§Japanese Foreign Policy: Maintaining Strong Sanctions and Building Confidence are Contradictory
[Note: Watch Report 9 was issued on April 23 prior to DPRK missile tests on May 9, which will be discussed in subsequent Reports. However, the tests do not change the tension between sanctions and confidence building that influences denuclearization talks.]
Chairman Kim Jong-Un’s policy speech
On April 12, Chairman of the Workers’ Party
of Korea, Kim Jong-Un, made policy speech at the First Session of the 14th
Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. [1] In
his speech, Chairman Kim stated his policy which focuses on “concentrating all
national resources on economic construction,” and in stating his policy, he conveyed
important messages on inter-Korean relations and US-DPRK relations as well.
Regarding inter-Korean relations, Chairman
Kim stated that, “the entire nation ardently hopes that the historic Panmunjom
Declaration and the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration will thoroughly be
implemented so that the peaceful atmosphere on the Korean peninsula will
continue and inter-Korean relations will improve uninterruptedly.” Regarding
US-DPRK relations, Chairman Kim appreciated the US-DPRK Joint Statement again by
saying that, “the June 12 DPRK-US Joint Statement was a historic declaration
announcing to the world that the two countries which had been hostile to each
other from one century into the next would write a new history of
relationship.”
On the other hand, Chairman Kim harshly
criticized the US stance for the negotiations at the Hanoi summit and stated,
“We are neither pleased nor willing to see summit talks like the Hanoi summit
talks re-enacted” and, “here is no need for me to obsess over the summit talks
with the United States out of thirst for the lifting of sanctions.” Additionally,
Chairman Kim clearly stated his current stance. He said, “we will be patient
and wait till the end of this year to see whether the United States makes a
courageous decision or not.”
At the press conference held on March 15, the
DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-Hui stated that Chairman Kim will
soon announce his decision on the DPRK’s next move, [2] and the above messages are
probably Chairman Kim’s decision that Choi had mentioned. To summarize Kim’s
policy, the DPRK’s position is that the DPRK will not be obsessed with seeking the
lifting of the sanctions and, while supporting its economy with self-reliance,
continue negotiations based on the US-DPRK and inter-Korean summit agreements.
Japan’s diplomacy is insensitive to the situation
Although Kim Jong-Un’s policy has remained cool-headed,
it is clear that the DPRK seriously views the continued sanctions as indication
of a “hostile policy.” In his same policy speech, Chairman Kim stated his critical
analysis that economic sanctions are a means of “disarming us first,
overthrowing our social system later.” Despite that, or because of that,
Chairman Kim called for his people not to plead for the lifting of the economic
sanctions, but to achieve economic development through alternate means.
As just described, if mishandled, the issue
of the economic sanctions has the potential of having a decisively negative
impact on negotiations on denuclearization and peace of the Korean Peninsula.
Despite that, concern about this issue in Japanese politics has remained unchanged
for a long time.
In Diet deliberations, it can be pointed out
that the level of interest in the denuclearization and peace on Korean
Peninsula is low.
The House of Representatives Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the ongoing 198th ordinary Diet session started on March 6,
2019 and by the issue date of this report (April 23), sessions of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs have been held 8 times and have spent 19 hours and 23
minutes on question-and-answer between the government and Committee members.
However, only 7 out of all 30 Committee members (20 from ruling coalition
parties --18 from Liberal Democratic Party and 2 from Komeito – and 10 from
opposition parties) have taken up the issue of the Korean Peninsula, and only
one hour and 41 minutes has been spent on the issue of the Korean Peninsula,
which accounts for 8.7% of total amount of time spent for question-and-answer.
Additionally, Diet members and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had shared generally the same view on “maintaining
strong pressure” on the DPRK through economic sanctions based on UN Security
Council resolutions. In fact, the issue of the sanctions would have provided a good
starting point to deepen discussions on the Japanese government’s policy on the
Korean Peninsula. However, no such discussions have taken place.
From that viewpoint, the question-and-answer
session on March 8 regarding US-DPRK negotiations based on the joint statement
at the Singapore summit between a Diet member Kokuta (Japanese Communist Party)
and Foreign Minister Kono struck at the heart of the issue and revealed the
Japanese government’s statements that warrant future discussion.
House of
Representatives member Kokuta: “As stated in
your policy speech, you have clearly expressed your stance to support US-North
Korean peace process, and what do you think is important for the US and North
Korea to advance process toward denuclearization and building a peace regime…?”
