§The Reopening of US-North Korea Talks Should Seek Small Deals, Not a Big One
On
June 30, US President Donald Trump and DPRK Chairman Kim Jong-un surprised the
world with their electrifying third summit in Panmunjom, right on the military
boundary between North and South Korea. Four months after the summit in Hanoi,
Vietnam, where they failed to reach an agreement about the process of denuclearization
and the lifting of sanctions, a wide disparity persists between the positions
of the US and the DPRK. Concerns have been expressed about the reopening of talks,
with worries that President Trump, with his eyes set on the next year’s election,
may give up his “big deal,” demanding the complete denuclearization of DPRK in
one stroke, and instead resign himself to “small deals,” thereby accepting the DPRK’s
status quo. However, the accumulation of those “small deals,” in fact, provides
a key to negotiations for the complete denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.
Since
the Panmunjom Summit, voices within the Trump administration have been
reported, showing the United States’ flexible stance toward the DPRK. For
example, Stephen Biegun, US State Department Special Representative for North
Korea Policy, said in his talks on June 28 with Lee Do-hoon, Korean Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security
Affairs, that the US “is ready to hold constructive talks with the North to
move the commitments of the June 12 Singapore Joint Declaration forward in a
simultaneous and parallel manner” [1]. Also, Mr. Biegun reportedly told US
media – on the condition it is kept off the record – that the US government was
considering plans in which the DPRK would implement a “complete freeze” of its WMD programs, and in return the US would provide humanitarian aid or expand
people-to-people talks between the two countries [2]. In addition, the
NHK reported on one of the minority opinions within the Trump administration.
According to the report, a plan was being developed as a possible breakthrough,
in which the US conducts partial and temporary lifting of economic sanctions
while it assesses the DPRK’s behavior [3].
Regarding
these flexible attitudes of the Trump administration, some observers fear that DPRK’s
complete denuclearization might be left behind. For example in Japan, the
anchor of NHK’s major news program expressed his concern that “Trump might resign
himself to a small outcome, a small deal, in face of his Presidential election”
[4].
However,
in order to break the stalemate after the Hanoi Summit, there is, in Biegun’s
words, a “need for a flexible approach” [5]. In his April 12 policy speech, Kim
Jong-un also argued that “both sides should give up their unilateral terms and
seek a constructive solution that meets each other’s interests” [6]. Biegun, who takes charge of the matter at the working-level,
understands the situation and shows a flexible attitude by stating – at least officially
– that the US is ready to implement the “simultaneously and in parallel” agreements
made in Singapore (i.e., to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations; to build a
lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula; to work toward complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and to recover POW/MIA remains
including the immediate repatriation of those already identified), which is
commendable enough in itself. The problem is whether future negotiations can
reach a specific common ground acceptable to both parties, for the DPRK is
seeking “reciprocal and phased” implementation.
What
is critical in finding a common ground is how to remove the threat the DPRK
senses from the United States. The importance of this is evidenced by the fact
that, promises aiming at the assurance of DPRK’s security (not merely the
protection of its regime), such as non-aggression of the DPRK, or improved
US-DPRK relations, are contained not only in the Singapore agreement but in all
major nuclear agreements on the Korean Peninsula, including the 1994 Agreed
Framework between the USA and DPRK, and the 2005 Joint Statement of the
Six-party Talks. In a situation where the Korean War has not ended and where
there is no trust between the US and DPRK, it is inconceivable to think of the
DPRK, which has been developing nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence
against US aggression, abandoning its nuclear weapons before the threat is
removed. It is the United States’ “hostile policy” against the DPRK that is impeding
DPRK’s action toward denuclearization. The issue of Korean Peninsula’s denuclearization
mostly boils down to whether the US abandons its hostile policy.
With
the above in mind, we would like to identify the focus of the negotiations to
come, based on “the unrealized Hanoi agreement”, a draft text prepared but not
signed at the Hanoi Summit.
Watch Report No.7 took note of this
“unrealized Hanoi agreement”, and proposed the following six interim measures that
should be worth seeking in the coming negotiations: [7]
(1) a
declaration to end the Korean War or a peace declaration;
(2) the
establishment of a US liaison office in Pyongyang;
(3) a
provisional agreement on the scale and nature of future US-ROK joint military
exercises, a possible cause for DPRK’s concern;
(4) a moderate
relaxation of the economic sanctions short of lifting of the 5 UNSC sanctions
resolutions;
(5)
partial lifting of the sanctions limited to those necessary for inter-Korean
economic cooperation; and,
(6) the
relaxation of restrictions on DPRK space and nuclear development programs, on
condition of ensuring peaceful purposes of the programs, and increasing
international access to DPRK nuclear and space facilities.
Regarding
the end-of-war declaration (1), it is extremely unreasonable that the Korean
Peninsula is still in a state of war, as was indicated symbolically by Trump
and Kim Jong-un shaking hands on the military border at the last summit meeting.
The DPRK and ROK have already issued a de facto end-of-war declaration,
by signing the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom
Declaration in the Military Domain”, a document annexed to the 2018 September
Pyongyang Joint Declaration between the two Koreas. Residents of the Korean Peninsula
do not want war. Now that the U.S. president and the DPRK leader – the enemies
– shook hands on the military boundary, there is no reason to continue the war.
