Watch Report No.37

   Watch Report No.37   　July 19, 2024

The NPT and the DPRK: The Governments of Japan and the ROK Should Use the Treaty Conference as a Forum for Resolving Issues, not Condemnation

From July to August 2024, the 2nd Preparatory Committee for the 11th (2026) Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held in Geneva. Almost a year ago, the first session of the Preparatory Committee was held in Vienna. These regularly scheduled NPT-related conferences, if properly utilized, provide a valuable forum for discussing regional nuclear weapon issues with a broad range of participating states.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has declared that it has withdrawn from the NPT and hasn’t attended these conferences of the States Parties. (Hereafter, the review conference and its preparatory committee are collectively referred to as the Treaty Conference). Therefore, it is often thought that Treaty Conferences have distanced themselves from North Korean issues, but in fact this is not the case. Treaty Conferences still devote time to discussing the North Korean nuclear issue. The North Korean issue has been the subject of discussions, first, as an issue related with States Parties’ withdrawal stipulated in Article X of the NPT, and second, as one of the major regional non-proliferation issues.

This report discusses how North Korean issues have been dealt with at recent Treaty Conferences and identifies its challenges. It then considers constructive roles that Japan and South Korea, two neighboring non-nuclear-weapon states, could play.

 

The Status of the DPRK under the NPT

As is well known, the DPRK has twice announced its withdrawal from the NPT.

The DPRK acceded to the NPT on December 12, 1985, and the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA stipulated in the treaty entered into force on April 10, 1992, much later than stipulated [1]. On May 4 of the same year, the DPRK submitted its initial declarations to the IAEA based on the Agreement, however the IAEA and the DPRK became in conflict with each other over inspections to verify the initial declarations. The DPRK considered that the IAEA’s decisions were strongly influenced by information provided by the US. Also, the Team Spirit US-Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) joint military exercise, which had been suspended under eased tensions after the Cold War, was resumed in 1993. Against this background, on March 12, 1993, the DPRK declared its withdrawal from the NPT on grounds of “extraordinary events” and “supreme interests of the country being jeopardized,” the terms by which a state may withdraw from the treaty under Article X. At that time, the DPRK notified the United Nations Security Council of its withdrawal, but did not notify all States Parties to the treaty, and thus didn’t fully follow the procedures as required in Article X.

The withdrawal is to take effect three months after notification, and urgent US-DPRK talks were held repeatedly to dissuade the DPRK from withdrawing. On June 11, 1993, just before the deadline, the two sides agreed on three principles, including US “assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons.” With that, the DPRK “decided unilaterally to suspend the effectuation of the withdrawal,” and withdrawal was avoided for the time being [2].

However, due to the US’s intentional abandonment of implementation of the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) process, based on the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, on January 10, 2003, the DPRK declared its withdrawal from the NPT for the second time, claiming that it would “immediately put into effect the withdrawal from the NPT that was temporarily suspended in 1993.”

How did States Parties to the NPT react to the DPRK’s move?

A few months after the second declaration, the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference was held on April 28, 2003. At the beginning of the session, the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Molnar (Hungary), made the following remarks regarding the treatment of the DPRK at the Committee: “… I carried out these consultations, which revealed diverging views on the status of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the NPT. It is my conviction that a debate on this issue would only serve to the detriment of the purpose of the Preparatory Committee. ... In the light of the above, the Chair has the intention, under his own responsibility, not to open a debate on this issue and to retain the nameplate of the said country [author’s note: referring to the DPRK] temporarily, in his custody. The Chair has therefore asked the secretariat to hold the nameplate in the conference room for the duration of the second session of the Preparatory Committee…” [3].

The Preparatory Committee agreed with the Chair’s remarks. The Chair’s factual summary attached to the Final Report of the session describes the committee’s acceptance of Chair’s opening remarks mentioned above regarding the treatment of the DPRK in the NPT as follows: “The Preparatory Committee took note of a statement by the Chair at the first meeting of the session related to the views of States parties on the DPRK’s status in the Treaty” [4].

In short, States Parties decided to put the issue of the status of the DPRK in the NPT on hold, seeing the debates on the issue would go nowhere.

