Watch Report No.32 June 12, 2021
§The US Must Be the First to Take Confidence Building Actions in Order to Reopen US-DPRK Negotiations: The Sooner, the Better
Today, June 12, 2021, is the third anniversary of the Joint Statement declared by the USA and the DPRK (Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, or North Korea) at the Singapore Summit. June 12 also marks the first time the anniversary of the U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement occurs during the Biden administration.
The policy review of the DPRK by Biden administration has just been completed. Although the details of the review have not been made public, it is reported that the goal of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” is to be pursued through diplomatic negotiations with the DPRK based on a “calibrated practical approach” [1]. At the US-ROK (Republic of Korea, or South Korea) Summit held on 21 May 2021 after completion of the U.S. policy review, both leaders reaffirmed their common belief that “(D)iplomacy and dialogue, based on previous inter-Korean and US-DPRK commitments such as the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and Singapore Joint Statement, are essential to achieve the complete denuclearization and establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula” [2]. This should be considered a good starting point that the Biden administration has indicated for its policy direction that respects previous agreements in which the US committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK and the DPRK reaffirmed its commitment to complete denuclearization, and both committed to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations.
However, given the long-accumulated distrust between U.S. and the DPRK, it is critically important how both will make efforts to overcome distrust in order to take concrete actions toward denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. From the perspective of events since 2018, it is the U.S., in our view, that has to take the initiative and act first to build confidence between U.S. and the DPRK. The risk of reemergence of the previous vicious cycle will increase if the U.S. delays its first action. In this respect, the sooner the better.
The 2018 Panmunjom Declaration [3], which is referred to in U.S.-ROK Joint Statement on 21 May 2021, was signed by the ROK President Moon Jae-In and then-Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of DPRK Kim Jong-Un, and it agreed to make joint efforts to bring an end to the Korean War, which is currently in a state of armistice, and to build a “durable and lasting peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula,” also agreeing to cease any hostile acts against each other, and to reaffirm mutual non-aggression, while confirming to realize complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And the Singapore Joint Statement [4] is the diplomatic document agreed upon by then-U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-Un at the US-DPRK Summit that took place for the first time in history, in June 2008. In the Statement, Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Kim Jong-Un reaffirmed his firm commitment to “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Then, the two leaders pointed out the importance of confidence building by saying that they recognize “that mutual confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Based upon this preamble, they agreed on four points: (1) “to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations,” (2) “to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” (3) “to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” and (4) to “commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.”
As was the case in past key nuclear-related agreements including U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework in 1994 and Six Parties’ Joint Statement in 2005, the North Korean government has agreed to abandon its nuclear program and stockpiles on the condition of security assurances, including improvement of U.S.-DPRK relations, non-aggression to the DPRK, and establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
Since the failure of the second U.S.-DPRK Summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February 2019, the DPRK has persistently refused to engage in negotiations with the U.S.. But, at the same time, the North Korean government has repeatedly suggested that it would be ready to talk if the US abandons its hostile policy toward the DPRK [5]. The fact that the Biden administration respects past agreements in which the U.S. committed to improvement of relations between the two countries and establishment of peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will possibly lead to the abandonment of its policy of hostility toward the DPRK. If this is made clear, it is highly probable that negotiations between the two countries will reopen after the long interval since the Hanoi Summit.
However, given the long history of hostility between the U.S. and the DPRK, lasting more than seventy years, failures of past negotiations on denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula have ended in further deepening of distrust. If mutual confidence building is a key to promoting negotiations, as is stated in the Singapore Joint Statement, it is necessary for them to try to resolve this entangled situation of distrust by analyzing the process of events since 2018 when the Singapore Joint Statement was agreed upon. If this can be accomplished with cool heads, it will lead to the conclusion that it is the U.S. whose turn it is to act first, as is demonstrated below.
Let us recall what has happened since 2018.
