Watch Report No.35

 Watch Report No.35   　July 29, 2022

International Efforts Should be Made to Make Use of the 2018 Agreements on the Korean Peninsula. US and Chinese Initiatives toward Resumption of the Six-Party Talks are Required

Have the 2018 Agreements Lost?
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea)’s test launch of ICBM missile on March 24, 2022, putting aside the question of whether the ICBM was a new type or not, was a political event marking a significant milestone. It can also be safely assumed from the declamatory writing style of the Korean Central News Agency’s report on the test launch that it was not merely a single test launch of a strategic missile, but DPRK’s move with political intentions [1]. The announcement stated:

“The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un gave a written order to conduct the test-lunch of the new type ICBM of the DPRK strategic forces on Wednesday. He visited the launch ground on Thursday and personally guided the overall process of the test-launch of the new type ICBM Hwasongpho-17.

With his deep insight into the ever-changing international political situation, the root cause of the daily-escalating military tension in and around the Korean peninsula and the long-term demand of our revolution that stems from the inevitability of the long-standing confrontation with the US imperialists accompanied by the danger of a nuclear war, the General Secretary put forward the Juche-oriented defence development strategy and the policy of bolstering in a sustained way the nuclear war deterrence at the historic 8th Congress of the WPK.”

This official announcement on the test launch of the ICBM missile clearly states its political and strategic intention, meaning the DPRK has explicitly abandoned its moratorium on ICBM test launches and nuclear tests that it had self-imposed since April of 2018 as diplomatic trust-building measures.

As early as January 19, a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) “gave an instruction to a sector concerned to reconsider in an overall scale the trust-building measures” and to “promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporally-suspended activities” [2]. It was March 24 when the results of the instruction were displayed.

Does this mean that the DPRK has returned to its brinkmanship diplomacy of 2017? Probably not. Ever since its test launch of a hypersonic missile was conducted at the beginning of the year, on January 5, the DPRK has repeatedly launched tactical guided missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and other missiles at an unprecedented pace. Some news reports suggest that these launches are to put pressure on the US to bring it back to negotiations to ease economic sanctions on the DPRK. However, that series of missile launches, of course, although they are undesired, should be regarded calmly as DPRK’s stance implementing its policy of bolstering war deterrence adopted at the WPK Congress, as it anticipates that US-DPRK and North-South relations are unlikely to improve for the time being [3].

The 8th WPK Congress held in January officially acknowledged that, “the five-year strategy for the national economic development” adopted in 2016 had failed to realize social construction that should have been evidenced by improved standard of living, and thus, adopted “the five-year plan for the national economic development.” The new five-year plan also sets concrete goals for bolstering military power including, “making nuclear weapons smaller, lighter and tactical,” “production of super large nuclear warhead,” “developing hypersonic gliding flight warhead,” “developing inter-continental ballistic rocket with the use of underwater or ground solid-fuel engine,” “possessing nuclear-powered submarine and underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon,” “operating reconnaissance satellite for military purposes,” and “developing reconnaissance drones” [4]. These developments are regrettable, but we have to reluctantly accept that the DPRK keeps bolstering its military power as long as tension remains high because of the failed diplomacy between US and the DPRK, as well as between North and South on the Korean Peninsula. The logic working behind this build-up is just similar to that of nuclear weapons modernization programs by nuclear states, such as the US.

However, at the same time, two points regarding decisions made at the 8th WPK Congress should be recalled. First, the top priority of the five-year plan is not a military buildup, but rather economic buildup, which will lead to a higher standard of living. Second, DPRK policy toward the US, which will be prerequisite for its economic development, is “to call for the US to withdraw its hostile policy toward the DPRK and to approach the US on the principle of power to power and goodwill to goodwill.” In other words, the possibility of exploring diplomacy is clearly stated [5].

On the other hand, DPRK’s frequent missile tests are considered to relate to the intrinsic nature of the military sector under the five-year plan for national economic development. Originally, in industrial sectors, such as farming, which are closely related to a higher standard of living, it is not easy to demonstrate tangible intermediate achievements in the short term. Additionally, under difficult circumstances due to natural disasters caused by climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and prolonged economic sanctions, the Kim Jong Un regime would have difficulty managing the implementation process for the five-year plan to result in success. As it is easier to demonstrate its interim achievements in the military technology development sector, there is the possibility that the sector has been prominently treated in the Party’s organizational management.

