§Lack of Clarity in US Negotiation Position – Efforts to Shape the Public Opinion Supporting a Step-by-step Approach Is Urgently Needed
Regarding the US-DPRK negotiations for peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which have stalled since the June US-DPRK Summit at Panmunjom, in late September, DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister, Choe Son-Hui, stated that the DPRK is prepared to agree to negotiations with the US [1]. He stated his expectations by saying, “I believe that the U.S. side will come out with a proposal geared to the interests of both the DPRK and the U.S. and based on the calculation method acceptable to us.” Choe Son-Hui also warned the US government that, “If the U.S. side fingers again to the worn-out scenario which has nothing to do with the new calculation method at the DPRK-U.S. working negotiation…, the DPRK-U.S. dealings may come to an end.” Although acceding to the DPRK demands could be taken as “concession” or “a weak-kneed attitude” in the US and Japan, in order to improve the current situation, the US government must go into negotiations with “a new method of calculation” upon which the DPRK has insisted. Although mass media have hardly paid attention, some US experts have already proposed realistic and effective measures that can be considered to be “a new method of calculation.” Whether the US government will be able to adopt those proposed measures will be the key to realizing the peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the future.
In
his letter, Chairman Kim Jong-Un communicated to US President Trump that, “he
(Kim Jong-Un) would like to meet and start negotiations as soon as the joint US-South
Korea joint exercise is over,” and “this [DPRK missile] testing would stop when
the exercises end” [2]. However, the DPRK has continued conducting test
launches of missiles even after US-ROK military joint exercises ended, and on August
23 Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho and on August 31 Choe Son-Hui harshly criticized
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on the negotiation stance of the US side [3].
Those
DPRK remarks, including Choe Son-Hui’s warning
mentioned at the beginning of this report, sound harsh, however, those remarks
can be understood to have been made in the context of the DPRK’s consistent
policy toward the US.
The
DPRK has been consistently calling for the US to give up its hostile policy
toward the DPRK as a condition for its giving up its nuclear weapons. All major
agreements regarding the nuclear issues of the Korean Peninsula that the DPRK
has made thus far, such as the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and DPRK
and the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, specify the condition that
security guarantees to the DPRK are to be provided. Also even after the breakdown
of the Six-Party Talks in 2008, there were occasions when the DPRK proposed
suspension of its nuclear programs on condition that the US abandons its
hostile policy toward the DPRK [4]. At the US-DPRK summit held in
Singapore in June 2018, President Trump committed to providing “security
guarantees to the DPRK” in the preamble of the joint statement. On that
condition, they agreed to commit to “establishing new US-DPRK relations”, “building
a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula”, “complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” and “recovering and repatriation of
POW/MIA remains”. After the Singapore agreement, the DPRK partially dismantled its
missile facilities and repatriated POW/MIA remains, according to the level of
its trust in the US, and called for the US, which had been calling for the DPRK
to unilaterally denuclearize, to implement the Singapore agreement. For the
DPRK, it would be impossible to abandon its nuclear weapons, which it has
developed as a means of deterrence against US aggression, unless it is
guaranteed that the DPRK will not be invaded by the US even if it abandons
those weapons.
In
contrast, US government policy on talks with the DPRK has remained unclear. Just
before the Hanoi Summit held in Vietnam last February, Stephen Biegun, US State
Department Special Representative for North Korea Policy, communicated to his North
Korean counterpart that, “we are prepared to pursue – simultaneously and in
parallel – all the commitments made in the Singapore agreement” [5]. In
reality, however, the US demanded the DPRK dismantle all of its nuclear
facilities as a condition for lifting of sanctions on the DPRK, and the summit
ended without agreement. As the New York
Times reported, in the background of the negotiations, US National Security
Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Pompeo advised President Trump to
demand that the DPRK dismantle all the nuclear facilities, knowing that the
North Korean would not agree to this condition. It is widely viewed that the hard-liners
within the Trump administration stopped President Trump who was willing to make
deals with the DPRK [6]. Additionally, right before the June Panmunjom
Summit, Biegun said that, “[the US] is ready to hold constructive talks with the
North to move the commitments of the June 12 Singapore Joint Declaration
between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un forward in a simultaneous and
parallel manner” [7]. Further, in an off-the-record conversation with reporters
after the summit, he also said that the US government is considering a freeze plan,
in which the North Korean side completely freezes its weapons of mass
destruction program, the US side will provide humanitarian aid, and both sides
will expand people-to-people exchanges and establish liaison offices in each
other’s capitals. In a later press conference, the US State Department spokesperson
didn’t deny the freeze plan and stated, “that would – something that we would
certainly hope to see at the beginning” of denuclearization process [8].
