Watch Report No.34

Watch Report No.34   　October 29, 2021

If You Want to Delve into the DPRK’s Nuclear Crisis? This Book is A Must-Read.
　Book Review: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons – A Mirror that Reflects the World, by Hiromichi       　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　   UMEBAYASHI, Kobunken, 2021

　            Hibiki YAMAGUCHI,VisitingResearcher,Nagasaki University Research
               Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition

This book offers the author’s comprehensive discussion on nuclear issues of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). The author, Mr. Hiromichi Umebayashi, is known for his prolific work regarding the DPRK nuclear issues, including proposing and advocating for the establishment of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. He also wields a mighty pen on this Watch Project “Citizen’s Watch for a Fair Implementation of Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Agreements”.

Before providing an overview of each chapter, let me highlight a few unique characteristics of this book.

First, this book provides a comprehensive look into the DPRK’s activity related to its nuclear program from the 1950s through today. Numerous books have been written on the DPRK, especially ones that stress the danger of its nuclear and missile programs. However, there have been few books that methodically organize information in chronological order as this book does. Furthermore, rather than offering a chronological discussion of encyclopedic information, the book delivers the author’s resolute perspective throughout, which makes the book exceptional.

Second, rather than solely focusing on the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs, the book examines geopolitical conditions surrounding the DPRK, centering on the actions taken by the United States. Thus, the book rules out the theory that the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs progressed in a linear and consecutive fashion. Instead, it calls attention to the zigzag path the programs have taken in the context of the US-DPRK relations.

Third, the author approaches the subject by drawing from his experiences as a participant of the social movements in Japan since 1960s and as a close supporter of the pro-democracy movements in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) as well as other people’s movements in Asia.

Let me reassure readers about these qualities characterizing this book and move onto chapter discussions.

The prologue is entitled “Calibrating Perspectives.”  According to the author, the conventional perspective of the DPRK’s nuclear issues is distorted in that it only focuses on the “threats” posed by the DPRK and fails to properly recognize the danger posed by nuclear weapons possessed by the large nuclear weapon states such as the US and Russia.

Mr. Umebayashi’s intention is not to exonerate the DPRK, but rather to duly acknowledge the context in which the DPRK’s nuclear armament has taken place. The context is that nuclear weapon states “insist that they need ultimate violence unleashed by nuclear weapons to ensure their national security” (Page 33).  And, that especially the US among them, deems the DPRK as its enemy and even attempts to overthrow the regime if it had the chance. Referring to the former US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s statement, the author points out that the US nuclear deterrent is “used” every day, which is rather revelational to me. The book’s subtitle “A Mirror that Reflects the World” alludes to the reality that the DPRK is pursuing nuclear weapons in order to stand on a level-playing field with nuclear weapon states that “use” nuclear deterrence every day.

The author’s call for “calibrating perspectives” applies to Japan’s role in causing the DPRK’s nuclear development. That is to say, the DPRK launched its nuclear program against the backdrop of history in which “the 1945 liberation from Japan’s colonial rule was only replaced by the division of the Korean Peninsula into North and South Korea, followed by the breakout of the Korean War” (Page 21). This is why, using the prologue of this book, Mr. Umebayashi discusses in detail the 1948 Jeju Uprising which ostensibly has nothing to do with the DPRK nuclear issues. There is no doubt that Japan, which not only has failed to atone for its imperialist past with the DPRK but also clings to the US nuclear umbrella, is one of the root causes leading to the DPRK nuclear program.

Having introduced these “calibrated” perspectives, Chapters 1 to 5 chronologically follow the DPRK’s nuclear development.

Chapter 1 describes the early stages of the DPRK nuclear program (1950s–1992). The DPRK began its nuclear program in the late 1950s with help from the Soviet Union. The Soviets were reluctant to provide the DPRK with nuclear reactors to generate electricity, probably because the DPRK did not ratify the NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) until 1985. During that time, the DPRK developed a graphite-moderated reactor without help from the Soviet Union. Mr. Umebayashi induces that the original purpose of developing the reactor was primarily to generate electricity (Page 44).