Actions of the US and the ROK under the Yoon Administration
In May 2022, the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) President Moon Jae-in who played a leading role in the Heads of States agreements in 2018 left office and conservative Yoon Suk-yeol assumed office, which is expected to cause significant changes to the fate of those 2018 agreements.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol criticized the Moon administration’s conciliatory stance toward the DPRK during the presidential election campaign. On May 21, right after his inauguration, at the summit with US President Biden held in Seoul, it became clear that US and ROK policy toward the DPRK has explicitly changed in their joint statement [6].

First, it should be noted that there is an important point that is absent from the joint statement. Just one year ago, on May 21 of 2021, in Washington DC, the US-ROK leaders’ joint statement by US President Biden and President Moon Jae-in was released, in which both leaders explicitly expressed that they would follow the 2018 summit agreements as follows [7].

“We also reaffirm our common belief that diplomacy and dialogue, based on previous inter-Korean and US-DPRK commitments such as the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and Singapore Joint Statement, are essential to achieve the complete denuclearization and establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

In contrast, the joint statement of President Biden and President Yoon didn’t mention anything about the 2018 summit commitments. The new joint statement is, briefly speaking, a return to policies before the 2018 summits, namely increasing international pressure through economic sanctions and military pressure by the combined US and ROK forces.

On the military side, the joint statement stated detailed measures for bolstering deterrence, including reactivating the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group, initiating discussions to expand the scope and scale of combined military exercises, and reaffirming commitment of the US to deploy strategic US military assets in a timely manner as necessary.

In line with these agreements, tangible changes have already taken place. The ten-day joint military exercise conducted in April was a command post training and didn’t mobilize field troops. However, the Carrier Strike Group exercise in early June was conducted with the ROKS Sejong the Great (DDG-991) Aegis destroyer joining the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) aircraft carrier homeported at Yokosuka, Japan, as a major combatant ship. Additionally, the US and ROK have started to demonstrate US-ROK combined force capabilities to respond quickly with a military counterattack if the DPRK launches missiles. They responded to DPRK missile launches not only by launching their own missiles, but also by escalating with a show of force by air strikes by the air force, which is overwhelmingly superior to that of the DPRK [8].

Regarding economic sanctions, the joint statement states that, “both leaders condemn the DPRK’s escalating ballistic missile tests this year…as clear violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions,” and, “urge all UN Member States to fully implement all United Nations Security Council resolutions” [9]. This statement merely repeats policy that has been historically proved a failure, based on the hope that if all UN Member States implement all UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, the severest sanctions in history, the DPRK will give in.

Viability of UN sanctions is weakening with the UNSC’s Resolutions Punishing the DPRK
As will be discussed later, originally, UN Security Council Resolutions that impose sanctions against ballistic missile launches don’t have a persuasive basis. Furthermore, the increasing political division within the Security Council caused by the Russian military invasion of Ukraine has made it more and more difficult to implement UNSC resolutions regarding sanctions.

On May 26, the UN Security Council voted down a draft resolution (S/2022/431) tabled by the US by a vote of 13 to 2 that would have strengthened sanctions against the DPRK, as China and Russia vetoed for the first time in a series of sanction resolutions, and their explanation for vetoing was consistent with their recent positions. In response, on June 8 and 10, for the first time in history, the UN General Assembly held a debate on Security Council’s veto. A formal meeting of the UN General Assembly to hold a debate on a veto was institutionalized in response to the situation in which the Security Council held a meeting on February 25 to address the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but couldn’t take any actions due to the veto. On April 26, the General Assembly decided that, “The President of the General Assembly shall convene a formal meeting of the General Assembly within 10 working days of the casting of a veto by one or more permanent members of the Security Council, to hold a debate on the situation as to which the veto was cast” [10]. The sanction resolution against the DPRK became the first such case.

