Watch Report No.36

  Watch Report No.36   　December 26, 2022

Declaring the Intention to Cease US-ROK Joint Military Exercises is the First Step for Easing Tensions

Easing Tension is Needed on the Korean Peninsula.
US-ROK (Republic of Korea) joint military exercises have been escalating with the involvement of US Forces Japan and the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF). The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has enacted the Law on Policy of Nuclear Forces and has repeatedly launched missiles at an unprecedented pace. The international community cannot just stand by and watch such developments. We need to focus our attention on putting forward concrete approaches to improve the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Since late August 2022, tension on the Korean Peninsula has been growing. From August 22 to September 1, US-ROK combined forces conducted “Ulchi Freedom Shield,” large-scale joint military exercises. During the exercises, in addition to command post training, large scale field maneuvers based on simulation of an attack on the DPRK were staged for the first time in four years. The inauguration of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeo, who is taking a hard line on the DPRK, in May 2022 is responsible for this position.

And, on September 8, the DPRK introduced the Law on DPRK’s Policy of Nuclear Forces which permits preemptive use of nuclear weapons [1]. In response to this, the US and the ROK held a meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) on September 16, which expressed “serious concern” over DPRK’s enacting the law and decided to take “an overwhelming and decisive response” against possible DPRK nuclear attacks. One week later, on September 23, the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) aircraft carrier, homeported at Yokosuka, Japan, pulled into the South Korean port of Busan and joined the US-ROK joint military exercises from September 26 to 29 for the first time in half a decade. Probably in response to the exercise, the DPRK conducted military drills by the Korean People’s Army (KPA) units for the operation of tactical nukes from September 25 to October 9. Since then, between the DPRK and the US-ROK-Japan, especially between the DPRK and the US-ROK, verbal and military tit for tat exchanges have continued [2].

Additionally, on November 13, in Phnom Penh, the leaders of Japan, the US and the ROK issued a joint statement for the first time in half a decade [3]. As is evident in the statement, there is a new trend to be noted. The historical barrier against military cooperation between Japan and the ROK has been weakening under the Yoon administration, and military cooperation among these three countries has become apparent in the region. The DPRK has been increasing its vigilance against Japan’s deepening involvement [4].

If such military tension remains high, the possibility of military conflicts triggered by misunderstanding and miscalculation also remains high. It cannot be ruled out that the situation could escalate to the point of using nuclear weapons. To prevent such risks, what is needed now?

Law on DPRK’s Policy of Nuclear Forces
Let us examine the concrete risks resulting from the Law on DPRK’s Policy of Nuclear Forces” (Nuclear Policy Law or the New Law) adopted by the Supreme People’s Assembly on September 8, 2022 and announced on the same day.

The New Law replaces the “Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State” (hereinafter referred to as the Old Law) introduced on April 1, 2013 [5]. All that the Old Law stipulates is that nuclear weapons are defined as a “means of defense” against the US’s hostile policy and its nuclear threat (Paragraph 1) and are to be used for deterring and repelling the aggression and attack (Paragraph 2, 4). It doesn’t stipulate anything regarding the actual use of nuclear weapons into law. In contrast, although both laws regard the main mission of the nuclear forces is to deter a war and repulse hostile forces’ aggression and attack in case deterrence fails, the New Law stipulates principles and concrete conditions for the decision to actually use nuclear weapons. Thus, the New Law entails many risks.

First, regarding the fundamental principle on the use of nuclear weapons, there aren’t essential differences between the DPRK’s Nuclear Policy Law and those of the US and other nuclear countries, if rhetorical differences are ignored. The New Law stipulates that the DPRK shall use nuclear weapons as “the last resort” in order to cope with a nuclear state (the US is in mind) when the latter seriously invades or attacks the DPRK, even by conventional forces. It also stipulates that the DPRK shall use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states (ROK or Japan) if they join aggression or attack against the DPRK in collusion with a nuclear weapon state (the US). No hesitation to the first use of nuclear weapons can be seen in the New Law.

