Watch Report No.7

Watch Report No.7      Mar. 11, 2019

§The Hanoi Summit Can’t Be Regarded as a Failure. The International Community Should Consider the Potential Benefits of Multitrack Diplomacy, Including China and Russia, in the Phased Lifting of Sanctions

The second US-DPRK summit held in Hanoi from February 27 to 28 ended without producing any agreed upon documents. There had seemed to be some change in the US diplomatic stance prior to the Summit and there were expectations that both counties would reach agreement on certain mutually acceptable intermediate measures. Despite such expectations, the second summit ended without any agreed upon documents, and a number of reviews by the media and experts used words such as “breakdown” or “failure” in their headlines to describe the Summit.

But, was it a failure? If we assess what the Hanoi Summit achieved by the extent of the deepening of mutual understanding which serves as a basis for future negotiations, the Hanoi Summit did, in fact, achieve significant results. Considering that the leaders of both countries tend to prefer top^-down decision making, the deepening of mutual understanding would only be possible by holding such a summit. On the other hand, if we assess achievement in Hanoi by how the deepening of the mutual understanding would affect future developments of the situation, the results are difficult to predict. It will take more time for both countries to digest the outcome of the Hanoi Summit. Factors which determine how much time will elapse until a third summit takes place are complicated, and range widely to include issues beyond US-DPRK relations alone.

Given the circumstance described above, this Watch Report will review the minimal recognition given to the significance of the Hanoi Summit as this must be clarified in anticipation of future developments.

(1) Process to implement Singapore agreement is still on track and has not been derailed

Although most articles have not underscored this simple fact, it is important to recognize its significance at the outset. Some suggest that the Singapore Summit agreement is threatened as basis for future negotiations, based on the fact that the Hanoi Summit ended without agreements. The current framework of US-DPRK negotiations is based on the joint statement at the 2018 June 12 Singapore Summit between the US and the DPRK. In fact, in Hanoi, both countries reconfirmed that their ongoing negotiations are based on that very framework.

On the US side, at the press conference right after the summit, US Secretary of State Pompeo stated that, “Chairman Kim reiterated on his trip he is fully prepared to denuclearize,” and that the objective of the talks was “to provide, in return, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and a brighter future for the North Korean people”. [1]

On the DPRK side, on the next day after the summit, KCNA reported the outcomes of the summit with exceptional speed as follows: “The top leaders of the two countries highly appreciated at the one-on-one talks and extended talks that a remarkable progress has been made in the historic course of implementing the Singapore joint statement.” “At the talks they shared the common understanding that the efforts made by the two sides and proactive measures taken by them to defuse tensions and preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula and completely denuclearize it were of great significance in building mutual trust and making a fundamental turn in the decades-long bilateral relations characterized by mistrust and antagonism.”[2] 

In summary, the US and the DPRK reaffirmed not only DPRK’s denuclearization, but also what they committed to in Singapore concerning a bigger framework in which each of them has responsibility. In Hanoi, it was demonstrated that both of them have a good understanding of that larger context. However, it should be also pointed out that US high-ranking officials have not stressed that point enough in their remarks, which is considered to have been largely caused by the media’s unbalanced interest.

(2) Both the US and the DPRK deepened understanding of the bottom line of each other’s demands and the reasons underlying those demands

Both the US and DPRK sides had had number of working-level discussions and, as a result of those discussions, documents to be signed by both leaders were readied prior to the Hanoi Summit. What we may call, “the unrealized Hanoi agreement” existed. At the press conference on February 28, US President Trump stated, “I could’ve signed an agreement today, and then you people would’ve said ‘Oh, what a terrible deal. What a terrible thing he did.’ … I could’ve 100 percent signed something today. We actually had papers ready to be signed, but it just wasn’t appropriate.” [3] In short, Trump’s judgement that he would not be able to win accolades from the US people made Trump press harder demands on the DPRK, which the DPRK could not accept, and as a result, the negotiation ended in a deadlock. [4]

If it was the case, both the US and the DPRK must have had a precious opportunity to deepen understanding of each other’s bottom-line demands and reasons behind those demands, through the top leaders’ direct negotiation.

