Watch Report No.32

  Watch Report No.32   　June 12, 2021

§The US Must Be the First to Take Confidence Building Actions in Order to Reopen US-DPRK Negotiations: The Sooner, the Better

Today, June 12, 2021, is the third anniversary of the Joint Statement declared by the USA and the DPRK (Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, or North Korea) at the Singapore Summit. June 12 also marks the first time the anniversary of the U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement occurs during the Biden administration.

The policy review of the DPRK by Biden administration has just been completed. Although the details of the review have not been made public, it is reported that the goal of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” is to be pursued through diplomatic negotiations with the DPRK based on a “calibrated practical approach” [1]. At the US-ROK (Republic of Korea, or South Korea) Summit held on 21 May 2021 after completion of the U.S. policy review, both leaders reaffirmed their common belief that “(D)iplomacy and dialogue, based on previous inter-Korean and US-DPRK commitments such as the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and Singapore Joint Statement, are essential to achieve the complete denuclearization and establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula” [2]. This should be considered a good starting point that the Biden administration has indicated for its policy direction that respects previous agreements in which the US committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK and the DPRK reaffirmed its commitment to complete denuclearization, and both committed to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations.

However, given the long-accumulated distrust between U.S. and the DPRK, it is critically important how both will make efforts to overcome distrust in order to take concrete actions toward denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. From the perspective of events since 2018, it is the U.S., in our view, that has to take the initiative and act first to build confidence between U.S. and the DPRK. The risk of reemergence of the previous vicious cycle will increase if the U.S. delays its first action. In this respect, the sooner the better.                                     

The 2018 Panmunjom Declaration [3], which is referred to in U.S.-ROK Joint Statement on 21 May 2021, was signed by the ROK President Moon Jae-In and then-Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of DPRK Kim Jong-Un, and it agreed to make joint efforts to bring an end to the Korean War, which is currently in a state of armistice, and to build a “durable and lasting peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula,” also agreeing to cease any hostile acts against each other, and to reaffirm mutual non-aggression, while confirming to realize complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And the Singapore Joint Statement [4] is the diplomatic document agreed upon by then-U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-Un at the US-DPRK Summit that took place for the first time in history, in June 2008. In the Statement, Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Kim Jong-Un reaffirmed his firm commitment to “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Then, the two leaders pointed out the importance of confidence building by saying that they recognize “that mutual confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Based upon this preamble, they agreed on four points: (1) “to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations,” (2) “to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” (3) “to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” and (4) to “commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.”

As was the case in past key nuclear-related agreements including U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework in 1994 and Six Parties’ Joint Statement in 2005, the North Korean government has agreed to abandon its nuclear program and stockpiles on the condition of security assurances, including improvement of U.S.-DPRK relations, non-aggression to the DPRK, and establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

Since the failure of the second U.S.-DPRK Summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February 2019, the DPRK has persistently refused to engage in negotiations with the U.S.. But, at the same time, the North Korean government has repeatedly suggested that it would be ready to talk if the US abandons its hostile policy toward the DPRK [5]. The fact that the Biden administration respects past agreements in which the U.S. committed to improvement of relations between the two countries and establishment of peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will possibly lead to the abandonment of its policy of hostility toward the DPRK. If this is made clear, it is highly probable that negotiations between the two countries will reopen after the long interval since the Hanoi Summit.

However, given the long history of hostility between the U.S. and the DPRK, lasting more than seventy years, failures of past negotiations on denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula have ended in further deepening of distrust. If mutual confidence building is a key to promoting negotiations, as is stated in the Singapore Joint Statement, it is necessary for them to try to resolve this entangled situation of distrust by analyzing the process of events since 2018 when the Singapore Joint Statement was agreed upon.  If this can be accomplished with cool heads, it will lead to the conclusion that it is the U.S. whose turn it is to act first, as is demonstrated below.

Let us recall what has happened since 2018.
First, the DPRK took bold measures on 20 April 2018, in advance to upcoming inter-Korean Summit and the U.S.-DPRK Summit. This can be interpreted as a unilateral step in pursuit of confidence building. On that day, at the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), practically the highest decision-making body in the governing system of North Korea. Kim Jong-Un presented a “new strategic line of the WPK to concentrate all efforts of the whole party and country on the socialist economic construction,” and decided to “discontinue nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire starting” from the following day, 21st April, and dismantle the nuclear test ground “to transparently guarantee the discontinuance of the nuclear test.” He actually exploded three tunnels of the nuclear test site on May 24, witnessed by invited foreign media including CNN. Responding to allegations that no experts have verified the consequences of the explosion, Kim Jong-Un proposed to U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo, who visited Pyongyang on October 7 in the same year after the Singapore Summit, that Kim Jong-Un was willing to invite experts to verify the dismantlement. (This never occurred due to the deadlocked negotiations).

At the Singapore Summit, Kim Jong-Un expressed his willingness to dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site to verify his intention not to restart test-launch of ICBMs. This was clearly documented in the inter-Korean Pyongyang Joint Declaration on September 19, 2018, which states that, “the North will permanently dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform under the observation of experts from relevant countries” [6]. As for recovering the POW/MIA remains committed in Singapore Joint Statement, DPRK repatriated 55 remains already identified on July 27, 2018, the 65th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice Agreement.

Also in the September Pyongyang Declaration, the DPRK stated clearly “its willingness to continue to take additional measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, if the US takes corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 US-DPRK Joint Statement.”

As is exemplified above, North Korea continued to make efforts to build confidence. It followed through on its words, and also suggested that the parties build confidence progressively by mutually taking further measures.

In contrast, what has U.S. done for mutual confidence building? The only concrete action it took was postponement and reduction of the large-scale military exercises against North Korea, to which Trump committed at the Singapore Summit. Given the uneven character of actions of the past, it is evident that it is now the U.S. turn to take balancing measures to build confidence if, in fact, Biden aspires to establish a new relationship between the two countries on the basis of the Singapore Joint Statement.

After the Hanoi Summit failed due to the “all or nothing” approach of the U.S., it seems that the DPRK adjusted its attitude towards negotiations with U.S. and started to say that, unless U.S. withdraws its hostile policy against it, the negotiations between the two countries would be meaningless. The DPRK must have come to believe that the reason why the U.S. has no intention to build confidence results from the fact that U.S. has no willingness to change its hostile policy against it. This “abandonment status” on the part of the DPRK is thought to persist at present. In order to deliberate over what U.S. should do to recover the trust, let’s look back at the history of the evolving DPRK attitude since Hanoi Summit.

After the Hanoi Summit, the DPRK waited for U.S. response to its request for substantive proposals based on a “new way of calculation” and set the time limit as the end of 2019. With no response from the U.S., at the very end of the year, the DPRK held the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of WPK. At the meeting, the DPRK assessed the U.S. situation as follows [7]:
“(T)he US real intention is to seek its own political and diplomatic interests while wasting time away under the signboard of dialogue and negotiations and at the same time keep sanctions upon the latter so as to weaken the latter.”
“If there were not the nuclear issue, the US would find fault with us under the other issue, and the US military and political threats would not end.”

It then continued referring to the “withdrawal of the US hostile policy”:

“(I)f the US persists in its hostile policy towards the DPRK, there will never be the denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and the DPRK will steadily develop necessary and prerequisite strategic weapons for the security of the state until the US rolls back its hostile policy towards the DPRK and lasting peace and durable peace-keeping mechanism is built.”

Here the withdrawal of the US hostile policy is emphasized as a necessary condition of denuclearization. Also, about one year later, at the WPK 8th Congress held in January 2021, the continuation of U.S. hostile policy against the DPRK was criticized, but this time the report points out that the withdrawal of the hostile policy is “a key to establishing new relationship between the DPRK and the USA,” as follows:
“(W)hoever takes power in the U.S., its entity and real intention of its policy toward the DPRK would never change.”
“Stating that the key to establishing new DPRK-US relationship lies in the US withdrawal of its hostile policy towards the DPRK, the report solemnly clarify the WPK’s stand that it would approach the US on the principle of power for power and goodwill for goodwill in the future” [8].

On 17 March 2021, the First Deputy Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui made a statement reiterating that, “Our stand that no DPRK-US contact and dialogue of any kind can be possible unless the US rolls back its hostile policy towards the DPRK,” when Biden administration tried to approach to the DPRK. She also reaffirmed that the country would approach the U.S. according to its basic principle: “power for power and goodwill for goodwill” [9].

As is seen in the above, since Hanoi Summit, North Korea has discussed its relations with U.S. and acted accordingly, focusing on the US hostile policy toward DPRK.

