Watch Report No.22

Watch Report No.22   April 24, 2020

§Self-sustaining Development of National Industries is what “The Offensive for Making a Breakthrough Head-on” Means; however, the Situation in which Denuclearization Hinges on US Withdrawal of Its Hostile Policy Remains Unchanged.

At the 5th Plenary Meeting of the7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea of last year, Chairman Kim Jong Un declared, “the offensive for making a breakthrough head-on”[1]. Subsequently, attention has been paid to the actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Although, since last month, the DPRK has repeatedly conducted missile drills and test-fires, the situation remains unchanged as to whether denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula can be realized peacefully or not and is dependent on US actions.

Regarding the 5th Plenary Meeting of the7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, in Japan, Kim Jong Un’s statement that, “the world will witness a new strategic weapon to be possessed by the DPRK in the near future” [2] drew attention [3]. However, the main points of Kim Jong Un’s speech are based on the assumption that the US will not roll back its hostile policy towards the DPRK. And thus, Kim proposes that the DPRK must “break through head-on” the tough sanctions imposed by the international community and develop socialism through “self-reliance” and “self-sufficiency.” As well, his speech emphasizes problems to be tackled by each front to realize that goal.

Specifically, Kim Jong Un said that, “if there were not the nuclear issue, the US would find fault with us under other issue, and the US military and political threats would not end.” He said, “We should launch an offensive for making a breakthrough head-on aimed at neutralizing the sanctions and pressure by the hostile forces and opening a new avenue for social construction,” and he clearly stated that, “the key front in the offensive for frontal breakthrough today is economic front,” and especially, “the agricultural front is the major thrust area in the offensive for making a breakthrough head-on” [4]. Kim Jong Un’s following statement at the end of the Plenary Meeting reveals most clearly the meaning of “the offensive for making a breakthrough on-head.”

“The basic idea, the basic spirit of the 5th Plenary Meeting of the7th Central Committee of the WPK is to conduct the offensive for frontal breakthrough, not to wait for the situation to turn better. In other words, we should never dream that the US and the hostile forces would leave us alone to live in peace, but we should make frontal breakthrough with the might of self-reliance to tide over the difficulties lying in the way of advancing the socialist construction” [5].

In fact, by reading the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the DPRK state-run news agency, we can learn that Kim Jae Ryong, Premier of the Cabinet, which is positioned as headquarters of the economy, has frequently visited some industrial facilities [6], and “responding to the declaration of “the offensive for making a breakthrough on-head,” the workers of the DPRK have “strived” and “made innovation in production.”

For instance, “In hearty response to the important tasks set forth at the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea, officials and workers of the Sangwon Cement Complex strive to boost the production,” [7] and “Workers of the Pyongyang Kim Jung Suk Textile Mill make innovation in production.” [8]

The KCNA also reported that on the agricultural front, the major thrust area in the offensive for making a breakthrough on-head, “the tasks and ways for attaining the new goal of grain productions set by the Workers’ Party of Korea this year, the first year of the offensive for making a breakthrough on-head,” was discussed in “the conference for reviewing the work in the field,” [9] and construction of a new phosphatic fertilizer factory and tideland reclamation have been vigorously conducted [10]. The phosphatic fertilizer factory seems to be intensely focused upon as not only Kim Jae Ryong, but also several senior officials of the DPRK government have visited there [11].

Military aspects mentioned by Kim Jong Un in his speech were only intended to identify the need to provide a guarantee that promotion of those industries will not be hampered by foreign aggression. The KCNA [12] reported that Kim Jong Un said in his speech that, “There have to be powerful political, diplomatic and military guarantee in order to ensure victory in the offensive for frontal breakthrough to brave unprecedented harsh challenge and difficulties.”

Regarding repeated missile drills and test-launches by the DPRK, the DPRK government refuted the criticism of five European nations which expressed “grave concern” about the actions of the DPRK after the UN Security Council meeting. The stance of the DPRK government is that those actions are conducted for self-defense purposes against US and South Korean forces aimed at the DPRK ever since the beginning of the Korean War. In response to the statement of the five European nations, the spokesperson of the DPRK Foreign Ministry released the following statement.

