Watch Report No.11

Watch Report No.11      Jun. 19, 2019

§The DPRK Issued Its Position Statement to UN Member States as a Formal UN Document on the Occasion of One-Year Anniversary of the US-DPRK Joint Statement

June 12th 2019 marks one-year since the historic US-DPRK summit. The DPRK issued a Foreign Ministry spokesperson statement on June 4^th for the anniversary and sent it to the UN Secretary General, asking him to circulate it to all UN member States as a formal UN document for the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. The document number is A/73/894-S/2019/466 [1].

Apparently, there has been no mass-media coverage of the full text of the statement, so this Watch Report reproduces it below without commentary.

[Letter to the UN Secretary General]

Letter dated 6 June 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a press statement made on 4 June 2019 by the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) with regards to DPRK-U.S. summit meetings (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the seventy-third session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 66, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kim Song

Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations

[Annex to the Letter to the UN Secretary General]

Annex to the letter dated 6 June 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Press statement of the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea dated 4 June 2019

The DPRK-U.S. summit meeting and talks held in Singapore in June last year for the first time in history was a momentous occasion of great significance in promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region and advancing the historic trend of reconciliation and cooperation.

The 12 June DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement adopted at the DPRK-U.S. summit meeting and talks enjoyed full support and approval of all countries and peoples across the world, as it proved in practice that even the countries with the most hostile

relations could lay out an avenue for establishing new relations once they make politically decisive steps to defend peace and stability, giving these issues a top priority.

As is acknowledged by the international society at large, the government of the DPRK has exerted ceaseless efforts over the past year to establish new DPRK-U.S. relations, build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula and achieve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, as has been stipulated in the 12 June DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement, and also made every possible endeavour, such as taking practical initiatives that require strategically decisive measures.

However, it is regrettable to see that the United States has become ever more undisguised during the past year in its scheme to annihilate us by force while deliberately turning its face away from the implementation of the DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement and only insisting on our unilateral surrender of nuclear weapons. At the second DPRK-U.S. summit talks, held in Hanoi amid the great interest and expectation of the entire world, the United States made the biggest mistake of having missed a lifetime opportunity by insisting on “dismantlement of the nuke first”.

This overshadows the future of the DPRK-U.S. talks.

Had the United States done anything of a little help in addressing the issues on the basis of serious position and sincere attitude for implementing the DPRK -U.S. Joint Statement, the issue of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula might also have seen much progress.

In his historic policy speech, Comrade Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said that, given the persistence of deep-rooted hostility between the DPRK and the U.S., it is necessary for implementation of the 12 June DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement that both sides give up their unilateral demands and find a constructive solution which would meet each other’s interest.

And he said that, to this end, it is requisite for the U.S. to fold its current method of calculation and approach us with a new one.

The 12 June DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement is the commitment which the two countries have pledged to the world and the humankind, and it is the task both sides should be jointly accountable for.

The DPRK remains unchanged in its stand and will to cherish and implement in good faith the 12 June DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement personally signed by the supreme leaders of the DPRK and the U.S. at the first-ever DPRK-U. S. summit talks.

However, if the U.S., a dialogue partner, fails to carry out its obligation and keeps resorting to anti-DPRK hostile policy, the fate of the 12 June DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement will not be promising.

Whether the 12 June DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement will remain effective or turn out to be a mere blank sheet of paper will now be determined by how the U.S. would respond to our fair and reasonable stand.

Nearly one year now since the declaration of the historic 12 June DPRK -U.S. Joint Statement, the U.S. should duly look back on the past one year and cogitate about which will be a correct strategic choice before it is too late.

The U.S. would be well-advised to change its current method of calculation and respond to our request as soon as possible.

There is a limit to our patience.

[1] https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/165/61/pdf/N1916561.pdf?OpenElement

Watch Report No.10

Watch Report No.10      Jun. 12, 2019

§The Goalpost of US-DPRK Negotiations is the Implementation of the Singapore Joint Statement, not the Implementation of UNSC Resolutions

One year has passed since the first US-DPRK summit in history was held in Singapore on June 12, 2018. The joint statement agreed upon at the Summit, along with two 2018 inter-Korean joint declarations, still remains a basic agreed document which serves as a starting point to realize peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region.

Although the second US-DPRK summit held in Hanoi at the end of February failed to produce any agreed documents, both the US and DPRK leaders must have gotten a feel for each other’s domestic situations which could be gained only through face-to-face dialogue. However, after the second summit up until today, both countries have been unable to find an opportunity to take the next step based on what they achieved in Hanoi. During times that a clear path has not been evident, dirt that has accumulated throughout an almost 70-year history of hostility and division between the two countries resurfaces in various forms. In Western countries, the tone of arguments demonizing the DPRK has been growing more predominant, making it more and more difficult for the public to correctly understand the situation.

At this time when negotiations between the US and the DPRK have been destabilized, it is critically important to reaffirm that the very implementation of the Singapore joint statement is both countries’ political commitment, leading to the change in US-DPRK relations. In particular, attention needs to be given to the fact that arguments have become evident which, intentionally or not, confuse or distort the relationship between the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) and the Singapore agreements between the US and the DPRK.

Since the Hanoi Summit, the US has started increasingly emphasizing not just “denuclearization of the DPRK,” but “complete elimination of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in North Korea” as the US goal.

For instance, right after the Hanoi Summit, when holding a briefing with traveling press, a senior State Department official mentioned “North Korea’s WMD” many times. The official stated that, “the North Koreans at this point are unwilling to impose a complete freeze on their weapons of mass destruction programs.” If this official’s statement was made in the context of lifting of sanctions imposed by UNSCRs, there would be no need to consider this a problem. However, during discussing the definition of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which is a core issue in the implementation of the Singapore joint statement, the official stated [1]:

 “…we got to a level of detail that has eluded us for quite a while, certainly since the Singapore joint statement, including things like what is the definition of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which is a very important issue for us as we look to disassemble the entire weapons of mass destruction program in North Korea.”

To summarize, the official insisted on “disassembling the entire weapons of mass destruction program” in the context of the implementation of the Singapore joint statement.

To cite another instance, the same thing was repeated when a senior State Department official was holding a special briefing on the North Korean issue. Regarding DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho’s statement that in Hanoi the US asked for not only the Yongbyon nuclear complex but also plus alpha, a reporter questioned, “Is this plus alpha one more uranium facility or ‘biochemical and all the WMD’ which National Security Advisor John Bolton says the US side claimed?” To this question, the official answered that, “I can’t clarify what Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho meant in his presentation, but I can certainly affirm what the President proposed to Chairman Kim, which was the complete elimination of their weapon of mass destruction program.”[2] There followed another reporter requesting clarification of the official’s answer by asking, “the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction program means chemical, biological, and nuclear, is that correct?” and the official answered, “Yes.”[3]

As described above, the US clearly pursues, in the context of the implementation of the Singapore joint statement, elimination of not only nuclear weapon program, but also the entire WMD program. And that has been brought up not as a last stage demand but as a demand from the start.

