§To Prevent Deterioration of the Korean Situation Caused by Military Incidents, International Support to Utilize the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee Is Recommended
The
Watch Project has been concerned about the risk that particular military actions
or incidents would trigger deterioration of the denuclearization and peace
process of the Korean Peninsula, which would have significant impact on Japan
as well [1]. Recent moves related to
the US-ROK joint military exercise “Dong Maeng (Alliance) 19-2” and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s launches of a new-type tactical guided
weapon have demonstrated that such a risk still exists.
Missile launches in
May
Let
us briefly look back on the missile launches conducted by the DPRK last May. On
May 4, the DPRK conducted a “strike drill” with the purpose of testing the operational
capability of large-caliber long-range multiple rocket launchers and tactical
guided weapons [2]. Additionally, on
May 9, the DPRK fired short-range missiles towards the Japan Sea (the East Sea
of Korea). The DPRK insisted that all the launches were part of the “regular
and self-defensive military drill” and criticized those who discussed these
launches and exaggerated their significance [3].
Media
of various countries reacted strongly to DPRK’s missile launches. Leading media
uniformly covered the launches in headline articles containing comments of
experts that the missile firings would be a violation of UN Security Council sanctions
resolutions (UNSCR) or were the first step towards the DPRK’s reverting to its past
brinkmanship, as launches of short-range missiles would eventually escalate
into those of long-range missiles, etc. Responding to the tone of some media
coverage, with the exception of foreign policy hard-liners such as US National
Security Advisor John Bolton, both US and South Korean authorities made efforts
to calm the situation. For instance, on May 22, in his speech at the Land
Forces Pacific (LANPAC) Symposium in Hawaii [4], General Robert Abrams, commander of US Forces Korea, said that
recent drills by North Korea including missile launches are part of its regular
military operations and “have not changed the palpable reduction of tensions on
the peninsula”. Additionally, on May 25, US President Trump said in a Twitter
post that, “North Korea fired off some small weapons, which disturbed some of
my people, and others, but not me. I have confidence that Chairman Kim will
keep his promise to me” [5]. The
South Korean government, while recognizing that the DPRK fired short-range
missiles, nevertheless suspended its judgement to the end whether those missiles
were ballistic missiles subjected to UNSCRs [6].
As
described above, DPRK’s missile launches in May provoked a large international reaction,
much of which inflamed public opinion to conclude that the DPRK was trying to
break its commitments again. This circumstance risked having negative impact on
negotiations for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, the leading
figures of the US government and the South Koran government made efforts to calm
down the situation.
The power
demonstration fire of missiles to destroy F35 of South Korean Air Force
Regarding
the two short-range missiles launched by the DPRK in the early morning of July
25, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the launch was “the
power demonstration fire of a new-type tactical guided weapon” and “part of the
power demonstration to send a solemn warning to south Korean military
warmongers,” conducted under the guidance of Kim Jong Un [7]. The distinguishing feature of the missile launch was that it
was conducted targeting South Korea.
There
were two direct motivations for the missile launch of July 25. Both of them are
derived from South Korea’s security policy which has long been maintained under
the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the US and the Republic of Korea. One of the
motivations is the arrival of two more ultramodern F35A stealth fighter jets on
July 15 which Republic of Korea (ROK) Air Force bought from the US [8]. The other is the US-ROK joint
military exercise, “Dong Maeng 19-2”, which is about to be conducted in August.
Regarding these two motivations, the DPRK said that both violate the “Agreement
on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military
Domain,” Annex of the September 2018 Pyongyang Joint Declaration.
In
coverage of the missile launch of July 25, a large number of Japanese media referred
only to the latter issue of the US-ROK joint military exercise. DPRK’s strong
protest against resumption of the US-ROK joint military exercise in the
situation where the delay of US-DPRK working-level negotiations was drawing
close attention was probably the reason why the latter issue was highlighted. However,
in reality, the former issue bears more difficult implications on both the
DPRK’s security and future peace and denuclearization process of the Korean
Peninsula. In fact, attention should be paid to the fact that right before the
new-type missiles were launched, the DPRK had warned that they would develop
and test the armaments to destroy the F35As on land.
On
July 11, four days before two more F-35A stealth fighter jets arrived at Cheongju
Air Force Base in South Korea, the Policy Research Director, Institute for
American Studies of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the stealth
fighter an “invisible lethal weapon” and insisted that its additional
deployment “is aimed at securing military supremacy over the neighboring
countries in the region and especially opening a ‘gate’ to invading the north
in time of emergency on the Korean peninsula.” The Director warned that, “We,
on our part, have no other choice but to develop and test the special armaments
to completely destroy the lethal weapons reinforced in South Korea” [9]. The test firing of July 25 is considered
to be conducted in order to test those very special armaments mentioned above.