Chapter 2, entitled “A Short Spring,” examines the period between 1993 and 2003 while focusing on the 1994 crisis. In early 1992, the safeguards agreement between the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and the DPRK had entered into force. Around the same time, the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula had been issued. However, because the international community ignored the latter and solely focused on stopping the DPRK’s nuclear program through the IAEA, the DPRK made its first announcement to withdraw from the NPT (March 1993). The US seriously considered a military strike against the DPRK, but former President Carter’s visit to the DPRK led to a breakthrough in the crisis and subsequently to the US-DPRK Agreed Framework (October 1994) followed by the establishment of the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) (March 1995). This historical development may be well-known, and thus I will leave out the details.

The important thing to note here is Mr. Umebayashi’s conclusion that at this point, the DPRK was not planning to arm itself with nuclear weapons and that the DPRK adopted a diplomatic strategy to maintain and allude to the possibility for its future nuclear weapons development. It was done for the strategic goal of establishing a normal US-DPRK relationship in order to remove the US threats of hostility” (Page 61).

Despite some setbacks such as the 1998 Taepodong launch by the DPRK, the KEDO gradually began producing results, only to be reversed by the Bush Administration that came into office in 2001. Chapter 3, entitled “The US Neo-Con Politics and the Six-Party Talks,” tackles the period between 2001 and 2008. The hawks in the US government declared Clinton’s Agreed Framework as a “failure” and denounced the DPRK as one of the “axis of evil” countries, leading to the DPRK’s second announcement in January 2003 to withdraw from the NPT.

Afterwards, unlike what the US did in Iraq, the US avoided a violent regime change in the DPRK and moved on to the Six-Party Talks. This is also commonly known, and thus I will refrain from mentioning the details. The book masterfully organizes the information: the circumstances leading up to the 2005 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, the US hawks’ backlash that pushed for the economic sanctions against the DPRK, the DPRK’s first nuclear test in 2006, and despite those twists and turns, the international efforts to maintain the Six-Party Talks framework and thereby keep the negotiation on track for the DPRK’s denuclearization.

Chapter 4, entitled “Parallel Development Policy and War Deterrent,” surveys the period between 2009 and 2017, preceded by the DPRK’s successful nuclear test. During this period, the DPRK conducted its second to sixth (and last, at this point) nuclear tests.

No progress was made in US-DPRK talks during the first term of the Obama administration, which began in 2009. Mr. Umebayashi summarizes the reasons in the following three points (Page 129).
(1) The Obama administration’s condescending message, positioning the US as being a superior power, lacked consideration for the DPRK’s sensitive pride.
(2) The international community, notably by the United Nation Security Council, rejected the DPRK’s space program to launch artificial satellites.
(3) For the first time in a decade, anti-communist, conservative administrations emerged in the ROK (Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations).

In March 2013, the DPRK launched the “byungjin (or pyongjin) policy”, a parallel development policy to improve its economy and nuclear deterrent. In response, the Obama administration in its second term adopted an approach called “strategic patience” (although President Obama did not use such term), a more reserved approach to its negotiation with the DPRK.

In 2017, in the first year of his administration, President Trump used such words as “fire and fury” and threatened to “totally destroy” the DPRK, provoking a fierce reaction from the DPRK. This event requires no further explanation.

Chapter 5, entitled “Hope and Expectations,” deals with the circumstances thereafter through today. In May 2017, the President Moon Jae-in administration came into office. In early 2018, the DPRK ended its “byungjin” policy. (The author explains that the DPRK moved to the “economy first policy,” the term he came up with by taking a cue from Kim Jong-il‘s “military first policy”). This fateful turn of events for the North-South relations led to the April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration by the leaders of North and South Korea and the June 2018 Joint Statement of President Trump and Chairman Kim at the Singapore Summit. Although the Joint Statement didn’t include concrete steps for implementation, it envisioned the following two critical goals upon which the leaders of the US and DPRK agreed: “establishment of new US-DPRK relations” and “building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” Mr. Umebayashi rates the Statement highly, as it provides a fundamental basis for future US-DPRK negotiations. However, the Trump administration’s preoccupation to secure a “big deal” with the DPRK created a high hurdle that caused the negotiations to stumble. As the author notes in the book’s Afterword, the Biden administration has not put out any definitive policy towards the DPRK, and it is not clear where the US-DPRK relations are headed.