First, the DPRK took bold measures on 20 April 2018, in advance to upcoming inter-Korean Summit and the U.S.-DPRK Summit. This can be interpreted as a unilateral step in pursuit of confidence building. On that day, at the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), practically the highest decision-making body in the governing system of North Korea. Kim Jong-Un presented a “new strategic line of the WPK to concentrate all efforts of the whole party and country on the socialist economic construction,” and decided to “discontinue nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire starting” from the following day, 21st April, and dismantle the nuclear test ground “to transparently guarantee the discontinuance of the nuclear test.” He actually exploded three tunnels of the nuclear test site on May 24, witnessed by invited foreign media including CNN. Responding to allegations that no experts have verified the consequences of the explosion, Kim Jong-Un proposed to U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo, who visited Pyongyang on October 7 in the same year after the Singapore Summit, that Kim Jong-Un was willing to invite experts to verify the dismantlement. (This never occurred due to the deadlocked negotiations).
At the Singapore Summit, Kim Jong-Un expressed his willingness to dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site to verify his intention not to restart test-launch of ICBMs. This was clearly documented in the inter-Korean Pyongyang Joint Declaration on September 19, 2018, which states that, “the North will permanently dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform under the observation of experts from relevant countries” [6]. As for recovering the POW/MIA remains committed in Singapore Joint Statement, DPRK repatriated 55 remains already identified on July 27, 2018, the 65th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice Agreement.
Also in the September Pyongyang Declaration, the DPRK stated clearly “its willingness to continue to take additional measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, if the US takes corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 US-DPRK Joint Statement.”
As is exemplified above, North Korea continued to make efforts to build confidence. It followed through on its words, and also suggested that the parties build confidence progressively by mutually taking further measures.
In contrast, what has U.S. done for mutual confidence building? The only concrete action it took was postponement and reduction of the large-scale military exercises against North Korea, to which Trump committed at the Singapore Summit. Given the uneven character of actions of the past, it is evident that it is now the U.S. turn to take balancing measures to build confidence if, in fact, Biden aspires to establish a new relationship between the two countries on the basis of the Singapore Joint Statement.
After the Hanoi Summit failed due to the “all or nothing” approach of the U.S., it seems that the DPRK adjusted its attitude towards negotiations with U.S. and started to say that, unless U.S. withdraws its hostile policy against it, the negotiations between the two countries would be meaningless. The DPRK must have come to believe that the reason why the U.S. has no intention to build confidence results from the fact that U.S. has no willingness to change its hostile policy against it. This “abandonment status” on the part of the DPRK is thought to persist at present. In order to deliberate over what U.S. should do to recover the trust, let’s look back at the history of the evolving DPRK attitude since Hanoi Summit.
After the Hanoi Summit, the DPRK waited for U.S. response to its request for substantive proposals based on a “new way of calculation” and set the time limit as the end of 2019. With no response from the U.S., at the very end of the year, the DPRK held the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of WPK. At the meeting, the DPRK assessed the U.S. situation as follows [7]:
“(T)he US real intention is to seek its own political and diplomatic interests while wasting time away under the signboard of dialogue and negotiations and at the same time keep sanctions upon the latter so as to weaken the latter.”
“If there were not the nuclear issue, the US would find fault with us under the other issue, and the US military and political threats would not end.”
It then continued referring to the “withdrawal of the US hostile policy”:
“(I)f the US persists in its hostile policy towards the DPRK, there will never be the denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and the DPRK will steadily develop necessary and prerequisite strategic weapons for the security of the state until the US rolls back its hostile policy towards the DPRK and lasting peace and durable peace-keeping mechanism is built.”
Here the withdrawal of the US hostile policy is emphasized as a necessary condition of denuclearization. Also, about one year later, at the WPK 8th Congress held in January 2021, the continuation of U.S. hostile policy against the DPRK was criticized, but this time the report points out that the withdrawal of the hostile policy is “a key to establishing new relationship between the DPRK and the USA,” as follows:
“(W)hoever takes power in the U.S., its entity and real intention of its policy toward the DPRK would never change.”