If the implementation of UNSCRs is a top-priority goal for the US, it is inevitable that all WMD programs will be a problem. However, if it was clear that the US goal was the implementation of UNSCRs, the historic US-DPRK summit would not have happened in the first place and it would have been unable to issue the US-DPRK joint statement. The implementation of the UNSCRs and that of the US-DPRK joint statement should be distinguished clearly and their relationship recognized correctly.

It was by Resolution 1718 (2006) adopted on October 14, 2006, that the UN Security Council resolved UN actions against the DPRK for the first time, based on UN Charter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. Since then, sanctions resolutions on the DPRK have been adopted 10 times. Those resolutions, in most cases, prohibit the DPRK from undertaking any further nuclear tests and launches that use ballistic missile technology, and demand that the DPRK abandon nuclear weapon and any other WMD, and ballistic missile programs in complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. The last of the 10 resolutions is Resolution 2397 (2017), adopted on December 22, 2017.  

The DPRK continued to demonstrate its stance to reject the resolutions, asserting that their nuclear weapon and missile development programs are legitimate self-defense countermeasures to protect the DPRK from US threat and not activities to threaten international peace. Additionally, the DPRK made a counterargument that the UN Security Council is not fair in that it would not discuss US-ROK large-scale combined military exercises conducted as a rehearsal for overthrowing the DPRK regime as a threat to peace violating the UN Charter. [4]

Thus, efforts to make the DPRK abandon its nuclear development programs (the entire WMD programs, in fact) by UN Security Council’s sanctions resolutions based on UN Charter VII have been strengthened over 11 years only to fail to improve the situation. It was the outcome of the US-DPRK summit that changed the situation drastically. As a result of the summit, the US and the DPRK agreed upon the joint statement.

As evident in the history described above, there exist fundamental differences between the implementation of UNSCRs and that of the Singapore joint statement. In the UNSCRs, the DPRK is forced to implement demands that the DPRK cannot agree upon. On the other hand, in the Singapore joint statement, both US and DPRK sides have obligations to implement what both sides agreed upon. The international community welcomed the agreement between the US and the DPRK because the implementation of the agreement could also be a significant step toward the realization of the goals of the UNSCRs. Therefore, what the international community should focus on right now is the implementation of the Singapore agreement and not criticize North Korea’s WMD programs by raising the UNSCRs.

It is understandable that the UNSCRs have been discussed repeatedly in multinational forums such as the UN. However, it is misguided that countries closely related to the Korean Peninsula situation, such as the US and Japan, keep insisting on maintaining the sanctions as a policy priority by bringing up the UNSCRs even under current circumstances and risking undermining the Singapore agreement.

In the following, we would like to focus on the behavior of Japanese government.

According to a well-known journalist, Masakatsu OTA, who has been following denuclearization issues on the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese government “has asked the leading figures of the US government to take care of WMD issue including biological and chemical weapons prior to the Singapore Summit.”[5] In this sense, considering constant comments by the Japanese government after the summit, it has to be said that the Japanese government failed to correctly understand the significance of the US-DPRK agreement enshrined in the Singapore joint statement.

As already discussed in Watch Report No.9, at the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 8, 2019, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono stated that it is important for the US-DPRK peace process that “the international community needs to continue to implement UNSCRs in solidarity as it has done thus far.”[6] On April 19, at the press conference after the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (US-Japan “2+2”) convened in Washington, DC, Foreign Minister Kono also stated that “we need to implement Security Council resolutions until North Korea makes CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement) for all the weapons of mass destruction and the missiles of all ranges.”[7], an opinion that affirms adherence to the UNSCRs, but fails to recognize the US-DPRK joint obligations of the Singapore agreement.

This foreign policy of the Japanese government is more influential than generally acknowledged. In late June, the G20 Osaka Summit will be held under Japanese presidency, and in late August, the G7 Summit will be held in Biarritz, France, under French presidency. From April 22 to 29, in an attempt to share his view on the North Korean issue at G20 and G7, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited European countries. Abe held summit meetings on April 23, in France [8], on April 24 in Italy [9], and on April 28 in Canada [10], and in all the countries he tried to confirm a shared recognition of North Korean situation. Accordingly, they agreed, based on the UNSCRs, to work closely for the realization of North Korea’s CVID of all WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges, and in order to prevent North Korea’s sanctions’ evasion, to work together to address “ship-to-ship transfer” by deploying patrol aircraft and vessels, etc.

Japanese foreign policy described above can hardly be considered to be based on a correct understanding of the interrelationship between the implementation of the historic Singapore joint agreement and the implementation of UNSCRs. Japanese diplomacy should immediately make efforts to share the recognition that the implementation of the Singapore agreement should be prioritized in order to eventually realize the goal of UNSCRs.

[1] “Remarks With Traveling Press,” U.S. Department of States, February 28, 2019

https://www.state.gov/senior-state-department-official-remarks-to-traveling-press-3/

[2]　 U.S. Department of State, “Senior State Department Official On North Korea,” March 7, 2019

https://www.state.gov/senior-state-department-official-on-north-korea/

[3]　 See note [2].

[4]　For example, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Totally Refutes UNSC ‘Resolution’,” KCNA, October 17, 2006 

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm　 Search for the article from date.

[5]　Masakatsu OTA, “The breakdown of the Hanoi summit.　The hidden second uranium enrichment facilities,” (tentative translation), Bungeishunju, May 2019 (in Japanese language)

[6]　The minutes of House of Representatives the Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 8, 2019 (informal translation by the present authors) (in Japanese language)

http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000519820190308002.htm#p_honbun

[7]　“Remarks With Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono, and Japanese Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya at a Joint Press Availability for the U.S.-Japan 2+2 Ministerial,” U.S. Department of State, April 19, 2019

https://www.state.gov/remarks-with-acting-secretary-of-defense-patrick-shanahan-japanese-foreign-minister-taro-kono-and-japanese-defense-minister-takeshi-iwaya-at-a-joint-press-availability-for-the-u-s-japan-22-ministe/

[8]　”Japan-France Summit Meeting and Working Lunch,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 23, 2019

https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/fr/page6e_000182.html

[9]　“Japan-Italy Summit Meeting,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 24, 2019

https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/it/page4e_001014.html
[10]　“Japan-Canada Summit Meeting,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 28, 2019

https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/ca/page3e_001023.html

Watch Report No.9

Watch Report No.9      Apr. 23, 2019

§Japanese Foreign Policy: Maintaining Strong Sanctions and Building Confidence are Contradictory

[Note: Watch Report 9 was issued on April 23 prior to DPRK missile tests on May 9, which will be discussed in subsequent Reports. However, the tests do not change the tension between sanctions and confidence building that influences denuclearization talks.]

