of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)’s accuracy given its status as “the state-run news agency of a dictatorship,” in fact, KCNA’s coverage of DPRK’s missile tests can be judged as accurate. In particular, regarding technical information about the missiles, KCNA’s reporting of each missile launch is consistent and describes those launches, not with details, but with a surprising degree of consistency. Therefore, carefully reading of KCNA’s coverage makes it possible to deepen our understanding of DPRK’s missile tests. For instance, KCNA describes missile launches making the distinction as to whether they are conducted as strike drills, demonstration fires, or test-fires. Additionally, KCNA uses language such as, “new-type missile,” “new weapon” or “newly-developed missile” and distinguishes among these launches of “new weapon,” or “newly-developed missile” by using “test-fire.” Making note of those distinctions, KCNA’s reporting of each missile launch is summarized in a chart at the end of this Report

Missiles launched on May 4 and 9, July 25, and August 6 are understood to be missiles similar to Iskander [1]. Not contradicting that understanding, this Watch Report would like to point out at least 2 facts regarding those 4 launches. First, two launches in May and two subsequent launches were conducted with clearly different purposes. Two launches in May were conducted as strike drills of defense units of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in front areas. Subsequent launches were conducted as demonstration firings, aimed at South Korea and the US-ROK joint military exercises. Second, while missiles launched in May were described simply as “tactical guided weapons” or “long-range strike means”, missiles launched subsequently were described as “new-type” tactical guided weapons or “new-type” tactical guided missiles. Comparing how those phrases were used in subsequent KCNA’s reportage, it can be interpreted that the language of “new-type” doesn’t mean newly-developed weapons, but rather means new-type weapons which have already been deployed. Considering these differences in descriptions in KCNA’s coverage, although all missiles launched in May and subsequently were missiles similar to Iskander, there is a possibility that they can be divided into old-type and new-type. Additionally, as described in the following, it should be considered that a “new-type” weapon does not mean an indigenous weapon developed in the DPRK, but means a weapon purchased from other countries or improved version of such a weapon.

Compared with the phrase of “new-type,” large-caliber multiple guided rocket systems launched on July 31 and August 2 and super-large multiple rocket launchers launched on August 24, September 10, and October 31 were described as “test-fire” of “newly-developed” weapons. Two test-fires were conducted on large-caliber multiple guided rocket systems and three test-fires were conducted on super-large multiple rocket launchers. In the same way, missiles whose shapes are similar to US ATACMS launched on August 10 and 16 were described as “test-fire” of a “new weapon”. Taking other related descriptions into account, launches of those three types of missiles can be confirmed as test-fires to verify results of new weapons that DPRK national defense scientists have developed according to an orientation given by the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK). In that sense, those test-fires were different in nature from launches of four missiles similar to Iskander (which might include two types).

In that connection, based on that analysis, large-caliber long-range multiple rockets launched on May 4 are existing operational weapons (probably unguided) and should be considered to have no relation to multiple rocket launchers being developed subsequently.

Trends of military buildup in South Korea and Japan

It is understandable that those short-range missile launches have been sensitively covered by mass media. This is because those launches are considered as signals that the DPRK would resume medium and long-range missile launches and could lead to the breakdown of the denuclearization and peace process in the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, whether intentionally or not, there exists a possibility that the fact that DPRK’s ballistic missile launches violate UN Security Council sanctions resolutions (UNSCRs) formally have lowered hurdle of the coverage for mass media. However, to prevent the breakdown of the denuclearization and peace process, being sensitive to the DPRK’s short-range missile launches does not seem to be right way to pay attention to this issue. Rather, that would lead to straying from the essence of the issue.

Both US President Donald Trump’s stance not to regard the DPRK’s short-range missile launches as a problem and Chief of Cheong Wa Dea’s National Security Office Chung Eui-yong’s stating that “I don’t see missile capabilities now being developed by North Korea as a grave threat to our national security” [2], can be considered to be reasonable attitude as a consequence, although each of them were based on different reasons. The current core issue of the denuclearization and peace process is whether the US would adopt a policy to take reciprocal and step-by-step approaches in negotiations with the DPRK and propose concrete measures corresponding to the past steps already taken by the DPRK and next steps which the DPRK has suggested in detail, including a freeze of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.