It is worth remembering that President Trump stated as follows: “I don’t want to talk about increasing sanctions. They’re strong. They have a lot of great people in North Korea that have to live also. And that’s important to me.” “My whole attitude changed a lot because I got to know, as you know, Chairman Kim very well. And they have a point of view also.”

There has been no accurate information regarding what agreement was reached at working-level, that is, the content of “the unrealized Hanoi agreement”. However, the fact that such an agreement on intermediate measures existed has great significance, because the agreement could provide an important basis for future negotiations between both countries.

To counter President Trump’s claims at the press conference, on March 1, the DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho held an early morning press conference and the DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-Hui responded to questions. [5] Then, right after the DPRK press conference, US Secretary of State Pompeo, and subsequently, a senior US State Department official traveling with him, held a press conference in Manila. [6] Consolidating all available information, it can be assumed that the prepared agreement papers on intermediate measures consisted of a complete and verifiable dismantlement of all of the Yongbyon nuclear center (including a uranium enrichment facility, a plutonium production reactor and a plutonium reprocessing facility) and partial lifting of sanctions imposed on the DPRK. Although the DPRK explained they had demanded the relief from the clauses of five UN Security Council sanctions resolutions imposed since 2016 that affect the DPRK civil economy and people’s livelihood, it is unclear if those demands were included in “the unrealized Hanoi agreement” or they were what the DPRK was trying to gain at Hanoi Summit. As Ri Yong-Ho stated, the DPRK side was ready to commit in writing to permanently ending nuclear and ballistic missile tests, and this could have been included in the prepared agreement.

As well, there has been no accurate information regarding what President Trump demanded beyond “the unrealized Hanoi agreement”. President Trump admitted at a press conference that additional US demands included dismantling of the second uranium enrichment plant outside Yongbyon, and at the same time, he also said that “we brought many, many points up.” [7] Furthermore, a senior US State Department official said the US side even sought to “impose a complete freeze on their (DPRK’s) weapons of mass destruction program,” which is not included in the Singapore agreement. [8] It is not surprising that such US demands resulted in a deadlock of negotiations in Hanoi.

(3) Not only seeking agreement on intermediate measures through bilateral negotiations between the US and the DPRK, international discussions regarding legitimacy of the extent of the sanctions at an intermediate phase are also required

Based on the analysis above, one of the most plausible and simple scenarios for future US-DPRK negotiations will be seeking a new point of agreement on intermediate measures based on the Hanoi Summit. This would involve an approach to try to strike balance by making additions to “the unrealized Hanoi agreement.” There can be no new agreement with a lower threshold than “the unrealized Hanoi agreement.” The following items could be added for a new agreement: ① declaration to end the Korean War or a peace declaration, ② establishment of the US liaison office in Pyongyang, both of which were topics reported by the media before the Hanoi Summit, ③ provisional agreement on the scale and nature of future US-ROK joint military exercises, a possible factor for DPRK’s concern, ④ small scale relaxation of the economic sanctions short of lifting of the 5 UNSC sanctions resolutions, as was the DPRK’s demand in Hanoi, ⑤ partial lifting of the sanctions limited to those necessary for inter-Korean economic cooperation, and ⑥ relaxation of restrictions on DPRK space and nuclear development programs, on condition of ensuring peaceful purposes of the programs, and increasing international access to DPRK nuclear and space facilities.

The Hanoi Summit demonstrates that along with those efforts, it has become necessary to examine more fundamental questions regarding relaxation of the economic sanctions. Sanctions on the DPRK based on UN Security Council resolutions should involve not only the US, but also all UN member states. Nonetheless, that has become a core subject in US-DPRK negotiations. In this respect, the international community should, in particular, increase awareness of the roles played by China and Russia, which are permanent members of UN Security Council and have close relations with the DPRK.