Chairman Kim Jong-Un’s policy speech

On April 12, Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Jong-Un, made policy speech at the First Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. [1] In his speech, Chairman Kim stated his policy which focuses on “concentrating all national resources on economic construction,” and in stating his policy, he conveyed important messages on inter-Korean relations and US-DPRK relations as well.

Regarding inter-Korean relations, Chairman Kim stated that, “the entire nation ardently hopes that the historic Panmunjom Declaration and the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration will thoroughly be implemented so that the peaceful atmosphere on the Korean peninsula will continue and inter-Korean relations will improve uninterruptedly.” Regarding US-DPRK relations, Chairman Kim appreciated the US-DPRK Joint Statement again by saying that, “the June 12 DPRK-US Joint Statement was a historic declaration announcing to the world that the two countries which had been hostile to each other from one century into the next would write a new history of relationship.”

On the other hand, Chairman Kim harshly criticized the US stance for the negotiations at the Hanoi summit and stated, “We are neither pleased nor willing to see summit talks like the Hanoi summit talks re-enacted” and, “here is no need for me to obsess over the summit talks with the United States out of thirst for the lifting of sanctions.” Additionally, Chairman Kim clearly stated his current stance. He said, “we will be patient and wait till the end of this year to see whether the United States makes a courageous decision or not.”

At the press conference held on March 15, the DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-Hui stated that Chairman Kim will soon announce his decision on the DPRK’s next move, [2] and the above messages are probably Chairman Kim’s decision that Choi had mentioned. To summarize Kim’s policy, the DPRK’s position is that the DPRK will not be obsessed with seeking the lifting of the sanctions and, while supporting its economy with self-reliance, continue negotiations based on the US-DPRK and inter-Korean summit agreements.

Japan’s diplomacy is insensitive to the situation

Although Kim Jong-Un’s policy has remained cool-headed, it is clear that the DPRK seriously views the continued sanctions as indication of a “hostile policy.” In his same policy speech, Chairman Kim stated his critical analysis that economic sanctions are a means of “disarming us first, overthrowing our social system later.” Despite that, or because of that, Chairman Kim called for his people not to plead for the lifting of the economic sanctions, but to achieve economic development through alternate means.

As just described, if mishandled, the issue of the economic sanctions has the potential of having a decisively negative impact on negotiations on denuclearization and peace of the Korean Peninsula. Despite that, concern about this issue in Japanese politics has remained unchanged for a long time.

In Diet deliberations, it can be pointed out that the level of interest in the denuclearization and peace on Korean Peninsula is low.

The House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs of the ongoing 198th ordinary Diet session started on March 6, 2019 and by the issue date of this report (April 23), sessions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs have been held 8 times and have spent 19 hours and 23 minutes on question-and-answer between the government and Committee members. However, only 7 out of all 30 Committee members (20 from ruling coalition parties --18 from Liberal Democratic Party and 2 from Komeito – and 10 from opposition parties) have taken up the issue of the Korean Peninsula, and only one hour and 41 minutes has been spent on the issue of the Korean Peninsula, which accounts for 8.7% of total amount of time spent for question-and-answer.

Additionally, Diet members and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had shared generally the same view on “maintaining strong pressure” on the DPRK through economic sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions. In fact, the issue of the sanctions would have provided a good starting point to deepen discussions on the Japanese government’s policy on the Korean Peninsula. However, no such discussions have taken place.

From that viewpoint, the question-and-answer session on March 8 regarding US-DPRK negotiations based on the joint statement at the Singapore summit between a Diet member Kokuta (Japanese Communist Party) and Foreign Minister Kono struck at the heart of the issue and revealed the Japanese government’s statements that warrant future discussion.

House of Representatives member Kokuta: “As stated in your policy speech, you have clearly expressed your stance to support US-North Korean peace process, and what do you think is important for the US and North Korea to advance process toward denuclearization and building a peace regime…?”

Foreign Ministry Kono: “I think there are two things. One is that the international community needs to continue to implement UNSC resolutions in solidarity as it has done thus far, and the other is that the US and North Korea need to build solid mutual confidence each other. In particular, as we are demanding North Korea to give up their nuclear weapons and missiles, if North Korea is not confident that they will be able to gain security guarantees to its regime, it would be difficult to realize North Korea’s CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament). Therefore, confidence building between the US and North Korea is essential.” [3]

The meaning of the phrase used in Foreign Minister Kono’s answer, “implement UNSC resolutions” is used as code for maintaining sanctions as strictly as ever. This can be surmised from Kono’s later remarks at the press conference after the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (US-Japan ‘2+2’) held in Washington DC on April 19, 2019, about one month after Kono had answered at the Foreign Affairs Committee. At the press conference, Foreign Minister Kono stated that, “we need to implement Security Council resolutions until North Korea makes CVID for all the weapons of mass destruction and the missiles of all ranges,” and additionally, Kono explained to the reporters that, “we need to take care of the issue of ship-to-ship transfer, and we need to work with the other partner countries to prevent this ship-to-ship transfer.” [4]

In summary, Foreign Minister Kono answered that both “strict implementation of UNSC resolutions” and “building confidence with DPRK” are necessary to advance the US-DPRK negotiations. Kono was right in pointing out the importance of confidence building.

However, are those two approaches compatible? This very question would provide clues as to how to deepen discussions over Japanese foreign policy on the North Korean issue. Thus far, the Diet hasn’t debated this question.

There are arguments for and against the assertion that UN Security Council’s strong sanctions forced the DPRK to be engaged in dialogues. However, the situation has changed since then. Today, 17 months have passed since the nuclear and missile tests that directly triggered the sanctions were suspended and almost one year has passed since the dialogues started. As described above, the DPRK views the stance of those who continue to reject lifting sanctions as indication of a hostile policy. Under the current circumstances, insisting on “strict implementation of sanctions on the DPRK based on UNSC Resolutions,” for all intents and purposes, sends a message contrary to “building confidence.”

On April 10, carrying a written appeal to Foreign Ministry Kono, the Peace Depot, which   manages the Watch Report project, visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and met Mr. Ishikawa, Deputy Director-General of MOFA’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, the number two figure of the Bureau which oversees issues of the Korean Peninsula. The first item of the written appeal to the Government of Japan was to “stop strengthening and maintaining economic sanctions on the DPRK’s nuclear and missile development, consider the merit of phased lifting of sanctions and appeal internationally the need of the phased lifting.” [5] The Peace Depot has the international society, including the UN Security Council, in its mind, as the intended recipient of the appeal. By pointing out that UNSC resolutions have repeatedly stated that “it (the Security Council) is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance,”[6] as pointed out in Watch Report No.8, the Peace Depot urged the Government of Japan to take actions accordingly. As the contents of Peace Depot’s appeal were contrary to current policy of the Japanese government, no progress was made in the discussions during the meeting. The Peace Depot has intensified lobbying Diet members. (Ichiro YUASA, Hiromichi UMEBYASHI)

[1]　KCNA, April 14, 2019

http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf Search for the article in the page ‘Supreme Leader’s Activities’ from date.

