Watch Report No.26 October 5, 2020
§Japan Should Consider Lifting Autonomous Sanctions and Change Its Hostile Policy against the DPRK
Introduction
On September 16, 2020, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who had continued a hostile policy against the Democratic People’s Public of Korea (hereafter, DPRK) for many years, stepped down and Yoshihide Suga succeeded him as prime minister. The inauguration of a new administration creates an opportunity for policy change.
The Abe administration’s hostile policy against the DPRK, which continues to impose sanctions without any due consideration, should be reviewed. If Japan continues to have such a blatantly hostile policy, it will be unable to seize the opportunity for successful negotiations with the DPRK at a time when negotiations on abductions, nuclear weapons and missiles can be expected to continue. Japan should consider lifting its autonomous economic sanctions as a stimulus for the resumption of dialogue with the DPRK. Japan’s partial lifting of sanctions may signal its policy change and open the door to dialogue. Based on this consideration, this paper will summarize the development of Japan’s autonomous sanctions against the DPRK and examine possible options for partial lifting of sanctions by the Japanese government.
Types and Structure of Japan’s Autonomous Sanctions
Japan’s move toward imposing autonomous sanctions against the DPRK began when the DPRK admitted that it had abducted Japanese citizens and apologized at the Japan-DPRK summit held in September 2002. Although some abductees returned to Japan, public backlash against the DPRK intensified partly because the DPRK took a negative stance toward further investigations on Japanese abductees who have chances of surviving. More and more people within the Japanese government started to insist that Japan should pressure the DPRK to resolve the abduction issue by imposing economic sanctions [1].
However, under the Japanese legal system of the time, UN Security Council resolutions were required for the Japanese government to impose sanctions against foreign countries. Under such circumstances, in November 2002, six lawmakers including Yoshihide Suga and Taro Kono set up a “Study Group for Diplomatic Cards against North Korea.” They probably didn’t necessarily consider Japan’s autonomous sanctions as a diplomatic card solely to resolve abduction issues, but the group took the initiative to advance lawmaker-initiated legislation for Japan to be able to impose autonomous economic sanctions. As a result, in February 2004, the “Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act” (FEFTA) was amended and the “Act on Special Measures concerning Prohibition of Entry of Specified Ships into Ports” (hereafter, “Ships Entry Prohibition Act”) was enacted. These two laws are also called “Economic Sanctions Related Laws” [2]. After that, the “Act for Special Measures on Cargo Inspection etc. Conducted by the Government in Accordance to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1874 etc.” (hereafter, “Cargo Inspection Act”) was enacted (2010), supplementing the “Economic Sanctions Related Laws”.
As described below, Japan’s sanctions were based on the above laws and have been implemented by restricting and blocking movements of persons, goods, money, and vessels [3].
(1) Restrictions on Movement of Persons
Restrictions on the movement of persons are implemented according to the “Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act” (ICRRA). Article 3 of the Act bans the landing of a person who intends to land in Japan without obtaining authorized permission from an immigration inspector, and Article 5 lists reasons for the denial of such landing. For instance, according to the Act, the Minister of Justice may deny the landing of “a person who is likely to commit an act which could be detrimental to the interests or public security of Japan.”
(2) Restrictions on Movement of Goods
Restrictions on movement of goods are implemented based on FEFTA. In 2004, Article 10 of the Act was amended, which enabled it to impose sanctions by cabinet decision when necessary to maintain peace and security in Japan. According to the Act, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry may restrict export (Article 48) and import (Article 52).
(3) Financial Restrictions
Financial restrictions, as well as restrictions on movement of goods, are implemented based on the FEFTA. According to the Act, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry may regulate international remittances (Article 16), import and export of payment means such as cash, checks, and securities (Article 19), capital transactions through asset-freezing and restrictions on investments (Article 21), direct outward investment (Article 23), specified capital transactions including loans for trade settlement (Article 24), service transactions (Article 25) and others.
(4) Restrictions on Transport
Restrictions on transport covers aircraft and maritime transport. Regulations on aircraft are implemented based on the Civil Aeronautics Act while regulations on maritime transport are implemented based on the Ships Entry Prohibition Act and the Cargo Inspection Act. The Ships Entry Prohibition Act enables the Japanese government to ban port calls of specified foreign vessels when the cabinet judges that such measures are necessary to maintain peace and security in Japan. The Cargo Inspection Act was enacted to implement UN Security Council resolution 1874, adopted in response to the second nuclear test by the DPRK (May 25, 2009).