The following year (2004), at the third session of the Preparatory Committee, the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia) decided not to discuss the DPRK’s status in the NPT, giving the same explanation as the previous year, which was reported to the 2005 NPT Review Conference [5].

At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the discussions at the Preparatory Committee were placed on the record, and President Duarte (Brazil) reaffirmed the shelving of the issue of the DPRK’s status under the NPT by Presidential decision [6]. At this time, it was simultaneously agreed to put the issue of withdrawal on the agenda of the Review Conference as a general discussion on Article X of the NPT which lays out the withdrawal issue, separately from the DPRK’s status issue.

Subsequent Treaty Conferences no longer discussed the DPRK’s status under the NPT. The next Treaty Conference after the 2005 Review Conference was the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference held from April to May 2007. By the time of the first session, the DPRK’s nuclear issue had become an important issue handled by the UN Security Council beyond the NPT Conferences, because the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test (October 9, 2006) and the UN Security Council imposed its first sanctions against the DPRK (October 14, 2006).

This said, the issue of the DPRK’s status in the NPT has never been resolved. Although more than 20 years have passed since the second declaration of withdrawal, at the present time, the DPRK’s name continues to appear as a States Party on the Treaty Conference financial table which provides information on the amounts owed by States Parties, with a note in the margin that states, “The status of the membership of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is uncertain” [7].

Additionally, the website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, which serves as the secretariat of the NPT, states as follows: “On 10 January 2003, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced its withdrawal from the Treaty in a public statement. States parties to the Treaty continue to express divergent views regarding the status of the DPRK under the NPT” [8]. In summary, even today, the status of the DPRK under the NPT remains unsettled.

In contrast, the DPRK itself recognizes that it withdrew from the NPT with the withdrawal notification on January 10, 2003.

In a statement refuting what a G7 Foreign Ministers Communiqué of April 2023 mentioned about the DPRK, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui stated, “Taking this opportunity, I courteously remind the G7 foreign ministers once again that the DPRK is free from any NPT obligations as it legally withdrew from the treaty 20 years ago in accordance with the withdrawal procedures specified in Article 10 of NPT” [9]. Additionally, in August of the same year, during the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference, the DPRK permanent mission to the UN Office and international organizations in Vienna stated, “Its stand on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is clear…it had legally withdrawn from the NPT 20 years ago according to the right of a signatory specified in the treaty, but concentrate efforts on finding solutions to the major challenges facing the treaty” [10], and “Signatories to the NPT should not take issue with the DPRK over its legitimate exercise of sovereignty [author’s note: referring to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons development policy].”

 

Discussions on the Withdrawal Clause

As already noted, in response to DPRK’s announcement of withdrawal, new discussions on the operation of Article X, which stipulates withdrawal from the treaty, began at the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Numerous States Parties reaffirmed the importance of the right to withdraw from the Treaty in circumstances of extraordinary events which “jeopardize the supreme interests of its country” as stipulated in Article X, as well as the obligation to give three months’ notice of withdrawal – including a statement of the extraordinary events – to all other Parties to the Treaty and the UN Security Council, as a matter of course. Then, the conference discussed, among other things, measures to ensure that withdrawal doesn’t become a means of excusing treaty violations, as well as ways to address the international security implications that would result from withdrawal.

Regarding the NPT Treaty Conferences where their decision process is based on consensus, the only agreed upon document on substantive issues adopted after 2005 is the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference [11]. However, the draft final document of the 10th NPT Review Conference, which was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and held in 2022, is a document that is assumed to have been adopted had it not been for Russian Federation’s objection to the clauses related to Ukraine [12]. Therefore, it is safe to assume that there are these two unanimous agreements on the view of the States Parties on Article X.

It is noteworthy that in these agreements, the right of States Parities to withdraw from the treaty was again strongly asserted [13], where it can be seen that the majority of States Parties are wary of and check the dominant influence of the major powers, including the nuclear weapon states. As well, there were also legal arguments to reduce the benefits that would accrue to a withdrawing state by its withdrawal. As a result, it was confirmed that such withdrawal would not affect any right, obligation or legal situation between the withdrawing State and each of the other States parties created during the execution of the Treaty prior to withdrawal (including those related to the required IAEA Safeguards), and that non-proliferation legal obligations exchanged under the Treaty would remain in force after the withdrawal [14].