[2]　The article by NEWSIS （Korean）, March 25, 2019

http://www.newsis.com/view/?id=NISX20190325_0000598643

　 Full text of the opening of Choe Son-hui’s remarks is translated into Japanese on Korea News No.766, March 26, 2019, by The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.

[3]　The minutes of House of Representatives the Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 8, 2019 (informal translation by the present authors)

http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/000519820190308002.htm#p_honbun (in Japanese)

[4]　“Remarks With Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono, and Japanese Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya at a Joint Press Availability for the U.S.-Japan 2+2 Ministerial,” U.S. Department of State, April 19, 2019

https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2019/04/291254.htm

[5]　“Denuclearization in Korean Peninsula and the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons : Request for calling for fundamentally reviewing Japanese Nuclear Deterrence Policy (tentative),” Peace Depot, April 10, 2019

http://www.peacedepot.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2eae3bb57f559f16ae6f49dded91385e.pdf (in Japanese)

[6]　For example, OP 28 of UNSC Resolution S/RES/2397(2017)
https://undocs.org/S/RES/2397(2017)

Watch Report No.8

Watch Report No.8      Apr. 1, 2019

§It Is Wrong for the United States to Restore Its Hard Line towards North Korea. The United States Should Shift its Policy to the Easing of Economic Sanctions in a Phased Manner.

Ever since the unsuccessful ending of the second US-DPRK Summit that took place in Hanoi on February 27-28, there are signs that the situation on the Korean Peninsula is getting worse.

US foreign policy is apparently reverting to a hard line stance. At a Special Briefing held at the US Department of State on March 7, a week after the Summit, a senior official of the State Department clearly indicated the US intention not to take a step-by-step approach to denuclearization [1]:

Reporter’s question: …Can you say confidently that all of the different members of President Trump’s advisory team on the negotiations with North Korea were in agreement with the all-or-nothing strategy the President ultimately embraced in Hanoi? And I ask because there’s the appearance that Mr. Bolton may have had the most influence over the President’s decision not to embrace a more step-by-step approach that others on the team had advocated for in the weeks leading up to this summit.

Senior State Department official: …[N]obody in the administration advocates a step-by-step approach. In all cases, the expectation is a complete denuclearization of North Korea as a condition for all the other steps being – all the other steps being taken. It has very much been characteristic of past negotiations to take an incremental approach to this that stretches it out over a long period of time, and quite honestly, has failed on previous occasions to deliver the outcome that both sides at least ostensibly committed to. This would be in the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations as well as in the Six-Party Talks. So we’re trying to do it differently here. The President has made abundantly clear to Chairman Kim that he’s personally invested in taking North Korea in this direction if North Korea gives up all of its weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery…

Thus, the Trump administration unanimously clarified its intention to oppose a step-by-step approach. Moreover, the administration ascribed the failure of past negotiations to the adoption of step-by-step approaches, an assertion that lacks factual grounding. This policy is different from the tone of the speech made at Stanford University by Stephen Biegun, US Special Representative for North Korea, the content of which was introduced in “Watch Report No. 5.”

However, Biegun himself confirmed the above-mentioned senior State Department official’s statement at the 2019 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, which was organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on March 11. The New York Times Pentagon Correspondent, Helene Cooper, who facilitated the dialogue with Biegun at the Conference, compared his own words in his Stanford speech with those of the senior official and asked him, “Which is it?” Biegun replied, “the semantic differences (between the two words) I have to say escape me,” and concluded [2]:

“We are not going to do denuclearization incrementally. The President has been clear on that and that is a position around which the U.S. government has complete unity. …we would be in a position where we would be lifting all the economic pressure that's been imposed upon North Korea for the totality of its weapons of mass destruction programs.”

“…the administration has been clear from the President on down that we will not lift these sanctions until North Korea completes the process of denuclearization.”

According to Biegun’s explanation on that day, the Trump administration’s current foreign policy can be summarized as follows: The US and DPRK made four agreements at the Singapore Summit: (1) establishing new US-DPRK relations; (2) building a lasting and stable peace regime; (3) complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and, (4) commitment to recovering POW/MIA remains. As all four of these are linked with one another, the administration is ready to pursue them in parallel. However, denuclearization is at the foundation of everything. The administration is trying to convince the DPRK that an all-at-once denuclearization can advance the other priorities all at once too. In response to the question, “[I]f the North agreed to more limited sanctions relief in exchange for Yongbyon, would you be receptive?”. Biegun gave no clear answer, but he did not deny the possibility.

On March 30, Reuters published an exclusive story [3] based on a piece of paper they had obtained. According to the article, the paper, which was assumed to have been handed from President Trump to Chairman Kim Jong-Un, included demands from the US on denuclearization - that the DPRK transfer its nuclear weapons and all its fissile material to the United States. Those demands remind one of the so-called Libya model, which John Bolton, U.S. National Security Affairs Advisor to the President, used to advocate. Though such a model is unlikely in this case, still it cannot be denied that the denuclearization scenario that the Trump administration intended to implement immediately may have had this kind of proposal.

At any rate, a “non-step-by-step denuclearization” policy lacks reality and is almost a fantasy. The United States and the DPRK have a long history of mutual distrust that cannot be swept away easily. In this situation, it would be impossible to persuade the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons all at once, for nuclear weapons represent the DPRK’s sole deterrence against the US. With the Trump administration clinging to such a policy, there may be a danger that US-DPRK negotiations will squander the current historic opportunity for peace.

On March 15 in Pyongyang, DPRK Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Son-hui invited and spoke to the resident diplomats and foreign media. The purpose of the meeting was to warn about this danger. Among the foreign media, the Associated Press (AP) and the Russian News Agency TASS were confirmed to have been present. Meanwhile, on March 25, NEWSIS, a South Korean Internet media outlet, obtained and released the full text of Vice Minister Choe’s opening remarks at the meeting. Compared to the AP article [4], the message from the raw, full text published by NEWSIS [5] sounds cooler, giving the impression there is more room for future negotiations.

The most important part in Vice Minister Choe’s opening address is the following passage:

“When we made a practical proposal in the talks (in Hanoi), President Trump adopted the flexible position that an agreement would be possible if a clause was added stating that the sanctions could be re-imposed if North Korea resumed nuclear activities after the sanctions were lifted. However, because of their continuing hostility and mistrust, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and White House National Security Advisor John Bolton created obstacles to the two leaders’ efforts to have constructive negotiations, and ultimately the summit didn’t produce meaningful results.”