“If even a routine drill of multiple launch rocket system by artillerymen should be a target of condemnation and alleged as ‘violation of resolutions,’ then with what do we hold in check the military forces of the US and south Korea in front of us and how do we defend our state…if they blindly call our self-defense acts into question as now, it is, in the long run, tantamount to asking us to abandon the defense of our own state” [13].

The military policy of the DPRK, which has been modernizing the Korean People’s Army (KPA) based on “the Juche idea” proclaiming independence, self-sustenance and self-defense, is restrained in its scale and intention as compared not only to the policy of the US, a state of hegemonism, but also to the policy of Japan, which has strengthened its capabilities to attack enemy territory unconstitutionally while deepening cooperation with the US forces under the “US nuclear umbrella”. However, as long as a state of war with the US continues, the DPRK will have no other choice but to maintain responsive military measures which can deal with that situation.

Just because the DPRK has shown no interest in negotiations with the US and has made it clear that it will advance on the course of “self-reliance” and “self-sufficiency” and has started to put those practices into action, it should not be concluded that the way for the realization of 2018 Singapore agreement, in which both US and DPRK governments committed to peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, has been completely closed off.

Kim Jong Un also stated in his speech at the end-of-last year:

“If the US persists in its hostile policy towards the DPRK, there will be never be the denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and the DPRK will steadily develop necessary and prerequisite strategic weapons for the security of the state until the US rolls back its hostile policy towards the DPRK and lasting and durable peace-making mechanism is built.” And further, “The scope and depth of bolstering our deterrent will be properly coordinated depending on the US future attitude to the DPRK.” [14]

If the US ceases its hostile policy towards the DPRK and shows its willingness to rebuild a relationship of trust with the DPRK as evidenced by its actions, the way for peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through negotiations would be opened again. (Hajime MAEKAWA)

[1] “Fifth Plenary Meeting of Seventh Central Committee of Workers' Party of Korea Held,” KCNA, January 1, 2020

http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf

[2] See, note [1].

[3] See, for example, “’The world will witness a new strategic weapon," North Korea's 4-day long Plenary Meeting ends,” Asahi Shimbun, January 3, 2020 (Japanese article); “Kim Jong Un says ‘the world will witness a new weapon,’  ‘in the near future,’ threatening US: Central Committee of WPK,” Mainichi Shimbun, June 3, 2020 (Japanese article).

[4] See, note [1].

[5] See, note [1].

[6] See, for example, “Kim Jae Ryong Inspects Various Fields of National Economy,” KCNA, January 21, 2020, “Kim Jae Ryong Inspects Various Fields of National Economy,” KCNA, February 16, 2020.

http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf

[7] “Sangwon Cement Complex,” KCNA, January 9, 2020

http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf

[8] ”Kim Jong Suk Textile Mill,” KCNA, February 20, 2020

http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf

[9] “Conference for Reviewing Work in Agricultural Field in 2019 Opens,” KCNA, January 18, 2020

http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf

[10] Regarding Phosphatic Fertilizer Factory: “Construction of Phosphatic Fertilizer Factory Progresses Apace in DPRK,” KCNA, February 22, 2020. Regarding Tideland Reclamation: “Tideland Reclamation in Full Swing,” KCNA, April 6, 2020

http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf

[11] For example, “Kim Jae Ryong Inspects Various Fields of National Economy,” KCNA, January 21, 2020; “Pak Pong Ju Inspects Various Units,” KCNA, February 3, 2020; “Choe Ryong Hae Inspects Sunchon Phosphatic Fertilizer Factory under Construction,” KCNA, February 5, 2020.

http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf

[12] See, note [1].

[13] “Spokesperson for DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Statement,” KCNA, March 7, 2020

http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf

[14] See, note [1].

