§Kim Jong-Un’s “New Year Address” Set the Tone for Negotiations and US Policy is Shifting toward Phased, Simultaneous and Parallel Denuclearization Measures
Stagnant
water has started running. We conclude that this change can be largely attributed
to the impact of Kim Jong-Un’s 2019 “New Year Address.”
On
February 5, during his State of the Union address, US President Trump announced
that Chairman Kim and he would meet again on February 27 and 28 in Vietnam for
their second summit. And on February 8, three days after the address, President Trump announced in a
tweet would take place in Hanoi, Vietnam.
Since
the agreement made at the first summit in Singapore last June, negotiations between
the US and the DPRK on implementation of the agreement have remained
deadlocked. It was widely agreed that unless there was a concrete commitment to
break the deadlock and advance implementation of the initial agreement, holding
a second summit would be useless. Therefore, the decision to hold a second
summit means that the DPRK, and especially the US, currently consider that a
second summit could possibly produce significant agreement between the parties.
To
understand the process that led to this decision, it is important to carefully read
two speeches. One is a “New Year Address” by Chairman of the Workers’ Party of
Korea, Kim Jong-Un [1], and the
other consists of remarks on the DPRK at Stanford University by Stephen Biegun,
US State Department Special Representative for North Korea Policy [2], delivered on January 31, 2019.
On January 1, 2019, Chairman of the Workers’
Party of Korea, Kim Jong-Un, delivered the annual “New Year Address.” Many observers
paid attention as to how the address would evaluate last year’s rapid developments
toward the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and discussions toward
denuclearization, and what this year’s policy would be. The reason for the close
attention to Kim’s address was that those who hoped for improvement in the
current situation were concerned that there might be a change in the DPRK’s
policy. And, those who were skeptical about any improvement in the situation under
the current conditions were expecting signs of aggravation with the deadlock. They
considered that this might be a possibility because since last April, while
inter-Korean relations had been steadily improving, discussions between the US
and the DPRK had remained deadlocked and the DPRK had been becoming
increasingly dissatisfied as it saw the deadlock had been caused by US
unilateral foreign policy. At the end of last year, refraining from directly
criticizing US President Trump, the DPRK had escalated criticism to the point
that the DPRK state-run media criticized US Secretary of State Pompeo by name. [3] Accordingly, given these circumstances,
no one could deny the possibility that Chairman Kim Jong-Un’s “New Year Address”
would include a hard line stance against the US or make difficult demands on
South Korea.
Under
these circumstances, in his “New Year Address,” Chairman Kim Jong-Un praised
the changes in 2018 and communicated to the DPRK people his will to prioritize
economic development and a clear policy to improve US and DPRK relations, making
advances toward denuclearization. Considering that the “New Year Address” is
basically a message directed to the DPRK people, the significance of the fact
that Kim Jong-Un mentions the joint statement at the Singapore summit between
the US and the DPRK is vitally important. He stated,
“It is
the invariable stand of our Party and the government of our Republic and my
firm will to … build a lasting and durable peace regime and advance towards
complete denuclearization.
Accordingly,
we declared at home and abroad that we would neither make and test nuclear
weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them, and we have taken various
practical measures…
We have
no intention to be obsessed with and keep up the unsavoury past relationship
between the two countries, but are ready to fix it as early as possible and
work to forge a new relationship in line with the aspirations of the two
peoples and the requirements of the developing times.”
Kim
Jong-Un even declared to the DPRK people in his policy that “we would not make
nuclear weapons any longer,” which had never been expressed openly before. Recalling
that last year’s “New Year Address” directed “to mass-produce nuclear warheads
and ballistic missiles and deploy them for action,” this year’s “New Year Address”
can be considered to have announced a dramatic policy change to the DPRK people.
On
the other hand, a large number of media focused on the following sentence in
the “New Year Address,” a DPRK’s warning message to the US.
“But if
the United States does not keep the promise … and out of miscalculation of our
people's patience, it attempts to unilaterally enforce something upon us and
persists in imposing sanctions and pressure against our Republic, we may be
compelled to find a new way for defending the sovereignty of the country and
the supreme interests of the state and for achieving peace and stability of the
Korean peninsula.”
It
is understandable why the overseas media showed interest in this sentence.
However, the most important message which should be read in the “New Year Address”
is not this one. The critical message is that the DPRK positively evaluated the
consequences of changes during the past year as an achievement and announced its
invariable stand that, based on that achievement, the DPRK would advance toward
improvement in US and DPRK relations and denuclearization this year.
That
message must have provided a significant basis for the US government to advance
US-DPRK relations.
