Apr 23, 2019

Watch Report No.7

Watch Report No.7      Mar. 11, 2019

§The Hanoi Summit Can’t Be Regarded as a Failure. The International Community Should Consider the Potential Benefits of Multitrack Diplomacy, Including China and Russia, in the Phased Lifting of Sanctions

The second US-DPRK summit held in Hanoi from February 27 to 28 ended without producing any agreed upon documents. There had seemed to be some change in the US diplomatic stance prior to the Summit and there were expectations that both counties would reach agreement on certain mutually acceptable intermediate measures. Despite such expectations, the second summit ended without any agreed upon documents, and a number of reviews by the media and experts used words such as “breakdown” or “failure” in their headlines to describe the Summit.

But, was it a failure? If we assess what the Hanoi Summit achieved by the extent of the deepening of mutual understanding which serves as a basis for future negotiations, the Hanoi Summit did, in fact, achieve significant results. Considering that the leaders of both countries tend to prefer top-down decision making, the deepening of mutual understanding would only be possible by holding such a summit. On the other hand, if we assess achievement in Hanoi by how the deepening of the mutual understanding would affect future developments of the situation, the results are difficult to predict. It will take more time for both countries to digest the outcome of the Hanoi Summit. Factors which determine how much time will elapse until a third summit takes place are complicated, and range widely to include issues beyond US-DPRK relations alone.

Given the circumstance described above, this Watch Report will review the minimal recognition given to the significance of the Hanoi Summit as this must be clarified in anticipation of future developments.

(1) Process to implement Singapore agreement is still on track and has not been derailed
Although most articles have not underscored this simple fact, it is important to recognize its significance at the outset. Some suggest that the Singapore Summit agreement is threatened as basis for future negotiations, based on the fact that the Hanoi Summit ended without agreements. The current framework of US-DPRK negotiations is based on the joint statement at the 2018 June 12 Singapore Summit between the US and the DPRK. In fact, in Hanoi, both countries reconfirmed that their ongoing negotiations are based on that very framework.

On the US side, at the press conference right after the summit, US Secretary of State Pompeo stated that, “Chairman Kim reiterated on his trip he is fully prepared to denuclearize,” and that the objective of the talks was “to provide, in return, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and a brighter future for the North Korean people”. [1]

On the DPRK side, on the next day after the summit, KCNA reported the outcomes of the summit with exceptional speed as follows: “The top leaders of the two countries highly appreciated at the one-on-one talks and extended talks that a remarkable progress has been made in the historic course of implementing the Singapore joint statement.” “At the talks they shared the common understanding that the efforts made by the two sides and proactive measures taken by them to defuse tensions and preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula and completely denuclearize it were of great significance in building mutual trust and making a fundamental turn in the decades-long bilateral relations characterized by mistrust and antagonism.”[2] 

In summary, the US and the DPRK reaffirmed not only DPRK’s denuclearization, but also what they committed to in Singapore concerning a bigger framework in which each of them has responsibility. In Hanoi, it was demonstrated that both of them have a good understanding of that larger context. However, it should be also pointed out that US high-ranking officials have not stressed that point enough in their remarks, which is considered to have been largely caused by the media’s unbalanced interest.

(2) Both the US and the DPRK deepened understanding of the bottom line of each other’s demands and the reasons underlying those demands
Both the US and DPRK sides had had number of working-level discussions and, as a result of those discussions, documents to be signed by both leaders were readied prior to the Hanoi Summit. What we may call, “the unrealized Hanoi agreement” existed. At the press conference on February 28, US President Trump stated, “I could’ve signed an agreement today, and then you people would’ve said ‘Oh, what a terrible deal. What a terrible thing he did.’ … I could’ve 100 percent signed something today. We actually had papers ready to be signed, but it just wasn’t appropriate.” [3] In short, Trump’s judgement that he would not be able to win accolades from the US people made Trump press harder demands on the DPRK, which the DPRK could not accept, and as a result, the negotiation ended in a deadlock. [4]

If it was the case, both the US and the DPRK must have had a precious opportunity to deepen understanding of each other’s bottom-line demands and reasons behind those demands, through the top leaders’ direct negotiation.

It is worth remembering that President Trump stated as follows: “I don’t want to talk about increasing sanctions. They’re strong. They have a lot of great people in North Korea that have to live also. And that’s important to me.” “My whole attitude changed a lot because I got to know, as you know, Chairman Kim very well. And they have a point of view also.”

There has been no accurate information regarding what agreement was reached at working-level, that is, the content of “the unrealized Hanoi agreement”. However, the fact that such an agreement on intermediate measures existed has great significance, because the agreement could provide an important basis for future negotiations between both countries.

To counter President Trump’s claims at the press conference, on March 1, the DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho held an early morning press conference and the DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-Hui responded to questions. [5] Then, right after the DPRK press conference, US Secretary of State Pompeo, and subsequently, a senior US State Department official traveling with him, held a press conference in Manila. [6] Consolidating all available information, it can be assumed that the prepared agreement papers on intermediate measures consisted of a complete and verifiable dismantlement of all of the Yongbyon nuclear center (including a uranium enrichment facility, a plutonium production reactor and a plutonium reprocessing facility) and partial lifting of sanctions imposed on the DPRK. Although the DPRK explained they had demanded the relief from the clauses of five UN Security Council sanctions resolutions imposed since 2016 that affect the DPRK civil economy and people’s livelihood, it is unclear if those demands were included in “the unrealized Hanoi agreement” or they were what the DPRK was trying to gain at Hanoi Summit. As Ri Yong-Ho stated, the DPRK side was ready to commit in writing to permanently ending nuclear and ballistic missile tests, and this could have been included in the prepared agreement.

As well, there has been no accurate information regarding what President Trump demanded beyond “the unrealized Hanoi agreement”. President Trump admitted at a press conference that additional US demands included dismantling of the second uranium enrichment plant outside Yongbyon, and at the same time, he also said that “we brought many, many points up.” [7] Furthermore, a senior US State Department official said the US side even sought to “impose a complete freeze on their (DPRK’s) weapons of mass destruction program,” which is not included in the Singapore agreement. [8] It is not surprising that such US demands resulted in a deadlock of negotiations in Hanoi.