However, in the interview with a US media on August 20, State Secretary Pompeo
stated that in the event that the DPRK doesn’t denuclearize, “we’ll continue to
keep on the sanctions that are the toughest in all of history and continue to
work towards convincing Chairman Kim and the North Korean leaders that the
right thing to do is for them to denuclearize” [9]. Additionally, in a speech
in Kansas City on September 6, ignoring US obligations to implement the
agreement, Pompeo stated that if the North Korea denuclearizes as they have committed,
the US will provide the security assurances [10]. He completely failed
to recognize that the Singapore agreements are mutual and equal between the two
states. Criticism against Pompeo by Ri Yong-Ho and Choe Son-Hui made last week can
be considered an understandable reaction.
Also,
last August, the US conducted US-ROK joint military exercise intended to
maintain and strengthen their military capability against the DPRK, though at a
smaller scale, and continued delivering state-of-the-art weaponry such as F35A stealth
fighter jets to South Korea [11]. While the test launches of missiles, which
have been repeatedly conducted by the DPRK since this July, have in part been
to demonstrate DPRK opposition toward the US and South Korea that have taken
actions breaching the agreement, essential nature of those launches should be
interpreted as DPRK’s strengthening of its own military capability to ensure
its security at this stage to counter the improvement of the US and South Korean
military capability.
In
order to realize the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as
committed to in Singapore, “security guarantees to the DPRK” must be ensured by
establishing “new US-DPRK relations,” building “a peace regime” on the Korean
Peninsula, and creating an environment in which the DPRK is able to give up its
nuclear weapons. The very freeze plan implied by Biegun could be the first step
of such a process. It can be expected that some mass media will express
concerns about the freeze plan, as it may imply abandonment of DPRK’s complete
denuclearization. However, if the US seriously considers the freeze plan, the
move should be seen as significant progress. Robert Einhorn, a former senior US
State Department official, supports the freeze plan and contributed an article about
detailed proposals acceptable to the DPRK to the 38 North, a web journal of the Stimson Center, a US-based think
tank, which has been frequently quoted by Japanese mass media [12].
Einhorn
argues that the United States will need “leverage” provided by sanctions
relief, to “press” North Korea to move “beyond an interim agreement” and down
the path toward “complete denuclearization,” and lists the following items as
concrete interim measures: A declaration to end the Korean War; the
establishment of liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington; limits on the
scale of US-South Korea joint military exercises; a commitment not to pursue
new US or UN sanctions; humanitarian assistance; exceptions to existing
sanctions to permit certain inter-Korean projects (such as the Kaesong
Industrial Complex and Mt. Kumgang tourism project), and the suspension of
certain UN sanctions, especially those restricting activities that do not earn
hard currency for Pyongyang (such as North Korea’s import of petroleum
products). Many of those measures are also proposed in the past issues of this
Watch Report [13].
The
US government must show how it will provide “security guarantees” to the DPRK which
is the indispensable condition for the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons. For
the DPRK, that would be “a new method of calculation.”
To
make it possible for the US to negotiate with “a new method of calculation,”
public opinion and the mass media of related countries must also play important
roles. When the US tries to take actions to provide security guarantees to the
DPRK, will public opinion recognize that those actions are necessary measures
to realize complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula? This reminds us that
President Trump chose not to sign agreement papers prepared for signature at
the Hanoi Summit for fear of media bashing. At the press conference after the
Summit, President Trump said that, “I could’ve signed an agreement today, and
then you people would’ve said, `Oh, what a terrible deal. What a terrible thing
he did,’” and made it clear that he didn’t sign agreement papers ready for
signature although he could’ve “100 percent” signed [14]. It might be
difficult for some mass media to break away from their conventional pattern of criticizing
President Trump for seeking achievements to bolster his candidacy in the next presidential
election. Media criticism arises from the President’s divisive remarks on
diverse subjects, both domestic and international. However, it is critically
important for experts and the media to make efforts to shape public opinion
from a non-partisan perspective, namely emphasizing the necessary measures to
be taken to realize “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”.
