Watch Report No.1
Nov. 14, 2018
§Introduction
This Watch Report
is a periodic publication issued by the Peace Depot’s Project, “Towards a
Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone: Citizen’s Watch for Fair
Implementation of Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Agreements” (in short:
“Citizens’ Watch on the Implementation of Korean Denuclearization Agreements”),
which is published in Japanese, then later in Korean and English, approximately
once every three weeks. The Watch Report is published on the following
free-access blog websites, as well as through an e-mail-magazine for the
subscribed members.
Today, two summit
agreements, the Panmunjom Declaration at the 2018 April 27 Inter-Korean summit [1], and the joint statement at the
2018 June 12 Singapore Summit between the United States and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) [2] have brought about dramatic changes on the Korean Peninsula.
The Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and the DPRK have started working
together to alleviate military tension, eliminate the danger of war and
establish a permanent peace regime, including a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
On November 1, the ROK and the DPRK began unarmed border security operations in
the Panmunjom Joint Security Area (JSA) with cooperation of the United Nations
Command. Additionally, the US and the DPRK agreed on their common goal to
establish a new US-DPRK relationship for peace and prosperity and to build a
lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, the US
has committed to providing security guarantees to the DPRK, and the DPRK has
committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
These initiatives,
occurring simultaneously between North and South Korea and between the US and
the DPRK, are unprecedented and represent a truly historic change. Even after
two significant turning points in modern history – the end of the World War II
and the end of the Cold War – difficult relationships among regional
states persist to this day in Northeast Asia. Disputes over Japan’s colonial
rule of the DPRK have remained unsettled for more than 70 years. The Korean War
has not officially ended more than 65 years after the 1953 ceasefire agreement.
Now is a golden opportunity to overcome these historical legacies and people
living in this region could benefit by making best use of this favorable moment.
To that end, we believe patient diplomatic efforts by concerned states to
faithfully implement the two summit agreements are vitally important to reverse
the long-standing mutual distrust among states and their populations.
In this process of
diplomatic efforts, we believe the roles of civil society, especially in Japan,
South Korea and the US, are vitally important. While closely monitoring the
progress of diplomatic efforts, civil society needs to appeal to their
democratically elected governments. It needs to emphasize the importance of
this opportunity and the necessity of gaining an accurate understanding of
previous negotiations concerning the Korean Peninsula denuclearization and to
draw lessons from that knowledge. At the same time, providing accurate
information to civil society is also important. In Japan, inaccurate
information has been widespread in civil society regarding the failure of past
international efforts for Korean Peninsula denuclearization, such as the KEDO
(Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) process and the Six-Party
Talks process. There has been a
misperception that such failure was caused solely by DPRK’s violation of its
commitments. Knowledge based on the inaccurate information is widespread and is
compounded by civil society’s deeply rooted prejudice against the DPRK, having
developed over the long history of an unusual relationship. Therefore, in
Japan, efforts to redress this negative situation in civil society must be
pursued as well.
The Watch Project
is undertaken with a goal of serving the dual-purpose described above.
The project team
consists of the following members:
Hiromichi
UMEBAYASHI (team leader), Takuya MORIYAMA (assistant leader), Kana HIRAI (coordinator),
Hajime MAEKAWA, Ichiro YUASA, Maria KIM (Korean editor), Patti WILLIS (English
editor), and many volunteers
§The Japanese Government’s Policy towards North Korea Seems
to Have Shifted from Hard Line to Wait-and-See Attitude
It is true that
after the Panmunjom Declaration at the 2018 April 27 Inter-Korean summit, and
the joint statement at the 2018 June 12 Singapore Summit between the United
States and the DPRK, the Abe administration’s foreign policy towards North
Korea has been softening, compared with the past hard line stance, which can be
considered to be hostile. However, it is difficult to say that the
administration is clearly ready to open a dialogue with North Korea. The
current stance of the Abe administration can best be described as a
wait-and-see attitude.
In his 2017
September 20 speech before the United Nations General Assembly, Prime Minister
Abe’s tough stance towards North Korea was very evident. He devoted almost all
of his speech to criticizing North Korea. He said “For North Korea, dialogue
was instead the best means of deceiving us and buying time,” and “What is
needed to do that is not dialogue, but pressure.” On January 22, 2018, in his
policy speech immediately after the opening of the ordinary Diet session, Abe
underscored the threat of North Korea and used it to stress the legitimacy of
the security legislation railroaded in September 2015 despite the controversy
as to whether the legislation is unconstitutional or not. Abe said “the threat
posed by the nuclear and missile programs of North Korea is unprecedented,
grave and imminent, and the security environment around Japan has been severest
since the end of the World War II,” and pointed out that the security
legislation had been useful to counter the threat of North Korea, saying,
“Three years ago, we enacted the peace and security legislation. With tensions
growing over North Korea, the Self-Defense Forces carried out a mission to
protect US vessels and aircrafts for the first time.”
