Citizens’ Watch for the Fair Implementation of the Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Agreements: Watch Report No.30

Watch Report No.30 　March 23, 2021

§Following the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party, No Change is Seen in DPRK Policy to Denuclearize and its Attitude Toward Negotiations with the US

In a way, the newly established Biden administration confronts a very similar problem that the Obama administration had at its outset in terms of the impasse of the US-DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) relationship. The Obama administration was forced to find a way out of the impasse brought about by the failure of the “six-party talks” to reach an agreement due to hurried US requirement to verify. The Biden administration is now forced to find an effective and promising approach to bring to an end the deadlocked US-DPRK Singapore Agreement caused by a hurried US ‘big deal’ demand. Of course, it is also true that the political situations surrounding the two administrations at the inauguration are quite different, at least in two respects: 1) the need to transition from the self-oriented and ostentatious character of the “Trump First” diplomacy employed by the former US President, and 2) the fact that the nuclear and missile capability of the DPRK has progressed significantly in the past several years.

Given these circumstances, it is important that we see clearly what the DPRK’s policies toward the USA are. To put it precisely, we should answer the following two questions taking into account the outcomes of the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party held in January 2021:

1) Does the DPRK’s evaluation of mutual agreements made in the 2018 US-DPRK Joint Statement remain unchanged?

2) Does the DPRK’s requirement of the US for a “New Way of Calculation” ensuring the US withdrawal from its hostile policy remain unchanged?

The 8th Congress of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) was held on 5th to 12th January 2021 after a five-year interval. It is reported that General Secretary Kim Jong Un called the US “the biggest enemy” and committed to continue developing nuclear weapons. But it is too early and short-sighted to conclude from these reports that the DPRK has abandoned its will to denuclearize and has returned to a confrontational policy toward the US. What is needed here is to understand the policies and messages expressed in the Congress with accuracy and within context.

The central focus of the Congress is the economy

First it should be pointed out that the central issue of the 8th Congress was to sum up the five-year strategy for national economic development adopted at the previous Congress held in 2016, and to launch a new economic development plan for the next five years to accomplish the Korean-style socialism construction. Economic difficulties caused by triple impacts in 2020 -- natural disasters, novel corona virus pandemic, and economic sanctions -- made it necessary for the DPRK to set the Congress as the point of departure to overcome these difficulties by creating a new agenda.

In his opening address, Kim Jong Un expressed the failure in his policy on economy, saying, “(T)hough the period of implementing the Five-Year-Strategy for the National Economic Development ended last year was a failure because almost all sectors fell a long way short of the set objectives” [1]. In his speech, lasting as long as nine hours and the main event of the Congress, the focus was almost exclusively on the economic strategy that was to be taken to promote the socialist construction, as is explained in the following paragraph. In his speech, made on the last day of the Congress, Kim Jon Un made a vigorous appeal to the people: “The socialist economic construction is the most important revolutionary task on which we should focus our all-out effort at present” [2]. Moreover, three slogans were adopted at the conclusion of the Congress: ‘The People Are God’, ‘Single-Hearted Unity’, and ‘Self-Reliance’ [3]. It can be said that these are the symbol of self-reliant economic development that should be pursued in order to improve living conditions of people. As such, the Congress was permeated all the way through with the basic theme of the challenge of economic development.

The economic aspects of his long speech in more detail

Kim Jong Un points out three items as the external factors that have adversely impacted economic development, namely “the most barbarous sanctions and blockade by the US and other hostile forces” and “severe natural diseases that hit the country every year and the world health crisis that broke out last year and became protracted.” But at the same time, he orients his analysis and criticism on the economic failure to internal factors inherent to the party itself. He says, “If one ascribes its failure to objective conditions, he can do nothing and the action and role of the driving force will be unnecessary, and it is impossible to accelerate the revolutionary struggle and constructive work unless the unfavorable external factors are removed.” And he emphasizes the subjective factors of the political responsibility in the failure of economic development. Namely in his report, citing the Party Central Committee, he says that “the 5-year strategy for national economic development had not been properly set on the basis of scientific calculation and grounds; science and technology failed to actually play the role of propelling the economic work of the country; and the work of readjusting and reinforcing the irrational economic work system and discipline was not properly done.”