Second, Paragraph 6 of the New Law details conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. Reading the paragraph makes it clear that the DPRK permits not only “first use” but also “preemptive use” [6] of nuclear weapons to change the course of the war decisively. This is stipulated in the New Law as the policy that “(nuclear weapons can be used) (i)n case the operation for preventing the expansion and protraction of a war and taking the initiative in the war is inevitably needed (Term 4, Paragraph 6).”

Third, the New Law carries serious risks in the process of making the decision to use nuclear weapons based on the preconditions for their use. Term 2, Paragraph 6 of the New Law stipulates that the DPRK can use nuclear weapons “in case a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces on the state leadership and the command of the state’s nuclear forces has been launched or is judged to be on the horizon.” The New Law also stipulates “in case the command-and-control system over the state nuclear forces is placed in danger… a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately” (Term 3, Paragraph 3). This means that when Kim Jong-Un himself or the command-and-control system used by him are damaged and the command and control by the supreme leader fails to function correctly, a nuclear strike plan decided in advance will be executed automatically and immediately. How will unit-level commanders responsible for executing launches know that such a crisis is coming? As will be described later, there are a considerable number of units responsible for launching nuclear missiles, thus, many questions arise including, what is a reasonable automatic system of order transmission chain from higher-level to lower-level commanders, and how it can work and be guaranteed to function properly during a wartime. Information necessary to answer those questions is not yet available. However, it is reasonable to assume that command and control of launching tactical nuclear weapons, as well as strategic nuclear weapons, of a state like the DPRK, where only one person monopolizes absolute power, involves inevitable risks.

Military drills of KPA units for operation of tactical nukes under the simulation of an actual war were staged about two weeks after the inception of Nuclear Policy Law supports the existence of such risks.

Realistic Launching Drills of KPA Units for Tactical Nuclear Operation
According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) report on October 10, 2022 [7], from September 25 to October 9, the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) (Chairman: Kim Jong-Un) staged “missile launching drills of KPA units for operation of tactical nukes.” KCNA described the aims and characteristics of 7 drills involving tactical nuclear missile launches conducted during that period. Based on KCNA’s report along with information issued by ROK Ministry of Defense, twelve (12) nuclear–capable ballistic missiles were launched during the drills, including nine (9) close-range ballistic missiles with a range of 300 - 360km [8], two short-range ballistic missiles with ranges of 600km and 800km [9], and one intermediate ballistic missile with a range of 4600km [10] (one that flew over the main island of Japan).

KCNA reported that missile launching drills of KPA units for the operation of tactical nukes were staged “in order to check and assess the war deterrence and nuclear counterattack capability of the country and to send a severe warning message to the enemies,” and that the drills were conducted at different levels “under the simulation of an actual war” [11]. However, according to the report, it is difficult to determine that all the launching drills were drills of units handling operationally deployed nuclear weapons. For instance, regarding the surprising underwater launch of the ballistic missile from a reservoir, inferring from KCNA’s reporting “the orientation of building a planned silo beneath the reservoir was confirmed” [12], it is considered the launch had an aspect of feasibility test. Additionally, the launch of “a new-type intermediate-range ballistic missile” on October 4 which flew over Japan was, rather than a tactical drill, a launch to display DPRK’s strategic attack capabilities targeting Guam and Japan with the political intention of sending a “more powerful and clear warning to the enemies” [13].

Regarding other tactical nuclear missile launching drills, KCNA report on October 10 gives the overall impression that those drills placed more emphasis on deterring war by means of demonstrating to the US, ROK and Japan that the DPRK has already fully deployed tactical nuclear weapons and is ready to use them. (In fact, the above-mentioned DPRK’s announcement of the enactment of the Nuclear Policy Law itself might have intended to play such a war deterrence role.)

Even when based on some reservations regarding the nature of the tactical nuclear drills, the risks involved in DPRK’s use of nuclear weapons cannot be overlooked in the content of drills.

