§Japan, and the World, Must Not Abandon the Historic Opportunity for Peacemaking on the Korean Peninsula
The denuclearization and peace process that began in 2018 not only helped avert the looming danger of war which reached its peak in 2017, but also produced an historic opportunity to establish a new order in all of Northeast Asia. However, the failed US-DPRK talks, which have been going on for over a year and a half, threaten to destroy this opportunity. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) had demanded that the US approach Pyongyang “with a new way of calculation” and said that the US had until the end of this year to come up with a proposal to implement the 2018 Singapore Declaration. With less than one month left until the deadline, there has been no sign that the US will respond to the DPRK’s demands. If the US does not respond, the world will lose an historic opportunity for peacemaking on the Korean Peninsula. This failure will be a monumental loss for Japanese citizens, as well.
The DPRK’s Year-End Deadline
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un referred to the year-end deadline in the April 12, 2019 policy speech [1] that he made at the First Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly. The relevant part of the speech is provided here; it is fairly long but gives the context:
Given the deep-rooted animosity between the DPRK and the United States, in order to implement the June 12 Joint Statement both sides should give up their unilateral terms and seek a constructive solution that meets each other's interests.
To this end, it is needed above all for the United States to approach us with a new way of calculation after putting aside the current one.
The United States is talking much about holding the third round of bilateral summit talks, but we are neither pleased nor willing to see summit talks like the Hanoi summit talks re-enacted.
However, as President Trump continuously observes, personal relations between he and I are not hostile like the relationship between the two countries, and we still maintain good relations, and if we want, we can send and receive letters asking for each other's regards any time.
If the United States proposed holding the third round of summit talks after finding out with a proper attitude a methodology that can be shared with us, we would be willing to try one more time.
But in my opinion at this moment, it comes to my mind that there is no need for me to obsess over the summit talks with the United States out of thirst for the lifting of sanctions.
Anyway, we will be patient and wait till the end of this year to see whether the United States makes a courageous decision or not, but it will obviously be hard to get a good opportunity like the last time again.
(Emphases are this author’s.)
To summarize, Kim Jong Un declared that the DPRK would wait until the end of 2019 for the US to make a proposal based on “a new way of calculation,” unlike the unilateral demand the US had made at the Hanoi Summit.
What is a “New Way of Calculation”?
What is the “new way of calculation” that the DPRK called on the US to formulate? Subsequent statements issued by the DPRK shed some light on this.
On June 12, 2019, on the day of the first anniversary of the Singapore Joint Statement, a spokesperson for the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement [2], which also called for “a new way of calculation.” The statement highlighted the DPRK’s criticism of the US for failing to fulfil its obligations under the Singapore Declaration while also demanding the DPRK’s unilateral surrender of nuclear weapons. This indicates that the “new way of calculation” embodies mutual fulfillment of obligations under the Singapore Declaration.
On June 30, 2019, during the historic Trump-Kim Panmunjom summit, both sides agreed to resume working-level talks, through which the details of the “new way of calculation” were expected to be hammered out. Immediately before and after the Panmunjom summit, US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun drew attention by making remarks (including off-the-record remarks) that the US was ready to hold “constructive talks” with the DPRK to make “simultaneous and parallel” progress on the fulfillment of the Singapore Declaration [3]. Biegun’s statements revealed that within the Trump administration, proposals to strike “small deals” with the DPRK were being discussed instead of a “big deal” for which Trump had been pushing. For example, Biegun’s off-the-record remark referred to a possible US commitment to providing humanitarian aid and promoting diplomatic communication by establishing liaison offices in both countries’ capitals, in exchange for a complete freeze of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. In addition, the spokesperson for the US Department of State did not deny that a freeze of the nuclear weapons program was being considered as part of first-step measures [4]. This development may indicate that the Department of State understands that the “new way of calculation” embodies a step-by-step implementation of the Singapore Declaration based on the “action for action” principle on which DPRK has long insisted. If these developments prove to be true, it should mean that the Department of State has an accurate understanding of the “new way of calculation.”