Keeping the above in mind, this Watch Report would like to consider the military trends in South Korea and Japan, in which the US has also been involved. Such trends serve as the background for the DPRK’s repeated short-range ballistic missile launches.

As pointed out in Watch Report 13, DPRK’s moves represent not only an angry reaction to the US-ROK joint military exercise conducted in August, but also to the DPRK’s need to bolster its defense capabilities, responding to the situation in which South Korea has been conducting military modernization by introducing F35A stealth fighter jets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Global Hawk.

The DPRK stated that the missile launch on July 25 was a warning to the ROK military who is running at fever pitch in their efforts to purchase ultramodern weapons and hold the US-ROK joint military exercise [3]. The DPRK conducted a demonstration firing of “new-type” tactical guided missiles on August 6, and the next day when US-ROK joint military exercise started, the DPRK stated that the launch was an occasion to send a warning to that exercise [4]. As described in Watch Report 13, the DPRK warned that, “We, on our part, have no other choice but to develop and test the special armaments to completely destroy the lethal weapons reinforced in South Korea” [5]. And according to that warning, to this date, the DPRK has displayed its weapons with the specific feature of low-attitude gliding and leaping flight orbit [6] and developed preemptive attack capabilities of super-large multiple rocket launchers against the group target [7].

Not only purchasing US state-of-the art weapons, in recent years, South Korea has also been making efforts to modernize its military capabilities. This July, the country announced the construction of its first light aircraft carrier [8]. Regarding missile launches with which the DPRK has attracted attention, as is well known, ROK’s Ministry of National Defense revised its ballistic missile guidelines and extended its ballistic missile range limit from 300km to 800km. Moreover, the country has worked on the establishment of the system called the Kill Chain to carry out a pre-emptive strike by missiles and others against the DPRK [9]. Chief of National Security Office Chung Eui-yong’s statement in the National Assembly regarding South Korea’s missile capabilities that, “I cannot go into details, but our military has conducted no fewer missile tests than North Korea” [10], is considered to honestly describe the country’s current military situation.

Not only South Korea’s arms buildup, but Japan’s arms buildup of the Japan Self- Defense Force (SDF) by the Abe administration has been widely known. The DPRK has been paying close attention to the Japanese military trend as well. On August 26, KCNA criticized the rebuilding of JS Izumo into an aircraft carrier as a “qualitative surge” in attack capability and pointed out that, “Today the SDF have turned into aggression forces capable of fighting a war at any time and any place beyond the boundary of the archipelago” [11]. It is a well-known fact that Japanese military capabilities are closely linked with US military strategy in the region. In late October, it was reported that two US B-52 Stratofortresses which took off from Guam made a rare training flight with the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) over the Sea of Japan [12].

Taking account of the recent trend of military buildup in South Korea and Japan and their daily military operations in the Northeast Asia region, the media’s habit of focusing solely on DPRK’s military activities in the field of conventional weapons is unbalanced and unreasonable. The trend that is really needed is the easing of tensions and genuine disarmament in the entire region, and from that viewpoint, the means to accelerate US-DPRK negotiations should be explored. (Takuya MORIYAMA and Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