Chapter 6, entitled “Present Technical Status of the DPRK Nuclear and Missile Programs,” is the last chapter of this book. It organizes from a technical point of view the current status of the nuclear weapons and missiles that are either in possession of the DPRK or in development.

Lastly, let me share the questions with which this book left for me as well as my expectations for Mr. Umebayashi’s future work.

First, what could be the reason why the negotiations with the DPRK advanced during Republican administrations (Bush and Trump) and stalled during the Democratic administration (Obama) with the exception of the Clinton administration? One might expect that the Obama administration would prioritize diplomacy more than the Republican administrations. Although the book vividly illustrates the battles among the US government waged by the neo-cons who tried to crush the negotiations with the DPRK, why did the Bush administration keep the negotiations on track, centering on the Six-Party Talks? In contrast, why did the Obama administration, in its second term, take the approach of “strategic patience” and express little interest in negotiating with the DPRK? By then, it was a fait accompli that the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs had made significant progress, but would this lapse of time be a reason attributable to Obama’s lack of interest in DPRK nuclear issues? Furthermore, how did Trump’s verbal hostility towards the DPRK in his early presidency quickly evolve into the US-DPRK summits?

Of course, demanding that a 300-page book address all these questions is asking for the impossible. What I would like to emphasize here is that this book, which masterfully presents a diachronic overview of the DPRK nuclear crisis, allows readers to deduce many such questions that can be explored in later studies.

Second, the book rarely touches upon what the Japanese government has actually done to resolve the DPRK nuclear crisis despite the fact that the book stresses the importance of acknowledging Japan’s role in the crisis. It is not Mr. Umebayashi’s fault, however. Rather, it perhaps reflects the reality that the Japanese government has not established its own foreign policy separate from that of the US when it comes to the DPRK nuclear problem. At the same time, the fact that Japan has shown little interest in negotiating with the DPRK, as signified by the Abe administration’s pursuit to keep the pressures on the DPRK, may mean that Japan is actually taking its own course of action separate from the US foreign policy that at times prioritizes practicality. Then, this book (for being a Japanese book), could have shed light on this fact. If Japan’s diplomacy is “missing in action,” the reason for that is worth exploring.

Third, I wonder how generations much younger than Mr. Umebayashi would understand this book. The leitmotif brought by Mr. Umebayashi, as I mentioned earlier, is easy to understand for the generations that have lived through the 1960s and 70s Japanese social movements. On the contrary, the generations that have formed their knowledge of the DPRK in 21st century Japan are indoctrinated to the core with the simplistic framing in which “the evil North Korea plays the international community.” In addition, with the decline in the ratio of the Koreans among the foreign residents in Japan, there is also a decline in the opportunities for the Japanese to face the old and new issues associated with Japan’s relationship with the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, it may be that I should say this book has its invaluable mission to guide these young generations to look into the DPRK nuclear issues from perspectives different from the mainstream ones.

Again, this book inspires readers to deduce questions for further studies. For this reason, among others, the book is a must-read for those who would like to dive into the depth of the DPRK nuclear crisis. The book is the first in the series entitled, The Deep Layers of Mr. Hiromichi Umebayashi’s Work. I look forward to the future publications from the series.
(The title of this Watch Report text is by the Citizens Watch editors)

Watch Report No.33

   Watch Report No.33   　October 18, 2021

U.S Calls for Talks with the DPRK without Preconditions are Insufficient. Proposals that Reflect the Essence of Past Negotiations Are Necessary

On September 21,2021, President Biden made a speech at the UN General Assembly. He said, “We seek serious and sustained diplomacy to pursue the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” and then, “We seek concrete progress toward an available plan with tangible commitments that would increase stability on the Peninsula and in the region, as well as improve the lives of the people in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” [1]. No details about the potential “available plan” were hinted at in the speech. Nevertheless, a small change is apparent in the statements on the DPRK made by Biden Administration thereafter. A sentence such as, “We made specific proposals (to the DPRK)” has been added to the previously conventional phrase, “to meet (North Koreans) anywhere, anytime without preconditions”.

