Watch Report No.17

Watch Report No.17   Dec. 6, 2019

§Japan, and the World, Must Not Abandon the Historic Opportunity for Peacemaking on the Korean Peninsula

The denuclearization and peace process that began in 2018 not only helped avert the looming danger of war which reached its peak in 2017, but also produced an historic opportunity to establish a new order in all of Northeast Asia. However, the failed US-DPRK talks, which have been going on for over a year and a half, threaten to destroy this opportunity. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) had demanded that the US approach Pyongyang “with a new way of calculation” and said that the US had until the end of this year to come up with a proposal to implement the 2018 Singapore Declaration. With less than one month left until the deadline, there has been no sign that the US will respond to the DPRK’s demands. If the US does not respond, the world will lose an historic opportunity for peacemaking on the Korean Peninsula. This failure will be a monumental loss for Japanese citizens, as well.

The DPRK’s Year-End Deadline

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un referred to the year-end deadline in the April 12, 2019 policy speech [1] that he made at the First Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly. The relevant part of the speech is provided here; it is fairly long but gives the context:

Given the deep-rooted animosity between the DPRK and the United States, in order to implement the June 12 Joint Statement both sides should give up their unilateral terms and seek a constructive solution that meets each other's interests.

To this end, it is needed above all for the United States to approach us with a new way of calculation after putting aside the current one.

The United States is talking much about holding the third round of bilateral summit talks, but we are neither pleased nor willing to see summit talks like the Hanoi summit talks re-enacted.

However, as President Trump continuously observes, personal relations between he and I are not hostile like the relationship between the two countries, and we still maintain good relations, and if we want, we can send and receive letters asking for each other's regards any time.

If the United States proposed holding the third round of summit talks after finding out with a proper attitude a methodology that can be shared with us, we would be willing to try one more time.

But in my opinion at this moment, it comes to my mind that there is no need for me to obsess over the summit talks with the United States out of thirst for the lifting of sanctions.

Anyway, we will be patient and wait till the end of this year to see whether the United States makes a courageous decision or not, but it will obviously be hard to get a good opportunity like the last time again.

(Emphases are this author’s.)

To summarize, Kim Jong Un declared that the DPRK would wait until the end of 2019 for the US to make a proposal based on “a new way of calculation,” unlike the unilateral demand the US had made at the Hanoi Summit.

What is a “New Way of Calculation”?

What is the “new way of calculation” that the DPRK called on the US to formulate? Subsequent statements issued by the DPRK shed some light on this.

On June 12, 2019, on the day of the first anniversary of the Singapore Joint Statement, a spokesperson for the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement [2], which also called for “a new way of calculation.” The statement highlighted the DPRK’s criticism of the US for failing to fulfil its obligations under the Singapore Declaration while also demanding the DPRK’s unilateral surrender of nuclear weapons. This indicates that the “new way of calculation” embodies mutual fulfillment of obligations under the Singapore Declaration.

On June 30, 2019, during the historic Trump-Kim Panmunjom summit, both sides agreed to resume working-level talks, through which the details of the “new way of calculation” were expected to be hammered out. Immediately before and after the Panmunjom summit, US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun drew attention by making remarks (including off-the-record remarks) that the US was ready to hold “constructive talks” with the DPRK to make “simultaneous and parallel” progress on the fulfillment of the Singapore Declaration [3]. Biegun’s statements revealed that within the Trump administration, proposals to strike “small deals” with the DPRK were being discussed instead of a “big deal” for which Trump had been pushing. For example, Biegun’s off-the-record remark referred to a possible US commitment to providing humanitarian aid and promoting diplomatic communication by establishing liaison offices in both countries’ capitals, in exchange for a complete freeze of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. In addition, the spokesperson for the US Department of State did not deny that a freeze of the nuclear weapons program was being considered as part of first-step measures [4]. This development may indicate that the Department of State understands that the “new way of calculation” embodies a step-by-step implementation of the Singapore Declaration based on the “action for action” principle on which DPRK has long insisted. If these developments prove to be true, it should mean that the Department of State has an accurate understanding of the “new way of calculation.”