According to this passage, while President Trump was flexible about the partial lifting of sanctions against the DPRK, Secretary Pompeo and Special Advisor Bolton were not.

The Watch Report has repeatedly emphasized that “phased sanctions relief” is the key in US-DPRK negotiations. It seems this is becoming a reality. The DPRK has been taking the position that the UN Security Council Resolutions posing sanctions against them are invalid in the first place, and that they do not accept those resolutions. There may well be a diverse range of opinions, both for and against, regarding such DPRK’s position. In the meantime, however, Choe’s remarks stating that, “There is no cause at all to preserve the sanctions in a situation where we have been suspending nuclear tests and ICBM test-launches over the past 15 months. We are sure the UN Security Council can answer this question even more clearly,” should be understandable for most people. While there may be some point in claiming that the imposition of strong sanctions opened the dialogue with the DPRK, what reason can there be for maintaining strong sanctions at this stage when the DPRK has already started the dialogue and is willing to continue it? What is happening now is that sanctions are beginning to disrupt the continuation of dialogue.

Most of the UN Security Council’s sanctions resolutions on DPRK contain the following provision:

“(The UN Security Council) affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance.” (For example, Operative Paragraph 28 of the latest resolution S/RES/2397 (2017) [6] and Operative Paragraph 32 of the preceding resolution S/RES/2395 (2017) [7].)

In other words, the sanctions resolutions of the Security Council are adopted under the premise that the sanctions would be tightened or eased according to the DPRK’s status of compliance with the resolutions. This is why the Security Council kept tightening sanctions, in a phased manner, every time the DPRK conducted nuclear tests or missile launches. By the same token, it is a natural duty of the Security Council to discuss phased sanctions relief in the present situation.

Civil society must raise its voice and urge action, not only by the US, but by their own governments and by the UN Security Council. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI and Kana HIRAI)

[1]　U.S. Department of State, “Senior State Department Official On North Korea,” March 7, 2019  https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2019/03/290084.htm

[2]　“A Conversation with U.S. Special Representative Stephen Biegun,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, March 11, 2019

https://s3.amazonaws.com/ceipfiles/pdf/NPC19-SpecialRepresentativeBiegun.pdf

[3]　“Exclusive: With a piece of paper, Trump called on Kim to hand over nuclear weapons,” Reuters, March 30, 2019

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-document-exclusive/exclusive-with-a-piece-of-paper-trump-called-on-kim-to-hand-over-nuclear-weapons-idUSKCN1RA2NR

[4]　Eric Talmadge, “NKorean official: Kim rethinking US talks, launch moratorium,” AP, March 15, 2019

https://www.apnews.com/5e747986f9204bd88ed0b38ab314c22a

[5]　An article by NEWSIS (in Korean), March 25, 2019

http://www.newsis.com/view/?id=NISX20190325_0000598643

Full text of the Choe Son-hui’s opening remarks is translated into Japanese on Korea News No.766 by The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan. March 26, 2019

[6]　 https://undocs.org/S/RES/2397(2017)

[7]　 https://undocs.org/S/RES/2375(2017)

Watch Report No.7

Watch Report No.7      Mar. 11, 2019

§The Hanoi Summit Can’t Be Regarded as a Failure. The International Community Should Consider the Potential Benefits of Multitrack Diplomacy, Including China and Russia, in the Phased Lifting of Sanctions

The second US-DPRK summit held in Hanoi from February 27 to 28 ended without producing any agreed upon documents. There had seemed to be some change in the US diplomatic stance prior to the Summit and there were expectations that both counties would reach agreement on certain mutually acceptable intermediate measures. Despite such expectations, the second summit ended without any agreed upon documents, and a number of reviews by the media and experts used words such as “breakdown” or “failure” in their headlines to describe the Summit.

But, was it a failure? If we assess what the Hanoi Summit achieved by the extent of the deepening of mutual understanding which serves as a basis for future negotiations, the Hanoi Summit did, in fact, achieve significant results. Considering that the leaders of both countries tend to prefer top^-down decision making, the deepening of mutual understanding would only be possible by holding such a summit. On the other hand, if we assess achievement in Hanoi by how the deepening of the mutual understanding would affect future developments of the situation, the results are difficult to predict. It will take more time for both countries to digest the outcome of the Hanoi Summit. Factors which determine how much time will elapse until a third summit takes place are complicated, and range widely to include issues beyond US-DPRK relations alone.

Given the circumstance described above, this Watch Report will review the minimal recognition given to the significance of the Hanoi Summit as this must be clarified in anticipation of future developments.

(1) Process to implement Singapore agreement is still on track and has not been derailed

Although most articles have not underscored this simple fact, it is important to recognize its significance at the outset. Some suggest that the Singapore Summit agreement is threatened as basis for future negotiations, based on the fact that the Hanoi Summit ended without agreements. The current framework of US-DPRK negotiations is based on the joint statement at the 2018 June 12 Singapore Summit between the US and the DPRK. In fact, in Hanoi, both countries reconfirmed that their ongoing negotiations are based on that very framework.

On the US side, at the press conference right after the summit, US Secretary of State Pompeo stated that, “Chairman Kim reiterated on his trip he is fully prepared to denuclearize,” and that the objective of the talks was “to provide, in return, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and a brighter future for the North Korean people”. [1]

On the DPRK side, on the next day after the summit, KCNA reported the outcomes of the summit with exceptional speed as follows: “The top leaders of the two countries highly appreciated at the one-on-one talks and extended talks that a remarkable progress has been made in the historic course of implementing the Singapore joint statement.” “At the talks they shared the common understanding that the efforts made by the two sides and proactive measures taken by them to defuse tensions and preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula and completely denuclearize it were of great significance in building mutual trust and making a fundamental turn in the decades-long bilateral relations characterized by mistrust and antagonism.”[2] 

In summary, the US and the DPRK reaffirmed not only DPRK’s denuclearization, but also what they committed to in Singapore concerning a bigger framework in which each of them has responsibility. In Hanoi, it was demonstrated that both of them have a good understanding of that larger context. However, it should be also pointed out that US high-ranking officials have not stressed that point enough in their remarks, which is considered to have been largely caused by the media’s unbalanced interest.