What is the hostile policy? What does withdrawal of hostile policy specifically mean? The answers to these questions are not simple. But we can understand from the recent history described above that the “hostile policy toward DPRK” means the whole of unilateral policies toward the DPRK adopted by the US that negate the DPRK’s efforts to overcome mutual distrust and build confidence one by one. Therefore, the substance of the U.S. hostile policy is not something that can be swept away once and for all. But, at the same time, signals of U.S. intention to withdraw can be demonstrated in many ways.

The first thing that President Biden, who is responsible for acting first, should do is clearly announce his intention of non-hostility toward the DPRK and his belief in the importance of efforts to build confidence in each other. The hurdle to do this is not that high. In October 2000, when Jo Myong-Rok, then First Vice Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission and special envoy of Chairman Kim Jong-Il, visited Washington D.C. to see then-U.S. President Bill Clinton, the U.S. and the DPRK issued a Joint Communique that both would have no hostile intent toward each other. What Biden only has to do is to reconfirm the Communique. It reads, in part:
“(T)he U.S. and the D.P.R.K. sides stated that they are prepared to undertake a new direction in their relations. As a crucial first step, the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity” [10].

Following this, the Biden administration should take specific actions for confidence building such as ceasing the US-ROK joint military exercises, declaring an end to the Korean War, establishing a liaison office in Pyongyang, easing sanctions, etc.         

Such U.S. actions should be undertaken as soon as possible. Every moment that passes increases distrust and hostility between the two countries. The Korean War still continues without a formal peace treaty although the state of truce has lasted for a long time. Both parties have more than enough justification to consider military exercises and further modernization of weapons as a necessity. In fact, a US-ROK joint military exercise is going to take place this coming August. Especially in U.S. and South Korea, governments have the challenge of how to deal with hardliner opposition and public opinion. There is concern that tensions on the Korean Peninsula will intensify again. The more time the Biden administration takes to initiate its action, the greater the risk of a reemergence of the vicious cycle of distrust. Urgent actions by the U.S. administration are imperative. (Hajime MAEKAWA and Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jen Psaki Aboard Air Force One En Route Philadelphia, PA,” The White House, 30 April 2021

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/04/30/press-gaggle-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-aboard-air-force-one-en-route-philadelphia-pa/

[2] “The U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement,” The White House, 21 May 2021

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/

[3] “Panmunjom Declaration,” Cheong Wadae, 27 April 2018

https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/32

[4] “Singapore US-DPRK Summit Joint Statement,” The White House, 12 June 2021

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/

[5] “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK,” KCNA, 1 January 2020, and “Press Statement by Kim Yo Jong, First Vice Department Director of Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea,” KCNA, 10 July 2020

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

[6] “Pyongyang Joint Declamation,” Cheong Wadae, 19 September 2018

https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Briefings/322

Japanese translation, Peace Almanac, Ryokuhu Shuppan, 10 July 2021, p.139 

[7] “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C. WPK,” KCNA,1 January 2020

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

[8] “Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory,” KCNA, 9 January 2021

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

[9] “Statement of First Vice Foreign Minister of DPRK,” KCNA, 18 March 2021

 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

[10] “US-DPRK Joint Communique,” US Department of State, 12 October 2000

https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eap/001012_usdprk_jointcom.html       

                          

Watch Report No.31

  Watch Report No.31   　April 26, 2021

§In the Ongoing US Consultations with Japan and South Korea over the Biden Administration’s Policy Toward the DPRK, Each Countries’ Independent Vision for Northeast Asia Region Is Being Questioned

The Biden administration began on January 20, 2021. Only a few months have passed since then, and for the time being, it remains to be seen if the administration will regard the Singapore agreement as basis of future US-DPRK negotiations, in which the US committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK and the DPRK committed to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the US and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Based on the remarks and documents of the Biden administration since its inauguration, it can be assumed that the administration attaches importance to the DPRK (North Korea) issues. It has been trying to pursue a certain kind of engagement policy rather than ignoring the issues and has consulted both the Japanese and ROK (South Korea) governments in developing its DPRK policy. 

In the MSNBC TV program aired on February 1, US Secretary of State Blinken said that, “I would be the first to acknowledge that it (North Korea’s nuclear issue) is a problem that’s gotten worse across administrations,” and admitted that regardless of Democrat or Republican administrations, US government diplomacy has not achieved anything. He also said that, “So the first thing the President … has asked us to do is to review the policy to make sure that we’re using the most effective tools to advance the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to deal with the problem,” [1] and he also stated that he would review the policy with US allies. On January 19, in his confirmation hearings, Blinken said that “(We would) (l)ook at what options we have … (T)hat starts with consulting closely with our allies and partners, particularly with South Korea and with Japan and others” [2]. February 19, the US, South Korea and Japan held a director-general level meeting via video conference and agreed to deepen cooperation among the countries.

The Biden administration’s basic stance to emphasize its consultations with South Korea and Japan sounds reasonable. However, the purpose of consultations is not necessarily self-evident. In reality, the policies toward the DPRK of the current South Korean government and that of Japanese government are fundamentally different. Especially, in relation to the trend on the Korean Peninsula favorable for peace and denuclearization since 2018, the government of Japan has not even been a player that has actively engaged in the issues as they have evolved. Given the fact that the US and South Korea have undoubtedly been playing important roles in changes since 2018, what is the real meaning of the US new administration’s policy statement asserting that it will to closely cooperate with both Japan and South Korea on US-DPRK negotiations? That’s the main topic of this Report.

The Moon Jae-in administration’s expectations of the US

As widely known, starting in 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in has made a major contribution to new developments of inter-Korean relations and US-DPRK relations. Especially, for President Moon, the establishment of a peace regime which would replace the 1953 Korean War Armistice has been an unshakable goal. 

President Moon hopes that the Biden administration also regards the Singapore agreement as a starting point for future US-DPRK dialogues. On January 18, 2021, during a New Year’s press conference held in the Chunchugwan Hall of the Blue House, President Moon said, “With the inauguration of the Biden administration, I believe it has provided a turning point to start over the US-DPRK dialogue and inter-Korean dialogue,” and “future dialogue should be based on the achievements of the Trump administration and build upon it” [3]. 

Additionally, on January 20, the day of the Biden’s inauguration, Moon Jae-in picked as his new foreign minister Chung Eui-yong who visited the DPRK as Presidential Special Envoy to North Korea in 2018 and prepared the US-DPRK Singapore summit.

On March 18, in the joint press conference held following ROK-US Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”), answering the question from a reporter, “Do you believe that the US needs to respect the Singapore agreement?,” Chung said, “Singapore agreement, from the Korean Government’s perspective, is a confirmation of fundamental principles to resolve the US-North Korea relations, establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula, and denuclearization, though it needs to be considered seriously,” [4] and stressed the fundamental importance of the Singapore agreement, while avoiding remarks, in the presence of Blinken, US Secretary of State, that could be taken as a demand towards the US.

The Japanese government has no new policy plan

Although the Japanese government acknowledged that the US-DPRK Singapore agreement was in the right direction, [5] in reality, it has been emphasizing continued pressure on the DPRK by imposing sanctions based on United Nations Security Council resolutions and has maintained a stance of “give up nuclear weapons first and sanctions-relief comes later.” According to a memoir written by John Bolton, former National Security Advisor to US President Donald Trump, prior to the Singapore summit, former Japanese Prime Minister Abe advised Trump not to trust Chairman Kim and tried to block developments at the summit [6].

The Suga administration, which began in September 2020, hasn’t changed this stance of relying solely on sanctions [7]. In his New Year’s press conference held on January 13, Prime Minister Suga repeated a conventional stance, saying that, “Japan seeks to normalize its relation with North Korea, through comprehensively resolving outstanding issues of concerns, such as abductions, nuclear and missile issues and settling the unfortunate past in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration” [8]. It is a sure bet that the Japanese government’s stance following the start of the Biden administration is a continuation of that statement of Prime Minister Suga. In the press conference following Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2+2) held on March 16, Foreign Minister Motegi said, “(A)s we strive for realization of complete denuclearization of North Korea, we confirmed the importance of complete implementation of UNSC resolutions and confirmed that cooperation will continue amongst the three countries, Japan, the US, and ROK, in addition to the bilateral cooperation with the US,” which is just a repetition of the past policy statement [9].