At the General Assembly, the DPRK, along with China and Russia, expressed their own views [11]. For instance, China argued that the Peninsula situation has developed to what it is today due to US policies’ disregard for the reasonable concerns of the DPRK, and the US needs to actually show its willingness to have a dialogue with the DPRK by means of actions such as easing sanctions and postponing joint military exercises. The majority of participating states that made statements at the Assembly criticized the DPRK for repeatedly violating past UNSC resolutions and demanded that UN Member States implement the UNSC resolutions. Nonetheless, when considering their arguments dispassionately, it is difficult to deny that explanations by Russia and China that the proposed draft resolution to strengthen the sanction is not an effective means to resolve the issue are convincing to a certain extent. In the future, if new sanction resolutions related to DPRK’s further missile launches are repeatedly voted down by the Security Council’s veto and every time such debates are held by General Assembly, it can be reasonably expected that more states will come to the conclusion that sanction resolutions are ineffective.

Originally, in today’s international community, imposing sanctions against missile launches based on UNSC resolutions has limitations. Because, unlike issues of development of nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, there is no universally accepted normative international agreement to regulate the missiles themselves [12].

Generally, the control of missile weapons in the international community has been limited to those related to delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, this is an oversight within the missile control regime at present. The well-known Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) are also within this limited framework. The MTCR states that the purpose of its Guidelines is to “limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons” [13]. HCOC states “comprehensively to prevent and curb the proliferation of Ballistic Missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction [14]”, as its principle. Therefore, UNSC resolutions regulating missile launches must be in accordance with those limitations.

Regarding UNSC sanction resolutions against the DPRK, generally, all 10 resolutions from Resolution 1718 (2006) to 2397 (2017) [15], are in this context. All resolutions state at the beginning that, “reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,” and thus, establish the context for resolutions as a whole.

However, in the case of resolutions against the DPRK, out of this context, their operative clauses leading to the imposition of sanctions were adopted against missile launches in general without considering whether they are delivery systems of nuclear weapons or not. This became possible probably because criticism against DPRK’s nuclear tests and missile launches was skillfully interwoven. Diplomatic initiatives by the US and Japan might have worked behind the scenes.

The context that automatically imposes sanctions against any missile launch was established by two UNSC resolutions. Both were triggered by the DPRK’s nuclear tests, not by its missile launches. The contents of the other eight resolutions that were adopted, were informed by those two resolutions.

The first resolution is Resolution 1718 (2006), adopted in response to DPRK’s first nuclear test. It demands that, “the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile.” This established the future trend to ban general ballistic missile launches. The second resolution is Resolution 1874 (2009) the adoption of which was triggered by DPRK’s second nuclear test. This time, it expands the scope of the ban by stating, “demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology,” which established the rationale to make any launches using ballistic missile technology, including launches of space rocket, subject to sanctions.

It is necessary to scrutinize the validity of unconditionally banning only a certain nation from activities that are not banned, and generally tolerated in international community. In the case of missile launches, when imposing sanctions against them, a fair mechanism to judge whether these missiles are meant to deliver weapons of mass destruction or not is required, even given that this is a difficult task.

As is well known, to maintain or restore international peace and security, the Security Council shall…decide “what measures shall be taken” (Article 39, Charter of the United Nations), including “measures not involving the use of armed force” (Article 41) or “such action by air, sea, or land forces” (Article 42), and the Member States “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council” (Article 25). The integrity of decisions made by the UNSC, which has such powerful authority, has a significant impact on not only sanctioned states, but also on the international community as a whole. Therefore, decisions by the UNSC should be fair and consistent with current norms shared by the international community and should not be distorted by convenience of great powers or the motivation of certain interested states.

In addition to fundamental problems regarding the validity of missile test ban described above, inconsistencies in the real world have surfaced.

As already mentioned, in response to DPRK’s short-range missile launches on May 25 and June 5, the US and South Korea launched the same kind of missiles and demonstrated combined forces capabilities to respond quickly. And on September 15 of last year, the same day when the DPRK launched short-range missiles, the ROK conducted a test launch of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile. Why are DPRK’s missile launches sanctioned and those by the US and South Korea on the Korean Peninsula tolerated? Calls for fair criteria for judgement in the international community will inevitably intensify. It is expected that imposing sanctions against DPRK’s missile launches will keep losing its persuasiveness.