In addition to the “mutual” and “step-by-step” implementation of the Singapore Declaration, the “new way of calculation” requires an important precondition. It is, as Kim Jong Un stressed in his April 12, 2019 policy speech, the US recognition that, although the DPRK “voluntarily took crucial and significant measures including the discontinuation of nuclear tests and test-fires of intercontinental ballistic missiles” and honored the US request to repatriate the remains of US soldiers, the US has not initiated any voluntary measures that are comparable to the DPRK’s concessions. The discontinuance of nuclear tests, while leaving a concern that the process could be reversed, involved the dismantling of a nuclear test site. The downsizing and postponement of US-Republic of Korea (ROK) joint military exercises are perceived to be insufficient to meet the scale of the action that the DPRK has taken.

To summarize the points discussed thus far, the “new way of calculation” can be deduced to entail the methods for making mutual and step-by-step progress on the Singapore Declaration, which can be implemented after the US takes measures that are comparable to the scale of the measures already taken by the DPRK.

Stockholm US-DPRK Working-Level Talks

The working-level talks announced at the Panmunjom summit were initially scheduled to begin in mid-July. After more than two months of delay, on October 5, 2019, the meeting finally took place in Stockholm. However, there was no evidence that any preparatory exchanges had occurred between the two parties.

Rather, during this time period, both the US-DPRK and DPRK-ROK relations suffered a setback amid heightened tensions, as the US and the ROK conducted the joint military exercise “DongMaeng 19-2” (although the name of the exercise was changed) and the F-35s that the ROK Air Force had purchased from the US arrived in the ROK. These were met by the DPRK’s multiple short-range missile tests and test-firing of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

The Stockholm working-level talks were joined by Biegun and Kim Myong Gil, a roving ambassador who had been appointed as a chief negotiator with the US. Immediately after the talks, which lasted for 8.5 hours [5], the DPRK announced that the negotiations had fallen apart, blaming the US for “coming to the negotiations empty-handed.” The US instantly refuted the DPRK’s accusation, stating it had “brought creative ideas and had good discussions with its DPRK counterparts,” adding, “At the conclusion of our discussions, the United States proposed to accept the invitation of our Swedish hosts to return to Stockholm to meet again in two weeks time” [6]. The following morning, the spokesperson for the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated criticism of the US, stating, “the US has actually not made any preparations for the negotiations but sought to meet its political goal of abusing the DPRK-US dialogue for its domestic political events on schedule.” Further, he set tough conditions for a next round of talks to take place, saying, “We have no intention to hold such sickening negotiations as what happened this time before the US takes a substantial steps to make complete and irreversible withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK, a policy that threatens the security of the country and hampers the right to existence and development of its people” [7].

In short, the working-level negotiations failed.

As later statements show, the DPRK has since then changed the language of its demands, by replacing the phrase “a new way of calculation” with the new phrase, “complete and irreversible withdrawal of the hostile policy.” It appears as though the DPRK has shifted gears from practical negotiations, as reflected in the former phrase, toward more political negotiations, as reflected in the latter.

Return to the “Withdrawal of the Hostile Policy”

The “withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK” is the bottom line of the DPRK’s demands on the US, which has a long history.

The post-Stockholm tension between the US and the DPRK remains high as the year-end deadline is approaching. When the US Secretary of Defense Mark Thomas Esper announced the postponement of the US-ROK joint Vigilant Ace air force drills, Kim Yong Chol, chairman of the Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee and former Vice Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, responded on November 18, 2019 saying that a mere postponement was not enough and demanded a complete halt to the drills. He reiterated that denuclearization negotiations would require the “complete and irrevocable withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK” [8]. (Emphasis is this author’s.) When, on November 17, 2019, Trump tweeted at Kim Jong Un, “You should act quickly, get the deal done,” and “See you soon!,” Kim Kye Gwan, adviser to the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, instantly responded, “We are no longer interested in such talks that bring nothing to us,” and “If the US truly wants to keep on dialogue with the DPRK, it had better make a bold decision to drop its hostile policy towards the DPRK” [9]. (Emphasis is this author’s.)

Perhaps more interesting yet is chief negotiator Kim Myong Gil’s November 14, 2019 statement, which included complaints about his counterpart Stephen Biegun. In response to Biegun’s request for the Swedish government to mediate US-DPRK talks, the chief negotiator questioned why Biegun had made such a move without “candidly making direct contact with me, his dialogue partner, if he has any suggestions or any idea over the DPRK-US dialogue,” and declared, “We are ready to meet with the US at any place and any time” if negotiation for solutions to problems is possible, but “I am not interested in meetings” so long as the US is not ready to make proposals and the invitation for meetings is “a trick to earn time.” He added that since the DPRK has already presented a list of demands and priorities to the US, “the ball is in the US court.” He further stated, “If the U.S., failing to put forth a basic solution for lifting the anti-DPRK hostile policy harmful to our rights to existence and development, thinks that it can lead us to negotiations with war-end declaration, which may reduce to a dead document any moment with change of situation, and with other matters of secondary importance like the establishment of a liaison office, there is no possibility of the settlement of the issues” [10]. (Emphasis is this author’s.)