Watch Report No.21

Watch Report No.21   Feb. 17, 2020

§We Support the January 7^th Statement by Korean Civil Society Groups, and Call on Japanese Civil Society to Take Action

North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un’s deadline for the US government’s decision regarding denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has passed as of the end of 2019. During the General Assembly of the Korean Labor Party Central Committee at the end of last year, Chairman Kim stated that, “there will never be denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula if the US continues to persist in its hostile policy towards the DPRK” [1]. However, the US shows no sign of retracting its hostile policy, causing concern over the bilateral negotiations for peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

We cannot give up on peace and denuclearization promised by US and Korean leaders at the Singapore Summit in June 1918. We, as citizens, need to act if we want to achieve peace, regional stability, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We cannot let US-Korean negotiations continue to degrade, relying solely on the personal relationship between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un. It is up to civil society organizations and individuals in the countries involved to demand that their governments take the necessary actions for peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The following is a joint declaration made by several South Korean civil society organizations that was sent out to the governments of South Korea, North Korea, and the United States, as well as the rest of the international community [2]. The statement calls for a resumption of the US-North Korea dialogue and the relaxation of sanctions on North Korea in order to achieve the Singapore Summit Agreement.

＊＊＊＊

We cannot possibly go back to times of competition and hostility.

　

At the beginning of 2020, the 70th new year since the outbreak of the Korean War, the situation of the Korean peninsula stays gloomy. The DPRK-U.S negotiations have been stuck at a deadlock for the past year without a seemingly possible breakthrough. In the meanwhile, DPRK that has recently announced “a new path” have resolved a “frontal breakthrough” in the latest Workers’ Party Central Committee plenum and emphasized economic self-help strategies and development of new strategic weapons. 

Two years have barely passed since 2018, when hope that this age of hostility and contention would end, was plated. As we all know, the road to peace establishment in the Korean peninsula should be a trust-building process through perpetual conversations and patience. We are now facing the uneasy obstacles along the road, but we cannot possibly abandon patience for a return for antagonism. Today, the civil society organizations have gathered here in a united wish to never go back to the time before the Panmunjom Inter-Korean Summit in any circumstances, when dangers of war were imminent. We assert that conversations between DPRK-U.S. and South-North should reconvene as soon as possible, and difficultly reached agreements between them should be fulfilled, and we hereby suggest to governments of ROK, DPRK, and the U.S.

DPRK and the U.S. should both work to form adequate preconditions to resume dialogue.

DPRK and the U.S. have not been able to progress meaningful discussions, neither after last year’s Hanoi Summit nor after the meeting at Panmunjom in June 2019. During Singapore, the two parties have declared that a mutual trust-building will expedite denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, but such resolutions have not been abided by. Above all, we pinpoint the fact that the U.S. has not taken any measures to show their trust compared to DPRK’s set of actions including a freeze of nuclear and missile experiment conducts. This is also a reason why there have been no points of contact – none among packaged, phased, or concurrent settlements – between the two. We are strongly against a practical muddling-through of the U.S. by insisting “denuclearization first”, and North’s missile tests conduct that creates militaristic tensions. Both the U.S. and DPRK should do their best to establish conditions that will continue the dialogue, and clarify the principles of denuclearization and peace regime establishment. We ask for the U.S.’s political, militaristic, economic trust-building mechanisms that will allow for greater agreements, and also for DPRK to halt from taking further militaristic actions.

The UN and the U.S. should lift the sanctions against the DPRK that are related to humanitarian aid at least

The United Nations and the U.S. have constantly maintained or built up the levels of economic sanctions against DPRK since it was first enacted. The U.S. is standing firm on the position that without prior denuclearization of DPRK, Washington cannot lift the sanctions. It has been testified that the economic sanctions have been aggravating the situation for especially the underprivileged. Now that the sanctions are outpacing their original purpose to act as a medium of problem-solving, the trust-building process between DPRK and the U.S. is even more injured. Moreover, these sanctions are keeping inter-peninsula cooperation. We hope that the unsuccessful history of insisting ‘denuclearization first, sanction alleviation next’ kind of solution without any fruit will not repeat itself. At the minimum, the sanctions that accelerate the humanitarian crisis should be lifted. We’d like to appeal to the UN Security Council for proactive discussions about the resolution of China and Russia partially lifting economic sanctions, which could lead to the negotiation table.