The specifics in scientific terms are not apparent in his report, nor how the planned reforms may be informed by Kim’s reflections on these subjects. The new five-year economic plan presupposes that the Cabinet will “definitely improve its economic management,” and promotes modernization of production “by dint of science and technology,” and “orientate the external economic activities toward reinforcing … self-supporting economy.” As is explained in Kim Jong Un’s speech, the general orientation of the five-year plan is “to lay solid foundations for reenergizing the overall national economy and improving the people’s standard of living by concentrating efforts on the main links in the whole chain of economic development.” While emphasizing the theme of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘self-sufficiency’, he proposed individual targets and strategies for key sectors of the metal industry and chemical industry, in relation to agriculture and light industry.

Continuation of the offensive for making a breakthrough head-on in the economy

As is stated so far, it is clear that the fact that DPRK has identified economic sanctions by enemy powers as one of the factors prohibiting economic development, it does not lead to a decision to submit to US-led international pressure and stop developing nuclear weapons to improve international relationship and gain sanction relief. On the contrary, the policy of ‘self-reliance’ will be strengthened all the more on the premise of continuing economic sanctions. It can be said that this idea of ‘self-reliance’ on the premise of continuing economic sanctions is the continuation of ‘the offensive for making a breakthrough head-on’ policy adopted throughout 2020, which pursued economic development based on the assumption that US policy of hostility toward the DPRK would not change [4].

In his report Kim Jong Un says that betterment of the situation can be accomplished not by defeat, but by victory in offensive diplomacy. Here it should be noted that he emphasizes solidarity with ‘anti-imperialist, independent forces’ while stressing the goal of prevailing in diplomacy with the US. We can read in it that he tries to find a way to overcome the difficulties in the economic cooperation with forces independent of the US.

Kim’s report states: “It (WPK) should wage offensive diplomacy to smash the attempts of the hostile forces to violate our sovereignty and defend our state’s rights to normal development.” “It should orient political activities with the main emphasis put on prevailing over subjugating the US, the fundamental obstacle to the development of our revolution and our principal enemy.” “Noting that whoever takes power in the US, its entity and the real intention of its policy toward the DPRK would never change.” “(It stresses) the need for the field of external work to adopt adroit strategy toward the US and steadily expand solidarity with the anti-imperialist, independent forces” [5].

War deterrent as a basis for concentrating on economic development

Although not much has been mentioned about DPRK nuclear development, references to the strengthened military capability of the US and the ROK (South Korea) and the repeated description on the new war-fighting capability of the DPRK characterize the report on military affairs at the 8th Congress of the WPK. In this regard, two features need to be pointed out.

One feature is that the concept of the war deterrent is maintained as before, the concept that the DPRK nuclear weapons are an essential war deterrent to ensure peace necessary for its concentration on economic development. This is the logic in 2017 when the DPRK declared victory for completion of its national nuclear forces and took it as the springboard for fresh progress in economic development [6] and the logic taken in 2018 of concentration on economy based on accomplishment of nuclear capability [7]. The same logic was expressed last year in the ‘head-on by dint of self-reliance’ speech made by Kim Jong Un [8] and also in the speech made at the UN General Assembly by UN Ambassador Kim Song in the fall [9]. In a similar vein at the WPK Congress, Kim Jong Un says in his report, “The reality shows that only when we bolster up our national defense capability without a moment’s halt will we be able to contain the military threat from the US and achieve peace and prosperity of the Korean peninsula” [10].

In support of this logic, Kim Jong Un emphasizes the reality that enemy powers are increasing their military capability and thus, there is a corresponding need for the DPRK to strengthen its war deterrence. He states, “Nothing is more foolish and dangerous than to idle our time away without steadily building up our strength while knowing well enough that the enemy’s high-tech weapons aimed at our state are increasing in volume” and “The international balance of power is crumbling owing to the reckless arms buildup of the US and other hostile forces.” And he also demands that the ROK (South Korea) “should stop introducing latest military hardware and joint military exercises with the US” [11].

Another feature is the intention of the DPRK to increase diplomatic and bargaining power by showcasing its growing military capabilities. The DPRK may calculate that giving the US public the impression of DPRK’s growing nuclear threats will serve to urge the new US administration to start negotiation sooner.