(3) Not only seeking agreement on intermediate measures through bilateral negotiations between the US and the DPRK, international discussions regarding legitimacy of the extent of the sanctions at an intermediate phase are also required
Based on the analysis above, one of the most plausible and simple scenarios for future US-DPRK negotiations will be seeking a new point of agreement on intermediate measures based on the Hanoi Summit. This would involve an approach to try to strike balance by making additions to “the unrealized Hanoi agreement.” There can be no new agreement with a lower threshold than “the unrealized Hanoi agreement.” The following items could be added for a new agreement: ① declaration to end the Korean War or a peace declaration, ② establishment of the US liaison office in Pyongyang, both of which were topics reported by the media before the Hanoi Summit, ③ provisional agreement on the scale and nature of future US-ROK joint military exercises, a possible factor for DPRK’s concern, ④ small scale relaxation of the economic sanctions short of lifting of the 5 UNSC sanctions resolutions, as was the DPRK’s demand in Hanoi, ⑤ partial lifting of the sanctions limited to those necessary for inter-Korean economic cooperation, and ⑥ relaxation of restrictions on DPRK space and nuclear development programs, on condition of ensuring peaceful purposes of the programs, and increasing international access to DPRK nuclear and space facilities.

The Hanoi Summit demonstrates that along with those efforts, it has become necessary to examine more fundamental questions regarding relaxation of the economic sanctions. Sanctions on the DPRK based on UN Security Council resolutions should involve not only the US, but also all UN member states. Nonetheless, that has become a core subject in US-DPRK negotiations. In this respect, the international community should, in particular, increase awareness of the roles played by China and Russia, which are permanent members of UN Security Council and have close relations with the DPRK.

Based on the Panmunjom Declaration and the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration between the two Koreas, along with the joint statement at the Singapore Summit between the US and the DPRK, the DPRK has shifted its national policy toward withdrawal from nuclear and missile development programs which caused the imposition of economic sanctions. It is assumed in the joint statement and declarations that the implementation of the DPRK’s policy shift requires both the implementation of security guarantees commitment to the DPRK, which claims persistent threats from the US, and the realization of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The international community understands and accepts such premises contained in the agreements. Therefore, in order to maintain legitimacy of UN Security Council resolutions, a discussion must occur about whether phased implementation of the agreements contained in the documents noted above should be accompanied by phased lifting of sanctions. If China and Russia, in particular, lead and propose such a discussion in the international community, it will greatly contribute to maintaining and strengthening DPRK’s incentive to implement existing joint statements and declarations. Legitimacy of the approach held by some countries that the current magnitude of sanctions on the DPRK -- the strongest sanctions ever -- should be maintained, needs to be objectively reexamined. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] “Remarks With Traveling Press,” U.S. Department of States, February 28, 2019
[2]  “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, President Trump Hold Second-day Talks,” KCNA, March 1, 2019  http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article from date.
[3] “Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference | Hanoi, Vietnam,” The White House, February 28, 2019
[4] At almost the same time as the Hanoi Summit, in the US, the congressional testimony of Michael Cohen, the former lawyer to President Trump, was televised nationally. Mr. Cohen testified about Trump’s alleged criminal activities in details and stunned Americans. It cannot be denied that this simultaneous event affected the Hanoi Summit.
[5] “Full text of a press conference by North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho,” Hangyoreh, March 1, 2019. (in Korean language)
[6] “Senior State Department Official Remarks to Traveling Press,” U.S. Department of States, February 29, 2019
[7] See Note [3].
[8] See Note [6].

Apr 5, 2019

Watch Report No.6

Watch Report No.6      Feb. 25, 2019

§Media Reports Concentrate Too Much on “DPRK’s Denuclearization.” The Focus of Future US-DPRK Negotiations Should Be on the United States’ Attitude towards “Peace Regime Building”

At a time when the second Summit is about to take place between the United States and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Japanese public attention is focused only on the issue of “DPRK’s denuclearization”. However, considering the joint statement issued at last June’s Singapore Summit, together with subsequent developments, the focus, instead, should be on whether U.S. President Donald Trump keeps his commitment to the agreements and accepts negotiations toward “new U.S.-DPRK relations” and “the building of a peace regime” on the Korean Peninsula.

It is no wonder that the DPRK’s denuclearization draws disproportionate attention in Japan. So far, most of the Japanese mass media reports regarding US-DPRK negotiations on peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are based on one-sided views, focusing solely on DPRK denuclearization, and attributing everything, from the collapse of the agreement to hindrance of the negotiations, to North Korea’s attitude. According to those media, previous promises between the US and DPRK for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula were all promises for “the denuclearization of the DPRK”, and the reason past agreements collapsed was because “DPRK did not keep those promises”.

Considering Japanese media coverage during and after the Singapore Summit, the only matter of concern was whether the DPRK would take steps toward denuclearization. Other agreements made at the Summit have been either ignored or reported in a distorted manner. For example, a news report on the upcoming US-DPRK Summit says, ”the points are whether the Summit leads to North Korea’s denuclearization, and how to deal with North Korea’s request to ease economic sanctions in return for it” [1]. Another report says that the stalemate in negotiations after the Singapore Summit stems from the confrontation between “the US demand that the DPRK submit the entire list of its nuclear facilities”, and “the DPRK refusing to proceed with denuclearization without ‘due reward’ such as sanction relief” [2]. Thus, negotiations between the US and DPRK are portrayed as a matter of “North Korea’s denuclearization” and “relief sanctions by the US to be given in return”.

In addition, last July when North Korea repatriated US soldiers’ remains in accordance with the agreement, the media made malicious speculations about North Korea’s motives by commenting, for example that, “this could be part of their tactics to gain rewards like guarantees for the preservation of their regime” [3]. There was also biased media coverage about an intelligence report stating that the North Korean reactor was in operation [4]. In sum, media reports are conveying the impression that North Korea is unwilling to denuclearize. On the other hand, while avoiding criticism of the US undertaking actions contrary to the agreement, they use language like “stepping back” or “returns” and express concern that Trump’s “easy compromise” may stop North Korea’s denuclearization from happening whenever the Trump administration shows any willingness to accept sanction reliefs or to consider a declaration to end the Korean War, [5].

All these remarks made by the Japanese media are based on an incorrect understanding.
Firstly, to elaborate on the agreement made at last year’s US-DPRK Summit, President Donald Trump “committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK”, and Chairman Kim Jong-Un “reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”. In addition, both leaders made the following four commitments [6]:


- “The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity”;
- “The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula”;
- “Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”; and,
- “The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.”