This statement not only demands a halt to “the hostile policy,” but also dismisses the end-of-war declaration as of secondary importance as well as the establishment of liaison offices, which was a much-discussed interim measure during the initial phase of the denuclearization talks, emphasizing the halt to “the hostile policy” as a high priority.

Evidently, the DPRK’s post-Stockholm demands are concisely consolidated into the “withdrawal of the hostile policy.” It is not difficult to see that the economic sanctions imposed on the DPRK, which are often described as “the toughest sanctions in history,” are implied as the worst aspects of the “hostile policy.”

What Japan Must Do

The 2018 US-DPRK and ROK-DPRK summits sowed a perhaps once in a lifetime opportunity for denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Now we are facing a crisis in which the opportunity may ultimately be turning into a failure. During the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Biegun explained that the year-end deadline was unilaterally set by the DPRK and that “the president remains of the view that Chairman Kim Jong Un can make this decision to move forward” [11]. However, taking into account the deteriorating ROK-DPRK relations, the prospect does not allow much room for optimism. The failure of US-DPRK negotiations would be a tremendous loss for the world.

The problems of denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula are problems to which Japan is a party. To this date, Japan has neither apologized to nor compensated the DPRK for colonizing the peninsula. A positive shift in the situation on the Korean Peninsula would likely offer us an invaluable chance to open dialogue for finding solutions to this persistent historical issue. Japanese citizens cannot afford to be bystanders.

Japan must act proactively and explore ways to break the current deadlock for the sake of peace and security in Northeast Asia and the resolution of the historical issues between Japan and the DPRK. Yes, it is possible – if Japan shifts from its dependence on extended nuclear deterrence to a pursuit of a collaborative security framework in the region by proposing the establishment of a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone. In doing so, Japan can help transform the denuclearization and peace processes that currently depend solely on the US-DPRK negotiations into processes of a much broader framework. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

 (Thanks to Toshie OZAKI and Patti WILLIS for translating from Japanese to English and proof-reading.)

[1] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s Policy Speech,” KCNA, April 14, 2019  http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from date in Supreme Leader’s Activities.

[2] United Nations official document A/73/894–S/2019/466

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/165/61/pdf/N1916561.pdf?OpenElement

[3] “(4th LD) U.S. ready for talks with N.K. to make 'simultaneous and parallel' progress: nuke envoy,” Yonhap News Agency, June 28, 2019 https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190628000454325?section=national/diplomacy

And, American internet media ”AXIOS” July 3, 2019 https://www.axios.com/trump-negotiator-steve-biegun-signals-flexibility-in-north-korea-talks-0b1f9a53-2599-49ac-b236-0fa819d175f8.html

[4] Morgan Ortagus, “Department Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, July 9, 2019

https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-july-9-2019/

[5]  Morgan Ortagus, “North Korea Talks, Press Statement,” U.S. Department of State, October 5, 2019

https://www.state.gov/north-korea-talks/

[6]  See 5.

[7]  “Fate of DPRK-U.S. Dialogue Depends on U.S. Attitude: DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson,” KCNA, October 6, 2019  http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  (Search for the article by date. )

[8]  “U.S. Should not Dream about Negotiation for Denuclearization before Dropping Its Hostile Policy towards DPRK,” KCNA, November 18, 2019  http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article by date.

[9]  “Advisor to DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Statement,” KCNA, November 18, 2019

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article by date.

[10]  “DPRK Foreign Ministry Roving Ambassador Issues Statement,” KCNA, November 14, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article by date.