US special representative for the DPRK, Sung Kim, used the phrase “anytime, anywhere” when he visited the Republic of Korea for the first time after taking office, to appeal to the DPRK to return to the dialogue. On June 21 of this year, he said, “We continue to hope that the DPRK will respond positively for our outreach and our offer to meet anywhere, anytime without preconditions” [2].

Although this statement was deemed inappropriate in the context of US-DPRK negotiations since the Hanoi Summit, US envoy Sung Kim repeated it when he visited the ROK about two months later [3]. Also, at White House and the US Department of State, similar phrases have been repeated. On July 1, Ned Price, Spokesperson for the US Department of State said, “Look, we have made very clear our willingness to sit down anytime, anywhere with representatives of the DPRK”, and on September 24, he said, “We are prepared to meet with the DPRK without preconditions” [4]. White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said on August 31, “We have left the door open and obviously reached out through our channels… Our offer remains to meet anywhere, anytime without preconditions” [5].

Then, after the speech of the US President Biden at the UN General Assembly, a phrase “specific proposals” has been added to the statements of the US government. For example, Press Secretary Psaki said on October 1, “We’ve made specific proposals for discussion with the North Koreans but have not received a response to date” [6]. Department of State spokesperson Price after repeating the phrase “anywhere, anytime, without preconditions” said, “We have made specific proposals for discussions with the DPRK in our messages to them, and we hope that they respond positively to our outreach” [7].

It is not clear at present what “specific proposals” mean, or whether they have any substance [8]. However, from media coverage of such stories, it is generally accepted in Japan, as well as in the US and Europe, that the ball is in the hands of the DPRK regarding the resumption of the US-DPRK talks.

However, the position of DPRK in terms of US-DPRK denuclearization negotiations is clear. For the DPRK, assurance of State security is the utmost pre-requisite to abandon its nuclear weapons, which were developed as a deterrent against the US with which it is still at war. As has been often discussed in issues of the Watch Report [9], whenever the DPRK made a commitment to abandon nuclear weapons or its nuclear development program, it insisted that the other parties commit to no invasion and improvement of the relationship. As is well known, when Kim Jong Un, then-Chairman of the State Affaires Commission, reaffirmed its commitment to “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” at the first and historic US-DPRK Summit in Singapore, then-US President Donald Trump committed to providing “security guarantee to the DPRK.” And they agreed to establish “new US-DPRK relations”, “a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” along with other items [10].

At the second US-DPRK Summit in Hanoi in February 2019, while the DPRK required the US to remove economic sanctions as the first step for the security assurance, the US required the DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons and related facilities. The DPRK could not accept the US requirements because of lack of its confidence in US commitments of a security guarantee and improvement of relations. On its part, the DPRK presented to the US a concrete proposal of “the maximum denuclearization measures” that it could take considering the degree of confidence in its relationship with the US, under the condition that the US lifts some of the sanctions that impede the civilian economy and the people’s livelihood. Namely, the DPRK suggested that it would completely and permanently dismantle the production facilities of all nuclear materials, including plutonium and uranium, in the Yongbyon complex, through joint work done by technicians from both countries and in the presence of US experts, and “we also expressed our willingness to make a written pledge to permanently halt nuclear tests and long-range missile test launches” [11]. The US refused this proposal, maintaining its “all or nothing” approach.

Following this impasse, the DPRK has concluded that the US has no willingness to establish better relations with the DPRK and that the US will continue its hostile policy. The DPRK stopped pursuing the lifting of economic sanctions, and instead undertook a policy shift to pursue economic development under the assumption that economic sanctions would persist. According to the press statement of Kim Yo Jong, First Vice Department Director of Central Committee of Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK), it is this basic policy line change of the DPRK that Kim Jong Un conveyed to Trump at the third US-DPRK Summit in Panmunjom, June 2019 [12]. At the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of WPK held at the very end of 2019, Kim Jong Un, based on the premise that the US hostile policy toward DPRK would never end, set forth a policy to improve the lives of the Korean people based on “the offensive for making a breakthrough head-on” to realize economic development by the people’s power while its national security is assured by its own nuclear deterrence.

