Watch Report No.16 Nov. 7, 2019
§DPRK’s Short-Range Missile Launches are Reactions to Military Trends in Japan and South Korea
§DPRK’s Short-Range Missile Launches are Reactions to Military Trends in Japan and South Korea
Korea Central News Agency’s (KCNA) reportage of DPRK’s missile launches
The
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched ballistic missiles in May
for the first time in about 18 months, although they were short-range missiles.
Since then, including the latest launch of October 31, the country has launched
at least 22 short-range missiles in eleven launches. At the end of this Report,
those 11 missile launches are listed in chronological order in a chart. (In addition
to those launches, the DPRK test-fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) on October 2.)
A
variety of technological analyses of short-range missile launches have been
made. Combining all analyses, it can be concluded that the series of missile
launches are generally related to four types of missiles; ① Ballistic missiles closely
similar to the Russian Iskander missile, ② Missiles whose exterior is similar
to US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), ③ Large-caliber multiple-launch
guided rocket systems, and ④ Super-large multiple rocket launchers.
The
first half of this Watch Report will technically analyze DPRK’s missile
launches and identify that which has been generally ignored in the DPRK’s
reportage about the launches.
Contrary
to a mistaken perception of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)’s accuracy
given its status as “the state-run news agency of a dictatorship,” in
fact, KCNA’s coverage of DPRK’s missile tests can be judged as accurate. In particular,
regarding technical information about the missiles, KCNA’s reporting of each missile
launch is consistent and describes those launches, not with details, but with a
surprising degree of consistency. Therefore, carefully reading of KCNA’s coverage
makes it possible to deepen our understanding of DPRK’s missile tests. For
instance, KCNA describes missile launches making the distinction as to whether they
are conducted as strike drills, demonstration fires, or test-fires.
Additionally, KCNA uses language such as, “new-type missile,” “new weapon” or
“newly-developed missile” and distinguishes among these launches of “new
weapon,” or “newly-developed missile” by using “test-fire.” Making note of those
distinctions, KCNA’s reporting of each missile launch is summarized in a chart
at the end of this Report
Missiles
launched on May 4 and 9, July 25, and August 6 are understood to be missiles
similar to Iskander [1]. Not
contradicting that understanding, this Watch Report would like to point out at
least 2 facts regarding those 4 launches. First, two launches in May and two
subsequent launches were conducted with clearly different purposes. Two
launches in May were conducted as strike drills of defense units of the Korean
People’s Army (KPA) in front areas. Subsequent launches were conducted as
demonstration firings, aimed at South Korea and the US-ROK joint military
exercises. Second, while missiles launched in May were described simply as “tactical
guided weapons” or “long-range strike means”, missiles launched subsequently
were described as “new-type” tactical guided weapons or “new-type” tactical
guided missiles. Comparing how those phrases were used in subsequent KCNA’s
reportage, it can be interpreted that the language of “new-type” doesn’t mean newly-developed
weapons, but rather means new-type weapons which have already been deployed. Considering
these differences in descriptions in KCNA’s coverage, although all missiles
launched in May and subsequently were missiles similar to Iskander, there is a possibility
that they can be divided into old-type and new-type. Additionally, as described
in the following, it should be considered that a “new-type” weapon does not mean
an indigenous weapon developed in the DPRK, but means a weapon purchased from
other countries or improved version of such a weapon.
Compared
with the phrase of “new-type,” large-caliber multiple guided rocket systems launched
on July 31 and August 2 and super-large multiple rocket launchers launched on August 24, September 10, and October
31 were described as “test-fire”
of “newly-developed” weapons. Two test-fires were conducted on large-caliber
multiple guided rocket systems and three test-fires were conducted on
super-large multiple rocket launchers. In the same way, missiles whose shapes
are similar to US ATACMS launched on August 10 and 16 were described as
“test-fire” of a “new weapon”. Taking other related descriptions into account, launches
of those three types of missiles can be confirmed as test-fires to verify results
of new weapons that DPRK national defense scientists have developed according
to an orientation given by the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK). In that sense, those test-fires were different in
nature from launches of four missiles similar to Iskander (which might include
two types).
In
that connection, based on that analysis, large-caliber long-range multiple
rockets launched on May 4 are existing operational weapons (probably unguided) and
should be considered to have no relation to multiple rocket launchers being
developed subsequently.
