Watch Report No.10 Jun. 12, 2019
§The Goalpost of US-DPRK Negotiations is the Implementation of the Singapore Joint Statement, not the Implementation of UNSC Resolutions
One
year has passed since the first US-DPRK summit in history was held in Singapore
on June 12, 2018. The joint statement agreed upon at the Summit, along with two
2018 inter-Korean joint declarations, still remains a basic agreed document which
serves as a starting point to realize peace and denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region.
Although
the second US-DPRK summit held in Hanoi at the end of February failed to
produce any agreed documents, both the US and DPRK leaders must have gotten a
feel for each other’s domestic situations which could be gained only through
face-to-face dialogue. However, after the second summit up until today, both
countries have been unable to find an opportunity to take the next step based
on what they achieved in Hanoi. During times that a clear path has not been
evident, dirt that has accumulated throughout an almost 70-year history of
hostility and division between the two countries resurfaces in various forms.
In Western countries, the tone of arguments demonizing the DPRK has been
growing more predominant, making it more and more difficult for the public to
correctly understand the situation.
At
this time when negotiations between the US and the DPRK have been destabilized,
it is critically important to reaffirm that the very implementation of the
Singapore joint statement is both countries’ political commitment, leading to the
change in US-DPRK relations. In particular, attention needs to be given to the fact
that arguments have become evident which, intentionally or not, confuse or distort
the relationship between the implementation of the UN Security
Council resolutions (UNSCRs) and the Singapore agreements between the US and
the DPRK.
Since
the Hanoi Summit, the US has started increasingly emphasizing not just “denuclearization
of the DPRK,” but “complete elimination of the weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) in North Korea” as the US goal.
For
instance, right after the Hanoi Summit, when holding a briefing with traveling
press, a senior State Department official mentioned “North Korea’s WMD” many
times. The official stated that, “the North Koreans at this point are unwilling
to impose a complete freeze on their weapons of mass destruction programs.” If
this official’s statement was made in the context of lifting of sanctions
imposed by UNSCRs, there would be no need to consider this a problem. However, during
discussing the definition of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which is a core
issue in the implementation of the Singapore joint statement, the official
stated [1]:
“…we got to a level of detail that has eluded
us for quite a while, certainly since the Singapore joint statement, including
things like what is the definition of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which is a
very important issue for us as we look to disassemble the entire weapons of
mass destruction program in North Korea.”
To
summarize, the official insisted on “disassembling the entire weapons of mass
destruction program” in the context of the implementation of the Singapore
joint statement.
To
cite another instance, the same thing was repeated when a senior State
Department official was holding a special briefing on the North Korean issue. Regarding
DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho’s statement that in Hanoi the US asked for not
only the Yongbyon nuclear complex but also plus alpha, a reporter questioned, “Is
this plus alpha one more uranium facility or ‘biochemical and all the WMD’
which National Security Advisor John Bolton says the US side claimed?” To this
question, the official answered that, “I can’t clarify what Foreign Minister Ri
Yong-Ho meant in his presentation, but I can certainly affirm what the
President proposed to Chairman Kim, which was the complete elimination of their
weapon of mass destruction program.”[2]
There followed another reporter requesting clarification of the official’s
answer by asking, “the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction
program means chemical, biological, and nuclear, is that correct?” and the
official answered, “Yes.”[3]
As
described above, the US clearly pursues, in the context of the implementation
of the Singapore joint statement, elimination of not only nuclear weapon program,
but also the entire WMD program. And that has been brought up not as a last
stage demand but as a demand from the start.
If
the implementation of UNSCRs is a top-priority goal for the US, it is
inevitable that all WMD programs will be a problem. However, if it was clear
that the US goal was the implementation of UNSCRs, the historic US-DPRK summit would
not have happened in the first place and it would have been unable to issue the
US-DPRK joint statement. The implementation of the UNSCRs and that of the US-DPRK
joint statement should be distinguished clearly and their relationship recognized
correctly.
It
was by Resolution 1718 (2006) adopted on October 14, 2006, that the UN Security
Council resolved UN actions against the DPRK for the first time, based on UN
Charter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression. Since then, sanctions resolutions on the DPRK have
been adopted 10 times. Those resolutions, in most cases, prohibit the DPRK from
undertaking any further nuclear tests and launches that use ballistic missile
technology, and demand that the DPRK abandon nuclear weapon and any other WMD,
and ballistic missile programs in complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.
The last of the 10 resolutions is Resolution 2397 (2017), adopted on December
22, 2017.