In addition to the “mutual” and “step-by-step” implementation of the Singapore Declaration, the “new way of calculation” requires an important precondition. It is, as Kim Jong Un stressed in his April 12, 2019 policy speech, the US recognition that, although the DPRK “voluntarily took crucial and significant measures including the discontinuation of nuclear tests and test-fires of intercontinental ballistic missiles” and honored the US request to repatriate the remains of US soldiers, the US has not initiated any voluntary measures that are comparable to the DPRK’s concessions. The discontinuance of nuclear tests, while leaving a concern that the process could be reversed, involved the dismantling of a nuclear test site. The downsizing and postponement of US-Republic of Korea (ROK) joint military exercises are perceived to be insufficient to meet the scale of the action that the DPRK has taken.
To summarize the points discussed thus far, the “new way of calculation” can be deduced to entail the methods for making mutual and step-by-step progress on the Singapore Declaration, which can be implemented after the US takes measures that are comparable to the scale of the measures already taken by the DPRK.
Stockholm US-DPRK Working-Level Talks
The working-level talks announced at the Panmunjom summit were initially scheduled to begin in mid-July. After more than two months of delay, on October 5, 2019, the meeting finally took place in Stockholm. However, there was no evidence that any preparatory exchanges had occurred between the two parties.
Rather, during this time period, both the US-DPRK and DPRK-ROK relations suffered a setback amid heightened tensions, as the US and the ROK conducted the joint military exercise “DongMaeng 19-2” (although the name of the exercise was changed) and the F-35s that the ROK Air Force had purchased from the US arrived in the ROK. These were met by the DPRK’s multiple short-range missile tests and test-firing of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
The Stockholm working-level talks were joined by Biegun and Kim Myong Gil, a roving ambassador who had been appointed as a chief negotiator with the US. Immediately after the talks, which lasted for 8.5 hours [5], the DPRK announced that the negotiations had fallen apart, blaming the US for “coming to the negotiations empty-handed.” The US instantly refuted the DPRK’s accusation, stating it had “brought creative ideas and had good discussions with its DPRK counterparts,” adding, “At the conclusion of our discussions, the United States proposed to accept the invitation of our Swedish hosts to return to Stockholm to meet again in two weeks time” [6]. The following morning, the spokesperson for the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated criticism of the US, stating, “the US has actually not made any preparations for the negotiations but sought to meet its political goal of abusing the DPRK-US dialogue for its domestic political events on schedule.” Further, he set tough conditions for a next round of talks to take place, saying, “We have no intention to hold such sickening negotiations as what happened this time before the US takes a substantial steps to make complete and irreversible withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK, a policy that threatens the security of the country and hampers the right to existence and development of its people” [7].
In short, the working-level negotiations failed.
As later statements show, the DPRK has since then changed the language of its demands, by replacing the phrase “a new way of calculation” with the new phrase, “complete and irreversible withdrawal of the hostile policy.” It appears as though the DPRK has shifted gears from practical negotiations, as reflected in the former phrase, toward more political negotiations, as reflected in the latter.
Return to the “Withdrawal of the Hostile Policy”
The “withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK” is the bottom line of the DPRK’s demands on the US, which has a long history.
The post-Stockholm tension between the US and the DPRK remains high as the year-end deadline is approaching. When the US Secretary of Defense Mark Thomas Esper announced the postponement of the US-ROK joint Vigilant Ace air force drills, Kim Yong Chol, chairman of the Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee and former Vice Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, responded on November 18, 2019 saying that a mere postponement was not enough and demanded a complete halt to the drills. He reiterated that denuclearization negotiations would require the “complete and irrevocable withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK” [8]. (Emphasis is this author’s.) When, on November 17, 2019, Trump tweeted at Kim Jong Un, “You should act quickly, get the deal done,” and “See you soon!,” Kim Kye Gwan, adviser to the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, instantly responded, “We are no longer interested in such talks that bring nothing to us,” and “If the US truly wants to keep on dialogue with the DPRK, it had better make a bold decision to drop its hostile policy towards the DPRK” [9]. (Emphasis is this author’s.)