Chart: DPRK’s short-range missile launches in May to October, 2019

Date of Launch	Estimated Launch Site	KCNA’s reporting of launches
May 4	Hodo Peninsula	The strike drill to evaluate and inspect the operating capabilities and the accuracy of striking duty performance of large-caliber long-range multiple rocket launchers and tactical guided weapons by KPA units in the forefront area and the eastern front [13].
May 9	Sino-ri	The strike drill of KPA units in the forefront area and the western front to carry out various long-range strike means [14].
July 25	Hodo Peninsula	The power demonstration fire of a new-type of tactical guided weapon to send a warning to the South Korean military. Confirmed the rapid anti-firepower capability of the system and the specific features of the low-attitude gliding and leaping flight orbit of the missile [15].
July 31	Wonsan	A test-fire of newly-developed large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket system, according to policy set forth at the 7th Congress of the WPK [16].
August 2	Yonghung	Retest-fire of newly-developed large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket system, aimed to examine the altitude control flight performance, track control capability and rate of hits of the rocket [17].
August 6	Kwail	The demonstration fire of two “new-type” tactical guided missiles. Missiles launched at the airfield in the Western area flew over the capital area and the central inland region to precisely hit the target islet in the East Sea. Also intended to send a warning to the US-ROK joint military drill [18].
August 10	Hamhung	Test-fire of a new weapon. Suitable for the terrain conditions of the DPRK and has advantageous tactical character different from the existing weapon system. The Party Central Committee gave the direction to develop the weapon system [19].
August 16	Tongchon	Retest-fire of a new weapon, developed in the shortest span of time, following the Party’s order to develop major striking means [20].
August 24	Sondok	Retest-fire of newly-developed super-large multiple rocket launcher, which was invented by young national defense scientists. [21].
September 10	Kaechon	Retest-fire of super-large multiple rocket launcher. Measured the time of combat deployment and verified combat operation, the characteristics of trajectory, accuracy and precise homing functions of launcher. Running fire test remains to be done [22].
October 31	Suncheon	Successfully verified the security of launchers’ continuous fire system through the 3rd test-fire of super-large multiple rocket launchers. Enabled a preemptive attack against the group target and designated target area [23].

[1] For example, Takeshi IWAYA’s, then-Minister of Defense of Japan, press conference on September 3, 2019 

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2019/0903a.html

and Taketsugu SATO, “North Korea missiles progressing steadily. New-type which is hard for radar to pick up eludes the U.S. and Japan (Tentative Translation),” The Asahi Shimbun, October 21, 2019 (Japanese language)

https://digital.asahi.com/articles/DA3S14224898.html。

[2] “Moon's top security adviser dismisses missile threat from N. Korea,” Yonhap News Agency, November 1, 2019

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20191101008200315?section=search

[3] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Power Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Weapon,” KCNA, July 26, 2019

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from date. 

[4] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Watches Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Missiles,” KCNA, August 7, 2019

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from date. 

[5] “S. Korean Authorities Slammed,” KCNA, July 11, 2019

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[6] See note [3].

[7] “Another Test-Fire of Super-large Multiple Rocket Launchers Conducted in DPRK,” KCNA, November 11, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[8] Josh Smith, “Buying a big stick: South Korea's military spending has North Korea worried,” Reuters, September 11, 2019

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-military-analysis/buying-a-big-stick-south-koreas-military-spending-has-north-korea-worried-idUSKCN1VW03C

[9] Ministry of Defense of Japan “2018 Defense of Japan (Annual White Paper)” September 28, 2018

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2018/html/n12202000.html#a77 

[10] See note [2]

[11] “KCNA Commentary Warns Japan against Military Moves,” KCNA, August 26, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[12] Jesse Johnson, “U.S. B-52 bombers make rare training flight over Sea of Japan with ASDF,” The Japan Times, October 29, 2019

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/10/29/asia-pacific/b52-bombers-training-sea-of-japan-asdf/#.XcJXfOj7SUk

[13] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Frontline Area and on Eastern Front,” KCNA, May 5, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[14] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Forefront Area and on Western Front,” KCNA, May 10, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from date. 

[15] See note [3].

[16] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New-type Large-caliber Multiple Launch Guided Rocket System,” KCNA, August 1, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[17]　“Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Again Test-Fire of New-type Large-caliber Multiple Launch Guided Rocket System,” KCNA, August 3, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[18] See note [4].

[19] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New Weapon,” KCNA, August 11, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[20] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of New Weapon Again,” KCNA, August 17, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[21] “Successful Test-fire of Newly Developed Super-large Multiple Rocket Launcher Held under Guidance of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un,” KCNA, August 25, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[22] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of Super-large Multiple Rocket Launcher Again,” KCNA, September 11, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[23] See note [7].