In his 2018
September 25 speech before the United Nations General Assembly, Prime Minister
Abe devoted only a few lines on North Korean issues. As might have been
expected, Abe didn’t show his tough stance but maintained his arrogant attitude
towards North Korea. Abe said, “I pay the greatest interest in changes of North
Korea,” and “North Korea is at a crossroads at which it will either seize, or
fail to seize, the historic opportunity it was afforded.” And he clearly stated,
“Japan’s policy of seeking to settle the unfortunate past and normalize its
relations with North Korea once the abductions, nuclear, and missile issues are
resolved, will not change,” maintaining his long-held hardline attitude that
without the resolution of the abductions, nuclear, and missile issues, there can
be no normalization talks with North Korea.
However, it has
been becoming clear to many Japanese citizens that Japan has been left behind
in the changing situation on the Korean Peninsula. As a result, on October 24,
about one month after he delivered his address at the UN General Assembly,
Prime Minister Abe started to tone down his stance towards North Korea in his
policy speech at the extraordinary Diet session after the cabinet reshuffle.
“By the historic June Singapore Summit
between the United States and the DPRK, conditions on the Korean Peninsula have
started changing considerably. I will give new impetus to this favorable
development and, united with the US and South Korea, seek to realize the complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while coordinating with the
international society.
Now, it’s my turn
to meet face to face with Chairman Kim Jong-Un. As the abductee’s family
members have reached old age, I will try to resolve the abductions issue, which
is my top priority, at the earliest possible date, determined to seize every
opportunity. I will seek to break the shell of distrust, resolve the abductions
issue, nuclear, and missile issues, settle the unfortunate past, and normalize
Japan’s relations with the DPRK.”
As described above, Prime Minister Abe expressed his willingness to
have a Japan-DPRK summit meeting with Chairman Kim and stated his resolve to
break the shell of mutual distrust. And without attaching conditions regarding
the order in which those issues are resolved, Abe listed the abductions,
nuclear and missile issues, settlement of the past, and normalization of
Japan’s relations with the DPRK. This can be considered to represent the sign
of departure from his long-held rigid stance.
However, on the other hand, the Abe administration maintains its
excessively aggressive attitude towards the DPRK in the international arena. On
November 2, 2018, the Japan-sponsored resolution entitled, “Renewed
determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/73/L.54) [3],” was adopted at the First
Committee of the UN General Assembly. The Japanese government has continued to
submit the resolution since 1994. The resolution was submitted on October 19,
and reflects the Japanese government’s views at that time. The resolution
mentions and welcomes two summits in the preamble. Then, in its operative part,
at first, “urges the DPRK to fulfill its commitment (made at the inter-Korean
Summit and the US-DPRK Summit) to the final, fully verified denuclearization of
the DPRK (Para. 27)”, and criticizes the DPRK in the following harsh words:
“(The General Assembly) condemns in the strongest terms all nuclear tests and
launches using ballistic missile technology and other activities in furtherance
of the development of nuclear and ballistic missile technology by the DPRK,
which cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon States in accordance with the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Para. 28).”
As the same resolution of last year was adopted by the General Assembly
on December 12, during the past one year to be covered by this year’s
resolution, the DPRK had not conducted any nuclear and ballistic missile tests.
In addition to that, the DPRK has committed to refraining from further testing.
This move by the Japanese government means when the international community
welcomes this favorable development of the situation, Japan’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs drafted the resolution which condemns the DPRK in the strongest
terms and tried to obtain support for it from member states. It would not be
surprising if the DPRK saw the real intent of the Abe administration in this
move.
It is not only within Japan, but there is also an international
perception that the DPRK’s attitude towards the US and South Korea has
softened, but it keeps expressing harsh words towards Japan. It is often
understood that Japan’s hardline stance on the abductions issues has made the
DPRK do so, but in reality, it is largely attributed to the lopsided attitude
of the Abe administration described above. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)
§How Far Have the US and North
Korea Agreed on a Procedure for Their Negotiations? Enhancing Transparency of a
Procedure Will Increase the Stability of the Denuclearization Process.
One of the reasons for persistent uncertainties about the ongoing US
and DPRK negotiations is the lack of clarity as to the extent of how far they
have agreed on a procedure to implement the June 12 Singapore agreement. As a
result, the outlook of the recent negotiations between the US and the DPRK is
becoming increasingly uncertain.
DPRK’s demand regarding the methodology has been clear before the
Singapore summit. On June 13, the day after
the Singapore summit, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported “Kim Jong-Un
and Trump had the shared recognition to the effect that it is important to
abide by the principle of step-by-step and simultaneous actions in achieving
peace, stability and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” [4] In this article, it can be
confirmed that there is no doubt that the DPRK insisted upon the principle of
step-by-step and simultaneous actions, being its long-held demand. However, it can
be assumed that the US “recognition to the effect” is a KCNA statement of its
wishful thinking, intended to secure US agreement. President Trump had a long
press conference right after the Singapore summit, where no comments implying
that he had shared such recognition were found. The same holds true for the
remarks of US Secretary of State Pompeo at that time.