As described above, Japanese sanctions are enforced by restricting movements of people, goods, money, and vessels on the basis of ICRRA, FEFTA, Civil Aeronautics Act, the Ships Entry Prohibition Act, and the Cargo Inspection Act.
Distinct Nature of Japanese Sanctions against the DPRK
As mentioned, the government of Japan enacted the Economic Sanctions Related Laws in 2004 with an eye to imposing autonomous sanctions against the DPRK, motivated by the abduction issues. Perhaps, given that background, Japan’s autonomous sanctions against the DPRK have the following characteristics.
Firstly, when imposing sanctions against the DPRK, the Japanese government mentions the abduction issue irrespective of the direct cause triggering sanctions. Japan’s autonomous sanctions began in July 2006, and except for its initial sanctions, the Japanese government has always mentioned three items: the abduction, nuclear and missile issues. Despite the fact that all sanctions were imposed against the ongoing DPRK’s security activities including nuclear and missile tests, the government of Japan has always mentioned abductions which are not, in fact, related to such activities.
Secondly, rather than responding to each DPRK’s activity which invites sanctions, Japan’s autonomous sanctions tend to be a general expression of its hostile policy toward the DPRK or its regime. In contrast, sanctions by the UN Security Council began with those which would restrict DPRK activities related to nuclear and missile programs and the DPRK leadership who advanced those programs. In addition, UN sanctions were structured cautiously in a manner so as to minimize adverse effects on ordinary DPRK people, at least until 2016. However, Japan went as far as to restrict movements of goods which might affect the livelihood of ordinary DPRK people from an early stage of the autonomous sanctions. Such a relentless stance of the Japanese government is different than that of the UN Security Council and reflects its hostile stance toward the DPRK.
In the following section, we will summarize the development of Japan’s autonomous sanctions in more detail.
Development of Japan’s Autonomous Sanctions against the DPRK
(1) Sanctions Triggered by Nuclear Tests and Missile Launches (July 2006 - July 2014)
The first autonomous sanctions against the DPRK by the Japanese government took place under the Junichiro Koizumi administration. On July 5, 2006, the very day that the DPRK launched seven missiles, the Japanese government imposed a set of autonomous sanctions against the DPRK: the regulations on transport (The ban on the entry into Japanese ports of the Mangyongbong-92 cargo-passenger ferry and the ban on the entry of chartered flights from the DPRK), and the restrictions on the movement of persons (The ban, in principle, on the entry of North Korean authority officials, the landing of North Korean crew members, the re-entry of North Korean authority officials living in Japan if they travel to North Korea, and the visit of Japanese government officials to the DPRK as well as the request to all Japanese nationals not to visit the DPRK) [4]. Ten days later, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1695, which froze assets of fifteen entities and one individual who provided support for North Korea’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles [5]. This can be considered as narrower and limited sanctions as compared to the Japanese autonomous sanctions.
On October 9, 2006, the DPRK conducted its first nuclear weapons test. In response, on October 11, the first Abe administration decided to take a set of tough measures based on reasons such as “the threat to Japan’s national security has doubled” and “North Korea has not made any sincere response toward the resolution of the abductions issue.” For instance, the administration strengthened the restrictions on transport and the movement of goods and persons. It expanded the scope of the ban from the Mangyongbong-92 ferry to all vessels registered as North Korean. The Japanese government expanded the scope of the ban on entry in principle to all nationals of the DPRK. As for the movement of goods, it banned all imports from the DPRK except for those made for humanitarian purposes. However, regarding export, Japan only implemented the Security Council resolution adopted on October 14 [6].
At this point, the government of Japan abruptly took relentless measures such as the ban on entry of all North Korean vessels and the embargo on all imports from North Korea which may affect the livelihood of the North Korean people.
In contrast, UN Security Council resolution 1781 adopted on October 14 only prohibited exports of arms and materials related to weapons of mass destruction, and luxury goods to the DPRK [7]. UN sanctions at this point in time targeted DPRK leadership as well as individuals and organizations considered to have been engaged in nuclear and missile programs, and avoided restricting trade which might cause considerable adverse impact on the North Korean people. This characteristic of UN sanctions remained until the time that the DPRK conducted its forth nuclear test. Almost a decade before that, the government of Japan imposed the embargo on imports from the DPRK which may have considerable effect on the livelihood of the North Korean people.