Based on the Panmunjom Declaration and the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration between the two Koreas, along with the joint statement at the Singapore Summit between the US and the DPRK, the DPRK has shifted its national policy toward withdrawal from nuclear and missile development programs which caused the imposition of economic sanctions. It is assumed in the joint statement and declarations that the implementation of the DPRK’s policy shift requires both the implementation of security guarantees commitment to the DPRK, which claims persistent threats from the US, and the realization of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The international community understands and accepts such premises contained in the agreements. Therefore, in order to maintain legitimacy of UN Security Council resolutions, a discussion must occur about whether phased implementation of the agreements contained in the documents noted above should be accompanied by phased lifting of sanctions. If China and Russia, in particular, lead and propose such a discussion in the international community, it will greatly contribute to maintaining and strengthening DPRK’s incentive to implement existing joint statements and declarations. Legitimacy of the approach held by some countries that the current magnitude of sanctions on the DPRK -- the strongest sanctions ever -- should be maintained, needs to be objectively reexamined. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] “Remarks With Traveling Press,” U.S. Department of States, February 28, 2019

https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2019/02/289785.htm

[2]  “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, President Trump Hold Second-day Talks,” KCNA, March 1, 2019  http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm　 Search for the article from date.

[3]　“Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference | Hanoi, Vietnam,” The White House, February 28, 2019

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference-hanoi-vietnam/

[4]　At almost the same time as the Hanoi Summit, in the US, the congressional testimony of Michael Cohen, the former lawyer to President Trump, was televised nationally. Mr. Cohen testified about Trump’s alleged criminal activities in details and stunned Americans. It cannot be denied that this simultaneous event affected the Hanoi Summit.

[5]　“Full text of a press conference by North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho,” Hangyoreh, March 1, 2019. (in Korean language)

http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/international/international_general/884116.html

[6]　“Senior State Department Official Remarks to Traveling Press,” U.S. Department of States, February 29, 2019

https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2019/02/289798.htm

[7]　See Note [3].

[8]　See Note [6].

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Watch Report No.6

Watch Report No.6      Feb. 25, 2019

§Media Reports Concentrate Too Much on “DPRK’s Denuclearization.” The Focus of Future US-DPRK Negotiations Should Be on the United States’ Attitude towards “Peace Regime Building”

At a time when the second Summit is about to take place between the United States and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Japanese public attention is focused only on the issue of “DPRK’s denuclearization”. However, considering the joint statement issued at last June’s Singapore Summit, together with subsequent developments, the focus, instead, should be on whether U.S. President Donald Trump keeps his commitment to the agreements and accepts negotiations toward “new U.S.-DPRK relations” and “the building of a peace regime” on the Korean Peninsula.

It is no wonder that the DPRK’s denuclearization draws disproportionate attention in Japan. So far, most of the Japanese mass media reports regarding US-DPRK negotiations on peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are based on one-sided views, focusing solely on DPRK denuclearization, and attributing everything, from the collapse of the agreement to hindrance of the negotiations, to North Korea’s attitude. According to those media, previous promises between the US and DPRK for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula were all promises for “the denuclearization of the DPRK”, and the reason past agreements collapsed was because “DPRK did not keep those promises”.

Considering Japanese media coverage during and after the Singapore Summit, the only matter of concern was whether the DPRK would take steps toward denuclearization. Other agreements made at the Summit have been either ignored or reported in a distorted manner. For example, a news report on the upcoming US-DPRK Summit says, ”the points are whether the Summit leads to North Korea’s denuclearization, and how to deal with North Korea’s request to ease economic sanctions in return for it” [1]. Another report says that the stalemate in negotiations after the Singapore Summit stems from the confrontation between “the US demand that the DPRK submit the entire list of its nuclear facilities”, and “the DPRK refusing to proceed with denuclearization without ‘due reward’ such as sanction relief” [2]. Thus, negotiations between the US and DPRK are portrayed as a matter of “North Korea’s denuclearization” and “relief sanctions by the US to be given in return”.