In reality, there exists the possibility that the Japanese government has pursued an even further backward-looking policy behind such a public policy statement. It was reported that, on January 22, at the meeting of Foreign Affairs Division of the ruling LDP (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan), a senior Foreign Ministry official said, “Japan has not supported a step-by-step approach. We will strengthen lobbying (the Biden administration)” [10]. This remark implies that the Japanese government has been trying to force the DPRK give in to sanctions and abandon its nuclear weapons at once, by keeping ‘historically unprecedented’ merciless sanctions in place. Additionally, this remark implies that the Japanese government expressed its intention to oppose a phased denuclearization approach which, some reports suggest, will be taken up by the Biden administration, unlike the Trump administration. It seems that the Japanese government is still adhering to the illusion that pressure is effective, without learning lessons from the history of negotiations where no progress was made based on the so-called “Libya model.” On March 30, the Japanese government decided to extend by two more years its autonomous sanctions against the DPRK that are going to expire in April [11]. 

Difficulties which appeared in 2+2 meetings

As described above, significant differences exist between current DPRK policies of South Korea and Japan. South Korea’s Moon administration has strived to resume US-DPRK negotiations to advance the implementation of the Singapore agreement. In contrast, Japan has maintained a policy which is more or less against the DPRK and has emphasized pressure on the DPRK. The Biden administration has said that they will emphasize consultations with those two countries. Because of this difference, the Biden administration is expected to face difficulties in the process, which have already arisen in 2+2 joint statements. 

Resulting from the Biden administration’s strategic priority on competition with China, the administration chose Japan and South Korea for the first overseas travel to hold direct bilateral meetings among foreign and defense ministers (so-called 2+2 meetings). As a result, the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (March 16, Tokyo) and the Republic of Korea-US Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (March 18, Seoul) were consecutively held and joint statements were issued respectively, which refer to the DPRK issues. 

These two joint 2+2 statements contain remarkably different messages regarding the DPRK issue. In the US-Japan joint statement, the two countries use an expression which can be considered hostile, provoking the DPRK. The phrase, “Recognizing that North Korea’s arsenal poses a threat to international peace and stability,” is highly provocative. It is a more aggressive expression than ever before, describing the full arsenal of the DPRK as an international threat, instead of limiting it to its nuclear weapons only. The US-Japan joint statement also “reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea,” [12] ignoring a sensitivity of the ROK government, which has repeatedly, and accurately, said that what is committed to among US, ROK and DPRK is not denuclearization of North Korea, but denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula.

In contrast, the US-ROK 2+2 joint statement uses accurate expressions throughout the document in consideration of the DPRK, while based on the premise of the shared recognition between ROK and US that no US nuclear weapon is deployed in South Korea at present. In the joint statement, the US and South Korea not only limited their expression to “North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile issues are a priority for the Alliance…and reaffirmed a shared commitment to address and resolve these issues.” Instead of using the phrase “denuclearization of the DPRK,” the two countries also directly avoided referring to US nuclear umbrella. In other words, they avoided reference to nuclear weapons in the US extended deterrence, by stating, “US officials reaffirmed the US commitment to the defense of the ROK and its extended deterrence using the full range of US capabilities” [13]. In comparison, in the same context, the Japan-US joint statement released two days earlier clearly stated “the full range of its capabilities, including nuclear.” Additionally, the joint communique of the US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting [14] released last October also clearly stated nuclear weapons, referring to elements of US extended deterrence. The reason why the two countries didn’t use the word ‘nuclear’ this time is obviously the South Korean side’s hope that US-DPRK relations have a good start under the Biden administration. 

Implications of US consultations with South Korea and Japan

As can be seen in these joint statements, if the Biden administration would consult with its allies to discuss its DPRK policy, it can be concluded that Japan and South Korea will pull US DPRK policy in almost opposite directions. 

If the DPRK policy review by the Biden administration aims to ensure “the most effective tools to advance the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” as already described [15], it will at minimum need to be reviewed so as to keep the DPRK continuously engaged in the process and be mindful of a long-term schedule of implementation. Solutions in the short-term cannot be assumed. In making such efforts, there would be hardly anything substantial that the current Japanese government could contribute. Rather, the Japanese government carries a risk of creating difficulties that would undermine progress. On the other hand, South Korea has been making efforts to realize the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration. South Korea can be regarded as an independent player in the same issue that the US is challenged to resolve. The US would derive great benefit from consultation with South Korea.

This situation reminds us of the US policy review in 1999 by the Special Policy Coordinator on North Korea, William Perry (former Secretary of State). US President Clinton asked Perry to comprehensively review US policy to find out whether the US should maintain the Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK and the KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) process. Perry emphasized the importance of the consultations with Japan and South Korea in his policy review. In his memoir, Perry stated that Japan and South Korea had completely different fears, describing it as follows [16]: 

“Kim Dae-Jung, the South Korean president, feared that my North Korea review would upset his ongoing “sunshine policy” with North Korea, while Keizo Obuchi, the Japanese prime minister, feared that I would ignore what he saw as Japan’s main issue with North Korea – securing the release of Japanese citizens who had been abducted by North Korea.” 

History shows that consultations with South Korea significantly contributed to the US policy review, however, no similar contribution from Japan can be found.

Nonetheless, it is critically important for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia as a whole that the US consult with Japan and South Korea on its DPRK policy. It is not because cooperation among the US, South Korea and Japan would increase pressure against the DRPK in negotiations, as is often said. It is safe to say that the DPRK is interested only in the emerging US policy toward the DPRK. This is so because the US’s pursuit of its DPRK policy with the understanding of Japan and South Korea is important for each of the three states, South Korea, Japan and the US, to continue its engagement in Korean Peninsula issues.

As the South Korean government is obliged to implement the Panmunjom Declaration, its coordination with the US is indispensable. For the Japanese government, the fact that it has been always consulted by the US would be of critical help in order to convince more conservative elements in the ruling political system should negotiations advance in a direction inconsistent with the intentions of the Japanese government. Furthermore, by knowing the direction of US policy, the Government of Japan is sometimes given chance to prevent public opinion from working too much against improvement of the situation, which hopefully would provide basis for the public to press the Japanese government to abandon its current lack of innovation in its policy toward North Korea and become more independently engaged in the issue.

As for the US government, to develop and implement its DPRK policy requires it to consider the entire security policy of Northeast Asia including the issue of ending the Korean War. For a sustainable resolution of these regional issues, the US policy review on the DPRK needs to be based on a regional vision including China, in which both Japan and South Korea have their own strong vested interests. Therefore, US consultations with Japan and South Korea are unavoidable. This also implies that both Japan and South Korea need to negotiate with the US based on their own regional visions.

Discussions among the US, South Korea and Japan on DPRK policy will naturally be occasions where each country participates with its own independent long-term vision for peace and security of Northeast Asia, including China and the DPRK. (Tatsuro DEBROUX, Ichiro YUASA and Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] “Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Andrea Mitchell of MSNBC Andrea Mitchell Reports,” Department of State, February 1, 2021 

https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-with-andrea-mitchell-of-msnbc-andrea-mitchell-reports/　

[2] “Nomination of Hon. Antony J. Blinken to Be U.S. Secretary of State—Part I”, Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, January 19, 2021

https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/01%2019%202021%20Nominations%20--%20Blinken%20Part%201.pdf　　 

[3] “President Moon, US-DPRK dialogue should restart based on Singapore Declaration,” Hankyoreh, January 19, 2021 (in Japanese)

https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/19bc8a9aa39f40d084494ffa189240022c705518

[4] “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Secretary of State Antony Blinken Conduct Press Conference With Their Counterparts After a US-ROK Foreign and Defense Ministerial (“2+2”), Hosted by the ROK’s Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong and Minister of Defense Suh Wook,” Department of Defense, March 18, 2021 

https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2541299/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-and-secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-c/

[5] “Prime Minister Abe support Singapore Agreement as one step toward resolution of outstanding North Korean issues,” NHK, June 12, 2018 (in Japanese)

https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/statement/5455.html

[6] John Bolton, The Room Where It Happened (Simon & Schuster, 2020)

[7] Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI and Ichiro YUASA, “Consistency in Policy Messages and an Accurate Understanding of the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration are Essential to the Japanese Government’s Policy towards the DPRK “to seek a Summit Without Any-Pre-conditions,” Watch Report 28, January 13, 2021    

[8] “[COVID-19] Press Conference by the Prime Minister” Kantei, January 13, 2021

http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/99_suga/statement/2021/0113kaiken.html

[9] “Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2+2), Joint Press Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 16, 2021 (in Japanese)

https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/na/st/page3_003036.html

[10] “Japan cautious about step-by-step denuclearization, DPRK policy of new US administration,” The Sankei Shimbun, January 22, 2021 (in Japanese)

https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/210122/plt2101220031-n1.html

[11] “Japan’s autonomous sanctions measures against DPRK will extend for two more years,” NHK, March 30, 2021, (in Japanese)

https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210330/k10012944431000.html