Watch Report No.15

Watch Report No.15      Sep. 20, 2019

§Lack of Clarity in US Negotiation Position – Efforts to Shape the Public Opinion Supporting a Step-by-step Approach Is Urgently Needed

Regarding the US-DPRK negotiations for peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which have stalled since the June US-DPRK Summit at Panmunjom, in late September, DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister, Choe Son-Hui, stated that the DPRK is prepared to agree to negotiations with the US [1]. He stated his expectations by saying, “I believe that the U.S. side will come out with a proposal geared to the interests of both the DPRK and the U.S. and based on the calculation method acceptable to us.” Choe Son-Hui also warned the US government that, “If the U.S. side fingers again to the worn-out scenario which has nothing to do with the new calculation method at the DPRK-U.S. working negotiation…, the DPRK-U.S. dealings may come to an end.” Although acceding to the DPRK demands could be taken as “concession” or “a weak-kneed attitude” in the US and Japan, in order to improve the current situation, the US government must go into negotiations with “a new method of calculation” upon which the DPRK has insisted. Although mass media have hardly paid attention, some US experts have already proposed realistic and effective measures that can be considered to be “a new method of calculation.” Whether the US government will be able to adopt those proposed measures will be the key to realizing the peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the future.

In his letter, Chairman Kim Jong-Un communicated to US President Trump that, “he (Kim Jong-Un) would like to meet and start negotiations as soon as the joint US-South Korea joint exercise is over,” and “this [DPRK missile] testing would stop when the exercises end” [2]. However, the DPRK has continued conducting test launches of missiles even after US-ROK military joint exercises ended, and on August 23 Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho and on August 31 Choe Son-Hui harshly criticized US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on the negotiation stance of the US side [3].

Those DPRK remarks, including Choe Son-Hui’s warning mentioned at the beginning of this report, sound harsh, however, those remarks can be understood to have been made in the context of the DPRK’s consistent policy toward the US.

The DPRK has been consistently calling for the US to give up its hostile policy toward the DPRK as a condition for its giving up its nuclear weapons. All major agreements regarding the nuclear issues of the Korean Peninsula that the DPRK has made thus far, such as the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and DPRK and the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, specify the condition that security guarantees to the DPRK are to be provided. Also even after the breakdown of the Six-Party Talks in 2008, there were occasions when the DPRK proposed suspension of its nuclear programs on condition that the US abandons its hostile policy toward the DPRK [4]. At the US-DPRK summit held in Singapore in June 2018, President Trump committed to providing “security guarantees to the DPRK” in the preamble of the joint statement. On that condition, they agreed to commit to “establishing new US-DPRK relations”, “building a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula”, “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” and “recovering and repatriation of POW/MIA remains”. After the Singapore agreement, the DPRK partially dismantled its missile facilities and repatriated POW/MIA remains, according to the level of its trust in the US, and called for the US, which had been calling for the DPRK to unilaterally denuclearize, to implement the Singapore agreement. For the DPRK, it would be impossible to abandon its nuclear weapons, which it has developed as a means of deterrence against US aggression, unless it is guaranteed that the DPRK will not be invaded by the US even if it abandons those weapons.