Foreign
Ministry Kono: “I think there are two things.
One is that the international community needs to continue to implement UNSC resolutions
in solidarity as it has done thus far, and the other is that the US and North
Korea need to build solid mutual confidence each other. In particular, as we
are demanding North Korea to give up their nuclear weapons and missiles, if
North Korea is not confident that they will be able to gain security guarantees
to its regime, it would be difficult to realize North Korea’s CVID (complete,
verifiable, and irreversible disarmament). Therefore, confidence building
between the US and North Korea is essential.” [3]
The meaning of the phrase used in Foreign
Minister Kono’s answer, “implement UNSC resolutions” is used as code for maintaining
sanctions as strictly as ever. This can be surmised from Kono’s later remarks
at the press conference after the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (US-Japan
‘2+2’) held in Washington DC on April 19, 2019, about one month after Kono had answered
at the Foreign Affairs Committee. At the press conference, Foreign Minister Kono
stated that, “we need to implement Security Council resolutions until North
Korea makes CVID for all the weapons of mass destruction and the missiles of
all ranges,” and additionally, Kono explained to the reporters that, “we need
to take care of the issue of ship-to-ship transfer, and we need to work with the
other partner countries to prevent this ship-to-ship transfer.” [4]
In summary, Foreign Minister Kono answered
that both “strict implementation of UNSC resolutions” and “building confidence with
DPRK” are necessary to advance the US-DPRK negotiations. Kono was right in pointing
out the importance of confidence building.
However, are those two approaches compatible?
This very question would provide clues as to how to deepen discussions over
Japanese foreign policy on the North Korean issue. Thus far, the Diet hasn’t
debated this question.
There are arguments for and against the assertion
that UN Security Council’s strong sanctions forced the DPRK to be engaged in
dialogues. However, the situation has changed since then. Today, 17 months have
passed since the nuclear and missile tests that directly triggered the
sanctions were suspended and almost one year has passed since the dialogues
started. As described above, the DPRK views the stance of those who continue to
reject lifting sanctions as indication of a hostile policy. Under the current
circumstances, insisting on “strict implementation of sanctions on the DPRK
based on UNSC Resolutions,” for all intents and purposes, sends a message contrary
to “building confidence.”
On April 10, carrying a written appeal to
Foreign Ministry Kono, the Peace Depot, which manages
the Watch Report project, visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and met
Mr. Ishikawa, Deputy Director-General of MOFA’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs
Bureau, the number two figure of the Bureau which oversees issues of the Korean
Peninsula. The first item of the written appeal to the Government of Japan was to
“stop strengthening and maintaining economic sanctions on the DPRK’s nuclear
and missile development, consider the merit of phased lifting of sanctions and
appeal internationally the need of the phased lifting.” [5] The Peace Depot has
the international society, including the UN Security Council, in its mind, as
the intended recipient of the appeal. By pointing out that UNSC resolutions have
repeatedly stated that “it (the Security Council) is prepared to strengthen,
modify, suspend or lift the measures as may needed in light of the DPRK’s
compliance,”[6] as pointed out in Watch Report No.8, the Peace Depot urged the Government
of Japan to take actions accordingly. As the contents of Peace Depot’s appeal were
contrary to current policy of the Japanese government, no progress was made in
the discussions during the meeting. The Peace Depot has intensified lobbying
Diet members. (Ichiro YUASA, Hiromichi UMEBYASHI)
[1] KCNA,
April 14, 2019
http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf Search for the article in the page ‘Supreme Leader’s Activities’ from
date.
[2] The
article by NEWSIS （Korean）, March 25, 2019
Full
text of the opening of Choe Son-hui’s remarks is translated into Japanese on
Korea News No.766, March 26, 2019, by The General Association of Korean
Residents in Japan.
[3] The
minutes of House of Representatives the Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 8,
2019 (informal translation by the present authors)
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000519820190308002.htm#p_honbun (in Japanese)
[4] “Remarks
With Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, Japanese Foreign Minister
Taro Kono, and Japanese Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya at a Joint Press
Availability for the U.S.-Japan 2+2 Ministerial,” U.S. Department of State,
April 19, 2019
[5] “Denuclearization
in Korean Peninsula and the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons : Request for calling for
fundamentally reviewing Japanese Nuclear Deterrence Policy (tentative),” Peace
Depot, April 10, 2019
http://www.peacedepot.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2eae3bb57f559f16ae6f49dded91385e.pdf (in Japanese)