[12] “US-Japan Joint Press Statement,” Department of State, March 16, 2021

https://www.state.gov/u-s-japan-joint-press-statement/

[13] “Joint Statement of the 2021 Republic of Korea-United States Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”),” Department of State, March 18, 2021

https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-2021-republic-of-korea-united-states-foreign-and-defense-ministerial-meeting-22/

[14] “Joint Communique of the 52nd US-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting,” Department of Defense, October 14, 2020

https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2381879/joint-communique-of-the-52nd-us-republic-of-korea-security-consultative-meeting/

[15] See note [1]

[16] William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford University Press, 2015)

Watch Report No.30

 Watch Report No.30   　March 23, 2021

§Following the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party, No Change is Seen in DPRK Policy to Denuclearize and its Attitude Toward Negotiations with the US

In a way, the newly established Biden administration confronts a very similar problem that the Obama administration had at its outset in terms of the impasse of the US-DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) relationship. The Obama administration was forced to find a way out of the impasse brought about by the failure of the “six-party talks” to reach an agreement due to hurried US requirement to verify. The Biden administration is now forced to find an effective and promising approach to bring to an end the deadlocked US-DPRK Singapore Agreement caused by a hurried US ‘big deal’ demand. Of course, it is also true that the political situations surrounding the two administrations at the inauguration are quite different, at least in two respects: 1) the need to transition from the self-oriented and ostentatious character of the “Trump First” diplomacy employed by the former US President, and 2) the fact that the nuclear and missile capability of the DPRK has progressed significantly in the past several years.

Given these circumstances, it is important that we see clearly what the DPRK’s policies toward the USA are. To put it precisely, we should answer the following two questions taking into account the outcomes of the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party held in January 2021:

1) Does the DPRK’s evaluation of mutual agreements made in the 2018 US-DPRK Joint Statement remain unchanged?

2) Does the DPRK’s requirement of the US for a “New Way of Calculation” ensuring the US withdrawal from its hostile policy remain unchanged?

The 8th Congress of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) was held on 5th to 12th January 2021 after a five-year interval. It is reported that General Secretary Kim Jong Un called the US “the biggest enemy” and committed to continue developing nuclear weapons. But it is too early and short-sighted to conclude from these reports that the DPRK has abandoned its will to denuclearize and has returned to a confrontational policy toward the US. What is needed here is to understand the policies and messages expressed in the Congress with accuracy and within context.

The central focus of the Congress is the economy 

First it should be pointed out that the central issue of the 8th Congress was to sum up the five-year strategy for national economic development adopted at the previous Congress held in 2016, and to launch a new economic development plan for the next five years to accomplish the Korean-style socialism construction. Economic difficulties caused by triple impacts in 2020 -- natural disasters, novel corona virus pandemic, and economic sanctions -- made it necessary for the DPRK to set the Congress as the point of departure to overcome these difficulties by creating a new agenda.

In his opening address, Kim Jong Un expressed the failure in his policy on economy, saying, “(T)hough the period of implementing the Five-Year-Strategy for the National Economic Development ended last year was a failure because almost all sectors fell a long way short of the set objectives” [1]. In his speech, lasting as long as nine hours and the main event of the Congress, the focus was almost exclusively on the economic strategy that was to be taken to promote the socialist construction, as is explained in the following paragraph. In his speech, made on the last day of the Congress, Kim Jon Un made a vigorous appeal to the people: “The socialist economic construction is the most important revolutionary task on which we should focus our all-out effort at present” [2]. Moreover, three slogans were adopted at the conclusion of the Congress: ‘The People Are God’, ‘Single-Hearted Unity’, and ‘Self-Reliance’ [3]. It can be said that these are the symbol of self-reliant economic development that should be pursued in order to improve living conditions of people. As such, the Congress was permeated all the way through with the basic theme of the challenge of economic development.

The economic aspects of his long speech in more detail

Kim Jong Un points out three items as the external factors that have adversely impacted economic development, namely “the most barbarous sanctions and blockade by the US and other hostile forces” and “severe natural diseases that hit the country every year and the world health crisis that broke out last year and became protracted.” But at the same time, he orients his analysis and criticism on the economic failure to internal factors inherent to the party itself. He says, “If one ascribes its failure to objective conditions, he can do nothing and the action and role of the driving force will be unnecessary, and it is impossible to accelerate the revolutionary struggle and constructive work unless the unfavorable external factors are removed.” And he emphasizes the subjective factors of the political responsibility in the failure of economic development. Namely in his report, citing the Party Central Committee, he says that “the 5-year strategy for national economic development had not been properly set on the basis of scientific calculation and grounds; science and technology failed to actually play the role of propelling the economic work of the country; and the work of readjusting and reinforcing the irrational economic work system and discipline was not properly done.”

The specifics in scientific terms are not apparent in his report, nor how the planned reforms may be informed by Kim’s reflections on these subjects. The new five-year economic plan presupposes that the Cabinet will “definitely improve its economic management,” and promotes modernization of production “by dint of science and technology,” and “orientate the external economic activities toward   reinforcing … self-supporting economy.” As is explained in Kim Jong Un’s speech, the general orientation of the five-year plan is “to lay solid foundations for reenergizing the overall national economy and improving the people’s standard of living by concentrating efforts on the main links in the whole chain of economic development.” While emphasizing the theme of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘self-sufficiency’, he proposed individual targets and strategies for key sectors of the metal industry and chemical industry, in relation to agriculture and light industry.

Continuation of the offensive for making a breakthrough head-on in the economy

As is stated so far, it is clear that the fact that DPRK has identified economic sanctions by enemy powers as one of the factors prohibiting economic development, it does not lead to a decision to submit to US-led international pressure and stop developing nuclear weapons to improve international relationship and gain sanction relief. On the contrary, the policy of ‘self-reliance’ will be strengthened all the more on the premise of continuing economic sanctions. It can be said that this idea of ‘self-reliance’ on the premise of continuing economic sanctions is the continuation of ‘the offensive for making a breakthrough head-on’ policy adopted throughout 2020, which pursued economic development based on the assumption that US policy of hostility toward the DPRK would not change [4]. 

In his report Kim Jong Un says that betterment of the situation can be accomplished not by defeat, but by victory in offensive diplomacy. Here it should be noted that he emphasizes solidarity with ‘anti-imperialist, independent forces’ while stressing the goal of prevailing in diplomacy with the US. We can read in it that he tries to find a way to overcome the difficulties in the economic cooperation with forces independent of the US.

Kim’s report states: “It (WPK) should wage offensive diplomacy to smash the attempts of the hostile forces to violate our sovereignty and defend our state’s rights to normal development.” “It should orient political activities with the main emphasis put on prevailing over subjugating the US, the fundamental obstacle to the development of our revolution and our principal enemy.” “Noting that whoever takes power in the US, its entity and the real intention of its policy toward the DPRK would never change.” “(It stresses) the need for the field of external work to adopt adroit strategy toward the US and steadily expand solidarity with the anti-imperialist, independent forces” [5].

War deterrent as a basis for concentrating on economic development 

Although not much has been mentioned about DPRK nuclear development, references to the strengthened military capability of the US and the ROK (South Korea) and the repeated description on the new war-fighting capability of the DPRK characterize the report on military affairs at the 8th Congress of the WPK. In this regard, two features need to be pointed out.

One feature is that the concept of the war deterrent is maintained as before, the concept that the DPRK nuclear weapons are an essential war deterrent to ensure peace necessary for its concentration on economic development. This is the logic in 2017 when the DPRK declared victory for completion of its national nuclear forces and took it as the springboard for fresh progress in economic development [6] and the logic taken in 2018 of concentration on economy based on accomplishment of nuclear capability [7]. The same logic was expressed last year in the ‘head-on by dint of self-reliance’ speech made by Kim Jong Un [8] and also in the speech made at the UN General Assembly by UN Ambassador Kim Song in the fall [9]. In a similar vein at the WPK Congress, Kim Jong Un says in his report, “The reality shows that only when we bolster up our national defense capability without a moment’s halt will we be able to contain the military threat from the US and achieve peace and prosperity of the Korean peninsula” [10].

 

In support of this logic, Kim Jong Un emphasizes the reality that enemy powers are increasing their military capability and thus, there is a corresponding need for the DPRK to strengthen its war deterrence. He states, “Nothing is more foolish and dangerous than to idle our time away without steadily building up our strength while knowing well enough that the enemy’s high-tech weapons aimed at our state are increasing in volume” and “The international balance of power is crumbling owing to the reckless arms buildup of the US and other hostile forces.” And he also demands that the ROK (South Korea) “should stop introducing latest military hardware and joint military exercises with the US” [11].