In contrast, US government policy on talks with the DPRK has remained unclear. Just before the Hanoi Summit held in Vietnam last February, Stephen Biegun, US State Department Special Representative for North Korea Policy, communicated to his North Korean counterpart that, “we are prepared to pursue – simultaneously and in parallel – all the commitments made in the Singapore agreement” [5]. In reality, however, the US demanded the DPRK dismantle all of its nuclear facilities as a condition for lifting of sanctions on the DPRK, and the summit ended without agreement. As the New York Times reported, in the background of the negotiations, US National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Pompeo advised President Trump to demand that the DPRK dismantle all the nuclear facilities, knowing that the North Korean would not agree to this condition. It is widely viewed that the hard-liners within the Trump administration stopped President Trump who was willing to make deals with the DPRK [6]. Additionally, right before the June Panmunjom Summit, Biegun said that, “[the US] is ready to hold constructive talks with the North to move the commitments of the June 12 Singapore Joint Declaration between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un forward in a simultaneous and parallel manner” [7]. Further, in an off-the-record conversation with reporters after the summit, he also said that the US government is considering a freeze plan, in which the North Korean side completely freezes its weapons of mass destruction program, the US side will provide humanitarian aid, and both sides will expand people-to-people exchanges and establish liaison offices in each other’s capitals. In a later press conference, the US State Department spokesperson didn’t deny the freeze plan and stated, “that would – something that we would certainly hope to see at the beginning” of denuclearization process [8]. However, in the interview with a US media on August 20, State Secretary Pompeo stated that in the event that the DPRK doesn’t denuclearize, “we’ll continue to keep on the sanctions that are the toughest in all of history and continue to work towards convincing Chairman Kim and the North Korean leaders that the right thing to do is for them to denuclearize” [9]. Additionally, in a speech in Kansas City on September 6, ignoring US obligations to implement the agreement, Pompeo stated that if the North Korea denuclearizes as they have committed, the US will provide the security assurances [10]. He completely failed to recognize that the Singapore agreements are mutual and equal between the two states. Criticism against Pompeo by Ri Yong-Ho and Choe Son-Hui made last week can be considered an understandable reaction.

Also, last August, the US conducted US-ROK joint military exercise intended to maintain and strengthen their military capability against the DPRK, though at a smaller scale, and continued delivering state-of-the-art weaponry such as F35A stealth fighter jets to South Korea [11]. While the test launches of missiles, which have been repeatedly conducted by the DPRK since this July, have in part been to demonstrate DPRK opposition toward the US and South Korea that have taken actions breaching the agreement, essential nature of those launches should be interpreted as DPRK’s strengthening of its own military capability to ensure its security at this stage to counter the improvement of the US and South Korean military capability.

In order to realize the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as committed to in Singapore, “security guarantees to the DPRK” must be ensured by establishing “new US-DPRK relations,” building “a peace regime” on the Korean Peninsula, and creating an environment in which the DPRK is able to give up its nuclear weapons. The very freeze plan implied by Biegun could be the first step of such a process. It can be expected that some mass media will express concerns about the freeze plan, as it may imply abandonment of DPRK’s complete denuclearization. However, if the US seriously considers the freeze plan, the move should be seen as significant progress. Robert Einhorn, a former senior US State Department official, supports the freeze plan and contributed an article about detailed proposals acceptable to the DPRK to the 38 North, a web journal of the Stimson Center, a US-based think tank, which has been frequently quoted by Japanese mass media [12].

Einhorn argues that the United States will need “leverage” provided by sanctions relief, to “press” North Korea to move “beyond an interim agreement” and down the path toward “complete denuclearization,” and lists the following items as concrete interim measures: A declaration to end the Korean War; the establishment of liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington; limits on the scale of US-South Korea joint military exercises; a commitment not to pursue new US or UN sanctions; humanitarian assistance; exceptions to existing sanctions to permit certain inter-Korean projects (such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. Kumgang tourism project), and the suspension of certain UN sanctions, especially those restricting activities that do not earn hard currency for Pyongyang (such as North Korea’s import of petroleum products). Many of those measures are also proposed in the past issues of this Watch Report [13].

The US government must show how it will provide “security guarantees” to the DPRK which is the indispensable condition for the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons. For the DPRK, that would be “a new method of calculation.”

To make it possible for the US to negotiate with “a new method of calculation,” public opinion and the mass media of related countries must also play important roles. When the US tries to take actions to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, will public opinion recognize that those actions are necessary measures to realize complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula? This reminds us that President Trump chose not to sign agreement papers prepared for signature at the Hanoi Summit for fear of media bashing. At the press conference after the Summit, President Trump said that, “I could’ve signed an agreement today, and then you people would’ve said, `Oh, what a terrible deal. What a terrible thing he did,’” and made it clear that he didn’t sign agreement papers ready for signature although he could’ve “100 percent” signed [14]. It might be difficult for some mass media to break away from their conventional pattern of criticizing President Trump for seeking achievements to bolster his candidacy in the next presidential election. Media criticism arises from the President’s divisive remarks on diverse subjects, both domestic and international. However, it is critically important for experts and the media to make efforts to shape public opinion from a non-partisan perspective, namely emphasizing the necessary measures to be taken to realize “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”.