Regarding what to do when an intention to withdraw from the Treaty is declared, it is stated, as numerous States Parties view, that States Parties should undertake consultations immediately, as well as regional diplomatic initiatives. In particular, numerous States Parties reaffirmed their understanding that Article X entrusts the Security Council with responsibilities for dealing with the withdrawal issue [15].

Perhaps, the most important role of diplomatic consultations and the Security Council efforts described above is to make efforts to remove the reasons that compel a state being forced to declare its withdrawal from the NPT.

Numerous States Parties also recognize this point. The Draft Final Document of the 10th NPT Review Conference, in Para.187, which lists future efforts of States Parties, recommends addressing the withdrawal issue, while taking into consideration that the withdrawal issue cannot be separated from security concerns of States Parties involved, as follows:

“102. The Conference encourages all State parties to undertake consultations and exert every diplomatic effort to persuade a withdrawing State to reconsider its decision, addressing the legitimate security needs of parties directly involved” [16].

In the session of the most recent Treaty Conference discussing the withdrawal issue in 2023, Japanese Ambassador Ogasawara extended this point and stated,

 “…Japan considers it important to give State Parties incentives to remain under the Treaty. To this end, tangible progress needs to be made in the implementation of the NPT obligations and the commitments adopted in the past NPT review process, including the 2010 action plan” [17].

In short, Ogasawara’s understanding is that the entire outcome of the implementation of the NPT is being questioned in the withdrawal issue. Certainly, major mutually enforcing pledges under the NPT, particularly past NPT agreements relating to security, such as nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and negative security assurances, would be fundamental issues that should be questioned in the withdrawal issue.

 

How Northeast Asian Regional Issues are Discussed

These basic arguments that have been discussed in the withdrawal issue are, of course, also fundamental issues in the “universalization of treaty,” which encourages states that have withdrawn to rejoin and non-member states to join the NPT. From this standpoint, Japan and the ROK, which are non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT in close vicinity to the DPRK and seriously affected by its withdrawal, should play a role in stimulating necessary discussions and actions on the Northeast Asia regional non-proliferation issue at the Treaty Conferences. Unfortunately, they haven’t done so.

Recent discussions on the issue of DPRK’s nuclear weapons are summarized in Para. 173 to 177 of the 10th NPT Review Conference’s draft final document [18], including calls and claims such as “support for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) of the Korean Peninsula and stressing the importance of the full implementation of the Security Council resolutions” (Para.173), “condemnation of DPRK’s nuclear tests and prohibition of further nuclear tests” (Para.174), “call on the DPRK to return to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon state,” (Para.175), “call on the DPRK to immediately cease ongoing nuclear activities and to take concrete measures to abandon all its nuclear weapons” (Para. 176), and “encouraging the resolution through negotiations and diplomacy, and call on all parties concerned to resume dialogue and reduce tensions” (Para177). Besides these agreements, at every Treaty Conference, more than 50 States Parties have issued joint statements with titles similar to “Addressing the North Korean nuclear challenge,” and continue to call for stronger condemnation to DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs and violation of Security Council resolutions, and stronger enforcement of sanctions imposed by Security Council resolutions [19]. Overall, in terms of regional non-proliferation issues in Northeast Asia, it is safe to say that the Treaty Conference has become a forum for merely repeating demands and condemnations of the DPRK and strict implementation of Security Council sanctions, rather than discussing solutions to these issues.

It is important to note that outside of the Treaty Conference, both Japan and the ROK have repeatedly acted in violation of the spirit of past NPT agreements. For instance, at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, they agreed that, “All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons,” and “Nuclear States…further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.” Nevertheless, South Korea and the US declared in their 2023 Washington Declaration that “the United States will further enhance the regular visibility of strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula, as evidenced by the upcoming visit of a U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarine to the ROK” [20]. In particular, the Yoon administration of South Korea is rushing to establish concrete nuclear cooperation guidelines that include the process of using nuclear weapons [21]. Additionally, after the 2023 Camp David Trilateral Summit, where the US committed to protect Japan and South Korea through extended deterrence by the full range of US capabilities, including nuclear, they agreed for the first time to conduct regular annual trilateral combined military exercises, which had been taboo since the end of the World War II [22]. All these moves have strengthened the role and significance of nuclear weapons in the regional security cooperation, in violation of past NPT agreements.