(2) Both the US and the DPRK deepened understanding of the bottom line of each other’s demands and the reasons underlying those demands

Both the US and DPRK sides had had number of working-level discussions and, as a result of those discussions, documents to be signed by both leaders were readied prior to the Hanoi Summit. What we may call, “the unrealized Hanoi agreement” existed. At the press conference on February 28, US President Trump stated, “I could’ve signed an agreement today, and then you people would’ve said ‘Oh, what a terrible deal. What a terrible thing he did.’ … I could’ve 100 percent signed something today. We actually had papers ready to be signed, but it just wasn’t appropriate.” [3] In short, Trump’s judgement that he would not be able to win accolades from the US people made Trump press harder demands on the DPRK, which the DPRK could not accept, and as a result, the negotiation ended in a deadlock. [4]

If it was the case, both the US and the DPRK must have had a precious opportunity to deepen understanding of each other’s bottom-line demands and reasons behind those demands, through the top leaders’ direct negotiation.

It is worth remembering that President Trump stated as follows: “I don’t want to talk about increasing sanctions. They’re strong. They have a lot of great people in North Korea that have to live also. And that’s important to me.” “My whole attitude changed a lot because I got to know, as you know, Chairman Kim very well. And they have a point of view also.”

There has been no accurate information regarding what agreement was reached at working-level, that is, the content of “the unrealized Hanoi agreement”. However, the fact that such an agreement on intermediate measures existed has great significance, because the agreement could provide an important basis for future negotiations between both countries.

To counter President Trump’s claims at the press conference, on March 1, the DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho held an early morning press conference and the DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-Hui responded to questions. [5] Then, right after the DPRK press conference, US Secretary of State Pompeo, and subsequently, a senior US State Department official traveling with him, held a press conference in Manila. [6] Consolidating all available information, it can be assumed that the prepared agreement papers on intermediate measures consisted of a complete and verifiable dismantlement of all of the Yongbyon nuclear center (including a uranium enrichment facility, a plutonium production reactor and a plutonium reprocessing facility) and partial lifting of sanctions imposed on the DPRK. Although the DPRK explained they had demanded the relief from the clauses of five UN Security Council sanctions resolutions imposed since 2016 that affect the DPRK civil economy and people’s livelihood, it is unclear if those demands were included in “the unrealized Hanoi agreement” or they were what the DPRK was trying to gain at Hanoi Summit. As Ri Yong-Ho stated, the DPRK side was ready to commit in writing to permanently ending nuclear and ballistic missile tests, and this could have been included in the prepared agreement.

As well, there has been no accurate information regarding what President Trump demanded beyond “the unrealized Hanoi agreement”. President Trump admitted at a press conference that additional US demands included dismantling of the second uranium enrichment plant outside Yongbyon, and at the same time, he also said that “we brought many, many points up.” [7] Furthermore, a senior US State Department official said the US side even sought to “impose a complete freeze on their (DPRK’s) weapons of mass destruction program,” which is not included in the Singapore agreement. [8] It is not surprising that such US demands resulted in a deadlock of negotiations in Hanoi.

(3) Not only seeking agreement on intermediate measures through bilateral negotiations between the US and the DPRK, international discussions regarding legitimacy of the extent of the sanctions at an intermediate phase are also required

Based on the analysis above, one of the most plausible and simple scenarios for future US-DPRK negotiations will be seeking a new point of agreement on intermediate measures based on the Hanoi Summit. This would involve an approach to try to strike balance by making additions to “the unrealized Hanoi agreement.” There can be no new agreement with a lower threshold than “the unrealized Hanoi agreement.” The following items could be added for a new agreement: ① declaration to end the Korean War or a peace declaration, ② establishment of the US liaison office in Pyongyang, both of which were topics reported by the media before the Hanoi Summit, ③ provisional agreement on the scale and nature of future US-ROK joint military exercises, a possible factor for DPRK’s concern, ④ small scale relaxation of the economic sanctions short of lifting of the 5 UNSC sanctions resolutions, as was the DPRK’s demand in Hanoi, ⑤ partial lifting of the sanctions limited to those necessary for inter-Korean economic cooperation, and ⑥ relaxation of restrictions on DPRK space and nuclear development programs, on condition of ensuring peaceful purposes of the programs, and increasing international access to DPRK nuclear and space facilities.

The Hanoi Summit demonstrates that along with those efforts, it has become necessary to examine more fundamental questions regarding relaxation of the economic sanctions. Sanctions on the DPRK based on UN Security Council resolutions should involve not only the US, but also all UN member states. Nonetheless, that has become a core subject in US-DPRK negotiations. In this respect, the international community should, in particular, increase awareness of the roles played by China and Russia, which are permanent members of UN Security Council and have close relations with the DPRK.

Based on the Panmunjom Declaration and the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration between the two Koreas, along with the joint statement at the Singapore Summit between the US and the DPRK, the DPRK has shifted its national policy toward withdrawal from nuclear and missile development programs which caused the imposition of economic sanctions. It is assumed in the joint statement and declarations that the implementation of the DPRK’s policy shift requires both the implementation of security guarantees commitment to the DPRK, which claims persistent threats from the US, and the realization of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The international community understands and accepts such premises contained in the agreements. Therefore, in order to maintain legitimacy of UN Security Council resolutions, a discussion must occur about whether phased implementation of the agreements contained in the documents noted above should be accompanied by phased lifting of sanctions. If China and Russia, in particular, lead and propose such a discussion in the international community, it will greatly contribute to maintaining and strengthening DPRK’s incentive to implement existing joint statements and declarations. Legitimacy of the approach held by some countries that the current magnitude of sanctions on the DPRK -- the strongest sanctions ever -- should be maintained, needs to be objectively reexamined. (Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] “Remarks With Traveling Press,” U.S. Department of States, February 28, 2019

https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2019/02/289785.htm

[2]  “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, President Trump Hold Second-day Talks,” KCNA, March 1, 2019  http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm　 Search for the article from date.

[3]　“Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference | Hanoi, Vietnam,” The White House, February 28, 2019

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference-hanoi-vietnam/

[4]　At almost the same time as the Hanoi Summit, in the US, the congressional testimony of Michael Cohen, the former lawyer to President Trump, was televised nationally. Mr. Cohen testified about Trump’s alleged criminal activities in details and stunned Americans. It cannot be denied that this simultaneous event affected the Hanoi Summit.

[5]　“Full text of a press conference by North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho,” Hangyoreh, March 1, 2019. (in Korean language)

http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/international/international_general/884116.html

[6]　“Senior State Department Official Remarks to Traveling Press,” U.S. Department of States, February 29, 2019

https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2019/02/289798.htm

[7]　See Note [3].

[8]　See Note [6].

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Watch Report No.6

Watch Report No.6      Feb. 25, 2019

§Media Reports Concentrate Too Much on “DPRK’s Denuclearization.” The Focus of Future US-DPRK Negotiations Should Be on the United States’ Attitude towards “Peace Regime Building”

At a time when the second Summit is about to take place between the United States and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Japanese public attention is focused only on the issue of “DPRK’s denuclearization”. However, considering the joint statement issued at last June’s Singapore Summit, together with subsequent developments, the focus, instead, should be on whether U.S. President Donald Trump keeps his commitment to the agreements and accepts negotiations toward “new U.S.-DPRK relations” and “the building of a peace regime” on the Korean Peninsula.