The two governments agreed not only on “denuclearization” but also on “building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula”, and  “denuclearization” is not just about “nuclear weapons in North Korea,” but about those “on the Korean Peninsula” which include those of the USFK. Therefore, it is incorrect to turn the spotlight solely on “the denuclearization of DPRK”. Moreover, it is accurate to say that “new US-DPRK relations” and “building a peace regime” would require elements including a declaration to end the Korean War, and the launch of negotiations on a peace treaty. From the DPRK’s perspective, the DPRK agreed to denuclearize precisely on the grounds that the war would end and the risk of invasion would no longer exist; it would be impossible for them to accept denuclearization if the US were to maintain its intention to invade the DPRK.

It is true that there may be some use of tactics in implementing the agreement. However, if President Trump would agree to make a declaration to end the Korean War or to start negotiations toward the conclusion of a peace treaty, those acts would constitute fulfillment of the agreements. The terms used by the media, such as “stepping back” or “giving rewards” are inappropriate and unhelpful, leading readers to have false perceptions of the situation.

Next, the writer would like to look back at the actions taken by both parties after the US-DPRK Singapore Summit. The DPRK has been steadily implementing the agreement by dismantling some of its missile facilities and repatriating some US soldiers’ remains. As for the Punggye-ri nuclear test site located in north-eastern DPRK, the DPRK had already dismantled it prior to the summit. Further, the DPRK is making concrete proposals about its next possible actions in exchange for corresponding steps on the part of the US. On the other  side, the US suspended the US-ROK joint military exercise, thereby showing efforts toward the establishment of “a new US-DPRK relationship”. However, the US has taken a number of actions that disregard the agreements. Those include: refusing to negotiate a declaration to end the Korean War or a peace treaty, which are both essential to building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula; conducting joint military exercises involving nuclear bombers last July and September with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces on the Sea of Japan (or East Sea) [7]; and reaffirming, in the joint communique of the US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting last October, that the US will continue to offer the ROK its “nuclear umbrella” [8]. The mass media ought to criticize the US for taking actions in disregard of the agreements, not the DPRK which is fulfilling them.

There are reports indicating that the DPRK is operating the nuclear reactor, and in this connection, Stephen Biegun, the US Special Representative for North Korea, complained about the remarks made by the Director of the US Intelligence Community and the way it was covered by the media. The Director suggested that the DPRK had not given up their nuclear program, but Biegun pointed out, “You cannot divorce the intelligence information from policy. The intelligence information is critical as an underpinning for the policy, but the policy is to address the threat”, expressing frustration over the manner how factual information was assessed. He emphasized that the US administration was conducting diplomacy precisely in order to solve the problem [9]. 

Kim Jong-Un says there will no longer be any reason for the DPRK to possess nuclear weapons once the US threat subsides, and expresses his willingness to take a further step toward denuclearization, on the condition that the US takes “corresponding measures” – which means, of course, the implementation of the joint statement. No observer would doubt the fact that, for the DPRK, nuclear weapons are a means to deter attacks from the United States. Kim Jong-Un’s words that there will no longer be any reason for the DPRK to hold nuclear weapons once the threat of the US subsides, should be taken seriously. Besides, if we turn our attention to inter-Korean developments, the DPRK and ROK issued a de facto declaration to end the war at their summit last September. Two parties of the Korean War, the DPRK and ROK, are no longer willing to continue the war. It should be reasonable to assume that the United States’ acceptance of the negotiations to build a peace regime would lead to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Lastly we will briefly look into past agreements regarding peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.  Media-created misconceptions that “the DPRK has been breaking promises” seems to hinder making reasonable judgements as mentioned above.

Whenever the mass media says that North Korea breaks promises, they usually refer to the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK, as well as of the 2005 Joint Statement made at the Six-Party Talks. Although it is generally believed that the DPRK unilaterally violated these two agreements, in reality the DPRK is not the only one to be blamed for their collapse.

The Agreed Framework between the US and DPRK stipulated, among others, the following commitments: (1) the DPRK will freeze and dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, which enabled the DPRK to produce plutonium; (2) the US will provide the DPRK with two light-water reactors (LWRs), with which it is relatively difficult to extract plutonium; (3) the US will deliver the DPRK 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually as an alternative energy source until the construction of the LWRs is completed; (4) the two countries will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations; (5) the US will neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK; and, (6) the DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will observe the safeguards agreement under the Treaty. These commitments led the two governments to issue a joint statement in October 2000 announcing that “neither government would have hostile intent toward the other”. According to Leon V. Sigal, a well-known expert on North Korean issues [10], the DPRK “made no fissile material whatsoever until 2003” under the Agreed Framework [11]. However, the Republican George W. Bush administration which took power in 2001 submitted its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress in December of that year, in which the DPRK is named as one of the targets for nuclear attack, as it is “actively pursuing its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and missile programs.” Furthermore, in his State of the Union Address in January 2002, President Bush called the DPRK, together with Iraq and Iran, “the Axis of Evil”, trampling on the 2000 joint statement that “neither government would have hostile intent toward the other”. Moreover, the Bush administration cut off the delivery of heavy oil to the DPRK and discarded the Agreed Framework unilaterally on grounds of the DPRK’s suspected uranium enrichment program. It is still unclear as to what was the extent of the details that the US had obtained regarding the DPRK’s suspected uranium enrichment program. According to an historical account [12], the US took the words, meaning “let us discuss”, of Kang Sok-ju, DPRK’s then First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and who was in charge of the matter at the time, as a sign of the DPRK admitting to its uranium enrichment program, but the DPRK has never explicitly acknowledged the existence of such a program.

The 2005 Joint Statement was agreed by six states – China, the DPRK, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the US – at the Six Party Talks, a diplomatic forum set up with the goal of a “verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner”. The Statement contained obligations pertaining to all six states, among which are ones relating to the US and DPRK: (1) the DPRK committed to abandoning nuclear weapons and nuclear programs; (2) the United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons; (3) economic cooperation and energy assistance offered to the DPRK by the other five states; and (4) normalizing US-DPRK relationships. However, just about at the same time, the US government imposed economic sanctions on the DPRK over suspicions of counterfeiting US dollar bills and money laundering. In objection to this apparent breach of the agreement, the DPRK restarted its nuclear development program and carried out its first nuclear test the following year in 2006.

