Watch Report No.25 September 8, 2020
§It’s Time for the Japanese Government to Take Advantage of the Wide-Spread Japanese Civil Society Support for a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone rather than the Pursuit of a Preemptive Attack Capability against Enemy Bases
On June 24th, 2020, the Japanese Government decided at the National Security Council (NSC) to abandon plans to deploy the ground-based interception system “Aegis Ashore” in both Yamaguchi and Akita prefectures. In response to this decision, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has begun heated debates, discussing possible alternatives to the Aegis Ashore system and “seeking to attain the military capability for a preemptive attack against foreign bases.”
On August 4th, the LDP’s Policy Research Council compiled Proposals for Improving Deterrence to Protect the People, [1] and submitted them to then Prime Minister Abe. The recommendation was that in order to protect against ballistic missile attacks, “new measures must be taken to improve deterrence,” including “the possession of abilities to block such missile attacks even within the enemy’s territory.” Although not explicitly written, it is implied that the ability to directly attack enemy bases should be considered.
However, this isn’t the first time such discussions have happened. In March 2017, the LDP’s same Policy Research Council stated in its Proposals for the Rapid and Drastic Strengthening of Ballistic Missile Defense [2], “Now that the threat of North Korea has entered a new stage …, the government should immediately start considering the ability to counterattack enemy bases, including by cruise missiles.” Later, the Medium-Term Defense Program, a formal agenda which was formulated with the 2018 Defense Program Guidelines, included the introduction of “stand-off missiles” that could respond to threats from outside the reach of other parties. Specifically, it was envisioned that JSM, LRASM, and JASSM stand-off missiles [3] would be mounted on F-15 and F-35A fighter planes. Fighters equipped with these missiles were to have the capability to attack enemy bases. The procurement of such missiles began in 2019. However, the 2018 Defense Program Guidelines, which describe the proposed use of stand-off missiles, do not mention enemy base attacks. Instead, they describe their usage against ships and landing parties attempting to invade Japanese islands.
On the other hand, the LDP’s proposal this time is trying to make it clear that missile facilities on enemy territorial ground can be targeted. Although the proposal emphasizes the attack will be done “within the scope of the peace Constitution, international law, and the concept of exclusive defense,” the true intent seems poised to break down the long-standing Constitutional framework of exclusively defensive defense, not only in terms of weapons systems, but also policies, doctrines, and operations. Following the August proposal, the government plans to revise its national security strategy by the end of the year – including new plans to strengthen its missile defense systems.
These recent moves by the LDP and Japanese Government were due to North Korea's repeated missile and nuclear tests from 2016 to 2017. The 2017 LDP proposal stated that "North Korea's nuclear tests and missile launches are a serious threat, and Japan cannot overlook such provocations, including 23 ballistic missile test launches and two nuclear tests last year.” On that basis, it stated, the following three points were requested to be considered as countermeasures.
１． Introducing new assets to strengthen ballistic missile defense capabilities
２． Acquiring Japan’s own capabilities to counterattack enemy bases
３． More adequately dealing with ballistic missiles launched into the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Needless to say, the central pillar of the first request revolved around strengthening of the missile defense system via Aegis Ashore. Therefore, as long as plans to set up Aegis Ashore systems have been abandoned, it is almost inevitable that the second request, “acquisition of capabilities to counterattack enemy bases”, will be pursued as an alternative. It cannot be denied that this proposed strengthening of military power has China in mind. In fact, the proposal explicitly mentions China when discussing the changes in the balance of power and the uncertainty of the existing order that lead to the creation of the proposal in the first place.
What is categorically lacking in the LDP’s proposal is any perspective on the significant change in the international situation on the Korean Peninsula since 2018. An historic movement has begun to attain a nuclear-free and peaceful Korean Peninsula through negotiations based upon agreements at summits between North and South Korea, as well as between US and North Korea. Unfortunately, as we see a deadlock in such negotiations at this point in time, fresh political leadership is vitally needed to break the impasse and create momentum to advance the negotiations. Any proposal to the Government of Japan regarding the regional security at this moment should embrace the question as to what Japan can contribute to break the current impasse.
Given this critical situation, Japan's pursuit of capabilities to attack enemy bases amounts to nothing but a policy to further move Japan away from the confidence-building process that began in 2018. Moreover, it will make the opportunity for dialogue between Japan and North Korea even more difficult. What is needed instead at this historic moment is to communicate an attitude of cooperation – joining the denuclearization and peace movement on the Korean Peninsula – by harnessing the peaceful philosophies that have taken root in postwar Japan, such as the three non-nuclear principles and the policy of exclusively defensive defense.
With that specifically in mind, the Japanese government should instead pivot their policy proposals towards the realistic idea of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) throughout Northeast Asia (NEA) as a first step for regional cooperative security.