[11]  David Brunnstrom, and Daphne Psaledakis, “Year-end could see return to North Korea 'provocations,' says U.S. envoy Biegun,” Reuters, November 21, 2019

https://jp.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biegun-northkorea/year-end-could-see-return-to-north-korea-provocations-says-u-s-envoy-biegun-idUSKBN1XU232

Watch Report No.16

Watch Report No.16      Nov. 7, 2019

§DPRK’s Short-Range Missile Launches are Reactions to Military Trends in Japan and South Korea

Korea Central News Agency’s (KCNA) reportage of DPRK’s missile launches

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched ballistic missiles in May for the first time in about 18 months, although they were short-range missiles. Since then, including the latest launch of October 31, the country has launched at least 22 short-range missiles in eleven launches. At the end of this Report, those 11 missile launches are listed in chronological order in a chart. (In addition to those launches, the DPRK test-fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on October 2.)

A variety of technological analyses of short-range missile launches have been made. Combining all analyses, it can be concluded that the series of missile launches are generally related to four types of missiles; ① Ballistic missiles closely similar to the Russian Iskander missile, ② Missiles whose exterior is similar to US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), ③ Large-caliber multiple-launch guided rocket systems, and ④ Super-large multiple rocket launchers.

The first half of this Watch Report will technically analyze DPRK’s missile launches and identify that which has been generally ignored in the DPRK’s reportage about the launches.

Contrary to a mistaken perception of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)’s accuracy given its status as “the state-run news agency of a dictatorship,” in fact, KCNA’s coverage of DPRK’s missile tests can be judged as accurate. In particular, regarding technical information about the missiles, KCNA’s reporting of each missile launch is consistent and describes those launches, not with details, but with a surprising degree of consistency. Therefore, carefully reading of KCNA’s coverage makes it possible to deepen our understanding of DPRK’s missile tests. For instance, KCNA describes missile launches making the distinction as to whether they are conducted as strike drills, demonstration fires, or test-fires. Additionally, KCNA uses language such as, “new-type missile,” “new weapon” or “newly-developed missile” and distinguishes among these launches of “new weapon,” or “newly-developed missile” by using “test-fire.” Making note of those distinctions, KCNA’s reporting of each missile launch is summarized in a chart at the end of this Report

Missiles launched on May 4 and 9, July 25, and August 6 are understood to be missiles similar to Iskander [1]. Not contradicting that understanding, this Watch Report would like to point out at least 2 facts regarding those 4 launches. First, two launches in May and two subsequent launches were conducted with clearly different purposes. Two launches in May were conducted as strike drills of defense units of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in front areas. Subsequent launches were conducted as demonstration firings, aimed at South Korea and the US-ROK joint military exercises. Second, while missiles launched in May were described simply as “tactical guided weapons” or “long-range strike means”, missiles launched subsequently were described as “new-type” tactical guided weapons or “new-type” tactical guided missiles. Comparing how those phrases were used in subsequent KCNA’s reportage, it can be interpreted that the language of “new-type” doesn’t mean newly-developed weapons, but rather means new-type weapons which have already been deployed. Considering these differences in descriptions in KCNA’s coverage, although all missiles launched in May and subsequently were missiles similar to Iskander, there is a possibility that they can be divided into old-type and new-type. Additionally, as described in the following, it should be considered that a “new-type” weapon does not mean an indigenous weapon developed in the DPRK, but means a weapon purchased from other countries or improved version of such a weapon.

Compared with the phrase of “new-type,” large-caliber multiple guided rocket systems launched on July 31 and August 2 and super-large multiple rocket launchers launched on August 24, September 10, and October 31 were described as “test-fire” of “newly-developed” weapons. Two test-fires were conducted on large-caliber multiple guided rocket systems and three test-fires were conducted on super-large multiple rocket launchers. In the same way, missiles whose shapes are similar to US ATACMS launched on August 10 and 16 were described as “test-fire” of a “new weapon”. Taking other related descriptions into account, launches of those three types of missiles can be confirmed as test-fires to verify results of new weapons that DPRK national defense scientists have developed according to an orientation given by the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK). In that sense, those test-fires were different in nature from launches of four missiles similar to Iskander (which might include two types).

In that connection, based on that analysis, large-caliber long-range multiple rockets launched on May 4 are existing operational weapons (probably unguided) and should be considered to have no relation to multiple rocket launchers being developed subsequently.

Trends of military buildup in South Korea and Japan

It is understandable that those short-range missile launches have been sensitively covered by mass media. This is because those launches are considered as signals that the DPRK would resume medium and long-range missile launches and could lead to the breakdown of the denuclearization and peace process in the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, whether intentionally or not, there exists a possibility that the fact that DPRK’s ballistic missile launches violate UN Security Council sanctions resolutions (UNSCRs) formally have lowered hurdle of the coverage for mass media. However, to prevent the breakdown of the denuclearization and peace process, being sensitive to the DPRK’s short-range missile launches does not seem to be right way to pay attention to this issue. Rather, that would lead to straying from the essence of the issue.

