Watch Report No.31

  Watch Report No.31   　April 26, 2021

§In the Ongoing US Consultations with Japan and South Korea over the Biden Administration’s Policy Toward the DPRK, Each Countries’ Independent Vision for Northeast Asia Region Is Being Questioned

The Biden administration began on January 20, 2021. Only a few months have passed since then, and for the time being, it remains to be seen if the administration will regard the Singapore agreement as basis of future US-DPRK negotiations, in which the US committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK and the DPRK committed to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the US and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Based on the remarks and documents of the Biden administration since its inauguration, it can be assumed that the administration attaches importance to the DPRK (North Korea) issues. It has been trying to pursue a certain kind of engagement policy rather than ignoring the issues and has consulted both the Japanese and ROK (South Korea) governments in developing its DPRK policy. 

In the MSNBC TV program aired on February 1, US Secretary of State Blinken said that, “I would be the first to acknowledge that it (North Korea’s nuclear issue) is a problem that’s gotten worse across administrations,” and admitted that regardless of Democrat or Republican administrations, US government diplomacy has not achieved anything. He also said that, “So the first thing the President … has asked us to do is to review the policy to make sure that we’re using the most effective tools to advance the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to deal with the problem,” [1] and he also stated that he would review the policy with US allies. On January 19, in his confirmation hearings, Blinken said that “(We would) (l)ook at what options we have … (T)hat starts with consulting closely with our allies and partners, particularly with South Korea and with Japan and others” [2]. February 19, the US, South Korea and Japan held a director-general level meeting via video conference and agreed to deepen cooperation among the countries.

The Biden administration’s basic stance to emphasize its consultations with South Korea and Japan sounds reasonable. However, the purpose of consultations is not necessarily self-evident. In reality, the policies toward the DPRK of the current South Korean government and that of Japanese government are fundamentally different. Especially, in relation to the trend on the Korean Peninsula favorable for peace and denuclearization since 2018, the government of Japan has not even been a player that has actively engaged in the issues as they have evolved. Given the fact that the US and South Korea have undoubtedly been playing important roles in changes since 2018, what is the real meaning of the US new administration’s policy statement asserting that it will to closely cooperate with both Japan and South Korea on US-DPRK negotiations? That’s the main topic of this Report.

The Moon Jae-in administration’s expectations of the US

As widely known, starting in 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in has made a major contribution to new developments of inter-Korean relations and US-DPRK relations. Especially, for President Moon, the establishment of a peace regime which would replace the 1953 Korean War Armistice has been an unshakable goal. 

President Moon hopes that the Biden administration also regards the Singapore agreement as a starting point for future US-DPRK dialogues. On January 18, 2021, during a New Year’s press conference held in the Chunchugwan Hall of the Blue House, President Moon said, “With the inauguration of the Biden administration, I believe it has provided a turning point to start over the US-DPRK dialogue and inter-Korean dialogue,” and “future dialogue should be based on the achievements of the Trump administration and build upon it” [3]. 

Additionally, on January 20, the day of the Biden’s inauguration, Moon Jae-in picked as his new foreign minister Chung Eui-yong who visited the DPRK as Presidential Special Envoy to North Korea in 2018 and prepared the US-DPRK Singapore summit.

On March 18, in the joint press conference held following ROK-US Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”), answering the question from a reporter, “Do you believe that the US needs to respect the Singapore agreement?,” Chung said, “Singapore agreement, from the Korean Government’s perspective, is a confirmation of fundamental principles to resolve the US-North Korea relations, establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula, and denuclearization, though it needs to be considered seriously,” [4] and stressed the fundamental importance of the Singapore agreement, while avoiding remarks, in the presence of Blinken, US Secretary of State, that could be taken as a demand towards the US.

The Japanese government has no new policy plan

Although the Japanese government acknowledged that the US-DPRK Singapore agreement was in the right direction, [5] in reality, it has been emphasizing continued pressure on the DPRK by imposing sanctions based on United Nations Security Council resolutions and has maintained a stance of “give up nuclear weapons first and sanctions-relief comes later.” According to a memoir written by John Bolton, former National Security Advisor to US President Donald Trump, prior to the Singapore summit, former Japanese Prime Minister Abe advised Trump not to trust Chairman Kim and tried to block developments at the summit [6].

The Suga administration, which began in September 2020, hasn’t changed this stance of relying solely on sanctions [7]. In his New Year’s press conference held on January 13, Prime Minister Suga repeated a conventional stance, saying that, “Japan seeks to normalize its relation with North Korea, through comprehensively resolving outstanding issues of concerns, such as abductions, nuclear and missile issues and settling the unfortunate past in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration” [8]. It is a sure bet that the Japanese government’s stance following the start of the Biden administration is a continuation of that statement of Prime Minister Suga. In the press conference following Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2+2) held on March 16, Foreign Minister Motegi said, “(A)s we strive for realization of complete denuclearization of North Korea, we confirmed the importance of complete implementation of UNSC resolutions and confirmed that cooperation will continue amongst the three countries, Japan, the US, and ROK, in addition to the bilateral cooperation with the US,” which is just a repetition of the past policy statement [9].