Communication and militaristic actions cannot coexist.

We remember the fact that the postponement of ROK-U.S. joint military exercise worked as a driving force for the peace process on the Korean peninsula. Raising militaristic threats and confrontations are no good for the negotiation. We hereby urge Seoul and Washington to pause another joint exercise planned in March. This decision will ignite the dying ember of negotiation between the DPRK and the U.S.

We urge for a resolute action for the ROK government to carry out the agreements.

When DPRK-U.S. negotiations have been stopped, South-North relations also chilled down. Including the exchanges and cooperation projects, the parts the two sides have agreed on has not been able to take a single step due to maintained economic sanctions of the UN and the U.S. This is a very lamentable situation. Operation of Gaeseong Industrial Complex, Mount Geumgang tours, humanitarian cooperation for solving separated families’ problems, road and railway connection projects should not be postponed any longer. This includes the formation of the Joint South-North Military Committee and other parts of the agreements that pertain to military issues. The ROK government should proactively ask for broad sanctions lift and exercise some autonomy in solving the problem. Though it will not be easy, the government should lead to provide room for problem solving and engine to change the current situation. 

We will take up the civic society’s responsibility to cease the war and to make peace.

This is the 70th year since the Korean War. It is time to put an end to contentions and hatred as results of the divide and cease-fire that have been regenerating itself. The Korean civil society is the agent directly involved that will form the peace on this peninsula. We hold the responsibility to stimulate dialogue for permanent peace regime and denuclearization to continue. We will gather desperate voices for peace and deliver them not only to the DPRK and the U.S. but to the whole international community. We will ask the international community to be with us on our peace-forwarding actions. We will strive to mark 2020 a year to be one that will halt the war and open the way to a new age of peace.

7 January 2020

Civil Society Organization Network in Korea - Civil Peace Forum

Korean Conference of Religions for Peace

Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation

Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea

The Southern Committee on June 15 Joint Declaration

＊＊＊＊

We, as Japanese, agree with this statement. At the same time, we believe Japanese Civil Society needs to acknowledge that this is the time for action.

The current situation on the Korean Peninsula presents a problem not just to its neighbors, but to Japanese society as well. Japan, which colonized the Korean peninsula during the era of Imperial Japan, holds historical responsibility for the division and later hostilities of North and South Korea. Even now, Japan still bears some responsibility for the continued war regime in Korea, as the US military forces maintain their war readiness by means of military bases located in Japan. If we wish for peace and stability in our region, we ourselves must take action.

We believe that in our current situation, it would be effective for Japanese civil society to take the following actions: 

•  
• We ask that civil organizations and NGOs in Japan, Korea, and the US collaborate to request the UN Security Council to review its sanction resolutions against DPRK in order to advance US-DPRK negotiations, by utilizing the “continuous review” provisions included in the resolutions (e.g. Section 28 of Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017). Additionally, we request that the Security Council work to adopt a draft resolution calling for partial easing of sanctions, which was proposed by Russia and China at the end of last year.
• We must reach out to the various sectors which make up Japanese civil society, including: municipalities, religious groups, lawyers, physicians and medical scientists, journalists and writers, and others, in order to emphasize the historic importance of this issue for Japan and to encourage all to take action.

(Hajime MAEKAWA)

[1] “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK,” KCNA, January 1, 2020

http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

[2]

Watch Report No.20

Watch Report No.20   Feb. 5, 2020

§As the Prolonged Process of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Has Entered a New Phase, Now is a Good Time to Review the Events of 2018 and 2019.