It is no wonder that the DPRK’s denuclearization draws disproportionate attention in Japan. So far, most of the Japanese mass media reports regarding US-DPRK negotiations on peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are based on one-sided views, focusing solely on DPRK denuclearization, and attributing everything, from the collapse of the agreement to hindrance of the negotiations, to North Korea’s attitude. According to those media, previous promises between the US and DPRK for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula were all promises for “the denuclearization of the DPRK”, and the reason past agreements collapsed was because “DPRK did not keep those promises”.

Considering Japanese media coverage during and after the Singapore Summit, the only matter of concern was whether the DPRK would take steps toward denuclearization. Other agreements made at the Summit have been either ignored or reported in a distorted manner. For example, a news report on the upcoming US-DPRK Summit says, ”the points are whether the Summit leads to North Korea’s denuclearization, and how to deal with North Korea’s request to ease economic sanctions in return for it” [1]. Another report says that the stalemate in negotiations after the Singapore Summit stems from the confrontation between “the US demand that the DPRK submit the entire list of its nuclear facilities”, and “the DPRK refusing to proceed with denuclearization without ‘due reward’ such as sanction relief” [2]. Thus, negotiations between the US and DPRK are portrayed as a matter of “North Korea’s denuclearization” and “relief sanctions by the US to be given in return”.

In addition, last July when North Korea repatriated US soldiers’ remains in accordance with the agreement, the media made malicious speculations about North Korea’s motives by commenting, for example that, “this could be part of their tactics to gain rewards like guarantees for the preservation of their regime” [3]. There was also biased media coverage about an intelligence report stating that the North Korean reactor was in operation [4]. In sum, media reports are conveying the impression that North Korea is unwilling to denuclearize. On the other hand, while avoiding criticism of the US undertaking actions contrary to the agreement, they use language like “stepping back” or “returns” and express concern that Trump’s “easy compromise” may stop North Korea’s denuclearization from happening whenever the Trump administration shows any willingness to accept sanction reliefs or to consider a declaration to end the Korean War, [5].

All these remarks made by the Japanese media are based on an incorrect understanding.
Firstly, to elaborate on the agreement made at last year’s US-DPRK Summit, President Donald Trump “committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK”, and Chairman Kim Jong-Un “reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”. In addition, both leaders made the following four commitments [6]:

- “The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity”;

- “The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula”;

- “Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”; and,

- “The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.”

The two governments agreed not only on “denuclearization” but also on “building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula”, and  “denuclearization” is not just about “nuclear weapons in North Korea,” but about those “on the Korean Peninsula” which include those of the USFK. Therefore, it is incorrect to turn the spotlight solely on “the denuclearization of DPRK”. Moreover, it is accurate to say that “new US-DPRK relations” and “building a peace regime” would require elements including a declaration to end the Korean War, and the launch of negotiations on a peace treaty. From the DPRK’s perspective, the DPRK agreed to denuclearize precisely on the grounds that the war would end and the risk of invasion would no longer exist; it would be impossible for them to accept denuclearization if the US were to maintain its intention to invade the DPRK.

It is true that there may be some use of tactics in implementing the agreement. However, if President Trump would agree to make a declaration to end the Korean War or to start negotiations toward the conclusion of a peace treaty, those acts would constitute fulfillment of the agreements. The terms used by the media, such as “stepping back” or “giving rewards” are inappropriate and unhelpful, leading readers to have false perceptions of the situation.

Next, the writer would like to look back at the actions taken by both parties after the US-DPRK Singapore Summit. The DPRK has been steadily implementing the agreement by dismantling some of its missile facilities and repatriating some US soldiers’ remains. As for the Punggye-ri nuclear test site located in north-eastern DPRK, the DPRK had already dismantled it prior to the summit. Further, the DPRK is making concrete proposals about its next possible actions in exchange for corresponding steps on the part of the US. On the other  side, the US suspended the US-ROK joint military exercise, thereby showing efforts toward the establishment of “a new US-DPRK relationship”. However, the US has taken a number of actions that disregard the agreements. Those include: refusing to negotiate a declaration to end the Korean War or a peace treaty, which are both essential to building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula; conducting joint military exercises involving nuclear bombers last July and September with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces on the Sea of Japan (or East Sea) [7]; and reaffirming, in the joint communique of the US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting last October, that the US will continue to offer the ROK its “nuclear umbrella” [8]. The mass media ought to criticize the US for taking actions in disregard of the agreements, not the DPRK which is fulfilling them.

There are reports indicating that the DPRK is operating the nuclear reactor, and in this connection, Stephen Biegun, the US Special Representative for North Korea, complained about the remarks made by the Director of the US Intelligence Community and the way it was covered by the media. The Director suggested that the DPRK had not given up their nuclear program, but Biegun pointed out, “You cannot divorce the intelligence information from policy. The intelligence information is critical as an underpinning for the policy, but the policy is to address the threat”, expressing frustration over the manner how factual information was assessed. He emphasized that the US administration was conducting diplomacy precisely in order to solve the problem [9]. 

Kim Jong-Un says there will no longer be any reason for the DPRK to possess nuclear weapons once the US threat subsides, and expresses his willingness to take a further step toward denuclearization, on the condition that the US takes “corresponding measures” – which means, of course, the implementation of the joint statement. No observer would doubt the fact that, for the DPRK, nuclear weapons are a means to deter attacks from the United States. Kim Jong-Un’s words that there will no longer be any reason for the DPRK to hold nuclear weapons once the threat of the US subsides, should be taken seriously. Besides, if we turn our attention to inter-Korean developments, the DPRK and ROK issued a de facto declaration to end the war at their summit last September. Two parties of the Korean War, the DPRK and ROK, are no longer willing to continue the war. It should be reasonable to assume that the United States’ acceptance of the negotiations to build a peace regime would lead to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Lastly we will briefly look into past agreements regarding peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.  Media-created misconceptions that “the DPRK has been breaking promises” seems to hinder making reasonable judgements as mentioned above.

Whenever the mass media says that North Korea breaks promises, they usually refer to the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK, as well as of the 2005 Joint Statement made at the Six-Party Talks. Although it is generally believed that the DPRK unilaterally violated these two agreements, in reality the DPRK is not the only one to be blamed for their collapse.