Sometime later the Six-Party Talks resumed and agreed in 2007 on measures to implement the 2005 Joint Statement. In accordance with the agreement, the DPRK suspended its nuclear tests and the operation of its nuclear reactor. However, the talks came to a halt over how to verify DPRK’s denuclearization, and the agreements made at the Six-Party Talks virtually broke down.

As seen above, it cannot be said that the DPRK alone repeatedly broke promises. Rather, there is some clear historical evidence to show that it was the US who broke the promises first. What is more important here is that, if both the US and the DPRK had fulfilled their commitments in good faith, there would have been a chance in the past to realize peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Will President Trump keep his commitment and accomplish a great achievement, or will he miss the opportunity to achieve peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, just like his predecessors? This is where we should keep our eyes fixed in the US-DPRK negotiations, including the upcoming Summit.

Fortunately, President Trump seems to have the willingness to end the Korean War. Despite all his problematic policies such as the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the Iranian nuclear deal, or his migrant and refugee policies, he deserves some praise in terms of holding the first-ever face-to-face US-DPRK summit and thus, contributing to the creation of a trend towards denuclearization and eternal peace on the Korean Peninsula.

However, it will not be easy for Trump to fulfill his commitments. There are a number of people who oppose the ending of the Korean War or who are against the conclusion of a peace treaty with the DPRK, including some within the administration and the ruling Republican Party. This is why strong public opinion is needed to make sure Trump keeps his promises. If we truly hope for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula – which is directly linked with peace in the entire East Asian region – we, the residents of the region, should give him a push to abide by his commitments with the DPRK. The mass media must be challenged to make fair and truthful coverage of the issue which would contribute to the shaping of a strong public opinion. And if the media fails to carry out their responsibilities, we the citizens should raise our voices of protest. (Hajime MAEKAWA)

1 “’Rewards’ for denuclearization” (tentative translation), NHK News 7, February 2, 2019 (in Japanese language)
2 “Possibility for Mr. Trump to give way – US-DPRK Summit to be held on 27th-28th in Vietnam” (tentative translation), The Asahi Shimbun, February 7, 2019 (in Japanese language)
3 “Repatriating US soldiers’ remains will not lead directly to North Korea’s denuclearization” (tentative translation), Yomiuri Shimbun, July 29, 2018 (in Japanese language)
4 For example, NHK News 7, February 13, 2019. The intelligence report states, “With the lack of negotiations, it is no wonder the DPRK continued to produce fissile materials, maintained their missile bases and strengthened them at times.” This part was meant to describe the status quo without any implications to doubt the DPRK’s willingness for denuclearization. However, the NHK News 7 TV program reported, “a US expert released a report indicating the possibility that North Korea last year produced fissile material equivalent to 5-7 nuclear weapons.” Although it added that “the report concludes that North Korea’s threat had gone down largely thanks to the easing of tensions after last year’s Singapore Summit,” it was broadcasted with the subtitles that read: “US experts report that the North Korea has produced fissile material equivalent to 5-7 nuclear bombs.“ This must have caused viewers doubts about the DPRK’s willingness for denuclearization. (Tentative translation)
5 For example, NHK News 7, February 2, 2019. After reporting on Stephen Biegun’s “intention to hold talks with North Korea over issues relating to the benefits they are seeking,” News 7 broadcasted the views of Evans J. R. Revere, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, pointing out the possibility that “President Trump may compromise by giving the DPRK benefits such as easing economic sanctions, not in exchange of denuclearization but merely in exchange of dismantling ICBMs, which is the direct threat for the US,” and warning that “consequently North Korea will be keeping both IRBMs and nuclear weapons”. (Tentative translation)
6 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/
7 Japan Air Self-Defense Force Press release(July 28, 2018, and September 28, 2018
http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/news/houdou/H30/300728.pdf (in Japanese)
http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/news/houdou/H30/300928.pdf (in Japanese)
8 "Joint Communiqué of the 50th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting," U.S. Department of Defense, October 31, 2018.
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/31/2002057967/-1/-1/1/50TH-SCM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE.PDF
9 U.S. Department of State, "Remarks on DPRK at Stanford University," January 31, 2019.
https://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2019/01/288702.htm
10 Mr. Sigal is Director of a Northeast Asia security project at the Social Science Research Council in New York.
11 Tim Shorrock, “Diplomacy With North Korea Has Worked Before, and Can Work Again,” The Nation, September 5, 2017.
https://www.thenation.com/article/diplomacy-with-north-korea-has-worked-before-and-can-work-again/
12 Hiromichi Umebayashi, “Embody the UN Charter on the Korean Peninsula”(tentative translation), Sekai, April 2018 (in Japanese language)

Mar 15, 2019

Watch Report No.5


Watch Report No.5      Feb. 12, 2019

§Kim Jong-Un’s “New Year Address” Set the Tone for Negotiations and US Policy is Shifting toward Phased, Simultaneous and Parallel Denuclearization Measures

Stagnant water has started running. We conclude that this change can be largely attributed to the impact of Kim Jong-Un’s 2019 “New Year Address.”

On February 5, during his State of the Union address, US President Trump announced that Chairman Kim and he would meet again on February 27 and 28 in Vietnam for their second summit. And on February 8, three days after the address, President Trump announced in a tweet would take place in Hanoi, Vietnam.

Since the agreement made at the first summit in Singapore last June, negotiations between the US and the DPRK on implementation of the agreement have remained deadlocked. It was widely agreed that unless there was a concrete commitment to break the deadlock and advance implementation of the initial agreement, holding a second summit would be useless. Therefore, the decision to hold a second summit means that the DPRK, and especially the US, currently consider that a second summit could possibly produce significant agreement between the parties.

To understand the process that led to this decision, it is important to carefully read two speeches. One is a “New Year Address” by Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Jong-Un [1], and the other consists of remarks on the DPRK at Stanford University by Stephen Biegun, US State Department Special Representative for North Korea Policy [2], delivered on January 31, 2019.