Another feature is the intention of the DPRK to increase diplomatic and bargaining power by showcasing its growing military capabilities. The DPRK may calculate that giving the US public the impression of DPRK’s growing nuclear threats will serve to urge the new US administration to start negotiation sooner.     

In his report at the Congress Kim Jong Un highly praises the completion of hydrogen bombs and the successful test launch of the Hwasong 15 ICBM by 2017 as ‘the great historic event’, and boasts that the Party Central Committee “accomplished the great cause of … uprising the country to the position of a world nuclear power and military power in both name and reality and putting an end once and for all to the era in which big powers attempted to make a bargain with the interests of our own state and nation.” Also, he refers in detail to the nuclear weapons capabilities that were developed in the past five years, including guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket (MIRV) which is at the final stage of research, the hypersonic gliding fight warheads for a new type ballistic missile being at the test stage, and the design of a nuclear-powered submarine being at the final stage of scrutiny [12]. As for the future course of action to strengthen nuclear capabilities, both in tactical and strategic weapons, he proposes enhanced development of tactical nuclear weapons and continuation of production of super-sized nuclear warheads and advanced ICBMs with an increased targeting accuracy rate, based upon the situational analysis “that various military threats from the enemies on the Korean peninsula … are inevitably accompanied by the nuclear threat” [13]. He also reiterates continuing a few years-long efforts to develop modern nuclear weapons technology, and in addition he reaffirms the need for general modernization of military capabilities including reconnaissance and information gathering by military satellite and unmanned reconnaissance planes.

The excessively detailed description of weapons development in the main report at the 8th WPK Congress is meant to send diplomatic messages to the US as is pointed out above.

Singapore Agreement is not abandoned

On witnessing such an overt emphasis on nuclear development, one may ask whether the Singapore Agreement in which Kim Jong Un has promised to attain a nuclear-free Korean peninsula is discarded and no longer valid.

      

Before answering this question, first we have to note Kim’s fundamental idea that war deterrence always presupposes diplomacy. Kim Jong Un says in the Congress report, “The strong defense capability of the state never precludes diplomacy but serves as a powerful means to propel it along the right course and guarantee its success” [14]. This means he has always diplomacy in mind, which is significant.

At the Congress of the Worker’s Party, Kim Jong Un values the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement in positive terms. He says, “At the one-on-one talks of the top leaders of the DPRK and the US, the first of its kind in the hostile relations between two countries, the Party Central Committee, with a strong principle of independence, made sure that the joint declaration that assured the establishment of new DPRK-US relations was adopted” [15]. The phrase ‘establishment of new DPRK-US relations’ is just the same as used in the Singapore Joint Statement. In the words that follow, he boasts that he has shown to the world the strategic position of his country by negotiating with the superpower on equal terms. The point that should be emphasized is the importance of the fact that the key phrase in the Joint Statement ‘establishment of new DPRK-US relations’ is cited in the report as a fruitful result of the negotiation.

          

In his report, Kim Jong Un does not refer directly to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula itself. In order to do so, he would have to recount the history in which the DPRK has required the US to ‘withdraw its hostile policy’ and to propose ‘new way of calculation’ to implement the Singapore Joint Agreement, but this tact has been in vain so far. It would be a tedious repetition for the DPRK to explain the whole story. It is understandable that he has made no mention of denuclearization in his report at the Congress. It is safe to conclude that the DPRK has not abandoned the Joint Statement as the point of departure, as long as it clearly places high value on some other key agreements in the Joint Statement.

         

On the other hand, he criticizes the ROK for its failure to implement the Panmunjom Declaration and Pyongyang Declaration jointly made by North and South Korea respectively in April and September 2018, and urges the ROK repeatedly to implement those declarations. It can be acknowledged that the DPRK’s will to denuclearize the Korean peninsula is steadily maintained from the fact that both declarations include a shared goal of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the Congress report, Kim Jong Un states that “It is necessary to take stand and stance to resolve the basic problems first in the north-south relations, halt all acts hostile toward the other side and seriously approach and faithfully implement the north-south declarations” [16].

                                           

In conclusion, we believe that the DPRK’s will to implement the Singapore agreements made in the US-DPRK Joint Statement remains unchanged after the 8th WPK Congress in April 2021. The way forward is open if the US is willing to hold negotiations with the DPRK on the  denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, along with other key agreements including establishing new US-DPRK relations and building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong Un says in his report, “The key to establishing new DPRK-US relationship lies in the US withdrawal of its hostile policy toward the DPRK,” and “It (the DPRK) would approach the US on the principle of power for power and goodwill for goodwill in the future, too” [17]. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI & Hajime MAEKAWA)

[1] “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Makes Opening Speech at the 8th WPK Congress,” KCNA, January 6, 2021  

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm 

[2] “WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un Makes Closing Address at Eighth Congress of WPK,” KCNA, January 13, 2021 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

[3] See note [2].

[4] “Official Report of 7th C.C. WPK Issued,” KCNA, January 1, 2020

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

[5] “Historical Event Laying Foundation for Developing Glorious Party, Fifth-day Sitting of 8th WPK Congress Held, Chapter 3,” KCNA, January 10, 2021 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

[6] “Kim Jong Un New Year Address,” KCNA, January 1, 2018

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

[7] Search by the date from http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

[8] See note [4].

[9] Kim Song “Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations at the General Debate of the 75 Session of the UN General Assembly  Statement by Head of the DPRK Delegation H.E. Ambassador Kim Song,” DPRK Permanent Mission to the United Nations, 29 September, 2020

https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20200929/azzQgcBAMYqv/WaUGJrE2AJvT_en.pdf 

[10] See note [5]. Chapter 3

[11] See note [10].

[12] See note [5]. Chapter 1

[13] See note [10]. 

[14] See note [10]. 

[15] See note [12]. 

[16] See note [5]. 

[17] See note [5].                                  

Watch Report No.28

Watch Report No.28   　January 13, 2021

§Consistency in Policy Messages and an Accurate Understanding of the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration are Essential to the Japanese Government’s Policy towards the DPRK “to Seek a Summit Without Any Pre-Conditions”

On October 26, 2020, Japanese Prime Minister SUGA stated as follows regarding Japan’s foreign policy towards the DPRK in his policy speech to the 203rd Extraordinary Diet Session [1]:

“The abduction issue continues to be a top priority for the administration. I will make utmost efforts to realize the return home of all abductees at the earliest possible date. I am determined to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un without any conditions. Japan seeks to normalize its relation with North Korea, through comprehensively resolving outstanding issues of concern, such as the abductions, nuclear and missile issues, and settling the unfortunate past in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration.”

SUGA’s statement reiterates almost exactly former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo ABE’s policy speech to the 201st Ordinary Diet Session of January 20, 2020 [2], about 9 months before. Former Prime Minister ABE stated:

“We will seek to settle outstanding issues of concern with North Korea, settle the unfortunate past and normalize relations, in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. In working towards the resolution of the abductions issue, the most important issue, I am determined to meet Chairman Kim Jong-un without attaching any conditions.”

Japanese foreign policy to pursue dialogue with Chairman Kim Jong-un announced by both the SUGA and ABE administrations is by no means coherent. It was in September 2017 when former Prime Minister ABE harshly criticized North Korea in front of world leaders. In his address at the seventy-second session of the UN General Assembly [3], ABE stated that, “For North Korea, dialogue was instead the best means of deceiving us and buying time. What is needed to do that is not dialogue, but pressure,” indicating overt hostility towards the DPRK. The purpose of this stance, involving increasing economic and military pressure, was to force the DPRK to capitulate and change its policy. However, following the policy change by US President Trump, ABE shifted to a policy which stressed dialogue, stating in his address at the UN General Assembly of the following year [4] that, “In order to resolve the abductions issue, I am also ready to meet face to face with Chairman Kim Jong-Un without attaching any conditions.”

What, in fact, is the Japanese dialogue-oriented policy towards the DPRK that began in September 2019 and was continued by both the ABE and the SUGA administrations? Although two years have passed since the ABE administration indicated its policy “to hold a summit with North Korea without attaching any conditions”, no plans to start a dialogue with the DPRK have yet to be made. We will analyze from two perspectives the implications of this current impasse. 

The first perspective is the issue of comprehensiveness and consistency. The Japanese policy change in 2018 was undoubtedly in response to the historic changes based on US-DPRK and Inter-Korean agreements in 2018, despite the fact the Japan’s policy change followed that of the Trump administration. In order to enable this policy change to achieve a successful outcome, while taking advantage of positive developments on the Korean Peninsula, Japan must not see abductions, nuclear and missile issues from the conventional and narrow view-point that these are “unique DPRK issues.” These issues are part of a more comprehensive policy agenda involving the historical issue of settlement of accounts for Japan’s invasion and colonial rule in Asia, and the regional peace and security issue in Northeast Asia. No such comprehensive perspective can be found in either of the ABE and the SUGA administrations’ policy towards the DPRK following their policy changes. 