Foreign policy hard-liner US National Security Advisor John Bolton has left the Trump administration. However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that the US will negotiate with “a new method of calculation” from now on. However, even if the Trump administration is willing to negotiate with “a new method of calculation,” they will have to take into account public opinion. And if the US government doesn’t change its method of calculation, pressure from public opinion to make the US government negotiate with “a new method of calculation” will be vitally necessary. What is in question is how researchers, mass media, civil societies, and all the people hoping for peace of East Asia will face this issue and act upon it. (Hajime MAEKAWA)

[1] “DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Issues Statement,” KCNA, Sep 9, 2019

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm　 Search for the article from date.

[2] President Trump’s tweet on Aug 10, 2019

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1160158592483418114?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1160158592483418114&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fus-news%2F2019%2Faug%2F10%2Ftrump-kim-jong-un-meeting-missile-tests-letter

[3] On August 23, Ri Yong-Ho criticized Pompeo who told US media that the US will denuclearize the DPRK by sanctions (see text) as “a trouble-maker,” and criticized the US government saying that, “… if it (the US) still thinks of standing in confrontation with the DPRK with sanctions, not dropping its confrontational stand, …then, we will remain as the biggest ‘threat’ to the US for long and long…” (KCNA, August 23, 2019). On August 31, opposing Pompeo’s describing North Korea as “rogue” in his speech in Indianapolis, Choe Son-Hui warned that, “Our expectations of dialogue with the US are gradually disappearing and we are being pushed to reexamine all the measures we have taken so far.” (KCNA, August 31, 2019)

[4] “Leap Day Agreement” of February 29, 2012, is an example. The US and the DPRK affirmed that they do not have hostile intentions toward each other, and the DPRK agreed to implement a moratorium on test launches of long-range missiles and nuclear weapons tests, uranium enrichment activities at Yongbyon, and accept inspections by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (See Peace Depot’s Nuclear Weapon and Nuclear Test Monitor No.397 for more information.)

[5] ”Remarks on DPRK at Stanford University,” U.S. Department of States, Jan 31, 2019 https://www.state.gov/remarks-on-dprk-at-stanford-university/

[6] “How the Trump-Kim Summit Failed: Big Threats, Big Egos, Bad Bets,” The New York Times, Mar 2, 2019

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/world/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-summit.html

[7] ”U.S. ready for talks with N.K. to make 'simultaneous and parallel' progress: nuke envoy,” Yonhap News Agency, Jun 28, 2019

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190628000454325

[8] Biegun’s official interview. Jonathan Swan, Erica Pandey. “Scoop: Trump's negotiator signals flexibility in North Korea talks,” AXIOS, Jul 3, 2019

https://www.axios.com/trump-negotiator-steve-biegun-signals-flexibility-in-north-korea-talks-0b1f9a53-2599-49ac-b236-0fa819d175f8.html

U.S. department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus’ comment which acknowledged the freeze. “Department Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of States, Jul 9, 2019

https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-july-9-2019/

[9] ”Mike Pompeo says no to Senate run in exclusive, wide-ranging interview,” Washington Examiner, Aug 21, 2019 

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/mike-pompeo-says-no-to-senate-run-in-exclusive-wide-ranging-interview