If Japan and South Korea are forced to act contrary to these agreements, while deeply committed to the NPT, they should consider that their policies to address regional non-proliferation issue are highly problematic.

 

Middle East Issues as an Example

There is a precedent for using the NPT Treaty Conferences as a forum for resolving regional nuclear issues instead of merely voicing criticism. Initiated by Egypt, Middle Eastern countries have been using the NPT Treaty Conferences as a forum to resolve regional non-proliferation issues.

On July 1, 1968, Egypt signed the NPT, however, it is well-known that Egypt didn’t ratify it for some time, because Israel refused to join the treaty [23]. Subsequently, in 1974, Egypt supported Iran’s proposal to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the region of the Middle East and worked for the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution entitled, “Establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,” which was adopted on November 9, 1974 for the first time [24]. Laying the groundwork for regional non-proliferation by repeatedly proposing the UN resolution every year since then, Egypt ratified the NPT on February 26, 1981. It is acknowledged that it took 13 years for Egypt to set the conditions for its NPT ratification. In 1990, Egyptian President Mubarak expanded the scope of the Middle East nuclear-weapons free zone into the Middle East weapons of mass destruction free zone, and Egypt’s initiative to realize this resulted in adoption of the “Resolution on the Middle East” at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Egypt submitted two working papers. One is “Article VII Nuclear Weapon Free Zone” [25], calling for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The other is “Security Assurances to Non-nuclear Weapon States” [26], arguing that the establishment of such a zone would constitute an important contribution towards the removal of threats to regional and international peace and security. As can be seen, Egypt’s intention is to achieve security in the Middle East by means of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons free zone, especially given Israel being suspected of having nuclear weapons. Moreover, we can see excellent political insight in the fact that Egypt attempts to realize it through the framework of the NPT, a highly universal treaty in which the majority of the world’s states participate.

At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, these efforts made the US, Britain and Russia submit “The Resolution on the Middle East,” and this resulted in a remarkable outcome in that the resolution was adopted as a document strongly tied to the key decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. The resolution states that the Middle East peace process and efforts towards establishment of a nuclear-weapons free zone are closely linked, by stating that, “(The Review Conference) endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction,” and calls upon all States Parties to the NPT including the nuclear-weapon states “to extend their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.”

The Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction which held its first session in November 2019, following the Resolution on the Middle East, has today become an annual conference hosted by the United Nations. Although Israel continually declines to participate in the Conference, the existence of an internationally agreed framework for pursuing denuclearization and peace in the Middle East is extremely significant.

Initiatives in the Middle East utilizing the NPT Treaty Conference contain many useful lessons for efforts to pursue denuclearization and comprehensive peace in Northeast Asia. The leadership of Egypt can be regarded as a valuable example for Japan and South Korea to follow.

DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT should serve as an impetus to make the regional denuclearization and comprehensive security issues in Northeast Asia the subject of the NPT Treaty Conference. Various studies and proposals have already been published in the academy and civil society, on a comprehensive security framework centered around a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon free zone [27]. The conditions are ripe for the Japanese and South Korean governments to utilize the NPT Treaty Conference as a forum for pursuing this initiative. (Ichiro YUASA and Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] IAEA, “Factsheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards”
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards

[2] For more on this history, see Hiromichi Umebayashi, “North Korea’s nuclear weapons – A mirror reflecting the world,” (Koubunken, 2021) pp.53-58, or Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman and Robert L. Gallucci, “Going Critical – The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” (Brookings Institution Press, 2004) Chapter 1 to 3

[3] NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/SR.1 Para. 9

[4] NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/50, Annex II Para. 28

[5] NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/SR.1 Para. 9

[6] NPT/CONF.2005/1 Para. 11 or NPT/CONF.2005/57(Part III), p. 9, Para. 38

[7] For the latest example, NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/5

[8] “Declaration, statements, reservations and notes on NPT,” Website of United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs,
https://treaties.unoda.org/t/npt/declarations/PRK_moscow_ACC
 (accessed on February 12, 2024)