While regional governments have been reluctant to propose and follow through with such ideas after the end of the Cold War, many researchers and NGOs have proposed various potential policy ideas for a NEA-NWFZ [4]. As a recent example, there is an active initiative from the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA), Nagasaki University [5]. Additionally, there is a widely known and easy-to-understand NEA-NWFZ scheme based upon so called “Three Plus Three” concept proposed by Hiromichi Umebayashi, whereby Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) form a nuclear-weapon-free zone, while surrounding three nuclear-weapon states, the US, China, and Russia, provide negative security assurances to the zone[6]. As discussed below, widespread public opinion has been cultivated in Japanese civil society in support of the establishment of such a NEA-NWFZ.
Perhaps the first public introduction of a concept of a NEA-NWFZ with a specific geographic scheme, rather than a broad general concept, appeared in a Japanese newspaper article in the Asahi Shimbun (June, 1995) that reported on the research of the Endicott Group [7]. An expert group led by Professor John Endicott of Georgia Institute of Technology introduced circular and elliptical geographic scenarios for a NEA-NWFZ covering Korean Peninsula and Japan Archipelago. Since then, Japanese media outlets have frequently and consistently published articles and editorials urging the creation of a NEA-NWFZ. These articles included works such as Umebayashi's "Three Plus Three" proposal as well as another circular zone proposal by Kumao Kaneko, the first chief of the Nuclear Energy Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. It is no exaggeration to say that most nation-wide daily newspapers and major local newspapers in Japan have published large-scale, in-depth articles on the subject.
Not only articles, but also public events, have been organized by news companies. For example, the Asahi Shimbun hosted an international symposium entitled, "Aiming for a World without Nuclear Weapons – Japan's Role in Northeast Asia," which tried to evoke political debates on the denuclearization of Northeast Asia. One contributor was Koichi Kato, former secretary-general of the then ruling LDP, who said, "Japan has a great influence on Asian politics, so we should absolutely stop trying to attain nuclear capabilities. Instead, we will consider a way to a non-nuclear scheme for Northeast Asia that will allow us to leave the nuclear umbrella.” Katsuya Okada, who at the time was the representative of the Democratic Party of Japan, advocated the idea of a NEA-NWFZ, saying that it was entirely possible for Japan, South Korea, and North Korea to create a NWFZ – with the United States and others promising no first-use of nuclear weapons to the zone.
Even when the situation on the Korean Peninsula improved after 2018, the media's dedicated interest continued. On August 23, 2018, the Asahi Shimbun said in its editorial, "Now that measures to change the confrontational structure of the Korean Peninsula are being discussed, it makes sense to set the goal of the denuclearization of Northeast Asia." The editorial proclaimed:
"The Panmunjom Declaration by the leaders of North and South Korea in April confirmed the ‘common goal of realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.’ A joint statement by US and North Korean leaders in June reaffirmed this. If Japan with its ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’, joins the ‘denuclearized Korean Peninsula’, the time for a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia will finally come. … Given the potential for changes in the order of Northeast Asia, it is time for Japan to take the initiative in creating a nuclear-free zone."
Complementing and reaffirming this position by the media, there are widespread and persistent voices in Japan's local governments that support the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ.
Headed by the Mayor of Nagasaki, the National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities (hereafter referred to as the Nuclear Free Local Authorities) [8], embracing roughly 300 active local governments, officially started a campaign to support the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ in 2009. In the campaign, the Council published and distributed an 8-page pamphlet entitled, “Toward the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia," hoping to enlighten local government officials and citizens. Under such circumstances, as many as 546 heads of local authorities signed to endorse the “Statement to Support the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia" (as of the end of 2016), in a signature campaign driven by civic groups, including Peace Depot, in cooperation with Nuclear Free Local Authorities and Mayors for Peace.
The Peace Declarations by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, issued on August 6th and 9th each year, have often urged the Government of Japan to consider establishing a NEA-NWFZ. In particular, Mayor of Nagasaki appealed in his 2018 Peace Declaration as a response to the beginning of the historic US-North Korean dialogues as follows:
"We in the atomic-bombed cities watch this development attentively and have great expectations that persistent diplomatic efforts, as initiated with the Panmunjom Declaration by the leaders of North and South Korea and the first ever United States-North Korea Summit, will lead to the realization of irreversible denuclearization. I hope that the Japanese government will make use of this great opportunity to work towards the realization of a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon- Free Zone that would see Japan and the entire Korean Peninsula denuclearized.”
The editorial of the Asahi Shimbun cited earlier was written in response to this statement.
The wide-spread support from religious communities in Japan should also be mentioned. Four religious leaders, two Christians and two Buddhists, issued the following statement in February 2016: “People of Faith in Japan Call for Japan to Stop Relying on the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella and to Move toward the Establishment of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone” [9]. While calling for support amongst Japan’s religious communities, they visited the Foreign Ministry to represent their policy requests.
