Watch Report No.28

Watch Report No.28   　January 13, 2021

§Consistency in Policy Messages and an Accurate Understanding of the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration are Essential to the Japanese Government’s Policy towards the DPRK “to Seek a Summit Without Any Pre-Conditions”

On October 26, 2020, Japanese Prime Minister SUGA stated as follows regarding Japan’s foreign policy towards the DPRK in his policy speech to the 203rd Extraordinary Diet Session [1]:

“The abduction issue continues to be a top priority for the administration. I will make utmost efforts to realize the return home of all abductees at the earliest possible date. I am determined to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un without any conditions. Japan seeks to normalize its relation with North Korea, through comprehensively resolving outstanding issues of concern, such as the abductions, nuclear and missile issues, and settling the unfortunate past in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration.”

SUGA’s statement reiterates almost exactly former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo ABE’s policy speech to the 201st Ordinary Diet Session of January 20, 2020 [2], about 9 months before. Former Prime Minister ABE stated:

“We will seek to settle outstanding issues of concern with North Korea, settle the unfortunate past and normalize relations, in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. In working towards the resolution of the abductions issue, the most important issue, I am determined to meet Chairman Kim Jong-un without attaching any conditions.”

Japanese foreign policy to pursue dialogue with Chairman Kim Jong-un announced by both the SUGA and ABE administrations is by no means coherent. It was in September 2017 when former Prime Minister ABE harshly criticized North Korea in front of world leaders. In his address at the seventy-second session of the UN General Assembly [3], ABE stated that, “For North Korea, dialogue was instead the best means of deceiving us and buying time. What is needed to do that is not dialogue, but pressure,” indicating overt hostility towards the DPRK. The purpose of this stance, involving increasing economic and military pressure, was to force the DPRK to capitulate and change its policy. However, following the policy change by US President Trump, ABE shifted to a policy which stressed dialogue, stating in his address at the UN General Assembly of the following year [4] that, “In order to resolve the abductions issue, I am also ready to meet face to face with Chairman Kim Jong-Un without attaching any conditions.”

What, in fact, is the Japanese dialogue-oriented policy towards the DPRK that began in September 2019 and was continued by both the ABE and the SUGA administrations? Although two years have passed since the ABE administration indicated its policy “to hold a summit with North Korea without attaching any conditions”, no plans to start a dialogue with the DPRK have yet to be made. We will analyze from two perspectives the implications of this current impasse. 

The first perspective is the issue of comprehensiveness and consistency. The Japanese policy change in 2018 was undoubtedly in response to the historic changes based on US-DPRK and Inter-Korean agreements in 2018, despite the fact the Japan’s policy change followed that of the Trump administration. In order to enable this policy change to achieve a successful outcome, while taking advantage of positive developments on the Korean Peninsula, Japan must not see abductions, nuclear and missile issues from the conventional and narrow view-point that these are “unique DPRK issues.” These issues are part of a more comprehensive policy agenda involving the historical issue of settlement of accounts for Japan’s invasion and colonial rule in Asia, and the regional peace and security issue in Northeast Asia. No such comprehensive perspective can be found in either of the ABE and the SUGA administrations’ policy towards the DPRK following their policy changes. 

If based on a comprehensive perspective, most attention must be paid to consistently communicating messages within all related policies that Japan has been moving in the direction of ending its hostile policy towards the DPRK and building mutual confidence.

For instance, messages regarding economic sanctions are essential. It is necessary to communicate to the DPRK Japan’s willingness to review its conventional stance of relying solely on “strong pressure through sanctions.” Although it may take a time to convince related parties to relax sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions, it would be possible to deliver a message to the DPRK that Japan would first lift its own sanctions step by step. On November 4, 2020, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives of the 203rd Extraordinary Diet session, a Diet member Kastuya OKADA (The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan) and Foreign Minister Toshimitsu MOTEGI had the following question-and-answer session [5]: 

OKADA: “It is reported that North Korea is currently facing difficult situation, because of economic sanctions, border closures due to COVID-19, and floods. Chairman Kim Jong-un made an unusual statement aimed at the domestic audience as well. Under the circumstance, for instance, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) has reported about 40 percent of North Korean population suffers from malnutrition. Do you have any plan to propose [to] the DPRK any food aid, humanitarian aid and others?” 

MOTEGI: “As you just mentioned, it is said that currently North Korea is facing triple whammy. Still I believe relaxation of economic sanctions is too early at least under current circumstance. However, regarding humanitarian aid, I will make appropriate decision by assessing it comprehensively and carefully including if it is necessary or not, …”

This answer by the Foreign Minister indicates no willingness to send a positive message to the DPRK. He could have delivered a stronger message at least regarding humanitarian food aid. And regarding Japan’s economic sanctions against the DPRK, it could have served as an opportunity to convey a positive message to the DPRK, by distinguishing Japan’s independent sanctions from those based on UN Security Council resolutions.

In addition to messages regarding economic sanctions, a strong negative message towards the DPRK was conveyed that Japan would consider giving the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) military capability for a preemptive attack against foreign bases, as possible alternatives to the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense system. Although the SUGA administration hasn’t repeated this negative message conveyed by the ABE administration, it has not conveyed any messages to soften the former negative one either. Since August 2020, within the administration, discussion has taken place about attaining the military capability for a preemptive attack against foreign bases, based on the assumption that the DPRK is a potential enemy. This move is in complete contradiction to the administration’s dialogue-oriented policy seeking to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un without conditions. On this point, too, on November 13, 2020, at the meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of the 203rd Extraordinary Diet session, Diet member OKADA pointed out that “Prime Minister SUGA stated that he is determined to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un without any conditions, and if, on the other hand, he is discussing to attain the military capability for a preemptive attack against foreign bases, it may look utterly incoherent [6]”. 