Although some people who do not want to withdraw the U.S. Forces Korea seem to
oppose an end-of-war declaration, the USFK issue should not be an obstacle to
the ending of the Korean War, since – as ROK President Moon Jae-in stated
clearly in a recent written interview – Kim Jong-un “has never linked
denuclearization (of the Korean Peninsula) with the ROK-U.S. alliance or a
pullout of the United States Forces Korea” [8].
The
establishment of a US liaison office in Pyongyang (2) can be realized
relatively easily if the Korean War ends. In fact, Biegun refers to this in the
above-mentioned off-the-record talks with the press [9]. The existence of US facilities and property in Pyongyang should
serve as assurance that the US would not attack the DPRK.
With
regard to a provisional agreement on US-ROK joint military exercises etc. (3),
it is necessary to avoid a situation in which military exercises and weapons
development on the part of either the US or ROK may cause distrust of the DPRK
and hinder the negotiations, given that currently mutual trust among the US,
ROK and DPRK is lacking. Moreover, a tripartite military agreement with the US
in the loop is also needed for the sake of preventing an accidental crash or
other military-related incident.
As
for economic sanctions relief (4), it is necessary to find a middle ground
acceptable to both parties. This is because the DPRK demanded the livelihood sanctions
relief of UN Security Council resolutions as partial relief at the Hanoi
Summit, whereas the US took it as “a de facto overall relaxation”. One could
begin with sanctions relief limited to north-south economic cooperation, as in
(5). Although the ROK anxiously looks forward to the implementation of
inter-Korean economic cooperation, the economic sanctions are preventing it
from happening, thereby harming north-south relationships. An early lifting of
sanctions on inter-Korean economic cooperation would be desirable. As the Watch
Report repeatedly pointed out (in No.8 and No.9), the UN Security Council’s
sanction resolutions mostly contain provisions stipulating that it is ready to
strengthen, modify or lift the measures according to the DPRK’s status of
compliance with the resolutions. We would like to reiterate the necessity for
the international community to consider reviewing the sanctions so that those
sanctions do not impede the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In
particular, the international community must take seriously the fact that the
sanctions are affecting the United Nations assistance operations and are imposing
great impact on the lives of ordinary North Koreans [10].
As
for peaceful uses of outer space and nuclear energy by the DPRK (6), if the
DPRK returns to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and is placed under diligent international
inspection, it naturally follows that the DPRK should be granted the right to the
peaceful uses of outer space and nuclear energy without delay.
There
should be other possible interim measures toward the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. At any rate, the re-opening of working-level talks should build
consensus on concrete and feasible measures, implement them steadily, thereby
removing the US threat claimed by the DPRK, building trustworthy relationships
between the two countries, and creating an environment enabling the DPRK to
denuclearize.
Such
a step-by-step approach to denuclearization does not contradict complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. A step-by-step approach is the first rung
on the ladder to complete denuclearization and does not mean admitting DPRK’s
possession of nuclear weapons. Biegun’s off-the-record “freeze” plan is merely
“the beginning of the process” of denuclearization, as Morgan Ortagus, US State
Department Spokesperson said later at a press conference [11].
In
order for President Trump to show his difference from his predecessors, he needs
to abandon his hostile policy, assure DPRK’s security, and pave the way to complete
denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. For that to happen, Trump needs to
overcome his fellow hard-liners as well as the public opinion thinking of a small
deal as a “compromise”. Civil society should act to build a rational public
opinion, and to sustain and pursue the opportunity generated by President Trump.
(Hajime MAEKAWA & Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)
[1]
“U.S. ready for talks with N.K. to make 'simultaneous and parallel' progress:
nuke envoy,” Yonhap
News Agency, June 28, 2019
[2]
“Scoop: Trump's negotiator signals flexibility in North Korea talks,” AXIOS,
July 3, 2019
[3]
Remarks made by Hideki Yui, Chief Correspondent of NHK’s Washington D.C.
Bureau, at the “News Watch 9” program broadcasted on June 28, 2019.
[4]
Remarks made by anchorman Yoshio Arima, at the “News Watch 9” broadcasted on July
1, 2019.
[5]
“‘Door is Wide Open’ for Negotiations with North Korea, US Envoy Says,” Atlantic
Council, June 19, 2019
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/door-is-wide-open-for-negotiations-with-north-korea-us-envoy-says
[6] KCNA, April 14, 2019
http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf Search for the article in the page ‘Supreme Leader’s Activities’ from date.
[6] KCNA, April 14, 2019
http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf Search for the article in the page ‘Supreme Leader’s Activities’ from date.
[8]
“Joint Written Interview with President Moon Jae-in by Yonhap and Six Global
News Agencies,” The Republic of Korea Cheong Wa Dae, June 26, 2019
[9]
Same as [2]. In his informal talks with the press, Biegun proposes to build
liaison offices in the capitals of one another, in return for the DPRK freezing
its WMD development program.
[10]
For example: World Food Programme (WFP), “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) - FAO/WFP Joint Rapid Food Security Assessment,” May 2019, 14p
[11]
“Department Press Briefing,” U.S. Department
of State, July 9, 2019
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