It has often been pointed out that a serious drawback of Japan's democracy is that such growing and sustained interest within civil society rarely translates into policy outcomes by the Japanese government. However, it should be confirmed that at least Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policy review process has changed its attitude in its consideration of the idea of a NEA-NWFZ.
Since 2002, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has published a kind of diplomatic ‘white paper’ every few years called, "Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Diplomacy." Up until its 4th edition (2008), it did not devote even one word about a NEA-NWFZ, although it mentioned existing nuclear-weapon-free zones elsewhere in the world. It was the 5th edition (2011) that finally mentioned a NEA-NWFZ for the first time, albeit only as the following negative and brief description:
“With regard to the plan to create a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone that includes Japan, the Japanese government holds the view that efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue must first be undertaken in order to ensure Japan’s security and improve the security environment of Northeast Asia“ [10].
In the 6th edition (2013), the White Paper provided a more substantial response towards a NEA-NWFZ, stating:
“(E)specially in recent years, the idea of a ‘Three Plus Three’ arrangement, in which Japan, the ROK and DPRK form a non-nuclear zone while the U.S., China and Russia provides security assurances, attracts a certain degree of attention” [11].
Despite this change in its way of portraying the issue, the government’s position remained firm in that the denuclearization of the DPRK had to be achieved before any efforts to create a NWFZ could start. The latest 7th (2016) remains largely unchanged on the issue [12].
In this way, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken a negative attitude toward a NEA-NWFZ initiative, saying that "the realistic environment for realization is not yet in place." However, in 2018, that ‘environment’ changed significantly. There is now new opportunity for the Japanese government to play a significant role in transforming the security environment for the better.
It would be a big political mistake for the Government of Japan to adopt a policy towards the "possession of enemy-base attack capability" at this time. Especially, as mentioned at the beginning, this policy direction emerged and has been discussed as a counter-measures towards North Korea's nuclear and missile development. With the US-North Korea negotiations having stalled, it may be argued that since the DPRK’s short-range missile tests have been repeated since May 2019, that the threat situation for Japan has not changed. However, if the dialogues among the US, North Korea and South Korea resume, such argument will not hold because it is senseless to say only threats to Japan remain unchanged. In fact, the more viable way to reduce the missile-threat towards Japan is that Japan examines and implements the ways in which to contribute to reopening the stalled dialogue among concerned states. Such efforts made by Japan will open up new channels and opportunities towards the resolution of the many other issues that exist between Japan and North Korea, such as the abduction and colonial-period-compensation issues.
With this point of view in mind, the above-mentioned 2018 Nagasaki City Peace Declaration and the related editorial in the Asahi Shimbun should be heeded. The Government of Japan should make best use of the widely growing public opinion in support of a NEA-NWFZ and work to break the current deadlock.
（Ichiro YUASA & Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI）
[1] Liberal Democratic Party Policy Research Council “Proposals for Improving Deterrence to Protect the People,” (in Japanese) August 4, 2020.
[2] Liberal Democratic Party Policy Research Council, “Proposals for the Rapid and Drastic Strengthening of Ballistic Missile Defense,” (in Japanese) March 3, 2017.
[3] JSM=Joint Strike Missile; JASSM=Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile; LRASM=Long Range Anti-Ship Missile
[4] Box 3 “Proposals on a NEA-NWFZ, included in “Proposal: Comprehensive Approach toward Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone,” by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition Nagasaki University, 2015.
[5] Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition Nagasaki University, “Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone”
[6] Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI, “A Northeast Asia NWFZ: A Realistic and Attainable Goal”, INESAP (International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation) Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, May 30 - June 2, 1996. For more comprehensive commentary on a NEA-NWFZ, Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI, “Nuclear Weapon Free Zone,” (in Japanese) Iwanami-shoten, 2011.
[7] The Asahi Shimbun, (in Japanese) June 13, 1995.
[8] National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities was established by nuclear free local authorities for cooperation among local authorities in 1984.
[9] The representatives include Rev. Kouichi KOBASHI (Moderator, National Christian Council Japan in 2016), Rev. Kijun SUGITANI (ex-Administrative Director of Tendai Buddhism Headquarters; Chair, Religions for Peace International Standing Committee on Disarmament and Security), The Most Rev. Archbishop Mitsuaki TAKAMI (Catholic Archdiocese of Nagasaki), Rev. Ryumyo YAMAZAKI (Jodo Shinshu Honganji-ha Buddhism). All titles are those at that time.
[10] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s Diplomacy for Disarmament and Nonproliferation” vol. 5 (in Japanese), 2011, March, p.71.
[11] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s Diplomacy for Disarmament and Nonproliferation” vol. 6 (in Japanese), 2013, March, p.42.
[12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s Diplomacy for Disarmament and Nonproliferation” vol. 7 (in Japanese), 2016, March, p.59.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000145531.pdf
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