On December 18, 2020, the Japanese Government made a Cabinet decision to improve a new missile defense system and strengthen standoff defense capabilities, including development of stand-off missiles [7]. Although the Cabinet decision describes the use of stand-off missiles to protect Japanese islands such as the Senkaku Islands, instead of the idea of military capability for a preemptive attack against foreign bases, no efforts have been made to correct messages towards the DPRK.

As can be seen in the two instances described above, the ABE and the SUGA administrations’ policy to stress dialogue with the DPRK to resolve abductions, and nuclear and missile issues, has been completely lacking in comprehensiveness and consistency.

The second perspective is the issue of the governmental position on the 2002 Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. 

Even today, the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration agreed upon by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong-Il of the DPRK National Defense Commission in September 2002 is considered a basic diplomatic document to normalize Japan-DPRK relations. As described above, both the ABE and the SUGA administrations explained their policy towards the DPRK, quoting the Pyongyang Declaration. However, the Japanese government has not explained which parts of the Declaration it values most. This amounts to the lack of the most fundamental element of the Japanese government’s ‘aggressive policy of seeking dialogues without any pre-conditions.’

In its preamble, the Pyongyang Declaration states, “Both leaders confirmed the shared recognition that establishing a fruitful political, economic and cultural relationship between Japan and the DPRK through the settlement of unfortunate past between them and the outstanding issues of concern would be consistent with the fundamental interests of both sides, and would greatly contribute the peace and stability of the region.” Following the preamble, its main paragraph 1 states, “Both sides determined that, pursuant to the spirit and basic principles laid out in this Declaration, they would make every possible effort for an early normalization of the relations… Both sides expressed their strong determination that they would sincerely tackle outstanding problems between Japan and the DPRK.”

This means that the spirit of the Declaration lies in the resolution of both states to overcome various obstacles and normalize Japan-DPRK relations as early as possible. Pending issues such as abductions and nuclear-missiles are specific and separate, though not trivial issues. If the Japanese government gives priority to solving one of these and jeopardizes achieving normalization by doing so, this would be contrary to the Pyongyang Declaration. 

In this regard, especially, the means by which the ABE and the SUGA administrations deal with the abductions issue has been problematic. Both administrations regard the abductions issue as if it is a locked door that blocks the entry into any negotiations. Naturally, the present authors also hope for resolution of the abductions issue at the earliest possible date, considering the feelings of family members of the abductees. As for resolving the abductions issue, we consider it as the best approach for Japan to support positive developments on the Korean Peninsula which began in 2018, and to try to advance them toward the normalization of Japan and DPRK relations. As Haruki WADA, a prominent Japanese historian, points out [8], the notion that “without the resolution of the abductions issue, there can be no normalization talks with North Korea” [9], which the ABE and the SUGA administrations have repeated even today, is not consistent with the Pyongyang Declaration and should be abandoned.

The SUGA administration’s foreign policy towards the DPRK expressing, “I’m determined to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un without any conditions,” should be maintained in the future. However, in order to make this policy achieve a successful outcome, it is necessary to convey messages to the DPRK which demonstrates comprehensiveness and consistency of Japanese foreign and security policy, in accordance with the administration’s foreign policy towards the DPRK, and to clearly recognize that the top priority of the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration is the normalization of Japan-DPRK relations. Without those corrections being made, Japan’s foreign policy towards the DPRK deserves criticism for being a mere gesture meant for public consumption. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI & Ichiro YUASA)

[1] Kantei, “Policy Speech by the Prime Minister to the 203rd Session of the Diet,” October 26, 2020

https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/99_suga/statement/2020/1026shoshinhyomei.html

[2] Kantei, “Policy Speech by the Prime Minister to the 201st Session of the Diet,” January 20, 2020

https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/statement/2020/0120shiseihoushin.html

[3] Kantei, “Address by Prime Minister Abe at the Seventy Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 20, 2017

https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/97_abe/statement/2017/0920enzetsu.html

[4] Kantei, “Address by Prime Minister Abe at the Seventy Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 25, 2018

https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/statement/2018/0925enzetsu.html

[5] The House of Representatives, “The minutes of the meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives of the 203rd Extraordinary Diet session,” November 4, 2020 http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/001820320201104003.htm#p_honbun (in Japanese)

[6] The House of Representatives, “The minutes of the meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of the 203rd Extraordinary Diet session,” November 13, 2020

http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000520320201113002.htm#p_honbun (in Japanese)

[7] Ministry of Defense, “The Cabinet Decision on improvement of a new missile defense system and strengthening of standoff defense capabilities,” December 18, 2020

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/stand-off_20201218.pdf

[8] Hayami ICHIKAWA, “Discuss repair of fractured Japan-DPRK relations with Haruki WADA,” Web Ronza, July 5, 2019 (in Japanese)

https://webronza.asahi.com/politics/articles/2019070200004.html?page=4

[9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “2019 Report on the measures taken by the Government of Japan in addressing issues of human rights violations by DPRK authorities including resolution of the abductions issues,” June 12, 2020 (in Japanese)

https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/pr/pub/pamph/rachi_torikumi.html