[10] ”Secretary Michael R. Pompeo with Pete Mundo of KCMO,” U.S. Department of States, Sep 6, 2019

https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-pete-mundo-of-kcmo/

[11] Watch Report No.13, and No.14

[12] Robert Einhorn. “US-DPRK Negotiations: Time to Pivot to an Interim Agreement,” 38 North, Aug 2, 2019

https://www.38north.org/reports/2019/08/reinhorn080219/

[13] Watch Report No.7 and No.12 proposed the following interim measures on which the US and the DPRK need to seek agreement at the early stage of negotiations; ① declaration to end the Korean War or a peace declaration, ② establishment of the US liaison office in Pyongyang, both of which were topics reported by the media before the Hanoi Summit, ③ provisional agreement on the scale and nature of future US-ROK joint military exercises, a possible factor for DPRK’s concern, ④ small scale relaxation of the economic sanctions short of lifting of the 5 UNSC sanctions resolutions, as was the DPRK’s demand in Hanoi, ⑤ partial lifting of the sanctions limited to those necessary for inter-Korean economic cooperation, and ⑥ relaxation of restrictions on DPRK space and nuclear development programs, on condition of ensuring peaceful purposes of the programs, and increasing international access to DPRK nuclear and space facilities.

[14] “ Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference | Hanoi, Vietnam,” The White House, Feb 28, 2019

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference-hanoi-vietnam/

Watch Report No.14

Watch Report No.14      Aug. 28, 2019

§The UN Security Council Meeting Called by the UK, France and Germany Should Have Discussed Ways to Enhance the Implementation of the Singapore Agreement, not Sanctions against the DPRK.

On June 30, 2019, at the Summit meeting in Panmunjom, the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) agreed to hold working-level discussions in mid-July. However, the discussions have not taken place yet because the US has failed to come up with “a new method of calculation,” which the DPRK has been expecting.

Conflicts arose during the last two months, both between the US and DPRK, and between North and South Korea, over the US-ROK Joint Military Exercise. The DPRK strongly and continuously urged the US and ROK to stop the military exercise, claiming that it was a manifestation of hostility toward the DPRK and therefore, was counter to the US-DPRK Singapore agreement or the inter-Korean Panmunjom Declaration. Although the US and ROK stopped using names for the exercise such as “Dong Maeng (Alliance) 19-2,” and instead started calling the exercises “Crisis Management Staff Training” (for the first half on August 5-8) and “Combined Command Post Training” (for the latter half on August 11-20) [1], they carried out the program as scheduled. In response, the DPRK conducted seven test-launches, with multiple shots, of short-range ballistic missiles from July 25 to the present (on July 25, 31, August 2, 6, 10, 16 and 24), concurrently with the US-ROK Joint Military Exercise.

In reaction to DPRK’s short-range missile launch, the UK, France and Germany requested that the Security Council (SC) convene a meeting, and a closed meeting was held on August 1. After the meeting the three states held a press conference [2], during which they issued a short statement condemning the DPRK’s launch of short-range ballistic missiles [3]. The statement said that they “reiterate (their) condemnation” of “the launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea in the past few days,” “which are violations of UN Security Council Resolutions.” The statement strongly insisted on continuing the enforcement of sanctions, asserting that “international sanctions must remain in place and be fully enforced until North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes are dismantled.”

In response to this, the spokesperson for the DPRK Foreign Ministry immediately released a statement through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), strongly condemning the action of UK, France and Germany [4]. The spokesperson’s statement criticized the three states for taking issue with “the firing based on the ballistic technology, not the range of the projectile,” without questioning “the war exercises in south Korea and shipment of cutting-edge attack weapons into it,” which is tantamount to demanding a complete renunciation of the right to self-defense. The statement also warned that “their (the three states’) stupid words and deeds wouldn’t restrain the tension on the Korean Peninsula but serve as a catalyst for the escalation.” What the DPRK statement calls the “shipment of cutting-edge attack weapons into South Korea” refers to the recent arrival of F-35A stealth fighters, which the ROK purchased from the United States. The fighters were delivered to the ROK Air Force base in Cheongju. Global Hawks, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), are also scheduled to land at the same Air Force base.