 On January 1, 2019, Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Jong-Un, delivered the annual “New Year Address.” Many observers paid attention as to how the address would evaluate last year’s rapid developments toward the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and discussions toward denuclearization, and what this year’s policy would be. The reason for the close attention to Kim’s address was that those who hoped for improvement in the current situation were concerned that there might be a change in the DPRK’s policy. And, those who were skeptical about any improvement in the situation under the current conditions were expecting signs of aggravation with the deadlock. They considered that this might be a possibility because since last April, while inter-Korean relations had been steadily improving, discussions between the US and the DPRK had remained deadlocked and the DPRK had been becoming increasingly dissatisfied as it saw the deadlock had been caused by US unilateral foreign policy. At the end of last year, refraining from directly criticizing US President Trump, the DPRK had escalated criticism to the point that the DPRK state-run media criticized US Secretary of State Pompeo by name. [3] Accordingly, given these circumstances, no one could deny the possibility that Chairman Kim Jong-Un’s “New Year Address” would include a hard line stance against the US or make difficult demands on South Korea.

Under these circumstances, in his “New Year Address,” Chairman Kim Jong-Un praised the changes in 2018 and communicated to the DPRK people his will to prioritize economic development and a clear policy to improve US and DPRK relations, making advances toward denuclearization. Considering that the “New Year Address” is basically a message directed to the DPRK people, the significance of the fact that Kim Jong-Un mentions the joint statement at the Singapore summit between the US and the DPRK is vitally important. He stated,
“It is the invariable stand of our Party and the government of our Republic and my firm will to … build a lasting and durable peace regime and advance towards complete denuclearization.
Accordingly, we declared at home and abroad that we would neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them, and we have taken various practical measures…
We have no intention to be obsessed with and keep up the unsavoury past relationship between the two countries, but are ready to fix it as early as possible and work to forge a new relationship in line with the aspirations of the two peoples and the requirements of the developing times.”

Kim Jong-Un even declared to the DPRK people in his policy that “we would not make nuclear weapons any longer,” which had never been expressed openly before. Recalling that last year’s “New Year Address” directed “to mass-produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles and deploy them for action,” this year’s “New Year Address” can be considered to have announced a dramatic policy change to the DPRK people.

On the other hand, a large number of media focused on the following sentence in the “New Year Address,” a DPRK’s warning message to the US.

“But if the United States does not keep the promise … and out of miscalculation of our people's patience, it attempts to unilaterally enforce something upon us and persists in imposing sanctions and pressure against our Republic, we may be compelled to find a new way for defending the sovereignty of the country and the supreme interests of the state and for achieving peace and stability of the Korean peninsula.”

It is understandable why the overseas media showed interest in this sentence. However, the most important message which should be read in the “New Year Address” is not this one. The critical message is that the DPRK positively evaluated the consequences of changes during the past year as an achievement and announced its invariable stand that, based on that achievement, the DPRK would advance toward improvement in US and DPRK relations and denuclearization this year.

That message must have provided a significant basis for the US government to advance US-DPRK relations.

On January 18, 2019, Kim Yong-Chol, vice chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, carrying a letter from Kim Jong-Un to US President Trump, visited Washington, DC and met with President Trump. At this time, Kim Yong-Chol was accompanied by North Korea’s former ambassador to Spain, Kim Hyok Chol, who would lead working-level talks. Being the DPRK’s number two figure, Kim Yong-Chol’s visit to Washington, DC reminds us of the vice chairman of the National Defense Commission Jo Myong-Rok’s historic visit to the US on behalf of Kim Jong-Il in October 2000 to meet with US President Clinton. At that time, following Jo’s visit, US Secretary of State Albright’s historic visit to Pyongyang and meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-Il took place.

Following the talks between President Trump and Kim Yong-Chol, US-DPRK relations progressed quickly. Although US Secretary of State Pompeo appointed Stephan Biegun as US State Department Special Representative for North Korea Policy on August 2018, no working-level talks with DPRK counterparts had taken place. However, the next day following talks between Kim Yong-Choi and President Trump, three days of working-level talks took place in Stockholm, with the attendees remaining on the premises of their hotel and an international conference venue for the duration. Then, the second summit’s schedule was announced, as described at the beginning of this report.

To understand the changes since January 18, Biegun’s remarks about the DPRK at Stanford University are vitally important. After the remarks, a question-and-answer session with Robert Carlin, a veteran expert on North Korea and former Chief of the Northeast Asia Division in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department under the Clinton administration, was held. Carlin’s pointed questions covered many valuable topics.

The vitally important point clearly expressed in Biegun’s remarks is that the US is prepared to pursue simultaneous, parallel and phased measures that the DPRK had been calling for.  Biegun stated as follows:

“For our part, we have communicated to our North Korean counterparts that we are prepared to pursue – simultaneously and in parallel – all of the commitments our two leaders made in their joint statement at Singapore last summer.”
“Chairman Kim qualified next steps on North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichment facilities upon the United States taking corresponding measures. Exactly what these measures are is a matter I plan to discuss with my North Korean counterpart during our next set of meetings. From our side, we are prepared to discuss many actions that could help build trust between our two countries and advance further progress in parallel on the Singapore summit objectives of transforming relations, establishing a permanent peace regime on the peninsula, and complete denuclearization.” [2]

This represents a substantial change and indicates progress in US foreign policy. The US demand on the DPRK to submit a complete list of its nuclear program, which attracted a lot of attention from the media at first, has now been postponed to become an issue to be addressed at later stages of negotiations.

“Before the process of denuclearization can be final, we must also have a complete understanding of the full extent of the North Korean weapons of mass destruction missile programs. We will get that at some point through a comprehensive declaration.” [2]

Additionally, Biegun strongly implied that intermediate measures would include issues related to putting an end to the Korean War.

“President Trump is ready to end this war. … We are not seeking to topple the North Korean regime. We need to advance our diplomacy alongside our plans for denuclearization in a manner that sends that message clearly to North Korea as well. We are ready for a different future. It’s bigger than denuclearization, while it stands on the foundation of denuclearization, but that’s the opportunity we have and those are the discussions we will be having with the North Koreans.” [2]

Another our point of interest is the relation between this new policy and the US approach of putting pressure through sanctions, which the US has stressed to date. In this regard, Biegun implied changes but didn’t convey clear message.