From December 28, 2019 to December 31, 2019 — four days, which is longer than usual — the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea was held. According to the KCNA [1], DPRK leader Kim Jong-un stressed the phrase ‘break through head-on’ at the meeting. Anticipating that international economic sanctions against the DPRK would continue, Kim called on citizens and Workers’ Party leaders to overcome (‘breakthrough head-on’) the challenge with self-sufficiency and self-reliance. At the same time, Kim said that national security will require the advancement of strategic weapon development until such time as the United States reverses its hostile policy toward the DPRK and a ‘durable peace mechanism’ is restored on the Korean Peninsula. And, he suggested that the DPRK would possess new strategic weapons. He also added that the prospect of further weapon development might change depending on the US approach towards the DPRK, implying that there was still room for diplomatic negotiations with the US.

In November 2020, the US presidential election will take place. It is unlikely that the US will initiate an approach capable of breaking new ground with the DPRK this year. Taking this into account, along with the DPRK’s ‘break through head-on’ remarks, it is unlikely that there will be rapid development regarding Korean Peninsula denuclearization talks. This is a good time for civil society to plan and effectuate a positive change in the status of the Korean Peninsula denuclearization and peace process.

As a resource for planning, a chronology of major events since 2018, pertinent to Korean Peninsula denuclearization, is provided below.