Trends of military
buildup in South Korea and Japan
It
is understandable that those short-range missile launches have been sensitively
covered by mass media. This is because those launches are considered as signals
that the DPRK would resume medium and long-range missile launches and could
lead to the breakdown of the denuclearization and peace process in the Korean
Peninsula. Additionally, whether intentionally or not, there exists a possibility
that the fact that DPRK’s ballistic missile launches violate UN Security
Council sanctions resolutions (UNSCRs) formally have lowered hurdle of the coverage
for mass media. However, to prevent the breakdown of the denuclearization and
peace process, being sensitive to the DPRK’s short-range missile launches does
not seem to be right way to pay attention to this issue. Rather, that would
lead to straying from the essence of the issue.
Both
US President Donald Trump’s stance not to regard the DPRK’s short-range missile
launches as a problem and Chief of Cheong Wa Dea’s National Security Office
Chung Eui-yong’s stating that “I don’t see missile capabilities now being
developed by North Korea as a grave threat to our national security” [2], can be considered to be reasonable attitude
as a consequence, although each of them were based on different reasons. The
current core issue of the denuclearization and peace process is whether the US
would adopt a policy to take reciprocal and step-by-step approaches in
negotiations with the DPRK and propose concrete measures corresponding to the past
steps already taken by the DPRK and next steps which the DPRK has suggested in
detail, including a freeze of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.
Keeping
the above in mind, this Watch Report would like to consider the military trends
in South Korea and Japan, in which the US has also been involved. Such trends
serve as the background for the DPRK’s repeated short-range ballistic missile
launches.
As
pointed out in Watch Report 13, DPRK’s moves represent not only an angry reaction
to the US-ROK joint military exercise conducted in August, but also to the
DPRK’s need to bolster its defense capabilities, responding to the situation in
which South Korea has been conducting military modernization by introducing F35A
stealth fighter jets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Global Hawk.
The
DPRK stated that the missile launch on July 25 was a warning to the ROK
military who is running at fever pitch in their efforts to purchase ultramodern
weapons and hold the US-ROK joint military exercise [3]. The DPRK conducted a demonstration firing of “new-type”
tactical guided missiles on August 6, and the next day when US-ROK joint
military exercise started, the DPRK stated that the launch was an occasion to
send a warning to that exercise [4].
As described in Watch Report 13, the DPRK warned that, “We, on our part, have
no other choice but to develop and test the special armaments to completely
destroy the lethal weapons reinforced in South Korea” [5]. And according to that warning, to this date, the DPRK has
displayed its weapons with the specific feature of low-attitude gliding and
leaping flight orbit [6] and
developed preemptive attack capabilities of super-large multiple rocket launchers
against the group target [7].
Not
only purchasing US state-of-the art weapons, in recent years, South Korea has
also been making efforts to modernize its military capabilities. This July, the
country announced the construction of its first light aircraft carrier [8]. Regarding missile launches with
which the DPRK has attracted attention, as is well known, ROK’s Ministry of
National Defense revised its ballistic missile guidelines and extended its
ballistic missile range limit from 300km to 800km. Moreover, the country has
worked on the establishment of the system called the Kill Chain to carry out a
pre-emptive strike by missiles and others against the DPRK [9]. Chief of National Security Office Chung
Eui-yong’s statement in the National Assembly regarding South Korea’s missile capabilities
that, “I cannot go into details, but our military has conducted no fewer
missile tests than North Korea” [10],
is considered to honestly describe the country’s current military situation.
Not
only South Korea’s arms buildup, but Japan’s arms buildup of the Japan Self-
Defense Force (SDF) by the Abe administration has been widely known. The DPRK
has been paying close attention to the Japanese military trend as well. On
August 26, KCNA criticized the rebuilding of JS Izumo into an aircraft carrier as
a “qualitative surge” in attack capability and pointed out that, “Today the SDF
have turned into aggression forces capable of fighting a war at any time and
any place beyond the boundary of the archipelago” [11]. It is a well-known fact that Japanese military capabilities
are closely linked with US military strategy in the region. In late October, it
was reported that two US B-52 Stratofortresses which took off from Guam made a rare
training flight with the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) over the Sea of Japan [12].
