§The Hanoi Summit Can’t Be Regarded as a Failure. The International Community Should Consider the Potential Benefits of Multitrack Diplomacy, Including China and Russia, in the Phased Lifting of Sanctions
The
second US-DPRK summit held in Hanoi from February 27 to 28 ended without producing
any agreed upon documents. There had seemed to be some change in the US
diplomatic stance prior to the Summit and there were expectations that both counties
would reach agreement on certain mutually acceptable intermediate measures. Despite
such expectations, the second summit ended without any agreed upon documents, and
a number of reviews by the media and experts used words such as “breakdown” or “failure”
in their headlines to describe the Summit.
But,
was it a failure? If we assess what the Hanoi Summit achieved by the extent of the
deepening of mutual understanding which serves as a basis for future
negotiations, the Hanoi Summit did, in fact, achieve significant results.
Considering that the leaders of both countries tend to prefer top-down
decision making, the deepening of mutual understanding would only be possible by
holding such a summit. On the other hand, if we assess achievement in Hanoi by
how the deepening of the mutual understanding would affect future developments
of the situation, the results are difficult to predict. It will take more time
for both countries to digest the outcome of the Hanoi Summit. Factors which determine
how much time will elapse until a third summit takes place are complicated, and
range widely to include issues beyond US-DPRK relations alone.
Given
the circumstance described above, this Watch Report will review the minimal recognition
given to the significance of the Hanoi Summit as this must be clarified in
anticipation of future developments.
(1) Process to
implement Singapore agreement is still on track and has not been derailed
Although
most articles have not underscored this simple fact, it is important to
recognize its significance at the outset. Some suggest that the Singapore
Summit agreement is threatened as basis for future negotiations, based on the fact that the Hanoi Summit ended without
agreements. The current framework of US-DPRK negotiations is based on the joint
statement at the 2018 June 12 Singapore Summit between the US and the DPRK. In
fact, in Hanoi, both countries reconfirmed that their ongoing negotiations are
based on that very framework.
On
the US side, at the press conference right after the summit, US Secretary of
State Pompeo stated that, “Chairman Kim reiterated on his trip he is fully
prepared to denuclearize,” and that the objective of the talks was “to provide,
in return, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and a brighter future
for the North Korean people”. [1]
On
the DPRK side, on the next day after the summit, KCNA reported the outcomes of
the summit with exceptional speed as follows: “The top leaders of the two
countries highly appreciated at the one-on-one talks and extended talks that a
remarkable progress has been made in the historic course of implementing the
Singapore joint statement.” “At the talks they shared the common understanding
that the efforts made by the two sides and proactive measures taken by them to
defuse tensions and preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula and completely
denuclearize it were of great significance in building mutual trust and making
a fundamental turn in the decades-long bilateral relations characterized by
mistrust and antagonism.”[2]
In
summary, the US and the DPRK reaffirmed not only DPRK’s denuclearization, but
also what they committed to in Singapore concerning a bigger framework in which
each of them has responsibility. In Hanoi, it was demonstrated that both of
them have a good understanding of that larger context. However, it should be also
pointed out that US high-ranking officials have not stressed that point enough
in their remarks, which is considered to have been largely caused by the media’s
unbalanced interest.
(2) Both the US and
the DPRK deepened understanding of the bottom line of each other’s demands and the
reasons underlying those demands
Both
the US and DPRK sides had had number of working-level discussions and, as a
result of those discussions, documents to be signed by both leaders were readied
prior to the Hanoi Summit. What we may call, “the unrealized Hanoi agreement”
existed. At the press conference on February 28, US President Trump stated, “I
could’ve signed an agreement today, and then you people would’ve said ‘Oh, what
a terrible deal. What a terrible thing he did.’ … I could’ve 100 percent signed
something today. We actually had papers ready to be signed, but it just wasn’t
appropriate.” [3] In short, Trump’s
judgement that he would not be able to win accolades from the US people made
Trump press harder demands on the DPRK, which the DPRK could not accept, and as
a result, the negotiation ended in a deadlock. [4]
If
it was the case, both the US and the DPRK must have had a precious opportunity to deepen understanding of each other’s bottom-line
demands and reasons behind those demands, through the top leaders’ direct
negotiation.
It
is worth remembering that President Trump stated as follows: “I don’t want to
talk about increasing sanctions. They’re strong. They have a lot of great
people in North Korea that have to live also. And that’s important to me.” “My
whole attitude changed a lot because I got to know, as you know, Chairman Kim
very well. And they have a point of view also.”
There
has been no accurate information regarding what agreement was reached at
working-level, that is, the content of “the unrealized Hanoi agreement”. However,
the fact that such an agreement on intermediate measures existed has great
significance, because the agreement could provide an important basis for future
negotiations between both countries.