In addition, last July when North Korea repatriated US soldiers’ remains in accordance with the agreement, the media made malicious speculations about North Korea’s motives by commenting, for example that, “this could be part of their tactics to gain rewards like guarantees for the preservation of their regime” [3]. There was also biased media coverage about an intelligence report stating that the North Korean reactor was in operation [4]. In sum, media reports are conveying the impression that North Korea is unwilling to denuclearize. On the other hand, while avoiding criticism of the US undertaking actions contrary to the agreement, they use language like “stepping back” or “returns” and express concern that Trump’s “easy compromise” may stop North Korea’s denuclearization from happening whenever the Trump administration shows any willingness to accept sanction reliefs or to consider a declaration to end the Korean War, [5].

All these remarks made by the Japanese media are based on an incorrect understanding.
Firstly, to elaborate on the agreement made at last year’s US-DPRK Summit, President Donald Trump “committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK”, and Chairman Kim Jong-Un “reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”. In addition, both leaders made the following four commitments [6]:

- “The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity”;

- “The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula”;

- “Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”; and,

- “The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.”

The two governments agreed not only on “denuclearization” but also on “building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula”, and  “denuclearization” is not just about “nuclear weapons in North Korea,” but about those “on the Korean Peninsula” which include those of the USFK. Therefore, it is incorrect to turn the spotlight solely on “the denuclearization of DPRK”. Moreover, it is accurate to say that “new US-DPRK relations” and “building a peace regime” would require elements including a declaration to end the Korean War, and the launch of negotiations on a peace treaty. From the DPRK’s perspective, the DPRK agreed to denuclearize precisely on the grounds that the war would end and the risk of invasion would no longer exist; it would be impossible for them to accept denuclearization if the US were to maintain its intention to invade the DPRK.

It is true that there may be some use of tactics in implementing the agreement. However, if President Trump would agree to make a declaration to end the Korean War or to start negotiations toward the conclusion of a peace treaty, those acts would constitute fulfillment of the agreements. The terms used by the media, such as “stepping back” or “giving rewards” are inappropriate and unhelpful, leading readers to have false perceptions of the situation.

Next, the writer would like to look back at the actions taken by both parties after the US-DPRK Singapore Summit. The DPRK has been steadily implementing the agreement by dismantling some of its missile facilities and repatriating some US soldiers’ remains. As for the Punggye-ri nuclear test site located in north-eastern DPRK, the DPRK had already dismantled it prior to the summit. Further, the DPRK is making concrete proposals about its next possible actions in exchange for corresponding steps on the part of the US. On the other  side, the US suspended the US-ROK joint military exercise, thereby showing efforts toward the establishment of “a new US-DPRK relationship”. However, the US has taken a number of actions that disregard the agreements. Those include: refusing to negotiate a declaration to end the Korean War or a peace treaty, which are both essential to building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula; conducting joint military exercises involving nuclear bombers last July and September with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces on the Sea of Japan (or East Sea) [7]; and reaffirming, in the joint communique of the US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting last October, that the US will continue to offer the ROK its “nuclear umbrella” [8]. The mass media ought to criticize the US for taking actions in disregard of the agreements, not the DPRK which is fulfilling them.

There are reports indicating that the DPRK is operating the nuclear reactor, and in this connection, Stephen Biegun, the US Special Representative for North Korea, complained about the remarks made by the Director of the US Intelligence Community and the way it was covered by the media. The Director suggested that the DPRK had not given up their nuclear program, but Biegun pointed out, “You cannot divorce the intelligence information from policy. The intelligence information is critical as an underpinning for the policy, but the policy is to address the threat”, expressing frustration over the manner how factual information was assessed. He emphasized that the US administration was conducting diplomacy precisely in order to solve the problem [9]. 