[9] “Press Statement of DPRK Foreign Minister,” KCNA, April 21, 2023
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[10] “Press Release by DPRK Mission to UN Office and Int’l Organizations in Vienna,” KCNA, August 5, 2023
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[11] 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document Volume I Part I
NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I) May 28, 2010

[12], 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Working paper of the President on the Final Document of 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/WP.77 August 26, 2022

[13] See note [12], Para.186

[14] See note [11], Para.119 or See note [5], Para. 186

[15] See note [11], Para.120

[16] See note [12], Para.187, Item.102

[17] “Statement by Ambassador OGASAWARA Ichiro, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, At the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference – Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty” August 9, 2023
https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom23/statements/9Aug_Japan_2.pdf

[18] See note [12]

[19] For instance, NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.36(2023), NPT/CONF.2020/60(2022)

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/13(2019), NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/9(2018),

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/13(2017)

[20] “Washington Declaration,” The White House, April 26, 2023
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/

[21] “Joint Statement by President Joseph R. Biden of the United States of America and President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea on US-ROK Guideline for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula,” The White House, July 11, 2024
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/11/joint-statement-by-president-joseph-r-biden-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-president-yoon-suk-yeol-of-the-republic-of-korea-on-u-s-rok-guidelines-for-nuclear-deterrence-and-nuclear-operations-o/

[22] “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” the White House, August 18, 2023
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/

[23] Speech of Mr. Karem of the Egyptian Delegation, NPT/CONF.1995/32（Part III）p.253
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/221469

[24] A/RES/3263(XXIX)

[25] “Working paper submitted by Egypt”
NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.13, April 27,1995
NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part II), p.359
https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/1995_FD_Part_II.pdf

[26] “Working paper submitted by Egypt”
NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.4, April 28, 1995
NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part II), p.289
https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/1995_FD_Part_II.pdf

[27] For instance, Michael Hamel-Green, “Nuclear Deadlock, Stalled Diplomacy: The Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Alternative - Proposals, Pathways, Prospects,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol.4, NO.51, 2021, pp201-233
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2021.1875285
or, UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi, SUZUKI Tatsujiro, NAKAMURA Keiko & HIROSE Satoshi, “Proposal: A Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone,” (Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University, March 2015)
https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/Proposal_J_honbun.pdf

Watch Report No.36

  Watch Report No.36   　December 26, 2022

Declaring the Intention to Cease US-ROK Joint Military Exercises is the First Step for Easing Tensions

Easing Tension is Needed on the Korean Peninsula.
US-ROK (Republic of Korea) joint military exercises have been escalating with the involvement of US Forces Japan and the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF). The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has enacted the Law on Policy of Nuclear Forces and has repeatedly launched missiles at an unprecedented pace. The international community cannot just stand by and watch such developments. We need to focus our attention on putting forward concrete approaches to improve the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Since late August 2022, tension on the Korean Peninsula has been growing. From August 22 to September 1, US-ROK combined forces conducted “Ulchi Freedom Shield,” large-scale joint military exercises. During the exercises, in addition to command post training, large scale field maneuvers based on simulation of an attack on the DPRK were staged for the first time in four years. The inauguration of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeo, who is taking a hard line on the DPRK, in May 2022 is responsible for this position.

And, on September 8, the DPRK introduced the Law on DPRK’s Policy of Nuclear Forces which permits preemptive use of nuclear weapons [1]. In response to this, the US and the ROK held a meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) on September 16, which expressed “serious concern” over DPRK’s enacting the law and decided to take “an overwhelming and decisive response” against possible DPRK nuclear attacks. One week later, on September 23, the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) aircraft carrier, homeported at Yokosuka, Japan, pulled into the South Korean port of Busan and joined the US-ROK joint military exercises from September 26 to 29 for the first time in half a decade. Probably in response to the exercise, the DPRK conducted military drills by the Korean People’s Army (KPA) units for the operation of tactical nukes from September 25 to October 9. Since then, between the DPRK and the US-ROK-Japan, especially between the DPRK and the US-ROK, verbal and military tit for tat exchanges have continued [2].

Additionally, on November 13, in Phnom Penh, the leaders of Japan, the US and the ROK issued a joint statement for the first time in half a decade [3]. As is evident in the statement, there is a new trend to be noted. The historical barrier against military cooperation between Japan and the ROK has been weakening under the Yoon administration, and military cooperation among these three countries has become apparent in the region. The DPRK has been increasing its vigilance against Japan’s deepening involvement [4].