“We will sustain the pressure campaign, at the same time, we are trying to advance the diplomatic campaign, and we have to find the right balance between those two. Areas like cultural exchanges or people-to-people initiatives that you (Carlin) described seem to me a very obvious place where we could begin to make progress in that environment.” [2]

In connection with that, we would like to take note of the fact as well that during rapid changes after the talks between President Trump and Kim Yong-Chol, remarks by John Bolton, a super-hawk national security advisor to the US President, have indicated a change. On January 25, during a private interview with the “Washington Times,” Bolton stated as follows regarding the sanctions:

“What we need from North Korea is a significant sign of a strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons and it is when we get that denuclearization that the President can begin to take the sanctions off.” [4]

It might be possible to interpret that the DPRK has already made a strategic decision to “give up nuclear weapons” and engaged in negotiations with the US at this time, and such an interpretation is left to the subjective judgement by the Trump administration. The phrase “begin to take the sanctions off” is considered to imply taking the sanctions off in a phased manner. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI and Kana HIRAI) 

[1] English full text is available in the following link.
[2] U.S. Department of State, "Remarks on DPRK at Stanford University," January 31, 2019
 (Robert Carlin’s questions and Stephen Biegun’s answers are included as well as Biegun’s remarks)
[3] For instance, an article from KCNA ”Press Statement of Policy Research Director of Institute for American Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK,” December 16, 2018
 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article from date.
[4] Tim Constantine, “John Bolton explains Trump's strategy on North Korea, China trade,” The Washington Times, January 25, 2019

Feb 22, 2019

Watch Report No.4

Watch Report No.4      Jan. 12, 2019

§Unnecessary Tension Should Not Be Created About Military Exercises. Military Confidence-Building Requires Gradual Progress.
Based on the 2018 April Panmunjom Declaration and the 2018 September Pyongyang Joint Declaration, both North and South Korea have taken various measures to alleviate military tension and build confidence. The US has also gone along with the two Koreas’ moves, for instance, by suspending large-scale military exercises. Though this development is positive, the significance of the long-term US-ROK alliance should not be underestimated. To successfully implement the agreements on peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it is necessary to take enough time to resolve issues in the military domain and this process will require phased progress.


As the first step toward military confidence building, North and South Korea worked together to alleviate tension in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the front line of military tension. This step was vitally important both symbolically and practically. The September 19, 2018 “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain” [1] (hereafter referred to as “the military agreement”) is a document of vital importance as it acknowledges concrete implementation measures for issues in the military domain.

In accordance with the military agreement, North and South Korea first worked together to demilitarize the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom (JSA) and this was completed on October 25, 2018. Then, from November 11, the two Koreas implemented agreements to cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, including land, air and sea and to establish “buffer zones on ground, at sea and in the air.” In terms of ground-based operations, the two sides ceased all live-fire artillery drills and field training exercises at the regiment level and above, within 5km from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). At sea, the two sides ceased all live-fire and maritime maneuver exercises within the roughly 135-kilometer buffer zone north of ROK’s Deokjeok-do and south of DPRK’s Cho-do in the West Sea (the Yellow Sea), and within the roughly 80-kilometer [2] buffer zone north of ROK’s Sokcho and south of DPRK’s Tongcheon in the East Sea (the Japan Sea). In the air, for fixed-wing aircraft, such as reconnaissance aircraft and fighter aircraft, no-fly zones were designated within 40km from the MDL in the east and within 20km from the MDL in the west. For rotary-wing aircraft, no fly zones were designated within 10km from the MDL, and for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), no-fly zones were designated within 15km from the MDL in the east and 10km form the MDL in the west.

In the military agreement, the two Koreas also agreed to proceed with a pilot project - an inter-Korean joint operation to recover remains within DMZ of soldiers killed during the Korean War.  And, on November 22, 2018, the ROK Ministry of Defense reported that they reconnected roads in the DMZ of Cheorwon, Gangwon-do, central Korean Peninsula, to use them for the project. [3] Also in accordance with the military agreement, in December 2018, the two Koreas withdrew 10 guard posts from each side on a trial basis, resulting in the withdrawal of 20 guard posts. (The two Koreas each agreed to preserve one respective guard post for their historical value after disarming them.) The military agreement’s goal to complete withdrawal of guard posts by December 31, 2018 was achieved. [4]

Thus far, the US has also continued to restrain itself militarily to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula. Measures to ease tension in the DMZ described above required the understanding and cooperation of the United Nations Command (UNC). In particular, regarding demilitarization of the JSA and its operations thereafter, a trilateral consultative body among South Korea, North Korea and the UNC was established and has conducted consultations. Commander of US Forces, Korea (USFK) who is also commander of ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC), serves concurrently as Commander of UNC. It was reported that the USFK expressed some disagreement regarding measures to reduce military tension agreed upon by the two Koreas, however, in general the USFK has thus far been cooperative.

As mentioned at the beginning of this report, large-scale US-ROK combined military exercises have been suspended or scaled down. In 2018, the US and ROK reduced the number of the US-ROK combined Marine military drills. These drills were originally planned to take place 19 times from October 2017 to September 2018, but in June 2018, by which time eleven such drills had been carried out, they announced suspension of the drills, and as a result, the remaining 8 drills were canceled. [5] Additionally, according to the announcement made by the ROK military authority on November 27, no US bombers have been deployed over the Korean Peninsula for almost one year. [6] According to the US forces, the move came at the request of the ROK government. [7] Furthermore, on November 21, at a press conference in Washington D.C., regarding the large-scale US-ROK combined field exercise “Foal Eagle”, which is held annually in March or April, then-US Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, announced that they were considering scaling back the exercise in spring 2019, saying “Foal Eagle is being reorganized a bit to keep it at – at a level that will not be harmful to diplomacy.” [8] Also on October 19, during the meeting of US Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense, the two sides agreed to suspend the large-scale US-ROK combined air combat drills, “Vigilant Ace” in 2018 which had been conducted annually in December. According to the senior spokesperson for US Department of Defense, Dana White, the reason for the suspension was “to give the diplomatic process every opportunity to continue.” [9]

As described above, thus far, with a stance of prioritizing the diplomatic process, the US Department of Defense has cooperated with inter-Korean efforts for reconciliation reducing negative impacts on the DPRK.

However, if discussions between the US and the DPRK remain deadlocked, it would be difficult to predict how long this US’s cooperative stance would be maintained. The Joint Communique issued after the 50th US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) [10] held in Washington, DC on October 31, 2018, tells us that it will require considerable effort by concerned states to harmonize the two Koreas’ efforts at military confidence-building and current situation of US-ROK security system.