In reality, there exists the possibility that the Japanese government has pursued an even further backward-looking policy behind such a public policy statement. It was reported that, on January 22, at the meeting of Foreign Affairs Division of the ruling LDP (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan), a senior Foreign Ministry official said, “Japan has not supported a step-by-step approach. We will strengthen lobbying (the Biden administration)” [10]. This remark implies that the Japanese government has been trying to force the DPRK give in to sanctions and abandon its nuclear weapons at once, by keeping ‘historically unprecedented’ merciless sanctions in place. Additionally, this remark implies that the Japanese government expressed its intention to oppose a phased denuclearization approach which, some reports suggest, will be taken up by the Biden administration, unlike the Trump administration. It seems that the Japanese government is still adhering to the illusion that pressure is effective, without learning lessons from the history of negotiations where no progress was made based on the so-called “Libya model.” On March 30, the Japanese government decided to extend by two more years its autonomous sanctions against the DPRK that are going to expire in April [11]. 

Difficulties which appeared in 2+2 meetings

As described above, significant differences exist between current DPRK policies of South Korea and Japan. South Korea’s Moon administration has strived to resume US-DPRK negotiations to advance the implementation of the Singapore agreement. In contrast, Japan has maintained a policy which is more or less against the DPRK and has emphasized pressure on the DPRK. The Biden administration has said that they will emphasize consultations with those two countries. Because of this difference, the Biden administration is expected to face difficulties in the process, which have already arisen in 2+2 joint statements. 

Resulting from the Biden administration’s strategic priority on competition with China, the administration chose Japan and South Korea for the first overseas travel to hold direct bilateral meetings among foreign and defense ministers (so-called 2+2 meetings). As a result, the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (March 16, Tokyo) and the Republic of Korea-US Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (March 18, Seoul) were consecutively held and joint statements were issued respectively, which refer to the DPRK issues. 

These two joint 2+2 statements contain remarkably different messages regarding the DPRK issue. In the US-Japan joint statement, the two countries use an expression which can be considered hostile, provoking the DPRK. The phrase, “Recognizing that North Korea’s arsenal poses a threat to international peace and stability,” is highly provocative. It is a more aggressive expression than ever before, describing the full arsenal of the DPRK as an international threat, instead of limiting it to its nuclear weapons only. The US-Japan joint statement also “reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea,” [12] ignoring a sensitivity of the ROK government, which has repeatedly, and accurately, said that what is committed to among US, ROK and DPRK is not denuclearization of North Korea, but denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula.

In contrast, the US-ROK 2+2 joint statement uses accurate expressions throughout the document in consideration of the DPRK, while based on the premise of the shared recognition between ROK and US that no US nuclear weapon is deployed in South Korea at present. In the joint statement, the US and South Korea not only limited their expression to “North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile issues are a priority for the Alliance…and reaffirmed a shared commitment to address and resolve these issues.” Instead of using the phrase “denuclearization of the DPRK,” the two countries also directly avoided referring to US nuclear umbrella. In other words, they avoided reference to nuclear weapons in the US extended deterrence, by stating, “US officials reaffirmed the US commitment to the defense of the ROK and its extended deterrence using the full range of US capabilities” [13]. In comparison, in the same context, the Japan-US joint statement released two days earlier clearly stated “the full range of its capabilities, including nuclear.” Additionally, the joint communique of the US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting [14] released last October also clearly stated nuclear weapons, referring to elements of US extended deterrence. The reason why the two countries didn’t use the word ‘nuclear’ this time is obviously the South Korean side’s hope that US-DPRK relations have a good start under the Biden administration. 

Implications of US consultations with South Korea and Japan

As can be seen in these joint statements, if the Biden administration would consult with its allies to discuss its DPRK policy, it can be concluded that Japan and South Korea will pull US DPRK policy in almost opposite directions. 

If the DPRK policy review by the Biden administration aims to ensure “the most effective tools to advance the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” as already described [15], it will at minimum need to be reviewed so as to keep the DPRK continuously engaged in the process and be mindful of a long-term schedule of implementation. Solutions in the short-term cannot be assumed. In making such efforts, there would be hardly anything substantial that the current Japanese government could contribute. Rather, the Japanese government carries a risk of creating difficulties that would undermine progress. On the other hand, South Korea has been making efforts to realize the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration. South Korea can be regarded as an independent player in the same issue that the US is challenged to resolve. The US would derive great benefit from consultation with South Korea.