Efforts for Regional Common Security is a Lesson Drawn from Ukraine
So far, regarding DPRK policy, both the Biden and Yoon administrations have announced policies of only economic sanctions and military pressure that are destined to fail. President Yoon has emphasized an audacious plan that will vastly strengthen North Korea’s economy. However, he has attached the condition that North Korea “genuinely embarks on a process to complete denuclearization” [16] first. It is difficult to expect that this heavy-handed approach will change the DPRK. Although President Yoon and President Biden have emphasized that the path to dialogue remains open toward peaceful and diplomatic resolution with the DPRK [17], the DPRK has argued that it is the US’s turn to demonstrate good faith in return for DPRK’s trust building measures. For example, the DPRK imposed its moratorium on ICBM test launches and nuclear tests, as this Watch Report has repeatedly stated (for instance, Watch Report 32 & 33). Given these circumstances, it seems difficult to realize meaningful dialogue. Consequently, it is expected that the DPRK will continue to strengthen its nuclear deterrence for the purpose of self-defense.

Now, in terms of next steps, let us pay attention to a clue found in the ROK-US leaders’ joint statement. It is the phrase stating that, “President Yoon and President Biden reiterate their common goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and agree to further strengthen the airtight coordination to this end” [18]. At first glance, this looks like just an ordinary phrase. However, the joint statement doesn’t use a phrase of “complete denuclearization of the DPRK” but “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” which has important implications. President Yoon used a phrase of “complete denuclearization of the DPRK” in his inauguration speech and at NATO’s Madrid summit [19], and never set the goal of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Nonetheless, the reason why the joint statement uses the phrase of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” can be safely said that it reflects US opinion.

If the DPRK continues to strengthen its nuclear forces, there is a growing risk that conservative groups behind the Yoon administration will intensify their calls for developing ROK’s own nuclear weapons and its public opinion may lean toward this possibility. This kind of development has the risk of triggering the nightmare of a nuclear domino scenario, which will spread to Japan. For the Biden administration to prevent such development, it is necessary to compel the Yoon administration to commit to “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” which includes South Korea.

If “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” is a goal to be achieved, it is crystal clear that the 2018 agreements in which the US, and North and South Korea agreed upon toward that goal at summit level should be the foundation as a basis for future progress.

The summit agreements have not been abandoned by any of the parties --- US, the ROK and the DPRK. All it takes are new ideas and initiatives which make use of the agreements.

Taking the Russian military invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity, in East Asia, arguments about the possibility of a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan have been enflamed and efforts to strengthen military capabilities and increase military budgets have been intensifying. However, at the same time, there are growing arguments that it is the theory of alliance, which brings together military powers to defeat opponents, is the root cause of the war in Ukraine. In East Asia, before the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, encirclement of China led by the US and its allies had already started and it is undeniable that US policy toward the Korean Peninsula has been affected by it. Considering this, it is possible to recast the 2018 agreements as valuable tools to prevent not only tension on the Korean Peninsula, but to prevent regional tension from further escalating and thereby, to establish common security system that all state parties can accept.

We again propose here that all state parties move toward the establishment of a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) based on the 2018 summit agreements. Configured on a three-plus-three scheme in which the territorial area, including the Korean Peninsula and Japan, becomes a nuclear weapon free zone and the surrounding three nuclear weapon states -- US, Russia and China -- provide security assurances, many experts have developed innovative ideas regarding comprehensive approach to realize the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ [20].

Considering that all state parties concerned are also the participants of the 2003-2008 Six Party Talks, many would agree that the Six Party Talks is the best framework to discuss this subject. Additionally, the history of cooperation in 2010 to 2011 between the US under the Obama administration and China to resume the Six Party Talks is a lesson worthy to be recalled. At that time, China negotiated with South Korea under a conservative administration and the DPRK respectively, in spite of high tensions between North and South Korea as a result of serious military incidents, and tried to set a course for them to rejoin the talks through three step processes [21]. Still today, we have high expectations of US or Chinese initiatives for such cooperation, if we follow history, especially Chinese initiatives.
(Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI, Hajime MAEKAWA, Yosuke WATANABE)

[1] “Striking Demonstration of Great Military Muscle of Juche Korea: Successful Test-Launch of New-Type ICBM,” KCNA, 25 March 2022
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article by date.