This ambiguity has recently surfaced as the difference in the
recognition between the US and the DPRK regarding the phased lifting of
economic sanctions. On Jun 13, the same day, KCNA reported that Chairman Kim
understood that “President Trump will relax the economic sanctions on North
Korea as the relationship between the US and North Korea improves through
dialogue and negotiations.” [5] However,
at the press conference after the Singapore summit, President Trump answered
questions using extremely evasive words, saying “The sanctions will come off
when we are sure that the nukes are no longer a factor,” “The sanctions right
now remain,” and “But at a certain point, I actually look forward to taking
them off.” It can be assumed that, in reality, knowing the disagreement with Chairman
Kim, Trump chose his words so as not to bring the disagreement to the fore.
Since then, the US stance regarding the economic sanctions has been
consistent in that it does not imply the possible phased lifting of the
sanctions. However, the US has not made any comments denying the possible phased
lifting of the sanctions. On September 25, in his speech at the United Nations General
Assembly, President Trump said “I would like to thank Chairman Kim for his
courage and for the steps he has taken, though much work remains to be done.
The sanctions will stay in place until denuclearization occurs.” [6] “The sanctions will stay in place
until denuclearization occurs” has been the US’s typical stance regarding this
matter. However, both phrases, “denuclearization occurs” and “the sanctions
will stay in place” are ambiguous. The policy that if denuclearization is
achieved to a certain degree, partial economic sanctions could be lifted, but
lifting all economic sanctions will not occur until the complete
denuclearization is achieved, is not inconsistent with the position that the
sanctions will stay in place until denuclearization occurs. Still, the US can
set the bar higher for lifting economic sanctions by using this language.
With maneuvers like this, risk of negative influence on the entire
negotiation process is high. It would be sensible for both the US and the DPRK
to make efforts to make the negotiation process clearer. As an NGO, Peace Depot
has proposed setting up the following 5 staged benchmarks to improve
predictability of the negotiation process. On November 8, it met high ranking
officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and called for the Japanese
government to consider its proposal and try to share the proposal with
concerned states. The relevant part of the proposal is quoted in the following.
[7]
“Regarding how to proceed with the future
negotiation process for denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula, Peace Depot
calls for the Japanese government to take the lead in the methodology in which concerned
states would take incremental and simultaneous actions, after agreeing to overall
benchmarks to be implemented by each state, so that they may overcome mutual
distrust step by step and make progress.
According to media
reports, the US demands that the DPRK declare a comprehensive list of the
latter’s nuclear programs in exchange for the declaration to end the Korean
War. This demand by the US is considered unrealistic under the current
situation of mutual distrust between the two countries. Once the declaration of
the comprehensive list is made by the DPRK, the credibility of the declaration
would immediately become the central issue. The negotiations would inevitably enter into a
process of verifying whether the declaration is true or false, which would be,
under the current situation of strong mutual distrust, counterproductive to
effective negotiations. Rather than such an approach, Peace Depot believes that
the following methodology is more appropriate in which, for example, concerned
states agree on setting up the following overall phased benchmarks first, and
at every phase of the benchmark, they negotiate to agree on concrete verifiable
steps each state will take reciprocally.
Five phased benchmarks:
Phase 1)
DPRK: freeze of known nuclear arsenals, intermediate- and long-range
missiles, and related facilities
US and ROK: declaration to end the Korean War and continued
suspension of large-scale US-ROK joint military exercises
Phase 2)
DPRK: disablement of frozen facilities and acceptance of inspections for
disablement
US and ROK: acceptance of inspections of the ROK’s nuclear
facilities and US military bases, and partial lifting of sanctions
Phase 3)
DPRK: declaration of nuclear arsenals, plutonium and enriched uranium
stockpiles, and establishment of the DPRK liaison office in Washington, D.C.
US and ROK: starting negotiations on a peace and nonaggression
treaty, and establishment of the US liaison office in Pyongyang, and further
partial lifting of sanctions
Phase 4)
DPRK: submission of the comprehensive list of nuclear programs, and
acceptance of inspections on requested sites
US and ROK: conclusion of a peace and nonaggression treaty, and
further lifting of sanctions
Phase 5)
DPRK: starting dismantlement of nuclear weapons, intermediate- and
long-range missiles, and fissile material production facilities under
international inspection, and establishment of the DPRK embassy in Washington,
D.C.
US and ROK: establishment of the US embassy in Pyongyang, and
lifting of all sanctions
This is just one of the examples, limiting concerned states to the US,
the ROK and the DPRK. In reality, security guarantee issues concern more
than these three states and as described in the next section (of the Peace
Depot’s proposal), the security guarantee issues could develop into the
discussion on the framework such as a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. (Hiromichi
UMEBAYASHI)
[5] Ibid.
[7] http://www.peacedepot.org/statement/2471/
(in Japanese language)