If based on a comprehensive perspective, most attention must be paid to consistently communicating messages within all related policies that Japan has been moving in the direction of ending its hostile policy towards the DPRK and building mutual confidence.

For instance, messages regarding economic sanctions are essential. It is necessary to communicate to the DPRK Japan’s willingness to review its conventional stance of relying solely on “strong pressure through sanctions.” Although it may take a time to convince related parties to relax sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions, it would be possible to deliver a message to the DPRK that Japan would first lift its own sanctions step by step. On November 4, 2020, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives of the 203rd Extraordinary Diet session, a Diet member Kastuya OKADA (The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan) and Foreign Minister Toshimitsu MOTEGI had the following question-and-answer session [5]: 

OKADA: “It is reported that North Korea is currently facing difficult situation, because of economic sanctions, border closures due to COVID-19, and floods. Chairman Kim Jong-un made an unusual statement aimed at the domestic audience as well. Under the circumstance, for instance, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) has reported about 40 percent of North Korean population suffers from malnutrition. Do you have any plan to propose [to] the DPRK any food aid, humanitarian aid and others?” 

MOTEGI: “As you just mentioned, it is said that currently North Korea is facing triple whammy. Still I believe relaxation of economic sanctions is too early at least under current circumstance. However, regarding humanitarian aid, I will make appropriate decision by assessing it comprehensively and carefully including if it is necessary or not, …”

This answer by the Foreign Minister indicates no willingness to send a positive message to the DPRK. He could have delivered a stronger message at least regarding humanitarian food aid. And regarding Japan’s economic sanctions against the DPRK, it could have served as an opportunity to convey a positive message to the DPRK, by distinguishing Japan’s independent sanctions from those based on UN Security Council resolutions.

In addition to messages regarding economic sanctions, a strong negative message towards the DPRK was conveyed that Japan would consider giving the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) military capability for a preemptive attack against foreign bases, as possible alternatives to the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense system. Although the SUGA administration hasn’t repeated this negative message conveyed by the ABE administration, it has not conveyed any messages to soften the former negative one either. Since August 2020, within the administration, discussion has taken place about attaining the military capability for a preemptive attack against foreign bases, based on the assumption that the DPRK is a potential enemy. This move is in complete contradiction to the administration’s dialogue-oriented policy seeking to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un without conditions. On this point, too, on November 13, 2020, at the meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of the 203rd Extraordinary Diet session, Diet member OKADA pointed out that “Prime Minister SUGA stated that he is determined to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un without any conditions, and if, on the other hand, he is discussing to attain the military capability for a preemptive attack against foreign bases, it may look utterly incoherent [6]”. 

On December 18, 2020, the Japanese Government made a Cabinet decision to improve a new missile defense system and strengthen standoff defense capabilities, including development of stand-off missiles [7]. Although the Cabinet decision describes the use of stand-off missiles to protect Japanese islands such as the Senkaku Islands, instead of the idea of military capability for a preemptive attack against foreign bases, no efforts have been made to correct messages towards the DPRK.

As can be seen in the two instances described above, the ABE and the SUGA administrations’ policy to stress dialogue with the DPRK to resolve abductions, and nuclear and missile issues, has been completely lacking in comprehensiveness and consistency.

The second perspective is the issue of the governmental position on the 2002 Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. 

Even today, the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration agreed upon by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong-Il of the DPRK National Defense Commission in September 2002 is considered a basic diplomatic document to normalize Japan-DPRK relations. As described above, both the ABE and the SUGA administrations explained their policy towards the DPRK, quoting the Pyongyang Declaration. However, the Japanese government has not explained which parts of the Declaration it values most. This amounts to the lack of the most fundamental element of the Japanese government’s ‘aggressive policy of seeking dialogues without any pre-conditions.’

In its preamble, the Pyongyang Declaration states, “Both leaders confirmed the shared recognition that establishing a fruitful political, economic and cultural relationship between Japan and the DPRK through the settlement of unfortunate past between them and the outstanding issues of concern would be consistent with the fundamental interests of both sides, and would greatly contribute the peace and stability of the region.” Following the preamble, its main paragraph 1 states, “Both sides determined that, pursuant to the spirit and basic principles laid out in this Declaration, they would make every possible effort for an early normalization of the relations… Both sides expressed their strong determination that they would sincerely tackle outstanding problems between Japan and the DPRK.”

This means that the spirit of the Declaration lies in the resolution of both states to overcome various obstacles and normalize Japan-DPRK relations as early as possible. Pending issues such as abductions and nuclear-missiles are specific and separate, though not trivial issues. If the Japanese government gives priority to solving one of these and jeopardizes achieving normalization by doing so, this would be contrary to the Pyongyang Declaration. 

In this regard, especially, the means by which the ABE and the SUGA administrations deal with the abductions issue has been problematic. Both administrations regard the abductions issue as if it is a locked door that blocks the entry into any negotiations. Naturally, the present authors also hope for resolution of the abductions issue at the earliest possible date, considering the feelings of family members of the abductees. As for resolving the abductions issue, we consider it as the best approach for Japan to support positive developments on the Korean Peninsula which began in 2018, and to try to advance them toward the normalization of Japan and DPRK relations. As Haruki WADA, a prominent Japanese historian, points out [8], the notion that “without the resolution of the abductions issue, there can be no normalization talks with North Korea” [9], which the ABE and the SUGA administrations have repeated even today, is not consistent with the Pyongyang Declaration and should be abandoned.

The SUGA administration’s foreign policy towards the DPRK expressing, “I’m determined to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un without any conditions,” should be maintained in the future. However, in order to make this policy achieve a successful outcome, it is necessary to convey messages to the DPRK which demonstrates comprehensiveness and consistency of Japanese foreign and security policy, in accordance with the administration’s foreign policy towards the DPRK, and to clearly recognize that the top priority of the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration is the normalization of Japan-DPRK relations. Without those corrections being made, Japan’s foreign policy towards the DPRK deserves criticism for being a mere gesture meant for public consumption. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI & Ichiro YUASA)

[1] Kantei, “Policy Speech by the Prime Minister to the 203rd Session of the Diet,” October 26, 2020

https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/99_suga/statement/2020/1026shoshinhyomei.html

[2] Kantei, “Policy Speech by the Prime Minister to the 201st Session of the Diet,” January 20, 2020

https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/statement/2020/0120shiseihoushin.html

[3] Kantei, “Address by Prime Minister Abe at the Seventy Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 20, 2017

https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/97_abe/statement/2017/0920enzetsu.html

[4] Kantei, “Address by Prime Minister Abe at the Seventy Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 25, 2018

https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/statement/2018/0925enzetsu.html

[5] The House of Representatives, “The minutes of the meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives of the 203rd Extraordinary Diet session,” November 4, 2020 http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/001820320201104003.htm#p_honbun (in Japanese)

[6] The House of Representatives, “The minutes of the meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives of the 203rd Extraordinary Diet session,” November 13, 2020

http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000520320201113002.htm#p_honbun (in Japanese)

[7] Ministry of Defense, “The Cabinet Decision on improvement of a new missile defense system and strengthening of standoff defense capabilities,” December 18, 2020

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/stand-off_20201218.pdf

[8] Hayami ICHIKAWA, “Discuss repair of fractured Japan-DPRK relations with Haruki WADA,” Web Ronza, July 5, 2019 (in Japanese)

https://webronza.asahi.com/politics/articles/2019070200004.html?page=4

[9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “2019 Report on the measures taken by the Government of Japan in addressing issues of human rights violations by DPRK authorities including resolution of the abductions issues,” June 12, 2020 (in Japanese)

https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/pr/pub/pamph/rachi_torikumi.html 

Watch Report No.29

 Watch Report No.29   　February 4, 2021

§Twenty-one Civic Organizations Submitted a Letter to the Government of Japan Requesting a Serious Study of the Possible Establishment of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, thereby Taking Advantage of the Moment of the Entry into Force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

 

Following the initiative made by this Watch Project, twenty-one (21) Non-Governmental Organizations submitted a letter of request to the Government of Japan on February 2, 2021. The submission, an explanation of the request, and a Q & A session were held online with the Foreign Ministry as a contact office. In addition, two copies of the book, “Compilation of Watch Reports from Nov. 2018 to Jan. 2021,” in Japanese were submitted to the Government via postal mail in advance. The book is found at:

http://www.peacedepot.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/NEA-NWFZ-watch-reports.pdf

The Letter of Request and names of 21 organizations are reproduced below.