The relentless stance of the Japanese government persisted. On April 10, 2009, the Taro Aso administration tightened financial restrictions on the DPRK, responding to the DPRK’s missile launch on April 5. Namely, the cabinet decision lowered the maximum amount of money that one can bring from Japan to the DPRK without official permission from one million yen to 300,000 yen, and also lowered the maximum amount of money that one can pay to a person whose address is in the DPRK without official permission from 30 million yen to 10 million yen. The Security Council did not adopt a new resolution in response to the missile launch, and the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea merely added three more entities to the list of asset freeze targets [8].
On May 25, 2009, the DPRK conducted its second nuclear test. In response to that, on June 12, the Security Council adopted resolution 1874 (2009) which obliged member states to prevent transfer of assets that could contribute to the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programs or activities, and prevent specialized training related to those activities. Even at this point in time, UN sanctions aimed solely at activities related to the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs. However, on July 16, Japan under the Aso administration announced its intention to impose a set of additional sanctions and banned all exports to the DPRK (except for those for humanitarian purposes) and expanded the scope of sanctions to foreigners. The Aso administration banned the landing of foreign crew members to Japan if they were sentenced for violation of sanctions measures on the DPRK, and also banned the re-entry of foreign citizens residing in Japan in the case in which they travel to the DPRK and if those people were sentenced for the violation of sanctions measures on the DPRK [9].
At this point in June 2009, Japan took measures far beyond the UN sanctions. It banned all export and import to/from the DPRK, including civilian goods which were not directly related to the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs.
Japan’s autonomous sanctions unfolded one after another. Triggered by the sinking of the Republic of Korea (hereafter, ROK) Navy corvette Cheonan on March 26 2010, which was seen as an incident caused by a DPRK torpedo (The DPRK denied its responsibility for the incident) [10], and the third nuclear test by the DPRK on February 12, 2013, Japan imposed additional sanctions on the DPRK. The latter sanctions were tougher than those enforced by UN Security Council [11].
(2) The Japan-DPRK Stockholm Agreement and Relaxation of Sanctions (July 2014 - February 2016)
In December 2011, North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-Il was succeeded by Kim Jong-Un while, in Japan, the second Abe administration began in December 2012.
Under these circumstances, on May 29, 2014, Japan and the DPRK held a meeting in Stockholm to discuss the abductions issue. In the meeting, the DPRK promised to conduct investigations into Japanese abductees and missing persons, and Japan agreed to lift part of its autonomous sanctions against the DPRK when the latter started the investigations [12]. Based on the agreement, Japan lifted part of its autonomous sanctions on July 4, 2014.
Although this relaxation of Japanese autonomous sanctions didn’t have any significant positive impact on the DPRK’s economy, it had a significant impact on Koreans in Japan who supported the DPRK. Specifically, the Japanese government implemented the following measures: the relaxation of restrictions on movement of persons (The Japanese government lifted the ban in principle on entry of all DPRK nationals, the re-entry of North Korean authority officials residing in Japan in case they travel to North Korea, and the request to all Japanese nationals not to visit the DPRK, etc.), the relaxation of financial restrictions (The Japanese government raised the maximum amount of money that one can bring from Japan to the DPRK without official permission from 100,000 yen to one million yen, and also raised the maximum amount of money that one can pay to a person whose address is in the DPRK without official permission from three million yen to 30 million yen) and the relaxation of restrictions on transport (The Japanese government would allow entry of North Korean vessels if they come for humanitarian purposes) [13]. However, the embargo on import and export against the DPRK, as well as the ban on the entry of all vessels registered as North Korean (except for humanitarian purposes), remained unchanged.
Despite the fact that Japan imposed autonomous sanctions due to the DPRK’s nuclear and missile development, it relaxed those sanctions for reasons related to the progress in the Japan-DPRK talks on abduction issues. As described above, this indicates that, for the Japanese government, the sanctions against the DPRK are an expression of Japan’s overall hostility toward the DPRK regime and there are no clear differences among nuclear, missile and abduction issues.