Thus, the basic stance of the DPRK at present is to maintain a credible national defense force, namely war deterrence compatible to the strength of US threat according to DPRK logic, and to focus its energy on the economic development. Hence, it can be said that the DPRK has lost its primary interest in holding negotiations with the US.

Nevertheless, for the DPRK that wants to concentrate on its economic development under the difficult circumstances of increasing natural hardships caused by COVID19 pandemic and climate change, a stable international environment free from the fear of invasion on the Korean Peninsula will be an indispensable precondition. Moreover, the success of “the five-year plan for the national economic development” established at the WPK Congress in January 2021, after the officially acknowledged failure of 2016 “five-year strategy for the national economic development,” is an absolute imperative for the Kim Jong Un regime. In this respect, diplomacy leading to the relief of tension on the Korean Peninsula could be a clue for the US as it develops its approach to the DPRK.

The DPRK has not closed off the path leading to negotiations with the US toward peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It is well known that Kim Jong Un said at the 8th WPK Congress in January 2021, “(T)he key to establishing new DPRK-US relationship lies in the US withdrawal of its hostile policy toward the DPRK,” and “(I)t would approach the US on the principle of power to power and goodwill to goodwill in the future” [13].

What is needed for the US at present is not a call like “anywhere, anytime without preconditions.” Rather, it is concrete proposals including unilateral measures for confidence building based on the history of US-DPRK negotiations since 2018. The reason why it is the US turn to take unilateral measures is described in Watch Report #32, and is not repeated here, but it is a matter of common sense that the US will need to reciprocate actions that the DPRK has already taken and sustains.

In this discussion, we would like to note two points that the US has to take into consideration in relation to its concrete proposals. One is related to withdrawal of the US-ROK joint military exercises and the other is related to relief of economic sanctions against the DPRK. Recently Kim Jong Un referred to the US tendency and said, “(T)he United States has frequently sent signals that it is not hostile to our state but its behavior provides us with no reason we should believe in them” [14]. The two points are important for the US to get rid of the grounds upon which Kim Jong-Un insists demonstrate the persistence of the US hostile policy.

The DPRK has repeatedly required US and the ROK to end their joint military exercises. The recent two stage joint military exercise starting on August 10 2021 were conducted against the warning of the DPRK government [15]. For the DPRK, a joint military exercise on Korean Peninsula soil, will never fail to be considered as a rehearsal for its invasion as long as the exercise is conducted by the US and the ROK, irrespective of its scale. This is even more so at a time when the Korean War has not yet officially ended. Any change in the very necessity and the mode of joint US-ROK military exercises resulting from the withdrawal of the US hostile policy against the US should be officially reexamined, especially in light of the United Nations Command and Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and ROK. This is a common problem facing the US and ROK when they want to sustain and develop the inter-Korean agreement on the reduction of tension and phased disarmament on the Korean Peninsula that was declared in the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain” attached to 2018 “September Pyongyang Joint Declaration”. If it takes time to reach a conclusion as to concrete changes, the US and the ROK should declare the initiation of such a reexamination and a moratorium on joint exercises until such reexamination is concluded.

A hint of tangible measures to show that the US no longer has hostile policies toward the DPRK is included in a speech given by Kim Song, DPRK Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN General Assembly in September 2021 [16]. This was not a new assertion, but he strongly demanded equity and justice within the UN. For example, in the current UN Security Council (UNSC), a situation exists in which, although many countries conduct test launches of short-range missiles, only those launches by the DPRK are blamed as “the threat of peace”, and in some cases, they might lead to the imposition of economic sanctions against it. Here we put aside the arguments about the plausibility of UNSC resolutions to impose sanctions against the DPRK for its nuclear tests and test-launchings of missiles from 2006 to 2017. What we have to consider now is the fact that the DPRK voluntarily made the decision to stop nuclear testing and test-launching of long-range attack missiles in April 2018 and has been implementing that decision faithfully for three and a half years. Meanwhile, a new situation has emerged in which the ROK, another party to the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, has demonstrated its first successful test launch of a SLBM from its submarine [17]. Under these circumstances, fair-minded people around the world think that it is high time to review the validity of on-going sanctions against the DPRK.