[2] “6th Political Bureau Meeting of 8th C.C., WPK Held,” KCNA, 20 January 2022
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article by date.

[3] For instance, “North Korea launches a missile, ninth time this year (tentative title in English),” Asahi Simbun Digital, 6 March 2022 (in Japanese)
https://digital.asahi.com/articles/DA3S15224936.html

This argument can also be found in researcher’s circles. Richard WEITZ, “The Military Logic Behind North Korea’s Missile Medley,” 38 NORTH, 14 March 2022
https://www.38north.org/2022/03/the-military-logic-behind-north-koreas-missile-medley/?utm_source=Stimson+Center&utm_campaign=6c5556ec9b-38N_RSS_AUTOMATED&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_15c3e20f70-6c5556ec9b-46317501&mc_cid=6c5556ec9b&mc_eid=6cb0bb0a89

[4] “Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory,” KCNA, 9 January 2021
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article by date.

[5] See note [4].

[6] “United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement,” The White House, 21 May 2022
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/

[7] “U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement,” The White House, 21 May 2021
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/

[8] In response to the North Korean missile launch on 25 May 2022, thirty ROK Air Force F15Ks performed an elephant walk with a full load of bombs and missiles on the same day.

David Choi & Hana Kusumoto, "US, South Korea respond to North Korea’s latest missile tests with launches of their own," STARS AND STRIPES, 24 May 2022
https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2022-05-24/north-korea-ballistic-missiles-launch-6118170.html

Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Launches Suspected ICBM and Two Other Ballistic Missiles,” New York Times, 24 May 2022
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/world/asia/north-korea-ballistic-missiles.html

Also, in response to the North Korean missile launch on 5 June 2022, 16 ROK Air Force strike-fighters (F35A, F15K, and KF16) and four US Air Force F16s flew in combat formation over the Yellow Sea on 7 June.

David Choi, “Allied fighter formations show resolve in wake of North Korean missile tests,” STARS AND STRIPES, 7 June 2022
https://www.stripes.com/branches/air_force/2022-06-07/us-south-korea-fighter-jets-6259171.html

[9] See note [6].

[10] A/RES/76/262

[11] “General Assembly Holds Landmark Debate on Security Council’s Veto of Draft Text Aimed at Tightening Sanctions against Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, GA/12423, 8 June 2022
https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12423.doc.htm

“Highlighting Strong Link between Multilingualism, Multilateralism, General Assembly Adopts Resolution Urging Parity among United Nations Six Official Languages,” UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, GA/12425, 10 June 2022
https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12425.doc.htm

[12] For instance, “The issue of missiles in all its aspects -- Report of the Secretary-General,” (A/57/229, United Nations, 2003, p. 13) concludes: “at present no universally accepted norms or instruments to deal specifically with missile-related concerns in all their aspects exist.”
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/494729

[13] https://mtcr.info/guidelines-for-sensitive-missile-relevant-transfers/

[14] https://www.hcoc.at/background-documents/text-of-the-hcoc.html

[15] There is a table of UN Security Council Sanctions Resolutions against North Korea in Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI’s book North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: a mirror reflecting the world, (in Japanese, Kobunken, September 2021), pp. 147-149.

[16] Yoon Suk Yeol, “Inaugural Address by President Yoon Yeol,” ROK Office of the 20th President, 10 May 2022
https://eng.president.go.kr/sub/inaugural.php

[17] See note [6].

[18] See note [6].

[19] Lee Haye-ah, “Yoon calls for int’l resolve to denuclearize N. Korea,” YONHAP NEWS, 30 June 2022
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220630000600315

[20] Michael Hamel-Green, “An Alternative to Nuclear Deadlock and Stalled Diplomacy – Proposals, Pathways, and Prospects for the Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone,” A Working Paper presented to the 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project, October 31–November 1, and November 14–15, 2020 (Japan Time)
https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/Hamel-Green_Nagasaki_WP_20201016_final.pdf

[21] See note [15], pp. 138-139.