If such military tension remains high, the possibility of military conflicts triggered by misunderstanding and miscalculation also remains high. It cannot be ruled out that the situation could escalate to the point of using nuclear weapons. To prevent such risks, what is needed now?

Law on DPRK’s Policy of Nuclear Forces
Let us examine the concrete risks resulting from the Law on DPRK’s Policy of Nuclear Forces” (Nuclear Policy Law or the New Law) adopted by the Supreme People’s Assembly on September 8, 2022 and announced on the same day.

The New Law replaces the “Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State” (hereinafter referred to as the Old Law) introduced on April 1, 2013 [5]. All that the Old Law stipulates is that nuclear weapons are defined as a “means of defense” against the US’s hostile policy and its nuclear threat (Paragraph 1) and are to be used for deterring and repelling the aggression and attack (Paragraph 2, 4). It doesn’t stipulate anything regarding the actual use of nuclear weapons into law. In contrast, although both laws regard the main mission of the nuclear forces is to deter a war and repulse hostile forces’ aggression and attack in case deterrence fails, the New Law stipulates principles and concrete conditions for the decision to actually use nuclear weapons. Thus, the New Law entails many risks.

First, regarding the fundamental principle on the use of nuclear weapons, there aren’t essential differences between the DPRK’s Nuclear Policy Law and those of the US and other nuclear countries, if rhetorical differences are ignored. The New Law stipulates that the DPRK shall use nuclear weapons as “the last resort” in order to cope with a nuclear state (the US is in mind) when the latter seriously invades or attacks the DPRK, even by conventional forces. It also stipulates that the DPRK shall use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states (ROK or Japan) if they join aggression or attack against the DPRK in collusion with a nuclear weapon state (the US). No hesitation to the first use of nuclear weapons can be seen in the New Law.

Second, Paragraph 6 of the New Law details conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. Reading the paragraph makes it clear that the DPRK permits not only “first use” but also “preemptive use” [6] of nuclear weapons to change the course of the war decisively. This is stipulated in the New Law as the policy that “(nuclear weapons can be used) (i)n case the operation for preventing the expansion and protraction of a war and taking the initiative in the war is inevitably needed (Term 4, Paragraph 6).”

Third, the New Law carries serious risks in the process of making the decision to use nuclear weapons based on the preconditions for their use. Term 2, Paragraph 6 of the New Law stipulates that the DPRK can use nuclear weapons “in case a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces on the state leadership and the command of the state’s nuclear forces has been launched or is judged to be on the horizon.” The New Law also stipulates “in case the command-and-control system over the state nuclear forces is placed in danger… a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately” (Term 3, Paragraph 3). This means that when Kim Jong-Un himself or the command-and-control system used by him are damaged and the command and control by the supreme leader fails to function correctly, a nuclear strike plan decided in advance will be executed automatically and immediately. How will unit-level commanders responsible for executing launches know that such a crisis is coming? As will be described later, there are a considerable number of units responsible for launching nuclear missiles, thus, many questions arise including, what is a reasonable automatic system of order transmission chain from higher-level to lower-level commanders, and how it can work and be guaranteed to function properly during a wartime. Information necessary to answer those questions is not yet available. However, it is reasonable to assume that command and control of launching tactical nuclear weapons, as well as strategic nuclear weapons, of a state like the DPRK, where only one person monopolizes absolute power, involves inevitable risks.

Military drills of KPA units for operation of tactical nukes under the simulation of an actual war were staged about two weeks after the inception of Nuclear Policy Law supports the existence of such risks.

Realistic Launching Drills of KPA Units for Tactical Nuclear Operation
According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) report on October 10, 2022 [7], from September 25 to October 9, the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) (Chairman: Kim Jong-Un) staged “missile launching drills of KPA units for operation of tactical nukes.” KCNA described the aims and characteristics of 7 drills involving tactical nuclear missile launches conducted during that period. Based on KCNA’s report along with information issued by ROK Ministry of Defense, twelve (12) nuclear–capable ballistic missiles were launched during the drills, including nine (9) close-range ballistic missiles with a range of 300 - 360km [8], two short-range ballistic missiles with ranges of 600km and 800km [9], and one intermediate ballistic missile with a range of 4600km [10] (one that flew over the main island of Japan).