Analyzing a KCNA report on October 10 tells us that a wide variety of drills were conducted. The drills included taking nuclear warheads out of storages and transporting them, loading nuclear warheads onto missiles, choosing set targets and making decisions on their explosion mode (air explosion and direct precision and dispersion strike and others), identifying launch units and transmitting orders to them, moving missile launchers to launching sites, confirmation and execution of launching procedures, verifying operation and the strength of missiles, and others.

Additionally, according to the information from the ROK Ministry of Defense, seven missiles were launched from at least six different sites, Teachon, Sunan, Samsok, Sunchon, Mupyonri and Munchon. As launches from different sites are considered to be made by different units, the number of KPA units for operation of tactical nukes is estimated to be considerable. If the complicated command-and-control system, especially the part of the system related to commander-in-chief, gets into trouble, the risk of a grave malfunction of the nuclear operation will be very high. Considering the majority of DPRK’s missiles for tactical nukes are dual-capable and launch mostly missiles with conventional warheads in a war, the risk of accidental launch of nuclear missiles would increase further.

The KCNA report detailed some of the set targets of nuclear attack in the drills. There is a high possibility that the launch of the short-range ballistic missile on September 25, which flew 600km according to ROK information, setting its target at a certain altitude in the air of the Japan Sea (or East Sea of Korea), was meant to simulate an attack scenario to destroy a US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) by nuclear air explosion, warning against repeated CVN deployment during that period [14]. Launching drills of close-range ballistic missiles to strike South Korean airports within the operation zones by nuclear missiles were staged several times with different modes of explosion. Launching drills of close-range and short-range ballistic missiles were also conducted in simulation of striking the enemies’ main military command facilities. It is reported by the ROK Ministry of Defense that one of those short-range missiles flew 800km, which means US military bases in Japan such as Sasebo and Iwakuni are within its range. Launching drills of close-range ballistic missiles in simulating the strike on the enemies’ main ports are also reported. As the DPRK itself describes the drills as “the simulation of an actual war,” those target settings are highly pragmatic and executable.

Immediate Top Priority: Easing Tensions and Avoiding Military Conflicts
As is explained above, the DPRK’s enactment of the Nuclear Policy Law and the KPA units’ drills for tactical nukes’ operation demonstrate that the risk of using nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, intentionally or accidentally, has been growing.

As important as the factors that increase risk, we would like to point out characteristics of the DPRK’s language and narratives in its reporting about the Nuclear Policy Law and KPA units drills for tactical nukes operation. DPRK’s discourse regarding the use of nuclear weapons is very straightforward, and sensitivity and hesitation to the issues expected to be raised by using nuclear weapons under international humanitarian law is hardly found, and thus a threshold for making the decision to use nuclear weapons appears to be extremely low. Just so there is no confusion, we don’t side with the argument that the DPRK and its leader are inhuman based on that low threshold. The fact that the DPRK has repeatedly called for indiscriminate and fair application of the UN Charter at the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council should compel us to use caution in labeling the DPRK as, for example, inhuman. Instead, we should try to find out the rationale for why the DPRK has embraced the idea of a low threshold on nuclear weapon use.

DPRK’s peculiar discourse regarding nuclear weapons comes from the history that the DPRK has kept fighting against overwhelmingly superior military powers for almost 70 years in order to maintain its regime. The US, ROK and Japan are military allies, and their combined military spending is more than 500 times larger than that of the DPRK. Such hopeless inequality of military power has led to the DPRK’s policy to emphasize the destructive power of nuclear weapons.

To resolve this hostile relationship peacefully is a goal that the international community should strive for. To do so, first of all, the existing risk of nuclear weapon use needs to be reduced. Then, it is necessary to put forward a path where efforts to reduce the nuclear risk would lead to a following diplomatic stage.

For those reasons, under the current circumstances, the immediate priority for the international community is to minimize the possibility of military conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. Such military conflicts create a risk that they could escalate to nuclear weapon use. To prevent this, the US and ROK should declare their intention to suspend their joint military exercises on and around the Korean Peninsula for the time being. At the same time, the US, ROK and Japan should cease any discourse which increases military tension on the Korean Peninsula and should make efforts to reduce tension.