To
counter President Trump’s claims at the press conference, on March 1, the DPRK
Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho held an early morning press conference and the DPRK
Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-Hui responded to questions. [5] Then, right after the DPRK press conference, US Secretary of
State Pompeo, and subsequently, a senior US State Department official traveling
with him, held a press conference in Manila. [6] Consolidating all available information, it can be assumed that
the prepared agreement papers on intermediate measures consisted of a complete and
verifiable dismantlement of all of the Yongbyon nuclear center (including a uranium
enrichment facility, a plutonium production reactor and a plutonium reprocessing
facility) and partial lifting of sanctions imposed on the DPRK. Although the
DPRK explained they had demanded the relief from the clauses of five UN
Security Council sanctions resolutions imposed since 2016 that affect the DPRK civil
economy and people’s livelihood, it is unclear if those demands were included
in “the unrealized Hanoi agreement” or they were what the DPRK was trying to
gain at Hanoi Summit. As Ri Yong-Ho stated, the DPRK side was ready to commit
in writing to permanently ending nuclear and ballistic missile tests, and this could
have been included in the prepared agreement.
As
well, there has been no accurate information regarding what President Trump
demanded beyond “the unrealized Hanoi agreement”. President Trump admitted at a
press conference that additional US demands included dismantling of the second uranium
enrichment plant outside Yongbyon, and at the same time, he also said that “we
brought many, many points up.” [7]
Furthermore, a senior US State Department official said the US side even sought
to “impose a complete freeze on their (DPRK’s) weapons of mass destruction
program,” which is not included in the Singapore agreement. [8] It is not surprising that such US demands
resulted in a deadlock of negotiations in Hanoi.
(3) Not only
seeking agreement on intermediate measures through bilateral negotiations between
the US and the DPRK, international discussions regarding legitimacy of the
extent of the sanctions at an intermediate phase are also required
Based
on the analysis above, one of the most plausible and simple scenarios for
future US-DPRK negotiations will be seeking a new point of agreement on
intermediate measures based on the Hanoi Summit. This would involve an approach
to try to strike balance by making additions to “the unrealized Hanoi
agreement.” There can be no new agreement with a lower threshold than “the unrealized
Hanoi agreement.” The following items could be added for a new agreement: ① declaration
to end the Korean War or a peace declaration, ② establishment
of the US liaison office in Pyongyang, both of which were topics reported by
the media before the Hanoi Summit, ③ provisional
agreement on the scale and nature of future US-ROK joint military exercises, a
possible factor for DPRK’s concern, ④ small
scale relaxation of the economic sanctions short of lifting of the 5 UNSC sanctions
resolutions, as was the DPRK’s demand in Hanoi, ⑤ partial
lifting of the sanctions limited to those necessary for inter-Korean economic
cooperation, and ⑥ relaxation of
restrictions on DPRK space and nuclear development programs, on condition of
ensuring peaceful purposes of the programs, and increasing international access
to DPRK nuclear and space facilities.
The
Hanoi Summit demonstrates that along with those efforts, it has become
necessary to examine more fundamental questions regarding relaxation of the economic
sanctions. Sanctions on the DPRK based on UN Security Council resolutions should
involve not only the US, but also all UN member states. Nonetheless, that has
become a core subject in US-DPRK negotiations. In this respect, the international
community should, in particular, increase awareness of the roles played by China
and Russia, which are permanent members of UN Security Council and have close
relations with the DPRK.
Based
on the Panmunjom Declaration and the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration
between the two Koreas, along with the joint statement at the Singapore Summit
between the US and the DPRK, the DPRK has shifted its national policy toward
withdrawal from nuclear and missile development programs which caused the imposition
of economic sanctions. It is assumed in the joint statement and declarations
that the implementation of the DPRK’s policy shift requires both the implementation
of security guarantees commitment to the DPRK, which claims persistent threats
from the US, and the realization of peace and stability on the Korean
Peninsula. The international community understands and accepts such premises
contained in the agreements. Therefore, in order to maintain legitimacy of UN
Security Council resolutions, a discussion must occur about whether phased implementation
of the agreements contained in the documents noted above should be accompanied by
phased lifting of sanctions. If China and Russia, in particular, lead and
propose such a discussion in the international community, it will greatly contribute
to maintaining and strengthening DPRK’s incentive to implement existing joint statements
and declarations. Legitimacy of the approach held by some countries that the current
magnitude of sanctions on the DPRK -- the strongest sanctions ever -- should be
maintained, needs to be objectively reexamined. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)
[1] “Remarks With Traveling Press,” U.S. Department of States, February 28, 2019
[2] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, President Trump Hold Second-day Talks,” KCNA, March 1, 2019 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from date.
[3] “Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference | Hanoi, Vietnam,” The White House, February 28, 2019
[4] At almost the same time as the Hanoi Summit, in the US, the congressional testimony of Michael Cohen, the former lawyer to President Trump, was televised nationally. Mr. Cohen testified about Trump’s alleged criminal activities in details and stunned Americans. It cannot be denied that this simultaneous event affected the Hanoi Summit.
[5] “Full text of a press conference by North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho,” Hangyoreh, March 1, 2019. (in Korean language)
[6] “Senior State Department Official Remarks to Traveling Press,” U.S. Department of States, February 29, 2019
[7] See Note [3].
[8] See Note [6].
No comments:
Post a Comment