******

To:

Prime Minister SUGA Yoshihide

Foreign Minister MOTEGI Toshimitsu

Recommendation on Japan’s Nuclear Weapons Policy

--- At the Time of the Entry into Force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, We Urge an Intensive Study of the Possible Establishment of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone with a View to Abandoning its “Nuclear Umbrella” Policy ---

In a world in which the number of Covid 19 victims has reached 100 million, it is vividly clear that military forces, especially nuclear weapons, do not contribute to “Human Security”. To promote human security, it is necessary that the enormous amount of resources devoted to the military, including nuclear weapons, should be reallocated to ensuring citizens' life and safety.

On January 22, 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) came into effect, a long-held accomplishment by world citizens including hibakusha, the atomic bomb victims. As everyone knows, nuclear weapons can kill large masses of people in one stroke without discrimination. If nuclear strikes follow in reprisal, there is the potential to destroy all humanity. The TPNW renders illegal the possession and the use of these horrific weapons under international law. Thanks to the TPNW, awareness of the inhumanity and illegality of nuclear weapons will spread the world over. As a result, this historic treaty will impact even the public in countries that do not join the Treaty.

This applies especially to Japan, the only country bombed by nuclear weapons in wartime, causing the disasters of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Despite such experience, Japan's government does not recognize the significance of the TPNW and continues to refuse to sign it. This refusal puts increasingly in question the contradiction between, on the one hand, the Japanese government verbally acknowledging nuclear weapons' inhumanity and asking for their abolition, and, on the other hand, refusing to sign the TPNW.

In order for Japan to overcome this contradiction and join the Treaty, it is necessary for it to renounce its policy that relies upon a “nuclear umbrella”, that Clause e of Article 1 of the TPNW renders illegal. The recommendations that follow advocate the creation of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) presented as a realistic policy alternative to abandon the “nuclear umbrella” policy.

1. Immediate Actions:

(1) To declare in-principle support for the TPNW, which prohibits nuclear weapons because of their inhumane nature

The Government of Japan has reiterated that it shares the goal of nuclear abolition with the TPNW. Also, Japan’s Foreign Minister has frequently said in his remarks at the Diet, that as the only nation bombed by atomic weapons in wartime, Japan understands better than any other country the inhumanity of these weapons. Nevertheless, he refuses to participate in the TPNW as he thinks the approach of the TPNW is different from that of Japan. Now that Japan agrees to the eventual elimination of inhumane nuclear weapons, the goal of the TPNW, and disagrees only with the approach represented in the TPNW, we urge the Government of Japan to send a clear message to the world that it supports the TPNW in principle. 

(2) To Participate as an observer in the TPNW State Party meeting

The TPNW stipulates that the first State Partiy meeting be held within one year after entry into force of the Treaty. Reportedly, the Government of Japan is cautious about the possibility of its participation in the meeting. On the one hand, it talks about its intention to play a bridging role between the proponents of the Treaty and its opponents, toward a nuclear weapon free world. It needs to understand the two sides' stances and build relations with both if it wants to play such a role. Participation as an observer in the State Parties’ meeting would allow Japan the opportunity to deepen mutual understanding with the State Parties of the TPNW. It is the necessary pre-condition for Japan to play the bridging role.

2. Intermediate Timed Actions – Getting Rid of the “Nuclear Umbrella” Policy

(1) To not undertake actions that will lead to the deterioration of the security environment in Northeast Asia

The Government of Japan justifies its “nuclear umbrella” policy and refuses to join the TPNW by arguing that the severity of the security environment surrounding Japan compels it to adopt such policies.  However, Japan shares the responsibility for the severe security environment in the region, in the past, as well as at present. For example, Japan is considering the pursuit of the military capability to strike foreign bases against its constitutionally mandated exclusively defensive defense policy. Also, it deploys Maritime Self Defense Force ships to the South China Sea to join the US Navy’s show of force in the area. In 2018, it did not seize the historic opportunity to calm the tension on the Korean Peninsula. Instead, it continued to impose autonomous sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) beyond those imposed by the UNSC. Japan must undertake diplomatic initiatives to improve the security environment in the region in order to build a more positive one. 

(2) To request that the US Biden administration to restart the US-DPRK talks in order to break the stalemate on the denuclearization and the peace process on the Korean Peninsula

The US-DPRK Joint Statement at the summit meeting in Singapore in June 2018 is a ground-breaking document. In the Joint Statement, both countries express their fundamental agreement, which remains vitally important at this moment, that they will     establish new US-DPRK relations for peace and prosperity, overcoming the long history of hostility and that they will build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. In that context, the DPRK commits to complete denuclearization and the US commits to provide security guarantees to the DPRK.

It is essential for the denuclearization and alleviation of tension in Northeast Asia that the new US administration reaffirm the significance of the Singapore Joint Statement, and take initiatives to resume US-DPRK talks in order to implement the agreement. Such resumption of US-DPRK talks will also contribute to Japan’s efforts to reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons in its security policy.

We urge the Government of Japan to request that the Biden administration take this important step.

(3) To consider seriously the policy option to establish a NEA-NWFZ, which would enable Japan to abandon its “nuclear umbrella”, and subsequently join the TPNW 

The Government of Japan has been arguing that, short of developing its own nuclear arsenals, it needs to depend on the US extended nuclear deterrence, the US “nuclear umbrella”, to deal with nuclear threats facing Japan. However, the overwhelming number of countries in the world neither have nuclear weapons, nor live under a “nuclear umbrella”. They ensure their security against nuclear threats by means of establishing a NWFZ Treaty, through diplomatic efforts and the legal force of international law. Those countries are the crucial driving force in promoting the TPNW. 

Realistically, Japan can do the same by making efforts to establish a NEA-NWFZ, to abandon its dependence on the “nuclear umbrella” and to become a State Party of the TPNW.

The way forward to a NEA-NWFZ will be greatly advanced if Japan not only supports the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula, which started in 2018 with inter-Korean Panmunjom Declaration and US-DPRK Joint Statement in Singapore, but also proposes to extend the process to denuclearize the entire North Eastern Asian region by including Japan with its existing Three Non-nuclear Principles. In this arrangement, three states, Japan and North and South Korea, constitute a geographical zone free from nuclear weapons, and three nuclear weapon states, the US, China, and Russia provide security assurances to the zone, not to use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against it. A NEA-NWFZ with a verification mechanism would make the “nuclear umbrella” unnecessary. As a result, Japan could join the TPNW and fulfill the mission afforded to it by being the sole nuclear-bombed state to lead the global efforts to abolish nuclear weapons.

We strongly urge the Government of Japan to examine the possibility of establishing a NEA-NWFZ at this critical moment of the entry into force of the TPNW.

February 2, 2021

Peace Depot, Inc.

Citizens’ Watch for a Fair Implementation of Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Agreements

AYUS International Buddhists Cooperation Network

Citizens Association against Revising Constitution

Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (CNIC)

Femin: Women's Democratic Club

Hiroshima Alliance for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (HANWA)

Japan Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms

Japan Catholic Council for Justice and Peace

Japan Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs

Japan Evangelical Lutheran Church Social Commission

Japan-Korea People’s Solidarity Japan Network

Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

National Christian Council (NCC) in Japan; Peace and Reconciliation Committee on East Asia

Network Against Japan Arms Trade (NAJAT)

Peace Boat

Physicians Against Nuclear War

Religions for Peace (RfP) Japan

United Church of Christ in Japan Kotobuki Chiku Center in Kanagawa District

World Federalist Movement of Japan

YWCA of Japan

Watch Report No.27

Watch Report No.27   November 30, 2020

§Mobilize Voices of Civil Society to Move Politically Entangled and Reluctant Governments to End the Korean War

 

“The end-of-war declaration will, indeed, open the door to complete denuclearization and permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.”

This statement made at the General Debate of this year’s UN General Assembly [1] by South Korean President Moon Jae-in called for the UN and the international community to provide support so that the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) can enter into “an era of reconciliation and prosperity” by means of an end-of-war declaration.

Soon after achieving liberation from Japanese colonial rule as a result of Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War, North and South Korea were intentionally divided into two countries by great powers. The Korean War which started soon after the division has not formally ended to date. How the upcoming change of the US administration will affect its policy towards the DPRK has drawn much attention. However, we need to recognize the simple common sense diplomatic solution once again, that is, “the end of the Korean War declaration will open the door.”

Undoubtedly, the DPRK has developed nuclear weapons as deterrence against US aggression. And as UN ambassador of the DPRK Kim Song stated at the General Debate of this year’s UN General Assembly [2], the DPRK perceives that US threat against the DPRK still continues.