Both US President Donald Trump’s stance not to regard the DPRK’s short-range missile launches as a problem and Chief of Cheong Wa Dea’s National Security Office Chung Eui-yong’s stating that “I don’t see missile capabilities now being developed by North Korea as a grave threat to our national security” [2], can be considered to be reasonable attitude as a consequence, although each of them were based on different reasons. The current core issue of the denuclearization and peace process is whether the US would adopt a policy to take reciprocal and step-by-step approaches in negotiations with the DPRK and propose concrete measures corresponding to the past steps already taken by the DPRK and next steps which the DPRK has suggested in detail, including a freeze of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.

Keeping the above in mind, this Watch Report would like to consider the military trends in South Korea and Japan, in which the US has also been involved. Such trends serve as the background for the DPRK’s repeated short-range ballistic missile launches.

As pointed out in Watch Report 13, DPRK’s moves represent not only an angry reaction to the US-ROK joint military exercise conducted in August, but also to the DPRK’s need to bolster its defense capabilities, responding to the situation in which South Korea has been conducting military modernization by introducing F35A stealth fighter jets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Global Hawk.

The DPRK stated that the missile launch on July 25 was a warning to the ROK military who is running at fever pitch in their efforts to purchase ultramodern weapons and hold the US-ROK joint military exercise [3]. The DPRK conducted a demonstration firing of “new-type” tactical guided missiles on August 6, and the next day when US-ROK joint military exercise started, the DPRK stated that the launch was an occasion to send a warning to that exercise [4]. As described in Watch Report 13, the DPRK warned that, “We, on our part, have no other choice but to develop and test the special armaments to completely destroy the lethal weapons reinforced in South Korea” [5]. And according to that warning, to this date, the DPRK has displayed its weapons with the specific feature of low-attitude gliding and leaping flight orbit [6] and developed preemptive attack capabilities of super-large multiple rocket launchers against the group target [7].

Not only purchasing US state-of-the art weapons, in recent years, South Korea has also been making efforts to modernize its military capabilities. This July, the country announced the construction of its first light aircraft carrier [8]. Regarding missile launches with which the DPRK has attracted attention, as is well known, ROK’s Ministry of National Defense revised its ballistic missile guidelines and extended its ballistic missile range limit from 300km to 800km. Moreover, the country has worked on the establishment of the system called the Kill Chain to carry out a pre-emptive strike by missiles and others against the DPRK [9]. Chief of National Security Office Chung Eui-yong’s statement in the National Assembly regarding South Korea’s missile capabilities that, “I cannot go into details, but our military has conducted no fewer missile tests than North Korea” [10], is considered to honestly describe the country’s current military situation.

Not only South Korea’s arms buildup, but Japan’s arms buildup of the Japan Self- Defense Force (SDF) by the Abe administration has been widely known. The DPRK has been paying close attention to the Japanese military trend as well. On August 26, KCNA criticized the rebuilding of JS Izumo into an aircraft carrier as a “qualitative surge” in attack capability and pointed out that, “Today the SDF have turned into aggression forces capable of fighting a war at any time and any place beyond the boundary of the archipelago” [11]. It is a well-known fact that Japanese military capabilities are closely linked with US military strategy in the region. In late October, it was reported that two US B-52 Stratofortresses which took off from Guam made a rare training flight with the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) over the Sea of Japan [12].

Taking account of the recent trend of military buildup in South Korea and Japan and their daily military operations in the Northeast Asia region, the media’s habit of focusing solely on DPRK’s military activities in the field of conventional weapons is unbalanced and unreasonable. The trend that is really needed is the easing of tensions and genuine disarmament in the entire region, and from that viewpoint, the means to accelerate US-DPRK negotiations should be explored. (Takuya MORIYAMA and Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