Foreign
policy hard-liner US National Security Advisor John Bolton has left the Trump administration.
However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that the US will negotiate with “a new
method of calculation” from now on. However, even if the Trump administration
is willing to negotiate with “a new method of calculation,” they will have to
take into account public opinion. And if the US government doesn’t change its method
of calculation, pressure from public opinion to make the US government
negotiate with “a new method of calculation” will be vitally necessary. What is
in question is how researchers, mass media, civil societies, and all the people
hoping for peace of East Asia will face this issue and act upon it. (Hajime
MAEKAWA)
[1] “DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister
Issues Statement,” KCNA, Sep 9, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from date.
[2] President Trump’s tweet on Aug
10, 2019
[3]
On August 23, Ri Yong-Ho criticized Pompeo who told US media that the US will
denuclearize the DPRK by sanctions (see text) as “a trouble-maker,” and
criticized the US government saying that, “… if it
(the US) still thinks of standing in confrontation with the DPRK with
sanctions, not dropping its confrontational stand, …then, we will remain as the
biggest ‘threat’ to the US for long and long…” (KCNA, August 23, 2019). On
August 31, opposing Pompeo’s describing North Korea as “rogue” in his speech in
Indianapolis, Choe Son-Hui warned that, “Our expectations of dialogue with the
US are gradually disappearing and we are being pushed
to reexamine all the measures we have taken so far.” (KCNA, August 31,
2019)
[4] “Leap Day Agreement” of February 29, 2012, is an example. The
US and the DPRK affirmed that they do not have hostile intentions toward each
other, and the DPRK agreed to implement a moratorium on test launches of
long-range missiles and nuclear weapons tests, uranium enrichment activities at
Yongbyon, and accept inspections by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
(See Peace Depot’s Nuclear Weapon and Nuclear Test Monitor No.397 for more
information.)
[5] ”Remarks on DPRK at Stanford
University,” U.S. Department of States, Jan 31, 2019 https://www.state.gov/remarks-on-dprk-at-stanford-university/
[6] “How the Trump-Kim Summit Failed:
Big Threats, Big Egos, Bad Bets,” The New York Times, Mar 2, 2019
[7] ”U.S. ready for talks with N.K.
to make 'simultaneous and parallel' progress: nuke envoy,” Yonhap News Agency,
Jun 28, 2019
[8] Biegun’s official interview.
Jonathan Swan, Erica Pandey. “Scoop: Trump's negotiator signals flexibility in
North Korea talks,” AXIOS, Jul 3, 2019
U.S. department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus’
comment which acknowledged the freeze. “Department
Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of States, Jul 9, 2019
[9] ”Mike Pompeo says no to Senate
run in exclusive, wide-ranging interview,” Washington Examiner, Aug 21,
2019
[10] ”Secretary Michael R. Pompeo
with Pete Mundo of KCMO,” U.S. Department of States, Sep 6, 2019
[11] Watch Report No.13, and No.14
[12] Robert Einhorn. “US-DPRK
Negotiations: Time to Pivot to an Interim Agreement,” 38 North, Aug 2, 2019
[13] Watch Report No.7
and No.12 proposed the following interim measures on which the US and the DPRK
need to seek agreement at the early stage of negotiations; ①
declaration to end the Korean War or a peace declaration, ②
establishment of the US liaison office in Pyongyang, both of which were topics
reported by the media before the Hanoi Summit, ③
provisional agreement on the scale and nature of future US-ROK joint military
exercises, a possible factor for DPRK’s concern, ④
small scale relaxation of the economic sanctions short of lifting of the 5 UNSC
sanctions resolutions, as was the DPRK’s demand in Hanoi, ⑤
partial lifting of the sanctions limited to those necessary for inter-Korean
economic cooperation, and ⑥
relaxation of restrictions on DPRK space and nuclear development programs, on
condition of ensuring peaceful purposes of the programs, and increasing
international access to DPRK nuclear and space facilities.
[14] “ Remarks by President Trump in
Press Conference | Hanoi, Vietnam,” The White House, Feb 28, 2019
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference-hanoi-vietnam/
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