“Stating that the key to establishing new DPRK-US relationship lies in the US withdrawal of its hostile policy towards the DPRK, the report solemnly clarify the WPK’s stand that it would approach the US on the principle of power for power and goodwill for goodwill in the future” [8].
On 17 March 2021, the First Deputy Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui made a statement reiterating that, “Our stand that no DPRK-US contact and dialogue of any kind can be possible unless the US rolls back its hostile policy towards the DPRK,” when Biden administration tried to approach to the DPRK. She also reaffirmed that the country would approach the U.S. according to its basic principle: “power for power and goodwill for goodwill” [9].
As is seen in the above, since Hanoi Summit, North Korea has discussed its relations with U.S. and acted accordingly, focusing on the US hostile policy toward DPRK.
What is the hostile policy? What does withdrawal of hostile policy specifically mean? The answers to these questions are not simple. But we can understand from the recent history described above that the “hostile policy toward DPRK” means the whole of unilateral policies toward the DPRK adopted by the US that negate the DPRK’s efforts to overcome mutual distrust and build confidence one by one. Therefore, the substance of the U.S. hostile policy is not something that can be swept away once and for all. But, at the same time, signals of U.S. intention to withdraw can be demonstrated in many ways.
The first thing that President Biden, who is responsible for acting first, should do is clearly announce his intention of non-hostility toward the DPRK and his belief in the importance of efforts to build confidence in each other. The hurdle to do this is not that high. In October 2000, when Jo Myong-Rok, then First Vice Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission and special envoy of Chairman Kim Jong-Il, visited Washington D.C. to see then-U.S. President Bill Clinton, the U.S. and the DPRK issued a Joint Communique that both would have no hostile intent toward each other. What Biden only has to do is to reconfirm the Communique. It reads, in part:
“(T)he U.S. and the D.P.R.K. sides stated that they are prepared to undertake a new direction in their relations. As a crucial first step, the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity” [10].
Following this, the Biden administration should take specific actions for confidence building such as ceasing the US-ROK joint military exercises, declaring an end to the Korean War, establishing a liaison office in Pyongyang, easing sanctions, etc.
Such U.S. actions should be undertaken as soon as possible. Every moment that passes increases distrust and hostility between the two countries. The Korean War still continues without a formal peace treaty although the state of truce has lasted for a long time. Both parties have more than enough justification to consider military exercises and further modernization of weapons as a necessity. In fact, a US-ROK joint military exercise is going to take place this coming August. Especially in U.S. and South Korea, governments have the challenge of how to deal with hardliner opposition and public opinion. There is concern that tensions on the Korean Peninsula will intensify again. The more time the Biden administration takes to initiate its action, the greater the risk of a reemergence of the vicious cycle of distrust. Urgent actions by the U.S. administration are imperative. (Hajime MAEKAWA and Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)
[1] “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jen Psaki Aboard Air Force One En Route Philadelphia, PA,” The White House, 30 April 2021
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/04/30/press-gaggle-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-aboard-air-force-one-en-route-philadelphia-pa/
[2] “The U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement,” The White House, 21 May 2021
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/
[3] “Panmunjom Declaration,” Cheong Wadae, 27 April 2018
https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/32
[4] “Singapore US-DPRK Summit Joint Statement,” The White House, 12 June 2021
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/
[5] “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK,” KCNA, 1 January 2020, and “Press Statement by Kim Yo Jong, First Vice Department Director of Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea,” KCNA, 10 July 2020
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm
[6] “Pyongyang Joint Declamation,” Cheong Wadae, 19 September 2018
https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Briefings/322
Japanese translation, Peace Almanac, Ryokuhu Shuppan, 10 July 2021, p.139
[7] “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C. WPK,” KCNA,1 January 2020
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm
[8] “Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory,” KCNA, 9 January 2021
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm
[9] “Statement of First Vice Foreign Minister of DPRK,” KCNA, 18 March 2021
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm
[10] “US-DPRK Joint Communique,” US Department of State, 12 October 2000
https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eap/001012_usdprk_jointcom.html