It is expected that the DPRK will keep bolstering its military power, based on its five-year plan. Although it is undesirable, we have already learned that repeatedly putting military pressure and strengthening economic sanctions on the DPRK cannot prevent the DPRK from proceeding on that course.

Concerns that the DPRK has no intention of resuming diplomacy may be true for the time being, but not definitive. In his speech on September 8, 2022, Kim Jong-Un stated “There will never be such a thing as our abandonment of the nuclear weapons or denuclearization first, nor will there be any negotiations to this end” [15]. However, for instance, in 2017, Kim Jong-Un insisted, “the DPRK would neither put its nukes and ballistic rockets on the table of negotiations in any case nor flinch even an inch from the road of bolstering the nuclear force chosen by itself,” but it was under condition that “Unless the US hostile policy and nuclear threat to the DPRK are definitely terminated” [16]. In fact, in the next year, Kim Jong-Un agreed to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the Panmunjom Declaration between North and South, and the Singapore Joint Statement between the US and DPRK, in exchange for the US’s meeting this condition.

The DPRK has persistently called for the US and the ROK to stop their joint military exercises. To avoid military conflicts and the risk of use of nuclear weapon, to ease tensions and to lead to the next diplomatic step, the US and the ROK should declare their intention to impose a moratorium on their joint military exercises first. The recent announcement by the ROK Ministry of National Defense to expand the scale of the US-ROK joint military exercises next year [17] goes in the totally opposite direction from this, and we strongly call on them to reconsider this position. (Yosuke WATANABE & Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] “Law on DPRK's Policy on Nuclear Forces Promulgated,” KCNA, September 9, 2022.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[2] For example, on November 1, 2022, Park Jong-Chun, Secretary of the WPK Central Committee, said that if the U.S. and the ROK attempt to use armed forces against the DPRK, they will pay the most horrible price in history. Perhaps aware of this, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III stated in the joint statement issued on November 3, 2022 at a regular U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting that any nuclear attack against the US or its allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of the Kim regime.

[3] Phnom Penh Statement on Trilateral Partnership for the Indo-Pacific
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100421322.pdf

[4] “KCNA Commentary Slashes Japan’s Moves against DPRK and Chongryon,” KCNA, November 16, 2022. “Press Statement of DPRK FM,” KCNA, November 17. 2022.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[5] “Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted,” KCNA, April 1, 2013.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. For a Japanese translation, see Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI’s book North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: a mirror reflecting the world, (in Japanese, Kobunken, September 2021), pp. 232-233.

[6] Many Japanese media reports refer to “first use (senko-shiyo or daiichi-shiyo in Japanese)” as “preemptive use (sensei-shiyo in Japanese)”. However, they are two different concepts and should be clearly distinguished.

[7] “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes,” KCNA, October 10, 2022.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[8] A close-range ballistic missile is a ballistic missile with a range of 0-300 nautical miles as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense.
"United States Government Compendium of Interagency and Associated Terms"
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/dictionary/repository/usg_compendium.pdf?ver=2019-11-04-174229-423

[9] A short-range ballistic missile is a ballistic missile with a range of 300-600 nautical miles as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense. See note [8] for source.

[10] An intermediate-range ballistic missile is a ballistic missile with a range of 1500-3000 nautical miles as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense. See note [8] for source.

[11] See note [7].

[12] See note [7].

[13] See note [7].

[14] “North Korea’s missile that passed over Japan was a ‘new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile’ (tentative title in English),” NHK, October 10, 2022 (in Japanese).
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20221010/k10013854001000.html

[15] “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at Seventh Session of the 14th SPA of DPRK,” KCNA, September 10. 2022.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[16] “Kim Jong Un Supervises Test-launch of Inter-continental Ballistic Rocket Hwasong-14,” KCNA, July 5, 2017.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[17] “S. Korea, U.S. to develop 'realistic' training scenarios on N.K. nuke, missile threats,” YONHAP NEWS, December 21, 2022.
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221221004700325?section=news