The Agreed Framework between the US and DPRK stipulated, among others, the following commitments: (1) the DPRK will freeze and dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, which enabled the DPRK to produce plutonium; (2) the US will provide the DPRK with two light-water reactors (LWRs), with which it is relatively difficult to extract plutonium; (3) the US will deliver the DPRK 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually as an alternative energy source until the construction of the LWRs is completed; (4) the two countries will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations; (5) the US will neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK; and, (6) the DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will observe the safeguards agreement under the Treaty. These commitments led the two governments to issue a joint statement in October 2000 announcing that “neither government would have hostile intent toward the other”. According to Leon V. Sigal, a well-known expert on North Korean issues [10], the DPRK “made no fissile material whatsoever until 2003” under the Agreed Framework [11]. However, the Republican George W. Bush administration which took power in 2001 submitted its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress in December of that year, in which the DPRK is named as one of the targets for nuclear attack, as it is “actively pursuing its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and missile programs.” Furthermore, in his State of the Union Address in January 2002, President Bush called the DPRK, together with Iraq and Iran, “the Axis of Evil”, trampling on the 2000 joint statement that “neither government would have hostile intent toward the other”. Moreover, the Bush administration cut off the delivery of heavy oil to the DPRK and discarded the Agreed Framework unilaterally on grounds of the DPRK’s suspected uranium enrichment program. It is still unclear as to what was the extent of the details that the US had obtained regarding the DPRK’s suspected uranium enrichment program. According to an historical account [12], the US took the words, meaning “let us discuss”, of Kang Sok-ju, DPRK’s then First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and who was in charge of the matter at the time, as a sign of the DPRK admitting to its uranium enrichment program, but the DPRK has never explicitly acknowledged the existence of such a program.

The 2005 Joint Statement was agreed by six states – China, the DPRK, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the US – at the Six Party Talks, a diplomatic forum set up with the goal of a “verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner”. The Statement contained obligations pertaining to all six states, among which are ones relating to the US and DPRK: (1) the DPRK committed to abandoning nuclear weapons and nuclear programs; (2) the United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons; (3) economic cooperation and energy assistance offered to the DPRK by the other five states; and (4) normalizing US-DPRK relationships. However, just about at the same time, the US government imposed economic sanctions on the DPRK over suspicions of counterfeiting US dollar bills and money laundering. In objection to this apparent breach of the agreement, the DPRK restarted its nuclear development program and carried out its first nuclear test the following year in 2006.

Sometime later the Six-Party Talks resumed and agreed in 2007 on measures to implement the 2005 Joint Statement. In accordance with the agreement, the DPRK suspended its nuclear tests and the operation of its nuclear reactor. However, the talks came to a halt over how to verify DPRK’s denuclearization, and the agreements made at the Six-Party Talks virtually broke down.

As seen above, it cannot be said that the DPRK alone repeatedly broke promises. Rather, there is some clear historical evidence to show that it was the US who broke the promises first. What is more important here is that, if both the US and the DPRK had fulfilled their commitments in good faith, there would have been a chance in the past to realize peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Will President Trump keep his commitment and accomplish a great achievement, or will he miss the opportunity to achieve peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, just like his predecessors? This is where we should keep our eyes fixed in the US-DPRK negotiations, including the upcoming Summit.

Fortunately, President Trump seems to have the willingness to end the Korean War. Despite all his problematic policies such as the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the Iranian nuclear deal, or his migrant and refugee policies, he deserves some praise in terms of holding the first-ever face-to-face US-DPRK summit and thus, contributing to the creation of a trend towards denuclearization and eternal peace on the Korean Peninsula.

However, it will not be easy for Trump to fulfill his commitments. There are a number of people who oppose the ending of the Korean War or who are against the conclusion of a peace treaty with the DPRK, including some within the administration and the ruling Republican Party. This is why strong public opinion is needed to make sure Trump keeps his promises. If we truly hope for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula – which is directly linked with peace in the entire East Asian region – we, the residents of the region, should give him a push to abide by his commitments with the DPRK. The mass media must be challenged to make fair and truthful coverage of the issue which would contribute to the shaping of a strong public opinion. And if the media fails to carry out their responsibilities, we the citizens should raise our voices of protest. (Hajime MAEKAWA)

1　“’Rewards’ for denuclearization” (tentative translation), NHK News 7, February 2, 2019 (in Japanese language)
2　“Possibility for Mr. Trump to give way – US-DPRK Summit to be held on 27th-28th in Vietnam” (tentative translation), The Asahi Shimbun, February 7, 2019 (in Japanese language)
3　“Repatriating US soldiers’ remains will not lead directly to North Korea’s denuclearization” (tentative translation), Yomiuri Shimbun, July 29, 2018 (in Japanese language)
4　For example, NHK News 7, February 13, 2019. The intelligence report states, “With the lack of negotiations, it is no wonder the DPRK continued to produce fissile materials, maintained their missile bases and strengthened them at times.” This part was meant to describe the status quo without any implications to doubt the DPRK’s willingness for denuclearization. However, the NHK News 7 TV program reported, “a US expert released a report indicating the possibility that North Korea last year produced fissile material equivalent to 5-7 nuclear weapons.” Although it added that “the report concludes that North Korea’s threat had gone down largely thanks to the easing of tensions after last year’s Singapore Summit,” it was broadcasted with the subtitles that read: “US experts report that the North Korea has produced fissile material equivalent to 5-7 nuclear bombs.“ This must have caused viewers doubts about the DPRK’s willingness for denuclearization. (Tentative translation)
5　For example, NHK News 7, February 2, 2019. After reporting on Stephen Biegun’s “intention to hold talks with North Korea over issues relating to the benefits they are seeking,” News 7 broadcasted the views of Evans J. R. Revere, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, pointing out the possibility that “President Trump may compromise by giving the DPRK benefits such as easing economic sanctions, not in exchange of denuclearization but merely in exchange of dismantling ICBMs, which is the direct threat for the US,” and warning that “consequently North Korea will be keeping both IRBMs and nuclear weapons”. (Tentative translation)
6　https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/
7　Japan Air Self-Defense Force Press release（July 28, 2018, and September 28, 2018
http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/news/houdou/H30/300728.pdf (in Japanese)
http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/news/houdou/H30/300928.pdf (in Japanese)
8　"Joint Communiqué of the 50th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting," U.S. Department of Defense, October 31, 2018.
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/31/2002057967/-1/-1/1/50TH-SCM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE.PDF
9　U.S. Department of State, "Remarks on DPRK at Stanford University," January 31, 2019.
https://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2019/01/288702.htm
10　Mr. Sigal is Director of a Northeast Asia security project at the Social Science Research Council in New York.
11　Tim Shorrock, “Diplomacy With North Korea Has Worked Before, and Can Work Again,” The Nation, September 5, 2017.
https://www.thenation.com/article/diplomacy-with-north-korea-has-worked-before-and-can-work-again/
12　Hiromichi Umebayashi, “Embody the UN Charter on the Korean Peninsula”(tentative translation), Sekai, April 2018 (in Japanese language)