“ …the nuclear threat on DPRK continues unabated along with all sorts of hostile act taking place before the very eyes. It is an undeniable reality of today that cutting-edge military hardware including stealth fighters continue to be introduced into the Korean peninsula and nuclear strike means of all kinds are directly aimed at the DPRK.”

Although UN Ambassador Kim Song didn’t name a state, it is obvious that the DPRK means it is the US that is engaged in “hostile act” against the DPRK and poses “the nuclear threat” to the DPRK. Regarding the military buildup in which South Korea has engaged, based on the US-ROK alliance, the DPRK also considers the US as driving force behind this buildup.

Additionally, since 2018, DPRK nuclear policy has made it clear that war deterrence based on nuclear weapons will establish preconditions for directing all its national efforts to the construction of a socialist economy [3]. The above-mentioned statement by UN Ambassador Kim Song described the policy as follows:

“The conclusion we have drawn is that peace never comes of itself by mere wish of one side and it is not granted by someone else either. In the present world, where high-handedness based on strength is rampant, genuine peace can only be safeguarded when one possesses the absolute strength to prevent war itself. As we have obtained the reliable and effective war deterrent for self-defence by tightening our belts, peace and security of the Korean peninsula and the region are now firmly defended.

Mr. President,

Based on its reliable guarantee for safeguarding the security of the state and people, the DPRK is now directing all its effort to economic construction at ease.”

Thus, the DPRK has justified its possession of nuclear weapons as a war deterrent for self-defense and economic development, and as a natural consequence, the DPRK government has repeatedly expressed it is ready to abandon its nuclear weapons on the condition that US threat against the DPRK is eliminated. In March 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un told a South Korean delegation that there is no reason for keeping nuclear weapons if the military threat against the DPRK is eliminated. And “the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” to which Kim Jong-un committed at the US-DPRK summit in June 2018 was agreed upon along with President Trump’s commitment of “security guarantees to the DPRK,” and mutual commitments to the “establishment of new US-DPRK relations” and “building of a peace regime,” and others [4].

Therefore, elimination of US threat and ending of the US hostile policy towards the DPRK are essential conditions to realize a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

Here lies the significance of the end-of-war declaration.

It is self-evident that to put an end to a state of war lasting for 70 years is a logical first step in a process to eliminate the US threat and hostile policy toward North Korea. It is unlikely that North Korea would give up its nuclear weapons upon which the country completely relies as deterrence against the US as long as the Korean War does not formally end and the US hostile policy towards the DPRK continues. President Moon Jae-in’s statement that, “The end-of-war declaration will, indeed, open the door to complete denuclearization and permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” articulates the correct path forward.

The US is not the only party to the Korean War. However, it’s no exaggeration to say that realization of the end-of-war declaration depends on willingness of the US government to act. Ever since the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed among the US, the DPRK and China in 1953, an armistice has continued, and then during armistice, the US and South Korea established diplomatic relations and normalized relations with China. Also, South Korea and the DPRK made the Panmunjom Declaration in April 2018 and agreed to make the end-of-war declaration in 2018, which wasn’t actually realized. In addition, at the third Moon-Jae-in and Kim Jon-un inter-Korean summit in September 2018, the two countries signed “The Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain” as an annex to the 2018 Pyongyang Declaration and agreed to “cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain” including land, air and sea [5], and made a de facto end-of-war declaration between the two countries.

What remains to address is the US-DPRK relationship, and although the DPRK has proposed negotiations towards the end of the Korean War and a peace treaty, the US has rejected such proposals.

There are various reasons why the US cannot go as far as the end-of-war declaration. Not only US security policy related to South Korea, Japan and China, but factors related to US world military strategy are involved. Additionally, the domestic situations of US allies such as South Korea and Japan are also part of the picture. In those countries, public opinion regarding the future of the alliance with the US has remained divided over the past several decades and this has weakened the leverage of South Korea and Japan to demand the US government to make a policy decision regarding this issue.

Regarding the US government, its true intention may be that it doesn’t want to make the end-of-war declaration. It could lead to an unavoidable argument on the reduction or even withdrawal of the US Forces in South Korea and Japan that play a critical role in supporting US global military and economic hegemony, along with other US military bases all over the world. Once the end of the Korean War is declared, the mission of the United Nations Command (UNC) will be accomplished, inevitably leading to discussion about the future of the US Forces, Korea (USFK). Especially, under the current situation in which the US has been trying to contain and restrict China, a rapidly rising global military and economic power, the US would be inclined to avoid making decisions which will lead to weaken the US military power in East Asia. Additionally, there are defense industries and politicians who have benefited from leaving military tension to persist in East Asia. Or, if the US agreed to make an end-of-war declaration, which is considered a North Korean demand, prior to denuclearization of North Korea, some might interpret such moves as “concession” or “a weak-kneed attitude.” In fact, media repeated critical coverage of President Trump who had expressed his readiness to end the Korean War at the Singapore summit, reporting that Trump is seeking “political theatrics” for historic achievement [6] and trying to “make an achievement” for the sake of “the 2018 US midterm elections” [7]. Eventually, it seems that President Trump is likely to leave the White House without making an end-of-war declaration.

In South Korea and Japan, not a few people see the US military presence is necessary for maintaining regional peace and security. Despite President Moon Jae-in’s enthusiasm, for the South Korean government to be able to urge the US to make the end-of-war declaration, there are a number of domestic issues to be resolved regarding the future of the US-ROK alliance. Such issues include the already decided purchase of US state-of-the-art weapons South Korea, how to handle the Terminal High-Attitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and troops deployed under the pretext of DPRK missile threat, consensus building towards reduction of rapidly increased national defense spending on the grounds of DPRK threat, and other issues.

The Japanese government has also continued a military buildup using the rationale of the DPRK threat. The United Nations Command (UNC)-Rear is headquartered in Japan, serving as an existing mechanism for Japan to host visiting foreign troops other than those of the US and to conduct joint military exercises with the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

Regardless of such domestic situations in the US and related countries, there is no justifiable reason to oppose ending the Korean War. Such self-interested intransigence is unacceptable as the US, as well as its followers in South Korea and Japan, to retain a state of war for the purpose of securing its hegemony and vested interests.

When governments are unable to do the right thing, the impetus for governments to overcome obstacles must be generated by civil society. It is necessary that, in response to President Moon Jae-in’s call for an end-of-war declaration, voices of civil society unite across national borders. These voices that call for an end to the Korean War will be heard by the US government and, if necessary, other related countries’ governments. Strong and worldwide campaigns like those calling for abolition of nuclear weapons and measures against Climate Change are required.

More than 350 South Korean civil society organizations and others have issued the “Korea Peace Appeal” [8] and have been conducting “a campaign which aims to end the Korean War through collecting 100 million signatures to endorse the Korea Peace Appeal.” We would like to earnestly support this initiative. This campaign puts forth the following four slogans:

l  End the Korean War and establish a peace agreement

l  Create a Korean Peninsula and a world free from nuclear weapons and nuclear threat

l  Resolve the conflict with dialogue and cooperation instead of sanctions and pressure

l  Break from the vicious cycle of the arms race and invest in human security and environmental sustainability 

Such a campaign will help grow global public awareness and support for the End-of-War Declaration of the Korean War. (Hajime MAEKAWA )

 

[1] Address by President Moon Jae-in at the 75th Session of United Nations General Assembly, September 22, 2020.
https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20200922/cVOfMr0rKnhR/vstE46z3tXBY_en.pdf[2] Statement by Head of the DPRK Delegation H.E. Ambassador Kim Song, Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations at the General Debate of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly, September 29, 2020. https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20200929/azzQgcBAMYqv/WaUGJrE2AJvT_en.pdf
[3] For example, “Kim Jong Un Makes New Year Address,” KCNA, January 1, 2018 or “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK,” KCNA, January 1, 2020. http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the articles by date.
[4] Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit, White House, June 12, 2018.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/
[5] “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” the National Committee on North Korea, September 19, 2020.
https://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/agreement-implementation-historic-panmunjom-declaration-military-domain.pdf
[6] “Trump referred to an end to the Korean War and indicated the possibility of the signature, to make the US-North Korea dialogue historic” (tentative translation), The Asahi Shimbun, June 9, 2018 (in Japanese).
[7] “The US-North Korea dialogue will be an achievement before the midterm election for the US and the dialogue became possible because North Korea had completed nuclear weapons,” (tentative translation) The Mainichi Shimbun, June 8, 2018 (in Japanese).
[8] Text of the Appeal: https://en.endthekoreanwar.net/appeal