Perhaps more interesting yet is chief negotiator Kim Myong Gil’s November 14, 2019 statement, which included complaints about his counterpart Stephen Biegun. In response to Biegun’s request for the Swedish government to mediate US-DPRK talks, the chief negotiator questioned why Biegun had made such a move without “candidly making direct contact with me, his dialogue partner, if he has any suggestions or any idea over the DPRK-US dialogue,” and declared, “We are ready to meet with the US at any place and any time” if negotiation for solutions to problems is possible, but “I am not interested in meetings” so long as the US is not ready to make proposals and the invitation for meetings is “a trick to earn time.” He added that since the DPRK has already presented a list of demands and priorities to the US, “the ball is in the US court.” He further stated, “If the U.S., failing to put forth a basic solution for lifting the anti-DPRK hostile policy harmful to our rights to existence and development, thinks that it can lead us to negotiations with war-end declaration, which may reduce to a dead document any moment with change of situation, and with other matters of secondary importance like the establishment of a liaison office, there is no possibility of the settlement of the issues” [10]. (Emphasis is this author’s.)
This statement not only demands a halt to “the hostile policy,” but also dismisses the end-of-war declaration as of secondary importance as well as the establishment of liaison offices, which was a much-discussed interim measure during the initial phase of the denuclearization talks, emphasizing the halt to “the hostile policy” as a high priority.
Evidently, the DPRK’s post-Stockholm demands are concisely consolidated into the “withdrawal of the hostile policy.” It is not difficult to see that the economic sanctions imposed on the DPRK, which are often described as “the toughest sanctions in history,” are implied as the worst aspects of the “hostile policy.”
What Japan Must Do
The 2018 US-DPRK and ROK-DPRK summits sowed a perhaps once in a lifetime opportunity for denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Now we are facing a crisis in which the opportunity may ultimately be turning into a failure. During the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Biegun explained that the year-end deadline was unilaterally set by the DPRK and that “the president remains of the view that Chairman Kim Jong Un can make this decision to move forward” [11]. However, taking into account the deteriorating ROK-DPRK relations, the prospect does not allow much room for optimism. The failure of US-DPRK negotiations would be a tremendous loss for the world.
The problems of denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula are problems to which Japan is a party. To this date, Japan has neither apologized to nor compensated the DPRK for colonizing the peninsula. A positive shift in the situation on the Korean Peninsula would likely offer us an invaluable chance to open dialogue for finding solutions to this persistent historical issue. Japanese citizens cannot afford to be bystanders.
Japan must act proactively and explore ways to break the current deadlock for the sake of peace and security in Northeast Asia and the resolution of the historical issues between Japan and the DPRK. Yes, it is possible – if Japan shifts from its dependence on extended nuclear deterrence to a pursuit of a collaborative security framework in the region by proposing the establishment of a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone. In doing so, Japan can help transform the denuclearization and peace processes that currently depend solely on the US-DPRK negotiations into processes of a much broader framework. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)
(Thanks to Toshie OZAKI and Patti WILLIS for translating from Japanese to English and proof-reading.)
[1] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s Policy Speech,” KCNA, April 14, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from date in Supreme Leader’s Activities.
[2] United Nations official document A/73/894–S/2019/466
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/165/61/pdf/N1916561.pdf?OpenElement
[3] “(4th LD) U.S. ready for talks with N.K. to make 'simultaneous and parallel' progress: nuke envoy,” Yonhap News Agency, June 28, 2019 https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190628000454325?section=national/diplomacy
And, American internet media ”AXIOS” July 3, 2019 https://www.axios.com/trump-negotiator-steve-biegun-signals-flexibility-in-north-korea-talks-0b1f9a53-2599-49ac-b236-0fa819d175f8.html
[4] Morgan Ortagus, “Department Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, July 9, 2019
https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-july-9-2019/
[5] Morgan Ortagus, “North Korea Talks, Press Statement,” U.S. Department of State, October 5, 2019
https://www.state.gov/north-korea-talks/
[6] See 5.
[7] “Fate of DPRK-U.S. Dialogue Depends on U.S. Attitude: DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson,” KCNA, October 6, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (Search for the article by date. )
[8] “U.S. Should not Dream about Negotiation for Denuclearization before Dropping Its Hostile Policy towards DPRK,” KCNA, November 18, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[9] “Advisor to DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Statement,” KCNA, November 18, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[10] “DPRK Foreign Ministry Roving Ambassador Issues Statement,” KCNA, November 14, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[11] David Brunnstrom, and Daphne Psaledakis, “Year-end could see return to North Korea 'provocations,' says U.S. envoy Biegun,” Reuters, November 21, 2019
https://jp.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biegun-northkorea/year-end-could-see-return-to-north-korea-provocations-says-u-s-envoy-biegun-idUSKBN1XU232
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