(3) Re-strengthening of Sanctions (January 2016 - Present)
With no progress made on resolution of the abduction issues through the agreement in Stockholm, on January 6, 2016, one and a half year after the agreement, the DPRK conducted its forth nuclear test, and on February 7, it launched missiles. In response, Japan under the Abe administration announced that, “The government of Japan has seriously looked into what concrete measures should be taken from the viewpoint of taking the most effective approach toward the comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abductions, nuclear, and missile issues, and the government of Japan has now decided to take the following measures of its own against North Korea,” [14] and imposed a set of autonomous sanctions against the DPRK ahead of the adoption of Resolution 2270 (2016) by the Security Council.
New autonomous sanctions were basically the re-imposition of the same sanctions Japan had lifted based on the Stockholm agreement. Other than those re-imposed sanctions, Japan added the ban on the re-entry of foreign experts on nuclear and missile technology residing in Japan if they travel to North Korea; Japan designated third-country flag vessels which had previously called at ports in the DPRK as subjects of ban on the entry to Japan; and, Japan added one entity and ten individuals to the list of asset freeze targets [15].
Following the fourth DPRK nuclear test, the Security Council began expanding the scope of its sanctions against the DPRK. In addition to sanctions targeting DPRK leadership and its military activities (The banishment of North Korean diplomats who violate laws from that country, the ban in principle on exports of all arms and related materials to the DPRK, and the ban on exports of aviation gasoline to the DPRK), Security Council resolution 2270 (2016) included the sanctions intended to damage the DPRK's economy (For instance, the ban on imports of gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, and rare earth minerals from the DPRK, the restrictions on imports of coal, steel, and iron ore from the DPRK, the inspection of all cargo shipped to and from the DPRK, and other financial restrictions) [16].
It was the first time that the UN imposed sanctions that could have significant harmful effects on the livelihood of ordinary people. As Japan had already enacted those kinds of sanctions since 2006 and it had banned all trade with the DPRK, in 2009, Japan had no additional measures left to tighten sanctions on trade.
On September 9, 2016, the DPRK conducted its fifth nuclear test. In response, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2321 (2016) which requested member states to impose sanctions mainly aimed at damaging the DPRK’s economy (For instance, the ban on imports of copper, nickel, zinc and silver from the DPRK, setting a cap on the amount of export of coal produced in the DPRK, the de-registration of any vessels that are owned, controlled or operated by the DPRK, and the limitation on the number of bank accounts held by DPRK diplomatic missions). As there were no sanction measures on trade left for Japan, Japan imposed other new autonomous sanctions. For instance, Japan tightened the restrictions on movement of persons (It expanded the category of people who are prohibited to re-enter Japan if they travel to North Korea), the restrictions on transport (It banned the entry of all vessels which had previously called at ports in the DPRK), and financial restrictions (It added six entities and nine individuals to the list of asset freeze targets). These sanctions are Japanese autonomous sanctions which exceeded the sanctions adopted by the Security Council.
When the DPRK conducted its sixth nuclear test on September 3 2017, and launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on November 30, the Security Council adopted resolution 2397 (2017) which is said to be the toughest ever imposed by the Security Council. What Japan was able to do at that time was to expand entities and individuals subject to asset-freezing and vessels subject to ban on entry. On December 15, 2017, Japan added 19 entities whose headquarters were located in North Korea to the list of asset freeze targets. These were Japan’s last autonomous sanctions against the DPRK to date [17].
Typical Examples of Japan’s Autonomous Sanctions
As mentioned above, typical examples of Japan’s autonomous sanctions currently imposed on the DPRK that exceed UN sanctions are as follows:
- North Korean residents in Japan who are regarded as DPRK officials and the like are banned from re-entering Japan if they travel to the DPRK. And, in principle, North Korean nationals are banned from entering Japan.
- Imports of all goods from the DPRK are prohibited except for those for humanitarian purposes. For instance, North Korean special products which are popular in Japan and not subject to UN sanctions, such as matsutake mushrooms, some electronic components and power cables, are prohibited from being imported from North Korea.
- Exports of all goods to the DPRK, including civilian-use trucks, buses, refrigerators, air conditioners and other goods, which are not subject to UN sanctions, are prohibited except for those for humanitarian purposes.
- Even when one’s visit to the DPRK is allowed, one cannot bring more than 100,000 yen to the DPRK without official permission.
- All the remittance to the DPRK are prohibited. For instance, North Koreans in Japan are unable to send money to their relatives and friends in the DPRK. This is not prohibited by the UN sanctions.