The KCNA article of July 26 said that a new-type of tactical guided weapon which
was test fired has “the specific features of the low-attitude gliding and
leaping flight orbit, which would be hard to intercept” [10]. It is safe to say that the DPRK conducted “the power
demonstration fire” of missiles which are able to avoid interception by
ballistic missile defense systems deployed in South Korea and can attack targets
on land (namely, F35As on the air base).
Therefore,
while the US adopted a wait-and-see attitude, taking the position that the new-type
tactical guided weapon isn’t a new threat, the ROK Defense Force made no secret
that they recognized DPRK’s new military capability as a threat to them [11]. However, both the US and the South
Korean governments maintained their similarly restrained stance as they had in
May when they tried not to let the DPRK’s firing to have a negative impact on ongoing
US-DPRK talks.
DPRK’s strong
criticism against the US-ROK joint military exercise
DPRK’s
missile launch in July can be interpreted as DPRK’s reaction to the ROK Armed
Forces’ introduction of new weapons and modernization from two perspectives:
faithful implementation of inter-Korean Summit Declarations and DPRK’s military
countermeasures.
Regarding
the issue of holding the US-ROK joint military exercise, “Dong Maeng 19-2”, the
name of which was later changed to ease the DPRK’s opposition, the DPRK
targeted the US and sent a message of strong criticism while linking it to the
plan of US-DPRK working-level talks. This reflects the situation where in backroom
diplomatic negotiations to resume working-level talks, no unconventional proposal
based on “a new method of calculation” [12]
from the US side which the DPRK has called for has been made. To obtain such a proposal
based on “a new method of calculation,” the DPRK has been trying to remind the
US of the significance of the US commitments in Singapore to suspend the US-ROK
joint military exercises.
On
July 16, a spokesperson for the DPRK Foreign Ministry made the following
counterargument against the explanation by the US and South Korea that the
“Dong Maeng 19-2” is different from past US-ROK military exercises, both in its
scale and intention [13]. “It is an
actual drill and a rehearsal of war aimed at militarily occupying our Republic
by surprise attack and rapid dispatch of large-scale reinforcements under the
cloak of ‘containment’ and ‘counter-offensive’ in time of emergency.”
Additionally, after mentioning DPRK’s discontinuation of the nuclear and ICBM
tests and US suspension of joint military exercises, the spokesperson stated
that although they are not an agreement inscribed on paper, they are “commitments
made to improve bilateral relations.” He described the current situation where,
in spite of that, only the DPRK has kept its commitment while the US has been
breaking its commitments, and warned as follows: “With the US unilaterally
reneging on its commitments, we are gradually losing our justifications to
follow through on the commitments we made with the US as well.” Based on that statement
by the DPRK, a large number of media reported that the DPRK implied that “if
the US-ROK joint military exercise is conducted, it will resume the nuclear and
ICBM tests.”
Although
the spokesperson for the DPRK Foreign Ministry didn’t refer to the phrase
“working-level negotiations” in the statement, the spokesperson mentioned the
Joint Statement of the US-DPRK summit in Singapore which is the basis of the working-level
negotiations, and warned that continuation of the US-DPRK negotiations to
realize the Joint Statement is at risk.
The
DPRK has strongly opposed the US-ROK joint military exercises before “Dong Maeng19-2.”
From March 4 to 12, when the joint military exercise “Dong Maeng 19-1” (called
just Dong Maeng at that time) which replaced the conventional exercise “Key
Resolve” was conducted, the DPRK stated that the exercise “aims at examining
wartime operation plan through computer-aided simulation of ‘the north’s
all-out invasion of the south’ and increasing the capabilities to fight a war,”
and criticized that circumstance by saying, “The ill-boding moves of the (S)outh
Korean military authorities and the US are a wanton violation of the DPRK-US
joint statement and the north-south declarations in which the removal of
hostility and tensions were committed to, and an open challenge to the
aspiration and desire of all Koreans and the international community for peace
and stability on the Korean Peninsula” [14].
The
DPRK’s critical tone against the US-ROK joint military exercises has almost
remained unchanged since March. Even if both the US and South Korea repeat
their verbal explanations regarding the scale-back or changes in the aims of
the joint exercises, the situation in which the conducting of military exercises
will cause DPRK’s opposition will not change unless some kind of measures for
risk management are devised. This issue will remain a time bomb which would put
the US-DPRK negotiations on peace and denuclearization at risk.
Expectation for the
Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee
With
the missile launch, the DPRK sent a strong message, criticizing of what it
believes is the double dealing behavior of the South Korean chief executives.