At its meeting on August 1, the SC did not issue any particular statement. Although details of the discussion have not been reported, the fact that the SC could not agree to issue a resolution or statement was not surprising. The U.S., with considerable influence in the SC, would not support any statement that would place blame on the short-range missile launches. The US did not have a willingness to address the DPRK’s short-range missile launch as a violation of the UNSC resolution, instead placing importance on the framework of the US-DPRK Singapore agreement. President Trump tweeted that “these missile tests are not a violation of our signed Singapore agreement,” even though “there may be a United Nations violation,” [5] and indicated the US would not question DPRK’s launch of a ballistic missile as long as it was a short-range missile.

The most serious problem that surfaced during the SC meeting was how outdated and one-sided the perspectives of the three states were in grasping the current situation. The problem is all the more serious, for these three European states have the potential to play an international coordinating role from a position different than that of the US, in terms of the peace and denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula.

As far as it can be judged from the joint statement of August 1, the three states seem to have a correct recognition that only discussions between the US and DPRK can move the situation forward to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, the joint statement remains silent about the three states’ views on core questions, including why the working-level discussions – originally scheduled for mid-July – have not been held yet, or what would be required under the current situation in order for the US-DPRK talks to make progress. Moreover, the three states repeat their basic demands in a condescending manner, such as: “[We] urge North Korea to take concrete steps towards its complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID),” or “Serious efforts by North Korea ... are the best way to guarantee security and stability on the Korean Peninsula.” This is not the attitude one would expect the SC to take at this stage.

As was pointed out in Watch Report No.10, the UNSC adopted sanction resolutions on the DRPK ten times, starting with Resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006 until 2017, in which it prohibited the DPRK from undertaking “nuclear tests” and any further “launches that use ballistic missile technology,” and demanded that the DPRK abandon nuclear weapon and any other WMD programs as well as ballistic missile programs. However, the SC’s efforts – efforts lasting for more than 11 years to improve the situation through economic sanctions resolutions – have not produced any results. What turned around the situation was the series of US-DPRK Summit meetings since 2018, culminating in the adoption of the Singapore Joint Declaration. The agreements set forth in this Declaration pave the way for the realization of the very goals the SC resolutions have aimed to achieve by means of the imposition of sanctions.

It is high time that the SC members, including the above-mentioned three states, discuss the roles the Council could play to support the smooth implementation of the US-DPRK Singapore agreement. Arguments, as if sanctions against DPRK were an end rather than a means, based upon the SC resolutions’ language such as, “shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology”, would be inappropriate and unhelpful at this point in the sensitive process of denuclearization.

At the outset, the SC resolutions against the DPRK placed unprecedented restrictions on missiles, prohibiting the DPRK “from undertaking any further launches that use ballistic missile technology,” which bound subsequent SC actions tightly, and the SC fell into a trap that it had set for itself, that is, it is now forced to take action on even trivial launches. If progress is to be made, the SC must face this fact calmly and squarely. (Ichiro YUASA & Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

Postscript: On August 27, shortly after this report was completed, the UN Security Council held its second meeting for the same purpose at the request of the UK, France and Germany. The three states issued a joint statement the content of which was almost the same as that of August 1 [6]. The analysis contained in this report is given greater credence by the outcome of this second meeting as evidenced by its joint statement.

[1] “Allies to conduct summertime military exercise in earnest next week,” Yonhap News Agency, Aug 10, 2019

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190810000900325?section=search

[2] “At U.N., Britain, France, Germany urge N. Korea to hold 'meaningful' talks with U.S.” Reuters, Aug 2, 2019

https://www.reuters.com/article/northkorea-missiles-un/at-u-n-britain-france-germany-urge-n-korea-to-hold-meaningful-talks-with-u-s-idUSL2N24X16Z

[3] “Statement by Germany, France and the United Kingdom after UN Security Council Consultations on North Korea”

https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/190801-unsc-north-korea/2236818

[4] “Spokesperson for DPRK Foreign Ministry Blames UNSC's Closed-Door Meeting,” KCNA, Aug 2, 2019

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[5] President Trump’s tweet on Aug 2, 2019

https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump

[6] https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/190827-e3-dprk/2241674