Watch Report No.2

Watch Report No.2      Dec. 10, 2018

§Value of the US-ROK Working Group Can Be Enhanced by ROK’s Leadership and Its Ensuring Close Communication with DPRK
The first meeting of the US-ROK Working Group comprised of officials in charge of practical negotiations for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was held in Washington DC on November 20, 2018. The South Korean delegation was headed by Lee Do-hoon, Republic of Korea Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs. Jeong Yeon-doo, South Korea’s Director-General for North Korean Nuclear Affairs, also participated in the meeting with others. The US delegation was headed by Stephen Biegun, US State Department Special Representative for North Korea Policy. In addition to Biegun, Alex N. Wong, Deputy Assistant Secretary for North Korea in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mark Lambert, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for North Korea, and Allison Hooker, the National Security Council’s Director for Korea, were scheduled to participate. Names of actual participants have not been confirmed. [1] The heads of the two sides’ delegations co-chaired the meeting.

According to the US State Department’s press release after the first meeting, “The working group further strengthened close US-ROK coordination on efforts to achieve our shared goal of final, fully verified denuclearization of the DPRK,” and “The participants discussed complete denuclearization and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions and inter-Korean cooperation.” [2]

The launch of the US-ROK Working Group means not only the official establishment of a framework to coordinate on North Korea at a working level which follows upon summits and high-level meetings, but it has greater significance.

An historic process to implement last year’s Panmunjom Declaration at the Inter-Korean Summit and the joint statement at the Singapore Summit between the US and the DPRK, two independent but inseparable agreements, is underway. In this process, implementation based on inter-Korean dialogue has achieved some progress, however, negotiations between the US and the DPRK have not seen any concrete progress as of yet. While the DPRK has unilaterally taken some intermediate measures, so far the US has not taken corresponding intermediate measures, nor has it expressed clearly if it is for or against the process itself in which both sides take reciprocal interim measures. If discussions between the US and the DPRK remain deadlocked, sooner or later discussions between North and South Korea will reach a deadlock as well. The deadlock could occur because it is expected that the ROK will face issues in which it is unable to ignore US intentions under the US-ROK alliance, especially those related to military cooperation and economic sanctions.  This could be considered an obstacle to North and South Korea reaching further agreements in the future.

If the ROK government wants to break the stalemate, it will have to make adjustments between the following two approaches, which may seem contradictory in some respects.

① Improvement of inter-Korean relations, especially potential inter-Korean economic cooperation accompanying it, will strengthen North Korea’s incentive for denuclearization. In addition, development of interdependent economic relations between North and South Korea is an important pillar in peace building and an essential condition for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as well. This approach has basically been advocated by the Moon Jae-in administration of South　Korea.

② On the other hand, advancement of economic cooperation between North and South Korea without any progress in North’s denuclearization will weaken pressure generated by international economic sanctions for DPRK denuclearization. It is undesirable that inter-Korean relations improve at a pace inconsistent with the US plan to seek agreement between the US and North Korea, while maintaining pressure on the North. This has basically been US President Donald Trump’s approach.

For both approaches, setting up the US-ROK Working Group is considered to have been necessary. The actual background which led to launch of the Working Group was as follows:

When Stephen Biegun, Special Representative for North Korea, visited the ROK on October 28 to 30, the establishment of a US-ROK working group was agreed upon between the US and the ROK. During the regular briefing on October 31, the Blue House, the executive office of the ROK president, explained that a working group was going to be launched with an objective specifically to discuss a general process for denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula. [3] If setting up the working group had been proposed by Biegun, it could be assumed that the US feared at the time that the inter-Korean dialogue was developing too fast and therefore, requested that South Korea establish the US-ROK working group as a framework to control the pace of this situation. However, a senior official in the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied this assumption. On October 31, the senior official said, “We (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) are the ones who suggested it and the discussions have been taking place for several months.” [4] At the same time (on October 30, EST), during the press conference at US State Department, when asked, “Do you think South and North Korea relations are going too fast rather than denuclearization?” State Department Deputy Spokesperson Robert Palladino answered, “We are – we’re closely coordinating on an almost daily basis with our Republic of Korea ally as well as with our Japanese ally, and that’s at all levels of government.” [5] Palladino did not directly answer the question about the pace, but he basically replied that there had been no discord between the US and South Korea as feared, even without the establishment of the working group. However, on the other hand, on the morning of the day of the first meeting of the Working Group, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo explained, “We have made clear to the Republic of Korea that we do want to make sure that peace on the peninsula and the denuclearization of North Korea aren’t lagging behind the increase in the amount of inter-relationship between the two Koreas. We view them as tandem, as moving forward together. We view them as important parallel processes, and that the working group is designed to make sure they continue to remain that way.” [6] In summary, it can be concluded that South Korea planned the US-ROK working group based on the approach ①, which also met US needs based on approach ②, and as a result, the working group became an official arrangement.