The DPRK points out that while extending “a handshake of peace” with the DPRK
as a standard-bearer of the peace on the Korean Peninsula, behind the scenes South
Korea is deploying the F35A and holding the US-ROK joint military exercise
“Dong Maeng 19-2”. What is in question here is how to resolve the negative legacy
from the past, such as existing plans for an arms buildup symbolized by
contracts to buy 40 stealth fighter jets and 4 unmanned surveillance aircraft,
Global Hawk, or that the US-ROK joint military exercises will continue, in the
changing situation where inter-Korean dialogue has been making progress. The
denuclearization transition process could take an extended period of time. The
international community, hoping for success of the peace and denuclearization
process on the Korean Peninsula, needs to work together and overcome the risk
of mishandling challenges related to military issues that could occur during
that transition period.
To
consider this issue, establishment of “the Inter-Korean Joint Military
Committee” agreed upon in the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic
Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain” which was adopted as an Annex of the
Pyongyang Joint Declaration on September 19, 2018, will serve as a starting
point [15].
In
the Agreement, South and North Korea agreed to completely cease all hostile
acts against each other in every domain, including land, air and sea that are
the source of military tension and conflict. In order realize this, the two
sides agreed to have consultations through the ‘Inter-Korean Joint Military
Committee’ on matters including large-scale military exercises and military
buildup aimed at each other, various forms of blockade, interdiction and
obstruction of navigation as well as reconnaissance activities against conducted
each other.
On
June 26, 2019, South Korean President Moon Jae-in replied to questions in a joint
written interview by Yonhap and six global news agencies. He stated his
expectations of the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee, as follows: “If
inter-Korean agreement in the military domain is properly implemented, it will
allow us to proceed to the stage of further enhancing transparency concerning
military postures by exchanging pertinent information through the Inter-Korean Joint
Military Committee and observing military drills and training. Furthermore, in
line with progress in denuclearization, we will be able to advance to the point
of disarming threatening weapons such as the long-range North Korean artillery
targeting our capital Seoul and the short-range missiles that both Koreas
possess.” [16]
Unfortunately,
the DPRK hasn’t demonstrated a positive attitude towards use of the Inter-Korean
Joint Military Committee. Possible reasons for this may include, that given the
slow progress of US-DPRK negotiations, the DPRK has had no option but to focus
on the development of US-DPRK talks and invest human resources in this
domain. As well, the DPRK has doubts
about the independence of South Korea in the US-ROK military alliance for years.
To overcome this circumstance, utilization of the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee,
based on international initiative, should be explored as a matter of urgency.
For instance, a possible initiative, with US prior agreement, would be an international
monitoring team consisting of countries that the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee
can agree upon with a mission to observe US-ROK joint military exercises. In
such an initiative, ASEAN member states which have friendly diplomatic ties with
the DPRK will play a valuable role. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)
PS: Although this
Watch Report was written before DPRK’s missile launch on July 31, 2019, the
main point of this Report remains unchanged.
[1] For
example, Watch Report No. 4, “Unnecessary Tension Should Not Be Created About Military
Exercises. Military Confidence-Building Requires Gradual Progress,” January 21,
2019
[2] ”Supreme
Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Frontline Area and
on Eastern Front,” KCNA, May 5, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from date.
[3] ”DPRK
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Criticizes Some Forces for Making Issue of Its
Routine and Self-Defensive Military Drill,” KCNA, May 8, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article from
date.
[4]
Speech by Robert Abrams USFK commander at Land Forces Pacific Symposium in
Honolulu
[5] Trump’s
tweet on May 25, 2019
[6] ”(LEAD)
S. Korea, U.S., Japan vow cooperation for N.K. denuclearization,” Yonhap News
Agency, June 2, 2019
[7] ”Supreme
Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Power Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided
Weapon,” KCNA, July 26, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article
by date.
[8] ”Two
more F-35A stealth fighters arrive in S. Korea,” Yonhap News Agency, July 16,
2019
[9] ”S.
Korean Authorities Slammed,” KCNA, July 11, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the
article by date.
[10] see
note [7]
[11] ”Ballistic
missile, gap in assessment between the U.S. and ROK (Tentative),” The Asahi
Shimbun, July 27, 2019
[12] On
April 12, 2019, Kim Jong Un called on the U.S. to approach DPRK with “a new way
of calculation” in a policy speech. KCNA, April 14, 2019
http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf Search for the article in the page
‘Supreme Leader’s Activities’ from date
[13] ”U.S.
Hit for Seeking to Wage Joint Military Drill against DPRK,” KCNA, July
16, 2019
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the
article by date.
[14] ”S.
Korea-U.S. Starts New Joint Military Drill,” KCNA, March 7, 2019
http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf Search for the article by date.
[15] “Agreement
on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military
Domain” The National Committee on North Korea
[16] ”Joint
Written Interview with President Moon Jae-in by Yonhap and Six Global News Agencies,” June 26, 2019