Chart: DPRK’s short-range missile launches in May to October, 2019

Date of Launch	Estimated Launch Site	KCNA’s reporting of launches
May 4	Hodo Peninsula	The strike drill to evaluate and inspect the operating capabilities and the accuracy of striking duty performance of large-caliber long-range multiple rocket launchers and tactical guided weapons by KPA units in the forefront area and the eastern front [13].
May 9	Sino-ri	The strike drill of KPA units in the forefront area and the western front to carry out various long-range strike means [14].
July 25	Hodo Peninsula	The power demonstration fire of a new-type of tactical guided weapon to send a warning to the South Korean military. Confirmed the rapid anti-firepower capability of the system and the specific features of the low-attitude gliding and leaping flight orbit of the missile [15].
July 31	Wonsan	A test-fire of newly-developed large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket system, according to policy set forth at the 7th Congress of the WPK [16].
August 2	Yonghung	Retest-fire of newly-developed large-caliber multiple launch guided rocket system, aimed to examine the altitude control flight performance, track control capability and rate of hits of the rocket [17].
August 6	Kwail	The demonstration fire of two “new-type” tactical guided missiles. Missiles launched at the airfield in the Western area flew over the capital area and the central inland region to precisely hit the target islet in the East Sea. Also intended to send a warning to the US-ROK joint military drill [18].
August 10	Hamhung	Test-fire of a new weapon. Suitable for the terrain conditions of the DPRK and has advantageous tactical character different from the existing weapon system. The Party Central Committee gave the direction to develop the weapon system [19].
August 16	Tongchon	Retest-fire of a new weapon, developed in the shortest span of time, following the Party’s order to develop major striking means [20].
August 24	Sondok	Retest-fire of newly-developed super-large multiple rocket launcher, which was invented by young national defense scientists. [21].
September 10	Kaechon	Retest-fire of super-large multiple rocket launcher. Measured the time of combat deployment and verified combat operation, the characteristics of trajectory, accuracy and precise homing functions of launcher. Running fire test remains to be done [22].
October 31	Suncheon	Successfully verified the security of launchers’ continuous fire system through the 3rd test-fire of super-large multiple rocket launchers. Enabled a preemptive attack against the group target and designated target area [23].

[1] For example, Takeshi IWAYA’s, then-Minister of Defense of Japan, press conference on September 3, 2019 

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2019/0903a.html

and Taketsugu SATO, “North Korea missiles progressing steadily. New-type which is hard for radar to pick up eludes the U.S. and Japan (Tentative Translation),” The Asahi Shimbun, October 21, 2019 (Japanese language)

https://digital.asahi.com/articles/DA3S14224898.html。

[2] “Moon's top security adviser dismisses missile threat from N. Korea,” Yonhap News Agency, November 1, 2019

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20191101008200315?section=search

[3] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Power Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Weapon,” KCNA, July 26, 2019

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from date. 

[4] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Watches Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Missiles,” KCNA, August 7, 2019

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from date. 

[5] “S. Korean Authorities Slammed,” KCNA, July 11, 2019

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[6] See note [3].

[7] “Another Test-Fire of Super-large Multiple Rocket Launchers Conducted in DPRK,” KCNA, November 11, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[8] Josh Smith, “Buying a big stick: South Korea's military spending has North Korea worried,” Reuters, September 11, 2019

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-military-analysis/buying-a-big-stick-south-koreas-military-spending-has-north-korea-worried-idUSKCN1VW03C

[9] Ministry of Defense of Japan “2018 Defense of Japan (Annual White Paper)” September 28, 2018

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2018/html/n12202000.html#a77 

[10] See note [2]

[11] “KCNA Commentary Warns Japan against Military Moves,” KCNA, August 26, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[12] Jesse Johnson, “U.S. B-52 bombers make rare training flight over Sea of Japan with ASDF,” The Japan Times, October 29, 2019

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/10/29/asia-pacific/b52-bombers-training-sea-of-japan-asdf/#.XcJXfOj7SUk

[13] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Frontline Area and on Eastern Front,” KCNA, May 5, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[14] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Forefront Area and on Western Front,” KCNA, May 10, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from date. 

[15] See note [3].

[16] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New-type Large-caliber Multiple Launch Guided Rocket System,” KCNA, August 1, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[17]　“Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Again Test-Fire of New-type Large-caliber Multiple Launch Guided Rocket System,” KCNA, August 3, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[18] See note [4].

[19] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New Weapon,” KCNA, August 11, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[20] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of New Weapon Again,” KCNA, August 17, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[21] “Successful Test-fire of Newly Developed Super-large Multiple Rocket Launcher Held under Guidance of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un,” KCNA, August 25, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[22] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of Super-large Multiple Rocket Launcher Again,” KCNA, September 11, 2019 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. 

[23] See note [7].