- The UN bans port calls of particular 59 vessels while Japan bans port calls of not only all North Korean vessels but also all vessels that have called at ports in the DPRK, including those for humanitarian purposes.
Those measures must be causing significant harm on the North Korean economy and the livelihood of North Koreans residing in Japan. Lifting those sanctions would not violate UN Security Council resolutions. Japan therefore can lift those sanctions based on solely its own decision.
The First Step Which Signals Japan’s Departure from its Hostile Policy
As described above, Japan has continued to impose relentless autonomous sanctions against the DPRK ahead of UN sanctions. However, nobody can deny that the Japanese autonomous sanctions have failed to produce desired outcomes in resolving the abduction, nuclear and missile issues.
Fortunately, dialogues between South and North Korea as well as between US and the DPRK started in 2018. Although the dialogues have been stalled for now, the door for future dialogues remains open. The DPRK has been calling for the US to abandon its hostile policy against the DPRK and rebuild trust in each other through the implementation of the Singapore agreement in a reciprocal and step-by-step manner.
As well, the Japanese government should review its sanctions-oriented hostile policy against the DPRK and shift to an approach of confidence-building through dialogues and interactions. To that end, the Japanese government should consider relaxing its autonomous sanctions first by providing humanitarian aid to alleviate the difficulties caused by COVID-19 and the natural disasters that the DPRK faces. The resumption of exchange of persons and goods after relaxing the autonomous sanctions must be the first step in a long-term process. This would be a first signal to demonstrate to the DPRK Japan’s departure from its hostile policy. For instance, Japan’s voluntary lifting of sanctions which were previously lifted on July 14, 2014 would be one of the options. This measure would not violate UN Security Council resolutions. In addition, as Japan has lifted those sanctions once before, there is a potential advantage in that many countries may show understanding of the Japanese position. They will see continuity rather than conflict with the past in Japan’s policy shift toward relaxing the autonomous sanctions. It is also recommended that the government of Japan relax the sanctions after explaining its intention to the United States, the European Union, and Republic of Korea. The advent of a new administration in Japan must be an opportunity for such a policy change. (Yosuke WATANBE & Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)
[1] Koh Young-ki, “In-Depth Study: Looking back the issues of abductions of Japanese,” July 15, 2014
[2] Center for Information on Security Trade Control (CISTEC), “Recent economic sanctions measures,” last updated on April 19, 2019,
Also, Kenichi Mizuno, “New Edition: What is economic sanctions bill (Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law)?” June 14, 2003
[3] This classification was made in reference to Takuhei Yamada, “Japanese autonomous measures on North Korea,” Ryukoku Law Review Vol.51 the third issue, (February 2019), pp.1541-1626 (in Japanese)
[4] Special Research Office of the Research Bureau of the House of Representatives, Reference materials on North Korean abductions issue and others, 2020, p.198 (in Japanese)
[5] Special Research Office of the Research Bureau of the House of Representatives, Basic information on North Korean abductions issue and others, 2018, p.94 (in Japanese)
[6] See note [4], p.203
[7] See note [5], p.93, p.100
[8] See note [4], p.213
[9] See note [5], p.94, p.101
[10] On May 28, 2010, as its autonomous sanctions, Japan lowered the maximum amount of money that one can bring from Japan to the DPRK without official permission from 300,000 yen to 100,000 yen. It also lowered the maximum amount of money that one can pay to a person whose address is in the DPRK without official permission from ten million yen to three million yen. The UN Security Council didn’t adopt new sanction resolutions in response to the sinking incident of the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan. See note [4], p.218
[11] On February 12, 2013, as its autonomous sanctions, Japan expanded subjects of ban on the re-entry to those who are in the position to assist DPRK authority officials residing in Japan if they travel to the DPRK. On the other hand, on March 7, UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2094 (2013) which added two entities and three individuals to the list of asset freeze targets. After that, Japan designated ten more entities and six more individuals to the list of asset freeze targets, which was the additional measure beyond UN sanctions (April 5 and August 30). See note [5], p.94, pp.101-102
[12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-North Korea Intergovernmental Consultations (overview), the Agreement,” May 29, 2014 (in Japanese)
[13] See note [4], p.228
[14] See note [4], p.231
[15] See note [4], pp.231-233
[16] See note [5], pp.93-99
[17] See note [5], pp.92-94, p.102, and the 2020 version of note [5], pp.108-109