The
DPRK continued to demonstrate its stance to reject the resolutions, asserting that
their nuclear weapon and missile development programs are legitimate self-defense
countermeasures to protect the DPRK from US threat and not activities to threaten
international peace. Additionally, the DPRK made a counterargument that the UN Security
Council is not fair in that it would not discuss US-ROK large-scale combined military
exercises conducted as a rehearsal for overthrowing the DPRK regime as a threat
to peace violating the UN Charter. [4]
Thus,
efforts to make the DPRK abandon its nuclear development programs (the entire
WMD programs, in fact) by UN Security Council’s sanctions resolutions based on
UN Charter VII have been strengthened over 11 years only to fail to improve the
situation. It was the outcome of the US-DPRK summit that changed the situation
drastically. As a result of the summit, the US and the DPRK agreed upon the
joint statement.
As
evident in the history described above, there exist fundamental differences
between the implementation of UNSCRs and that of the Singapore joint statement.
In the UNSCRs, the DPRK is forced to implement demands that the DPRK cannot
agree upon. On the other hand, in the Singapore joint statement, both US and
DPRK sides have obligations to implement what both sides agreed upon. The
international community welcomed the agreement between the US and the DPRK because
the implementation of the agreement could also be a significant step toward the
realization of the goals of the UNSCRs. Therefore, what the international
community should focus on right now is the implementation of the Singapore
agreement and not criticize North Korea’s WMD programs by raising the UNSCRs.
It
is understandable that the UNSCRs have been discussed repeatedly in
multinational forums such as the UN. However, it is misguided that countries
closely related to the Korean Peninsula situation, such as the US and Japan,
keep insisting on maintaining the sanctions as a policy priority by bringing up
the UNSCRs even under current circumstances and risking undermining the
Singapore agreement.
In
the following, we would like to focus on the behavior of Japanese government.
According
to a well-known journalist, Masakatsu OTA, who has been following denuclearization
issues on the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese government “has asked the leading
figures of the US government to take care of WMD issue including biological and
chemical weapons prior to the Singapore Summit.”[5] In this sense, considering constant comments by the Japanese
government after the summit, it has to be said that the Japanese government
failed to correctly understand the significance of the US-DPRK agreement
enshrined in the Singapore joint statement.
As
already discussed in Watch Report No.9, at the House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 8, 2019, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono
stated that it is important for the US-DPRK peace process that “the
international community needs to continue to implement UNSCRs in solidarity as
it has done thus far.”[6] On April
19, at the press conference after the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee
(US-Japan “2+2”) convened in Washington, DC, Foreign Minister Kono also stated
that “we need to implement Security Council resolutions until North Korea makes
CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement) for all the weapons
of mass destruction and the missiles of all ranges.”[7], an opinion that affirms adherence to the UNSCRs, but fails to
recognize the US-DPRK joint obligations of the Singapore agreement.
This
foreign policy of the Japanese government is more influential than generally acknowledged.
In late June, the G20 Osaka Summit will be held under Japanese presidency, and
in late August, the G7 Summit will be held in Biarritz, France, under French presidency.
From April 22 to 29, in an attempt to share his view on the North Korean issue
at G20 and G7, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited European countries. Abe
held summit meetings on April 23, in France [8], on April 24 in Italy [9],
and on April 28 in Canada [10], and
in all the countries he tried to confirm a shared recognition of North Korean
situation. Accordingly, they agreed, based on the UNSCRs, to work closely for
the realization of North Korea’s CVID of all WMD and ballistic missiles of all
ranges, and in order to prevent North Korea’s sanctions’ evasion, to work
together to address “ship-to-ship transfer” by deploying patrol aircraft and vessels,
etc.
Japanese
foreign policy described above can hardly be considered to be based on a correct
understanding of the interrelationship between the implementation of the
historic Singapore joint agreement and the implementation of UNSCRs. Japanese
diplomacy should immediately make efforts to share the recognition that the
implementation of the Singapore agreement should be prioritized in order to eventually
realize the goal of UNSCRs.
[1] “Remarks With Traveling
Press,” U.S. Department of States, February 28, 2019
[2] U.S. Department of State, “Senior
State Department Official On North Korea,” March 7, 2019
[3] See note [2].
[4] For example, “DPRK Foreign
Ministry Spokesman Totally Refutes UNSC ‘Resolution’,” KCNA, October 17, 2006
[5] Masakatsu OTA, “The breakdown of
the Hanoi summit. The hidden second uranium
enrichment facilities,” (tentative translation), Bungeishunju, May 2019
(in Japanese language)
[6] The minutes of House of Representatives
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 8, 2019 (informal translation by the
present authors) (in Japanese language)
[7] “Remarks With Acting Secretary of
Defense Patrick Shanahan, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono, and Japanese
Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya at a Joint Press Availability for the U.S.-Japan
2+2 Ministerial,” U.S. Department of State, April 19, 2019
[8] ”Japan-France Summit Meeting and
Working Lunch,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 23, 2019
[9] “Japan-Italy Summit Meeting,”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 24, 2019