On
January 18, 2019, Kim Yong-Chol, vice chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea,
carrying a letter from Kim Jong-Un to US President Trump, visited Washington,
DC and met with President Trump. At this time, Kim Yong-Chol was accompanied by
North Korea’s former ambassador to Spain, Kim Hyok Chol, who would lead working-level
talks. Being the DPRK’s number two figure, Kim Yong-Chol’s visit to Washington,
DC reminds us of the vice chairman of the National Defense Commission Jo
Myong-Rok’s historic visit to the US on behalf of Kim Jong-Il in October 2000 to
meet with US President Clinton. At that time, following Jo’s visit, US
Secretary of State Albright’s historic visit to Pyongyang and meeting with Chairman
Kim Jong-Il took place.
Following
the talks between President Trump and Kim Yong-Chol, US-DPRK relations progressed
quickly. Although US Secretary of State Pompeo appointed Stephan Biegun as US
State Department Special Representative for North Korea Policy on August 2018,
no working-level talks with DPRK counterparts had taken place. However, the
next day following talks between Kim Yong-Choi and President Trump, three days of
working-level talks took place in Stockholm, with the attendees remaining on
the premises of their hotel and an international conference venue for the duration.
Then, the second summit’s schedule was announced, as described at the beginning
of this report.
To understand the changes since
January 18, Biegun’s remarks about the DPRK at Stanford University are vitally
important. After the remarks, a question-and-answer session with Robert Carlin,
a veteran expert on North Korea and former Chief of the Northeast Asia Division
in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department under the
Clinton administration, was held. Carlin’s pointed questions covered many valuable
topics.
The vitally important point clearly
expressed in Biegun’s remarks is that the US is prepared to pursue
simultaneous, parallel and phased measures that the DPRK had been calling for. Biegun stated as follows:
“For our
part, we have communicated to our North Korean counterparts that we are
prepared to pursue – simultaneously and in parallel – all of the commitments
our two leaders made in their joint statement at Singapore last summer.”
“Chairman
Kim qualified next steps on North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichment
facilities upon the United States taking corresponding measures. Exactly what
these measures are is a matter I plan to discuss with my North Korean
counterpart during our next set of meetings. From our side, we are prepared to
discuss many actions that could help build trust between our two countries and
advance further progress in parallel on the Singapore summit objectives of
transforming relations, establishing a permanent peace regime on the peninsula,
and complete denuclearization.” [2]
This
represents a substantial change and indicates progress in US foreign policy. The
US demand on the DPRK to submit a complete list of its nuclear program, which
attracted a lot of attention from the media at first, has now been postponed to
become an issue to be addressed at later stages of negotiations.
“Before
the process of denuclearization can be final, we must also have a complete
understanding of the full extent of the North Korean weapons of mass
destruction missile programs. We will get that at some point through a
comprehensive declaration.” [2]
Additionally,
Biegun strongly implied that intermediate measures would include issues related
to putting an end to the Korean War.
“President
Trump is ready to end this war. … We are not seeking to topple the North Korean
regime. We need to advance our diplomacy alongside our plans for
denuclearization in a manner that sends that message clearly to North Korea as
well. We are ready for a different future. It’s bigger than denuclearization,
while it stands on the foundation of denuclearization, but that’s the
opportunity we have and those are the discussions we will be having with the
North Koreans.” [2]
Another
our point of interest is the relation between this new policy and the US approach
of putting pressure through sanctions, which the US has stressed to date. In
this regard, Biegun implied changes but didn’t convey clear message.
“We will
sustain the pressure campaign, at the same time, we are trying to advance the
diplomatic campaign, and we have to find the right balance between those two.
Areas like cultural exchanges or people-to-people initiatives that you (Carlin)
described seem to me a very obvious place where we could begin to make progress
in that environment.” [2]
In
connection with that, we would like to take note of the fact as well that
during rapid changes after the talks between President Trump and Kim Yong-Chol,
remarks by John Bolton, a super-hawk national security advisor to the US
President, have indicated a change. On January 25, during a private interview
with the “Washington Times,” Bolton stated as follows regarding the sanctions:
“What we
need from North Korea is a significant sign of a strategic decision to give up
nuclear weapons and it is when we get that denuclearization that the President
can begin to take the sanctions off.” [4]
It
might be possible to interpret that the DPRK has already made a strategic
decision to “give up nuclear weapons” and engaged in negotiations with the US
at this time, and such an interpretation is left to the subjective judgement by
the Trump administration. The phrase “begin to take the sanctions off” is
considered to imply taking the sanctions off in a phased manner. (Hiromichi
UMEBAYASHI and Kana HIRAI)
[1] English
full text is available in the following link.
[2] U.S.
Department of State, "Remarks on DPRK at Stanford University,"
January 31, 2019
(Robert Carlin’s questions and Stephen
Biegun’s answers are included as well as Biegun’s remarks)
[3] For
instance, an article from KCNA ”Press Statement of Policy Research Director of
Institute for American Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK,”
December 16, 2018
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm
Search for the article from date.
[4] Tim
Constantine, “John Bolton explains Trump's strategy on North Korea, China
trade,” The Washington Times, January 25, 2019
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jan/25/john-bolton-explains-trumps-strategy-on-north-kore/