2018
January 1	In his New Year’s speech, Kim Jong-un declares that the DPRK has accomplished nuclear deterrence; directs mass production of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles and their deployment; discusses the parallel development of nuclear weapons and the economy and calls on citizens to contribute to his 5-year-strategy for economic development; stresses that North-South tensions must be diffused and that inter-Korean relations must be improved; announces that DPRK delegates may be sent to the Pyeongchang Olympics and inter-Korean diplomatic meetings may be held.
January 9	A ministerial-level meeting between North and South is held for the first time in about two years. The ministers agree that the DPRK will participate in the Pyeongchang Olympics.
February 9-25	Pyeongchang Olympics. Inter-Korean friendship is highlighted with North Korean and South Korean athletes marching together and a joint North-South women’s ice hockey team.
February 10	ROK President Moon Jae-in meets with the DPRK delegation headed by Kim Yo-jong (First Vice Chair of the Central Committee) and Kim Yong-nam (President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly). Kim Yo-jong delivers Kim Jong-un’s letter to Moon and officially invites Moon to the DPRK.
March 5	The ROK delegation headed by Chung Eui-yong (Director of the National Security Office) and Suh Hoon (Director of the National Intelligence Service) visits Pyongyang, meets with Kim Jong-un. Kim expresses his intention to hold a North-Korea summit and denuclearize the DPRK.
March 6	Chung Eui-yong announces an inter-Korean summit that will be held in Panmunjom late April. The ROK government releases a statement which says that the DPRK does not think that there is a reason for keeping nuclear weapons if military threats against the DPRK are eliminated and security assurances are provided. This constitutes the first official announcement of the DPRK’s intention to denuclearize.
March 8	Chun Eui-yong and others visit Washington DC. US President Donald Trump accepts Kim Jong-un’s request for a US-DPRK summit.
March 25	Kim Jong-un makes a surprise visit to Beijing, his first foreign visit as DPRK leader, and meets with President Xi Jingping. This was his first diplomatic summit outside the DPRK.
March 30(?)	US CIA Director Mike Pompeo visits Pyongyang and holds a secret meeting with Kim Jong-un. He is reportedly in Pyongyang for three days and two nights.
April 20	The 3rd plenum of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea is held. Kim Jong-un: touts the success of the parallel development of the economy and nuclear weapons; emphasizes efforts for economic advancement; announces his decision to suspend nuclear and ICBM launch tests and dismantle a nuclear test site.
April 27	An inter-Korean summit is held at the Peace House in the ROK side of Panmunjom. Kim Jong-un and Moon Jea-in sign the Panmunjom Declaration, agreeing to: improve Inter-Korean relations and ease tensions between North and South; declare the end of the Korean War before the end of the year; and establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula through efforts including denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
May 7	The second China-DPRK summit is held in Dalian, China.
May 9	US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visits Pyongyang, secures the release of the three US citizens detained there, and flies them to the Yokota base.
May 10	Donald Trump tweets that a US-DPRK summit is to be held in Singapore on June 12.
May 11	US-ROK joint military exercise Max Thunder begins. (This ends on May 25).   B-52s are part of the exercise.
May 16	Kim Kye-gwan, First Vice Minister of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, releases a statement indicating that the US-DPRK summit scheduled to take place in Singapore may be cancelled, attacking both the US National Security Advisor John Bolton’s remarks about the ‘Libya model’ of denuclearization and the US-ROK joint military drills.
May 24	The DPRK invites reporters to witness the dismantling of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. Choe Song-hui, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, calls US Vice President Mike Pence “dummy” and indicates a possible postponement of the US-DPRK summit. Trump cancels the June 12 summit meeting with Kim Jong-un.
May 25	Kim Kye-gwan issues a statement urging Trump to reconsider the cancellation of the summit.
May 26	The second inter-Korean summit is held, as per Kim Jong-un’s request, at the Unification Pavilion in the DPRK side of Panmunjom.
Jun 1	Trump announces that the US-DPRK summit is back on, to be held on June 12 as originally scheduled.
June 12	The US-DPRK summit is held in Singapore, and a joint declaration is issued. The preamble states that Trump has ‘committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK,’ and that Kim has reaffirmed his ‘commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.’ The two leaders agree to: establish ‘new US-DPRK relations’; build ‘a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula’; reaffirm the ‘April 27 Panmunjom Declaration’ including commitment to the ‘complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’; and work towards recovering US POW remains. Trump tells reporters that the US will suspend its joint military exercise with the ROK, and that Kim Jong-un intends to dismantle a missile engine test facility at Tongchang-ri (often referred to as the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground).
June 18	The US Department of Defense and the ROK Ministry of National Defense announce the suspension of joint exercise Freedom Guardian, which was scheduled to take place in August. (The ROK’s announcement is dated June 19).  Afterwards, a series of large-scale joint military exercises is suspended.
June 19	Kim Jong-un visits China for the third China-DPRK summit.
July 6	Pompeo visits the DPRK, delivers a letter from Trump, and holds talks with DPRK officials. Kim Jong-un hands Pompeo his letter to Trump.
July 7	The DPRK’s foreign ministry spokesperson criticizes ‘gangster-like’ US demands.
July 27	The 65th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice. 55 US soldiers’ remains are returned from the DPRK to the US.
August 23	Stephen Biegun is appointed as US Special Representative for North Korea.