In evaluating the future role of the US-ROK Working Group, it will be a key whether the DPRK will be able to evaluate future behavior of the working group dispassionately as is analyzed above, while maintaining communications with the ROK. The North Korean media source, “Uriminzokkiri,” contended that the US-ROK working group was established to intervene in North-South relations, which had been heading for improvement and development and to block this movement [7], and also it demanded that the ROK fully implement the June 15th (2018) North-South Joint Declaration based on the principle of self-determination of the Korean people. [8] It is quite understandable that North Korea media would take such a view. To prevent the working group from having negative impact on inter-Korean discussions, it is essential to maintain close communication in good faith at the North and South Korean governmental level.

In this regard, the first meeting of the US-ROK Working Group produced a favorable result. Right after the meeting in Washington DC, South Korean head of delegation Lee Do-hoon told correspondents from South Korea that “the US made clear its full and strong support for the joint survey of inter-Korean railways.” [9] This means that the ROK’s explanation of the issue to the US prompted it to give the go-ahead to the long-awaited joint survey between North and South Korea. Namely, by engaging in discussions on sanctions’ exemptions for the joint railway surveys at the meeting of the working group on December 20, deliveries of materials from South Korea necessary to conduct the railway survey in the North were permitted, as were exemptions from not only UN Security Council resolution on sanctions, but also from US sanctions on North Korea. [10], [11] Regarding the UN Security Council resolution, on November 23, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea agreed to exempt the joint surveys from UN Security Council sanctions.

The two Koreas originally planned to conduct the joint railway surveys at the end of August 2018. However, as the United Nations Command didn’t give them permission to cross the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), they could not carry out the joint survey as they had planned. [12] This time, it was decided to conduct an 18-day joint survey of the North Korean railway sections to reconnect inter-Korean railways from November 30 to December 17. On November 30, a train with an ROK survey team, loaded with 55 thousand liters of light oil exempted from sanctions [13], departed for North Korea. (Kana HIRAI and Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] Hwang, Joon-bum, "US voices full support for a joint survey for linking South and North Korean railways," Hankyoreh, Nov. 22, 2018
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/871359.html
[2] US Department of State Media Note, “U.S.-ROK Working Group”, November 20, 2018
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/11/287492.htm
[3] Park Min-hee, "S. Korea-US working group on denuclearization negotiations convenes in Washington," Hankyoreh, Nov. 20, 2018
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/871036.html
[4] Noh Ji-won and Hwang Joon-bum, "S. Korea and US to establish working group for N. Korea’s denuclearization and US measures" Hankyoreh, Nov. 1, 2018
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/868408.html
[5] U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing - October 30, 2018,” October 30, 2018
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2018/10/287016.htm
[6] Michael R. Pompeo, “Remarks to the Press,” November 20, 2018
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/11/287487.htm
[7] The Uriminzokkiri (e-edition), Nov. 11, 2018
http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?ptype=ugisa1&no=1161875&pagenum=1 (in Korean)
[8] The Uriminzokkiri (e-edition), Nov. 9, 2018
http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?ptype=ugisa1&no=1161811&pagenum=8
[9] See note [1].
[10] "(3rd LD) U.N. grants sanctions exemption for inter-Korean railway survey," Yonhap News Agency, Nov 24, 2018
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20181124000253315?section=search
[11] Choe Sang-Hun, “North and South Korea Get U.N.’s Go-Ahead to Study Joint Rail Project,” The New York Times, Nov. 24, 2018
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/24/world/asia/north-south-korea-rail-un.html
[12] "(LEAD) Koreas agree to begin joint railway inspection on Friday" Yonhap News Agency, Nov. 28, 2018
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20181128007851325?section=search
[13] Kim Bo-eun, "South Korean train starts joint survey of North Korean railways” THE KOREA TIMES, Nov 30, 2018
http://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=259637