It is reported that Russia and China have already taken actions in this respect at the UNSC [18]. However, it is the Biden Administration that could take a more effective initiative to propose concrete ideas leading to sanction relief. Such US initiatives would serve to demonstrate a reversal of its hostile policy toward the DPRK. Fortunately, “The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Declaration” of the CTBT on September 22, 2021, an official document agreed upon through multilateral deliberation including the US, points out the importance of “review clause” in relevant UNSC Resolutions, while reaffirming the importance of full implementation of those resolutions and the denuclearization of the DPRK [19]. The “review clause” states, “(The Council) is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance.” The US should take positive actions, taking advantage of this opportunity when the international community is paying close attention to this clause. (Hajime MAEKAWA and Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] Remarks by President Biden before the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly, The White House, 21 September 2021  

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/09/21/remarks-by-president-biden-before-the-76th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly/　 

[2] “New U.S. envoy for North Korea looks forward to ‘positive response’ on dialogue,” Reuters, 21 June 2021

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-us-envoy-north-korea-huddle-with-skoreans-japanese-2021-06-20/　

[3] “U.S. envoy says no hostile intent toward North Korea, calls for talks,” Reuters, 23 august 2021

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-skorea-envoys-discuss-jumpstarting-talks-with-north-korea-2021-08-23/　

[4] “Department Press Briefing by Ned Price, Department Spokesperson,” US Department of State, 1 July 2021 and 24 September 2021

https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-july-1-2021/#NorthKorea　

https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-september-24-2021-2/　

[5] “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki,” The White House, 31 August 2021

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/08/31/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-august-31-2021/　

[6] “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki,” The White House, 1 October 2021

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/10/01/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-october-1-2021/　

[7] “Department Press Briefing by Ned Price, Department Spokesperson,” US Department of State, 7 October 2021

https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-october-7-2021/　

[8] “When asked about the “specific proposal”, Department Spokesperson’s answer was very ambiguous. Department Press Briefing by Ned Price, Department Spokesperson,” US Department of State, 15 October 2021

https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-october-15-2021/#post-284428-NorthKorea2　

[9] For example, see Watch Report 12 and 32

https://nonukes-northeast-asia-peacedepot.blogspot.com/2019/07/no.html　

https://nonukes-northeast-asia-peacedepot.blogspot.com/2021/06/no32.html　

[10] “Singapore US-DPRK Summit Joint Statement,” The White House, 12 June 2018

https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/　

[11] “Press Briefing by Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho,” Hankyoreh, 1 March 2019  

http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/international/international_general/884116.html　

Japanese translation in “NUCLEAR WEAPON & NUCLEAR TEST MONITOR,” Volume 565.

http://www.peacedepot.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/nmtr565.pdf　

[12] “Press Statement by Kim Yo Jong, First Vice Department Director of Central Committee of Workers' Party of Korea,” KCNA, 10 July 2021   

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm　

[13] “Report on the Review on Work of WPK Central Auditing Commission: For Independent Reunification of the Country and Development of External Relations,” KCNA, 10 January 2021  

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm　

[14] KCNA, 12 October 2021 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm　 　

[15] “Vice Department Director of WPK Central Committee Kim Yo Jong Releases Press Statement,” KCNA,1 August 2021 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm　 　

[16] “Statement by Head of the DPRK Delegation H.E. Ambassador Kim Song, Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations at the General Debate of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly,” The UN, 29 September 2020

https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20200929/azzQgcBAMYqv/WaUGJrE2AJvT_en.pdf　 

[17] President Moon Jae-in visited SLBM launching test site, and said, “Strengthening Missiles Makes Deterrence to the Provocation of the DPRK Ensured.” Yonhap News,15 September 2021

https://jp.yna.co.kr/view/AJP20210915004900882　

[18] UNSC plans to hold unofficial meeting, 30 December 2019, about loosening sanctions imposed on DPRK proposed by Russia and China, Reuters, 30 December 2020 

https://jp.reuters.com/article/northkorea-usa-un-idJPKBN1YY01Q　

[19] “The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Declaration, section 7”, CTBTO, 23 September 2021,

https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2021/CTBT-Art.XIV-2021-WP.1.pdf