Regarding the implementation of the military agreement, the Joint Communique of the 50th US-ROK SCM states that, “the agreement should be implemented in a way that contributes substantively to easing tension and establishing peace while ensuring combined readiness and committed to continue to maintain close coordination and cooperation between US and ROK defense authorities during the process of implementation.” In short, both sides agreed to maintain combat readiness of US-ROK Combined Forces. Not only that, despite the fact that both the US and South Korea have been calling for the DPRK to denuclearize and trying to realize “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” the US reaffirms “the continued US commitment to provide extended deterrence to the ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including US nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities.” That is, it clearly states that the US will continue to provide its “nuclear umbrella.” This means that the US and South Korea expressed something equivalent to the DPRK’s saying, “We will continue to maintain its nuclear deterrent capability.” As just described, to advance confidence-building in the military domain, many issues remain that need to be resolved.

In this situation of such a delicate balance, on December 3, 2018, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced that the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) would conduct independent “consolidated training for combat readiness” from December 3 to 7. [11] With US-ROK combined air combat drill, “Vigilant Ace,” cancelled, the aim of the training is to maintain military readiness. Considering the Joint Communique mentioned above, as well as the general military logic that military capabilities must be maintained, such training can be considered as something reasonably expected under current situation.

However, on December 4, 2018, the DPRK state run media, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), issued an article which condemns ROKAF’s independent training. [12] According to the UPI’s report of December 4, KCNA stated, “This is a dangerous military movement that reverses the situation of trust-building measures and reconciliation between North and South.” And, after pointing out the aim of training by stating, “South Korea’s joint chiefs of staff has publicly declared the air force training is to maintain military readiness and improve pilots’ ability to carry out missions,” KCNA stated that South Korea, “should stop all war exercises that could create conflict.” [13]

In response to the announcement that Foal Eagle would be conducted at a small scale, another North Korean state run online outlet, the Arirang-Meari, issued an article on December 2, 2018, stating that, “combined US-ROK military exercises of all scales should be suspended as well.” [14]

Those critical responses from North Korean media are quite understandable, unless they become the policy of the North Korean leadership and go too far. In the DPRK, soldiers can be engaged in farming and fishing as needed, but in many other countries, in time of peace, soldiers have no duty other than training and exercises. Unfortunately, in those countries, even when tension is easing, disarmament has to advance gradually. However, even though the pace may be slow, progress can be made in confidence-building by demonstrating a willingness to disarm and make tangible changes. In connection with alleviation of tension on the Korean Peninsula, on November 5, 2018, during a forum at Duke University, Joseph Dunford, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, made suggestive statements as follows. [15] “The more successful we are in the diplomatic track, the more uncomfortable we will be in the military space,” and “Because over time, this negotiation will take a form where we’re going to have to start making some changes to the military posture on the peninsula. And we’re prepared to do that in support of Secretary Pompeo.”

It is essential that concerned states deepen mutual understanding concerning the pace of easing tension and disarmament in the military domain. This holds true not only for North and South Korea and the US, but also for Japan and China, which are closely related to the military situation in this region.

[1] “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain” The National Committee on North Korea
[2] 尹相虎「南北の陸海空緩衝区域1日から施行、一切の軍事訓練中止」, Donga Ilbo, November 1, 2018
[3] “(2nd LD) Koreas connect road inside heavily fortified DMZ,” Yonhap News Agency, November 22, 2018
[4] ”(2nd LD) S. Korea confirms disablement of N.K. DMZ guard posts,” Yonhap News Agency, December 17, 2018
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20181217005552315?section=search
[5] ”S. Korean, U.S. to resume marine exercise,” Yonhap News Agency, November 4, 2018
[6] “(LEAD) S. Korea, U.S. continue 'higher-level' exercises off peninsula: U.S. general,” Yonhap News Agency, November 27, 2018
[7] See note [6].
[8] “Media Availability with Secretary Mattis,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 21, 2018
[9] Robert BURNS, “US and South Korea again call off a major military exercise,” AP, October 20, 2018. https://www.apnews.com/7c4c40989a98451493664fb11f27f861
[10] "Joint Communiqué of the 50th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting," U.S. Department of Defense, October 31, 2018.
[11] Kang-moon Yoo, “S. Korean Air Force to conduct comprehensive battle readiness drills until Dec. 7,” Hankyoreh, December 4, 2018
[12] ”남조선공군 전투준비태세유지 위한 종합훈련 시작” KCNA, December 4, 2018.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-k.htm Search for the article from  date (In Korean language)
[13] Elizabeth Shim, “North Korea condemns South's air force exercises,” UPI, December 4, 2018
[14] See note [11].
[15] Idrees Ali, and Phil Stewart, “U.S.-North Korea talks could affect U.S. military posture in Korea: Dunford,” Reuters, November 6, 2018.

Feb 4, 2019

Watch Report No.3

Watch Report No.3      Dec. 25, 2018

§The Japanese Government’s Efforts to Define its Peacebuilding Role on the Korean Peninsula and Beyond are not Evident
Worrying developments have become evident in the implementation of the agreements on the Korean Peninsula’s denuclearization.

A commentary entitled, “When does the US wake up from foolish greed and daydream?” by Kwon Jong Gun, director of the Institute for American Studies of the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK [1], appeared on November 2, 2018 on the Korean Central News Agency’s news site. It implied that DPRK criticism of the US stance in negotiations with North Korea has escalated one step further. Although with reservations, the commentary mentioned for the first time the possibility of a change in DPRK’s policy, a change which had not been mentioned in commentaries posted during October.

Refraining from directly criticizing US President Trump, the commentary stated that evidence of US efforts to improve US-DPRK relations cannot not be found, and attacked “high-ranking officials of the White House and the US administration.” Concerning the Singapore summit, Director Kwon said that, “What top leaders of the DPRK and the US promised at (the) historic Singapore meeting in June (by) shaking hands, is to put an end to the hostile relations of centuries between the DPRK and the US and (to) make a new history of improving relations.” The commentary underscored that the core of the Singapore summit, hailed by the whole world, is that the two countries agreed to make a new history of improving their relations. And, concerning the current US stance which has only stressed the need for sanctions and pressure on the DPRK, Kwon said, “The improvement of relations and sanctions are incompatible” and, “’Friendship’ is inconsistent with ‘pressure’.” Additionally, Kwon questioned whether, “the nuclear issue of the DPRK is really a sore spot that caused all the complicated problems including the tension on the Korean Peninsula and the bedeviled DKRP-US relations.”