Kim Jong-Un says there will no longer be any reason for the DPRK to possess nuclear weapons once the US threat subsides, and expresses his willingness to take a further step toward denuclearization, on the condition that the US takes “corresponding measures” – which means, of course, the implementation of the joint statement. No observer would doubt the fact that, for the DPRK, nuclear weapons are a means to deter attacks from the United States. Kim Jong-Un’s words that there will no longer be any reason for the DPRK to hold nuclear weapons once the threat of the US subsides, should be taken seriously. Besides, if we turn our attention to inter-Korean developments, the DPRK and ROK issued a de facto declaration to end the war at their summit last September. Two parties of the Korean War, the DPRK and ROK, are no longer willing to continue the war. It should be reasonable to assume that the United States’ acceptance of the negotiations to build a peace regime would lead to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Lastly we will briefly look into past agreements regarding peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.  Media-created misconceptions that “the DPRK has been breaking promises” seems to hinder making reasonable judgements as mentioned above.

Whenever the mass media says that North Korea breaks promises, they usually refer to the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK, as well as of the 2005 Joint Statement made at the Six-Party Talks. Although it is generally believed that the DPRK unilaterally violated these two agreements, in reality the DPRK is not the only one to be blamed for their collapse.

The Agreed Framework between the US and DPRK stipulated, among others, the following commitments: (1) the DPRK will freeze and dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, which enabled the DPRK to produce plutonium; (2) the US will provide the DPRK with two light-water reactors (LWRs), with which it is relatively difficult to extract plutonium; (3) the US will deliver the DPRK 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually as an alternative energy source until the construction of the LWRs is completed; (4) the two countries will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations; (5) the US will neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK; and, (6) the DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will observe the safeguards agreement under the Treaty. These commitments led the two governments to issue a joint statement in October 2000 announcing that “neither government would have hostile intent toward the other”. According to Leon V. Sigal, a well-known expert on North Korean issues [10], the DPRK “made no fissile material whatsoever until 2003” under the Agreed Framework [11]. However, the Republican George W. Bush administration which took power in 2001 submitted its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress in December of that year, in which the DPRK is named as one of the targets for nuclear attack, as it is “actively pursuing its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and missile programs.” Furthermore, in his State of the Union Address in January 2002, President Bush called the DPRK, together with Iraq and Iran, “the Axis of Evil”, trampling on the 2000 joint statement that “neither government would have hostile intent toward the other”. Moreover, the Bush administration cut off the delivery of heavy oil to the DPRK and discarded the Agreed Framework unilaterally on grounds of the DPRK’s suspected uranium enrichment program. It is still unclear as to what was the extent of the details that the US had obtained regarding the DPRK’s suspected uranium enrichment program. According to an historical account [12], the US took the words, meaning “let us discuss”, of Kang Sok-ju, DPRK’s then First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and who was in charge of the matter at the time, as a sign of the DPRK admitting to its uranium enrichment program, but the DPRK has never explicitly acknowledged the existence of such a program.

The 2005 Joint Statement was agreed by six states – China, the DPRK, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the US – at the Six Party Talks, a diplomatic forum set up with the goal of a “verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner”. The Statement contained obligations pertaining to all six states, among which are ones relating to the US and DPRK: (1) the DPRK committed to abandoning nuclear weapons and nuclear programs; (2) the United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons; (3) economic cooperation and energy assistance offered to the DPRK by the other five states; and (4) normalizing US-DPRK relationships. However, just about at the same time, the US government imposed economic sanctions on the DPRK over suspicions of counterfeiting US dollar bills and money laundering. In objection to this apparent breach of the agreement, the DPRK restarted its nuclear development program and carried out its first nuclear test the following year in 2006.

Sometime later the Six-Party Talks resumed and agreed in 2007 on measures to implement the 2005 Joint Statement. In accordance with the agreement, the DPRK suspended its nuclear tests and the operation of its nuclear reactor. However, the talks came to a halt over how to verify DPRK’s denuclearization, and the agreements made at the Six-Party Talks virtually broke down.

As seen above, it cannot be said that the DPRK alone repeatedly broke promises. Rather, there is some clear historical evidence to show that it was the US who broke the promises first. What is more important here is that, if both the US and the DPRK had fulfilled their commitments in good faith, there would have been a chance in the past to realize peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Will President Trump keep his commitment and accomplish a great achievement, or will he miss the opportunity to achieve peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, just like his predecessors? This is where we should keep our eyes fixed in the US-DPRK negotiations, including the upcoming Summit.