This situation reminds us of the US policy review in 1999 by the Special Policy Coordinator on North Korea, William Perry (former Secretary of State). US President Clinton asked Perry to comprehensively review US policy to find out whether the US should maintain the Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK and the KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) process. Perry emphasized the importance of the consultations with Japan and South Korea in his policy review. In his memoir, Perry stated that Japan and South Korea had completely different fears, describing it as follows [16]: 

“Kim Dae-Jung, the South Korean president, feared that my North Korea review would upset his ongoing “sunshine policy” with North Korea, while Keizo Obuchi, the Japanese prime minister, feared that I would ignore what he saw as Japan’s main issue with North Korea – securing the release of Japanese citizens who had been abducted by North Korea.” 

History shows that consultations with South Korea significantly contributed to the US policy review, however, no similar contribution from Japan can be found.

Nonetheless, it is critically important for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia as a whole that the US consult with Japan and South Korea on its DPRK policy. It is not because cooperation among the US, South Korea and Japan would increase pressure against the DRPK in negotiations, as is often said. It is safe to say that the DPRK is interested only in the emerging US policy toward the DPRK. This is so because the US’s pursuit of its DPRK policy with the understanding of Japan and South Korea is important for each of the three states, South Korea, Japan and the US, to continue its engagement in Korean Peninsula issues.

As the South Korean government is obliged to implement the Panmunjom Declaration, its coordination with the US is indispensable. For the Japanese government, the fact that it has been always consulted by the US would be of critical help in order to convince more conservative elements in the ruling political system should negotiations advance in a direction inconsistent with the intentions of the Japanese government. Furthermore, by knowing the direction of US policy, the Government of Japan is sometimes given chance to prevent public opinion from working too much against improvement of the situation, which hopefully would provide basis for the public to press the Japanese government to abandon its current lack of innovation in its policy toward North Korea and become more independently engaged in the issue.

As for the US government, to develop and implement its DPRK policy requires it to consider the entire security policy of Northeast Asia including the issue of ending the Korean War. For a sustainable resolution of these regional issues, the US policy review on the DPRK needs to be based on a regional vision including China, in which both Japan and South Korea have their own strong vested interests. Therefore, US consultations with Japan and South Korea are unavoidable. This also implies that both Japan and South Korea need to negotiate with the US based on their own regional visions.

Discussions among the US, South Korea and Japan on DPRK policy will naturally be occasions where each country participates with its own independent long-term vision for peace and security of Northeast Asia, including China and the DPRK. (Tatsuro DEBROUX, Ichiro YUASA and Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] “Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Andrea Mitchell of MSNBC Andrea Mitchell Reports,” Department of State, February 1, 2021 

https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-andrea-mitchell-of-msnbc-andrea-mitchell-reports/　

[2] “Nomination of Hon. Antony J. Blinken to Be U.S. Secretary of State—Part I”, Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, January 19, 2021

https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/01%2019%202021%20Nominations%20--%20Blinken%20Part%201.pdf　　 

[3] “President Moon, US-DPRK dialogue should restart based on Singapore Declaration,” Hankyoreh, January 19, 2021 (in Japanese)

https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/19bc8a9aa39f40d084494ffa189240022c705518

[4] “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Secretary of State Antony Blinken Conduct Press Conference With Their Counterparts After a US-ROK Foreign and Defense Ministerial (“2+2”), Hosted by the ROK’s Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong and Minister of Defense Suh Wook,” Department of Defense, March 18, 2021 

https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2541299/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-and-secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-c/

[5] “Prime Minister Abe support Singapore Agreement as one step toward resolution of outstanding North Korean issues,” NHK, June 12, 2018 (in Japanese)

https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/statement/5455.html

[6] John Bolton, The Room Where It Happened (Simon & Schuster, 2020)

[7] Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI and Ichiro YUASA, “Consistency in Policy Messages and an Accurate Understanding of the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration are Essential to the Japanese Government’s Policy towards the DPRK “to seek a Summit Without Any-Pre-conditions,” Watch Report 28, January 13, 2021    

[8] “[COVID-19] Press Conference by the Prime Minister” Kantei, January 13, 2021

http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/99_suga/statement/2021/0113kaiken.html

[9] “Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2+2), Joint Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 16, 2021 (in Japanese)

https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/na/st/page3_003036.html

[10] “Japan cautious about step-by-step denuclearization, DPRK policy of new US administration,” The Sankei Shimbun, January 22, 2021 (in Japanese)

https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/210122/plt2101220031-n1.html

[11] “Japan’s autonomous sanctions measures against DPRK will extend for two more years,” NHK, March 30, 2021, (in Japanese)

https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210330/k10012944431000.html

[12] “US-Japan Joint Press Statement,” Department of State, March 16, 2021

https://www.state.gov/u-s-japan-joint-press-statement/

[13] “Joint Statement of the 2021 Republic of Korea-United States Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”),” Department of State, March 18, 2021

https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-2021-republic-of-korea-united-states-foreign-and-defense-ministerial-meeting-22/

[14] “Joint Communique of the 52nd US-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting,” Department of Defense, October 14, 2020

https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2381879/joint-communique-of-the-52nd-us-republic-of-korea-security-consultative-meeting/

[15] See note [1]

[16] William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford University Press, 2015)