In his report at the Congress Kim Jong Un highly praises the completion of hydrogen bombs and the successful test launch of the Hwasong 15 ICBM by 2017 as ‘the great historic event’, and boasts that the Party Central Committee “accomplished the great cause of … uprising the country to the position of a world nuclear power and military power in both name and reality and putting an end once and for all to the era in which big powers attempted to make a bargain with the interests of our own state and nation.” Also, he refers in detail to the nuclear weapons capabilities that were developed in the past five years, including guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket (MIRV) which is at the final stage of research, the hypersonic gliding fight warheads for a new type ballistic missile being at the test stage, and the design of a nuclear-powered submarine being at the final stage of scrutiny [12]. As for the future course of action to strengthen nuclear capabilities, both in tactical and strategic weapons, he proposes enhanced development of tactical nuclear weapons and continuation of production of super-sized nuclear warheads and advanced ICBMs with an increased targeting accuracy rate, based upon the situational analysis “that various military threats from the enemies on the Korean peninsula … are inevitably accompanied by the nuclear threat” [13]. He also reiterates continuing a few years-long efforts to develop modern nuclear weapons technology, and in addition he reaffirms the need for general modernization of military capabilities including reconnaissance and information gathering by military satellite and unmanned reconnaissance planes.

The excessively detailed description of weapons development in the main report at the 8th WPK Congress is meant to send diplomatic messages to the US as is pointed out above.

Singapore Agreement is not abandoned

On witnessing such an overt emphasis on nuclear development, one may ask whether the Singapore Agreement in which Kim Jong Un has promised to attain a nuclear-free Korean peninsula is discarded and no longer valid.

Before answering this question, first we have to note Kim’s fundamental idea that war deterrence always presupposes diplomacy. Kim Jong Un says in the Congress report, “The strong defense capability of the state never precludes diplomacy but serves as a powerful means to propel it along the right course and guarantee its success” [14]. This means he has always diplomacy in mind, which is significant.

At the Congress of the Worker’s Party, Kim Jong Un values the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement in positive terms. He says, “At the one-on-one talks of the top leaders of the DPRK and the US, the first of its kind in the hostile relations between two countries, the Party Central Committee, with a strong principle of independence, made sure that the joint declaration that assured the establishment of new DPRK-US relations was adopted” [15]. The phrase ‘establishment of new DPRK-US relations’ is just the same as used in the Singapore Joint Statement. In the words that follow, he boasts that he has shown to the world the strategic position of his country by negotiating with the superpower on equal terms. The point that should be emphasized is the importance of the fact that the key phrase in the Joint Statement ‘establishment of new DPRK-US relations’ is cited in the report as a fruitful result of the negotiation.

In his report, Kim Jong Un does not refer directly to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula itself. In order to do so, he would have to recount the history in which the DPRK has required the US to ‘withdraw its hostile policy’ and to propose ‘new way of calculation’ to implement the Singapore Joint Agreement, but this tact has been in vain so far. It would be a tedious repetition for the DPRK to explain the whole story. It is understandable that he has made no mention of denuclearization in his report at the Congress. It is safe to conclude that the DPRK has not abandoned the Joint Statement as the point of departure, as long as it clearly places high value on some other key agreements in the Joint Statement.

On the other hand, he criticizes the ROK for its failure to implement the Panmunjom Declaration and Pyongyang Declaration jointly made by North and South Korea respectively in April and September 2018, and urges the ROK repeatedly to implement those declarations. It can be acknowledged that the DPRK’s will to denuclearize the Korean peninsula is steadily maintained from the fact that both declarations include a shared goal of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the Congress report, Kim Jong Un states that “It is necessary to take stand and stance to resolve the basic problems first in the north-south relations, halt all acts hostile toward the other side and seriously approach and faithfully implement the north-south declarations” [16].

In conclusion, we believe that the DPRK’s will to implement the Singapore agreements made in the US-DPRK Joint Statement remains unchanged after the 8th WPK Congress in April 2021. The way forward is open if the US is willing to hold negotiations with the DPRK on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, along with other key agreements including establishing new US-DPRK relations and building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong Un says in his report, “The key to establishing new DPRK-US relationship lies in the US withdrawal of its hostile policy toward the DPRK,” and “It (the DPRK) would approach the US on the principle of power for power and goodwill for goodwill in the future, too” [17]. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI & Hajime MAEKAWA)

[1] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Makes Opening Speech at the 8th WPK Congress,” KCNA, January 6, 2021