Fortunately, President Trump seems to have the willingness to end the Korean War. Despite all his problematic policies such as the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the Iranian nuclear deal, or his migrant and refugee policies, he deserves some praise in terms of holding the first-ever face-to-face US-DPRK summit and thus, contributing to the creation of a trend towards denuclearization and eternal peace on the Korean Peninsula.

However, it will not be easy for Trump to fulfill his commitments. There are a number of people who oppose the ending of the Korean War or who are against the conclusion of a peace treaty with the DPRK, including some within the administration and the ruling Republican Party. This is why strong public opinion is needed to make sure Trump keeps his promises. If we truly hope for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula – which is directly linked with peace in the entire East Asian region – we, the residents of the region, should give him a push to abide by his commitments with the DPRK. The mass media must be challenged to make fair and truthful coverage of the issue which would contribute to the shaping of a strong public opinion. And if the media fails to carry out their responsibilities, we the citizens should raise our voices of protest. (Hajime MAEKAWA)

1　“’Rewards’ for denuclearization” (tentative translation), NHK News 7, February 2, 2019 (in Japanese language)
2　“Possibility for Mr. Trump to give way – US-DPRK Summit to be held on 27th-28th in Vietnam” (tentative translation), The Asahi Shimbun, February 7, 2019 (in Japanese language)
3　“Repatriating US soldiers’ remains will not lead directly to North Korea’s denuclearization” (tentative translation), Yomiuri Shimbun, July 29, 2018 (in Japanese language)
4　For example, NHK News 7, February 13, 2019. The intelligence report states, “With the lack of negotiations, it is no wonder the DPRK continued to produce fissile materials, maintained their missile bases and strengthened them at times.” This part was meant to describe the status quo without any implications to doubt the DPRK’s willingness for denuclearization. However, the NHK News 7 TV program reported, “a US expert released a report indicating the possibility that North Korea last year produced fissile material equivalent to 5-7 nuclear weapons.” Although it added that “the report concludes that North Korea’s threat had gone down largely thanks to the easing of tensions after last year’s Singapore Summit,” it was broadcasted with the subtitles that read: “US experts report that the North Korea has produced fissile material equivalent to 5-7 nuclear bombs.“ This must have caused viewers doubts about the DPRK’s willingness for denuclearization. (Tentative translation)
5　For example, NHK News 7, February 2, 2019. After reporting on Stephen Biegun’s “intention to hold talks with North Korea over issues relating to the benefits they are seeking,” News 7 broadcasted the views of Evans J. R. Revere, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, pointing out the possibility that “President Trump may compromise by giving the DPRK benefits such as easing economic sanctions, not in exchange of denuclearization but merely in exchange of dismantling ICBMs, which is the direct threat for the US,” and warning that “consequently North Korea will be keeping both IRBMs and nuclear weapons”. (Tentative translation)
6　https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/
7　Japan Air Self-Defense Force Press release（July 28, 2018, and September 28, 2018
http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/news/houdou/H30/300728.pdf (in Japanese)
http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/news/houdou/H30/300928.pdf (in Japanese)
8　"Joint Communiqué of the 50th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting," U.S. Department of Defense, October 31, 2018.
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/31/2002057967/-1/-1/1/50TH-SCM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE.PDF
9　U.S. Department of State, "Remarks on DPRK at Stanford University," January 31, 2019.
https://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2019/01/288702.htm
10　Mr. Sigal is Director of a Northeast Asia security project at the Social Science Research Council in New York.
11　Tim Shorrock, “Diplomacy With North Korea Has Worked Before, and Can Work Again,” The Nation, September 5, 2017.
https://www.thenation.com/article/diplomacy-with-north-korea-has-worked-before-and-can-work-again/
12　Hiromichi Umebayashi, “Embody the UN Charter on the Korean Peninsula”(tentative translation), Sekai, April 2018 (in Japanese language)