Taking
account of the recent trend of military buildup
in South Korea and Japan and their daily military operations in the Northeast
Asia region, the media’s habit of focusing solely on DPRK’s military activities
in the field of conventional weapons is unbalanced and unreasonable. The trend
that is really needed is the easing of tensions and genuine disarmament in the
entire region, and from that viewpoint, the means to accelerate US-DPRK
negotiations should be explored. (Takuya MORIYAMA and Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)
Chart: DPRK’s
short-range missile launches in May to October, 2019
Date of Launch
|
Estimated Launch Site
|
KCNA’s reporting of
launches
|
May 4
|
Hodo Peninsula
|
The
strike drill to evaluate and inspect the operating capabilities and the
accuracy of striking duty performance of large-caliber long-range multiple
rocket launchers and tactical guided weapons by KPA units in the forefront
area and the eastern front [13].
|
May 9
|
Sino-ri
|
The
strike drill of KPA units in the forefront area and the western front to
carry out various long-range strike means [14].
|
July 25
|
Hodo Peninsula
|
The
power demonstration fire of a new-type of tactical guided weapon to send a
warning to the South Korean military. Confirmed
the rapid anti-firepower capability of the system and the specific features
of the low-attitude gliding and leaping flight orbit of the missile [15].
|
July 31
|
Wonsan
|
A
test-fire of newly-developed large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket
system, according to policy set forth at the 7th Congress of the WPK [16].
|
August 2
|
Yonghung
|
Retest-fire
of newly-developed large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket system, aimed
to examine the altitude control flight performance, track control capability
and rate of hits of the rocket [17].
|
August 6
|
Kwail
|
The
demonstration fire of two “new-type” tactical guided missiles. Missiles
launched at the airfield in the Western area flew over
the capital area and the central inland region to precisely hit the target
islet in the East Sea. Also intended to send a warning to the US-ROK joint
military drill [18].
|
August 10
|
Hamhung
|
Test-fire
of a new weapon. Suitable for the terrain conditions of the DPRK and has
advantageous tactical character different from the existing weapon system.
The Party Central Committee gave the direction to develop the weapon system [19].
|
August 16
|
Tongchon
|
Retest-fire
of a new weapon, developed in the shortest span of time, following the
Party’s order to develop major striking means [20].
|
August 24
|
Sondok
|
Retest-fire
of newly-developed super-large multiple rocket launcher, which was invented
by young national defense scientists. [21].
|
September 10
|
Kaechon
|
Retest-fire
of super-large multiple rocket launcher. Measured the time of combat
deployment and verified combat operation, the characteristics of trajectory, accuracy
and precise homing functions of launcher. Running fire test remains to be
done [22].
|
October 31
|
Suncheon
|
Successfully
verified the security of launchers’ continuous fire system through the 3rd test-fire
of super-large multiple rocket launchers. Enabled a preemptive attack against
the group target and designated target area [23].
|
[1] For example, Takeshi IWAYA’s,
then-Minister of Defense of Japan, press conference on September 3, 2019
and Taketsugu SATO, “North Korea
missiles progressing steadily. New-type which is hard for radar to pick up
eludes the U.S. and Japan (Tentative Translation),” The Asahi Shimbun, October
21, 2019 (Japanese language)
[2] “Moon's top security adviser
dismisses missile threat from N. Korea,” Yonhap News Agency, November 1, 2019
[3] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un
Guides Power Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Weapon,” KCNA,
July 26, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from
date.
[4] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un
Watches Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Missiles,” KCNA,
August 7, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from
date.
[5] “S. Korean Authorities
Slammed,” KCNA, July 11, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[6] See note [3].
[7] “Another Test-Fire of
Super-large Multiple Rocket Launchers Conducted in DPRK,” KCNA, November
11, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[8] Josh Smith, “Buying a big stick:
South Korea's military spending has North Korea worried,” Reuters, September
11, 2019
[9] Ministry of Defense of Japan
“2018 Defense of Japan (Annual White Paper)” September 28, 2018
[10] See note [2]
[11] “KCNA Commentary Warns Japan
against Military Moves,” KCNA, August 26, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[12] Jesse Johnson, “U.S. B-52
bombers make rare training flight over Sea of Japan with ASDF,” The Japan Times, October 29, 2019
[13] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un
Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Frontline Area and on Eastern Front,”
KCNA, May 5, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[14] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un
Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Forefront Area and on Western Front,” KCNA,
May 10, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from
date.
[15] See note [3].
[16] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un
Guides Test-Fire of New-type Large-caliber Multiple Launch Guided Rocket
System,” KCNA, August 1, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[17] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides
Again Test-Fire of New-type Large-caliber Multiple Launch Guided Rocket
System,” KCNA, August 3, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[18] See note [4].
[19] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un
Guides Test-Fire of New Weapon,” KCNA, August 11, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[20] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un
Guides Test-fire of New Weapon Again,” KCNA, August 17, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by
date.
[21] “Successful Test-fire of
Newly Developed Super-large Multiple Rocket Launcher Held under Guidance of
Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un,” KCNA, August 25, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[22] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un
Guides Test-Fire of Super-large Multiple Rocket Launcher Again,” KCNA,
September 11, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[23] See note [7].
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