September 14	The first permanent inter-Korean liaison office is established in Kaesong, DPRK, staffed with representatives from both the DPRK and the ROK.
September 19	The third inter-Korean summit is held, and the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration is signed. Defense ministers of both sides sign the ‘Agreement in the Military Domain.’ The DPRK agrees to permanently dismantle its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon if the US takes matching action.
September 29	At a rally in Wheeling, West Virginia, Trump says he and Kim Jong-un ‘fell in love’.
November 30	An inter-Korean railway connection survey begins. (This ends on December 17, 2018).
December 26	The DPRK and the ROK hold a groundbreaking ceremony for the inter-Korean railway connection project at the Panmun Station in Kaesong. However, actual construction work is blocked due to international sanctions.
2019
January 7	Kim Jong-un visits China for the fourth China-DPRK summit.
January 18	Kim Yong-chol, Vice Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, meets with Pompeo and then with Trump. Immediately afterwards, Trump announces that the second US-DPRK summit is to be held at the end of February 2019.
January 19-21	Biegun and Choe Song-hui hold the first working-level meeting in Stockholm.
January 31	In his speech at Stanford University, Biegun suggests negotiations with the DPRK could be undertaken with ‘simultaneous and parallel’ progress. This is generally understood to refer to step-by-step negotiations.
February 27-28	The second US-DPRK summit is held in Hanoi. No joint declaration is issued.
March 15	At the press conference in Pyongyang, Choe Song-hui accuses Pompeo and Bolton of ‘creating an atmosphere of hostility and mistrust’ and hardening Trump’s flexible approach.
April 12	In his speech to the First Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, Kim Jong-un, anticipating that the sanctions will continue, emphasizes the development of a self-supporting economy. He states the DPRK will wait until the end of the year to see whether the US makes a courageous decision or not.
May 4	The DPRK test-launches a short-range ballistic missile for the first time in 18 months. Thereafter, it continues with on and off  short-range missile tests.
May 6	Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe tells reporters that he wants to hold an Japan-DPRK summit without pre-conditions.
May 9	The US Department of Justice directed the seizure of a North Korean cargo ship, Wise Honest, and transports it to American Samoa.
May 14	The DPRK’s foreign ministry condemns the ship seizure by the US, stating that it violates the spirit of the June 12 Singapore Joint Declaration).
May 27-30	The ROK undertakes Ulchi Taegeuk, a large-scale military exercise.
June 4	Prior to the one-year anniversary of the Singapore Declaration, the DPRK foreign ministry spokesperson issues a statement to highly regard the declaration and, at the same time, to criticize the US for failing to fulfil its obligations while making unilateral demands. He calls on the US to make a proposal based on ‘a new way of calculation.’
June 20-21	Xi Jingping visits Pyongyang for the first time to hold the fifth China-DPRK summit.
June 30	The third US-DPRK summit is unexpectedly held in Panmunjom. The meeting lasts for about an hour and Trump steps over the border into North Korea. A working-level team is created, which holds a meeting in a few weeks.
July 11	The policy study director at the DPRK foreign ministry’s Institute for American Studies releases a statement condemning the ROK’s purchase of F-35As, which are scheduled to arrive from the US in mid-July.
August 1	The UN Security Council meets behind closed doors per requests from the UK, Germany, and France in response to the DPRK’s July 31 missile launch.
August 29	The Second Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) approves a change to the constitution, in which the chairman of the State Affairs Commission is elected at the SPA and will be the supreme representative of all Korean people and the head of the state.
September 10	Trump tweets he has asked John Bolton to resign from his national security advisor position, which Bolton does.
October 2	The DPRK test fires a new type of SLBM Pukguksong 3 in vertical mode from the submerged waters off Wonsan Bay.
October 5	Biegun and Kim Myong-gil, the DPRK chief negotiator with the US, hold working-level talks in Stockholm. After the talks, Kim Myong-gil comments that negotiations have fallen apart. US Department of State spokesperson Morgan Ortagus refutes the characterization, stating that the US has had good 8.5-hour discussions with the DPRK.
October 6	The DPRK foreign ministry spokesperson states that there will not be another US-DPRK summit unless the US presents new proposals. He reiterates that the US has until the end of the year to do so.
October 21	During a cabinet meeting, Trump states that he and Kim Jong-un get along well with each other and respect each other.
October 24	Kim Jong-un proposes the demolition of the South Korean facilities at Mount Kumgang. He criticizes his ‘predecessors’ failed policy’ to depend on foreign countries.
November 14	Kim Myong-gil blames the US for not being ready to make proposals that bring the DPRK to negotiations. He states that the war-end declaration or the establishment of a liaison office are not grounds for negotiations; he further states that new solutions to stop hostile policies against the DPRK are required.
November 17	US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announces in Bangkok that a US-ROK joint air exercise is postponed.
December 2	Ri Thae-song, the DPRK’s Vice Foreign Minister, warns the US of the end-of-year deadline and states that it is up to the US what Christmas gift it will receive.
December 16	At the UN Security Council, China and Russia circulate a draft resolution to ease sanctions on the DPRK. The US rejects it, arguing that easing sanctions on the DPRK would be premature.
December 28-31	The 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea is held, for an unusually long four days. Kim Jong-un stresses the need for overcoming (‘breaking through head-on’) sanctions with self-reliance, and announces the continuing development of strategic weapons.

 (Takuya MORIYAMA & Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK,” KCNA, January 1, 2020 http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm   Search for the article by date.