Then Kwon argued that taking into account the historic background of the nuclear issue, “the DPRK-US negotiations should be (a) simultaneous and phased course based on reciprocity and equality.” Kwon stated that based on this stance, “Now that we gave all things possible to the US, things it hardly deserves, by taking proactive and good-will measures, what remains to be done is the US corresponding reply.” The DPRK demands that the US take action and, “Unless there is any reply, the DPRK will not move even 1 mm, how costly it may be.”

As described above, there is a point of particular interest in director Kwon’s commentary. Choosing his words carefully, he implies that the DPRK has almost reached the limit of its patience. In other words, the commentary states that if the US remains arrogant without showing any change in its position, the DPRK may “add one thing to the state line for directing all efforts to the economic construction adopted (in the Plenary Meeting of Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea) in April and as a result, the word ‘pyongjin’ ((which means) ‘simultaneously conducting economic construction and building up nuclear forces’) may appear again and the change of the line could be seriously reconsidered.”

We are working on the Watch Project in hopes that agreement on the Korean Peninsula’s denuclearization will be implemented without being derailed. Examining the current situation based on this objective, we would like to point out that at this point the following two factors that have a role in preventing US-DPRK relations from deteriorating further. ① The North and South Korean governments have continued efforts to restore inter-Korean relations in accordance with the 2018 Inter-Korean summit agreements and have been making progress. ② Good US-South Korea relations have been maintained. It is important for civil society in the US, South Korea and Japan to accurately analyze this situation so as to appreciate and encourage efforts made by the North and South Korean governments, especially the role of the South Korean government that has been involved in both diplomatic processes.

In addition, civil society of the three countries needs to take note of the fact that the Japanese government has not, as yet, appeared on a diplomatic stage where it would naturally be expected to be. If the Japanese government had appeared on the stage with intention of getting involved in the peacebuilding process of Northeast Asia, there could be the possibility that those of us in civil society would have gained another influential country, which could be useful in dealing with current difficult circumstances.

However, unfortunately, the current reality of the Japanese government has fallen far short of such expectations.

As described in Watch Report 1, in his policy speech at the extraordinary Diet session after the cabinet reshuffle on October 24, Prime Minister Abe said, “Now it’s my turn to meet face to face with Chairman Kim Jong-Un. I will seek to break the shell of distrust, resolve the abduction issue, nuclear, and missile issues, settle the unfortunate past, and normalize Japan’s relations with the DPRK.”

However, in subsequent Japanese politics, almost no effort to demonstrate his words can be found. Not only in the Abe administration, but in the Diet, overall debate on the Korean Peninsula issue has been low key. At the start of the House of Councilors Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Kono stated as follows, and the policy expressed was related only to the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions.
“It is important that the summit agreement written clearly in the joint statement at the Singapore summit between the US and the DPRK, including North Korea’s commitment toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, is completely and immediately implemented, and it is indispensable to ensure the full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions by all countries of the UN.” [2]
Also, at the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, when asked about the nature of his recognition of the DPRK’s current situation, Foreign Minister Kono answered that the threat of North Korea remained unchanged and underscored the importance of the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions.
“Since the Singapore Summit, North Korea has not conducted nuclear and missile tests, but the situation remains unchanged where North Korea still possesses a number of Rodong missiles and its nuclear weapons program has considerably advanced. As perception that North Korea still poses the threat to international community remains unchanged, I’d like to continue to maintain the current situation of concerted international efforts wherein the international community fully implements the relevant UN Security Council resolutions while maintaining solidarity for the realization of North Korea’s CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement) of nuclear weapons and missiles.” [3]

It’s not an exaggeration to say that the Japanese government’s policy, which has been articulated thus far, is limited to the obsolete policy of strict implementation of sanctions against the DPRK based on UN Security Council resolutions, and has stayed unchanged since before the historic Singapore summit was held.

In particular, the Japanese government has been actively engaged in a crackdown on sanctions evasion through illicit ship-to-ship transfers by DPRK vessels. In November, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) issued a press release concerning ship-to-ship transfers, in which the following position of MOFA is stated.
“Japan considers that the international community needs to fully implement the relevant UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) while maintaining solidarity for the realization of North Korea’s dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. In this regard, Japan welcomes and highly appreciates the efforts made by partner countries to that end. Japan will continue to work closely with all partner countries to ensure effectiveness of the relevant UNSCRs.”[4]

Unfortunately, regarding denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, what has been communicated positively by Japan’s MOFA to civil society in Japan is limited to efforts to put pressure on the DPRK by ensuring the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, as described above. In late November, one of the authors of this report spoke at a symposium held by an NGO in Tokyo at which a mid-level official of MOFA’s Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department was invited to speak as well. The position of the MOFA concerning the North Korean nuclear issue as explained to the audience during the symposium was, “Nothing is more important than urging the UN member states to implement UN Security Council resolutions.” The statement fails to recognize the obligations on both sides.

Does Japan MOFA recognize that the US and the DPRK agreement at the Singapore summit contains not only DPRK’s “commitment to complete denuclearization,” but also a US “commitment to providing security guarantees to the DPRK”? Dose it recognize that to fully realize the summit agreements, the implementation of both sides’ commitments needs to advance simultaneously?

As debate on this issue in the Diet is lacking, it will be vitally important for not only Japanese citizens, but also worldwide citizens interested in this issue, to receive clear answers to these questions. Fortunately, at the launch of the Watch Project, the Peace Depot was able to meet and exchange opinions with a high-ranking official, the number two figure of MOFA’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau which oversees this issue. The official’s answer to these questions was clear. He replied, “We’re aware that the agreement contains both sides’ commitments. I can’t tell you the details, but we have maintained close contact with the US with such a recognition.” The answer meets only minimum requirements, but must be considered good news to citizens. (Takuya MORIYAMA and Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] “Institute for American Studies of DPRK Foreign Ministry Urges U.S. to Abandon Foolish Daydream” KCNA, November 2, 2018.
[2]  Foreign Minister Taro KONO’s statement at House of Councilors Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, Japanese Diet Minutes, November 13, 2018 (in Japanese).
[3]  Foreign Minister Taro KONO’s response at House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Japanese Diet Minutes, November 14, 2018 (in Japanese).
[4] Press Release “Monitoring and surveillance activities by concerned states against illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean flagged vessels prohibited by UNSCRs”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 6, 2018

Watch Report No.37

    Watch Report No.37    July 19, 2024 The NPT and the DPRK: The Governments of Japan and the ROK Should Use the Treaty Conference as a For...