KCNA reported that missile launching drills of KPA units for the operation of tactical nukes were staged “in order to check and assess the war deterrence and nuclear counterattack capability of the country and to send a severe warning message to the enemies,” and that the drills were conducted at different levels “under the simulation of an actual war” [11]. However, according to the report, it is difficult to determine that all the launching drills were drills of units handling operationally deployed nuclear weapons. For instance, regarding the surprising underwater launch of the ballistic missile from a reservoir, inferring from KCNA’s reporting “the orientation of building a planned silo beneath the reservoir was confirmed” [12], it is considered the launch had an aspect of feasibility test. Additionally, the launch of “a new-type intermediate-range ballistic missile” on October 4 which flew over Japan was, rather than a tactical drill, a launch to display DPRK’s strategic attack capabilities targeting Guam and Japan with the political intention of sending a “more powerful and clear warning to the enemies” [13].

Regarding other tactical nuclear missile launching drills, KCNA report on October 10 gives the overall impression that those drills placed more emphasis on deterring war by means of demonstrating to the US, ROK and Japan that the DPRK has already fully deployed tactical nuclear weapons and is ready to use them. (In fact, the above-mentioned DPRK’s announcement of the enactment of the Nuclear Policy Law itself might have intended to play such a war deterrence role.)

Even when based on some reservations regarding the nature of the tactical nuclear drills, the risks involved in DPRK’s use of nuclear weapons cannot be overlooked in the content of drills.

Analyzing a KCNA report on October 10 tells us that a wide variety of drills were conducted. The drills included taking nuclear warheads out of storages and transporting them, loading nuclear warheads onto missiles, choosing set targets and making decisions on their explosion mode (air explosion and direct precision and dispersion strike and others), identifying launch units and transmitting orders to them, moving missile launchers to launching sites, confirmation and execution of launching procedures, verifying operation and the strength of missiles, and others.

Additionally, according to the information from the ROK Ministry of Defense, seven missiles were launched from at least six different sites, Teachon, Sunan, Samsok, Sunchon, Mupyonri and Munchon. As launches from different sites are considered to be made by different units, the number of KPA units for operation of tactical nukes is estimated to be considerable. If the complicated command-and-control system, especially the part of the system related to commander-in-chief, gets into trouble, the risk of a grave malfunction of the nuclear operation will be very high. Considering the majority of DPRK’s missiles for tactical nukes are dual-capable and launch mostly missiles with conventional warheads in a war, the risk of accidental launch of nuclear missiles would increase further.

The KCNA report detailed some of the set targets of nuclear attack in the drills. There is a high possibility that the launch of the short-range ballistic missile on September 25, which flew 600km according to ROK information, setting its target at a certain altitude in the air of the Japan Sea (or East Sea of Korea), was meant to simulate an attack scenario to destroy a US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) by nuclear air explosion, warning against repeated CVN deployment during that period [14]. Launching drills of close-range ballistic missiles to strike South Korean airports within the operation zones by nuclear missiles were staged several times with different modes of explosion. Launching drills of close-range and short-range ballistic missiles were also conducted in simulation of striking the enemies’ main military command facilities. It is reported by the ROK Ministry of Defense that one of those short-range missiles flew 800km, which means US military bases in Japan such as Sasebo and Iwakuni are within its range. Launching drills of close-range ballistic missiles in simulating the strike on the enemies’ main ports are also reported. As the DPRK itself describes the drills as “the simulation of an actual war,” those target settings are highly pragmatic and executable.

Immediate Top Priority: Easing Tensions and Avoiding Military Conflicts
As is explained above, the DPRK’s enactment of the Nuclear Policy Law and the KPA units’ drills for tactical nukes’ operation demonstrate that the risk of using nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, intentionally or accidentally, has been growing.

As important as the factors that increase risk, we would like to point out characteristics of the DPRK’s language and narratives in its reporting about the Nuclear Policy Law and KPA units drills for tactical nukes operation. DPRK’s discourse regarding the use of nuclear weapons is very straightforward, and sensitivity and hesitation to the issues expected to be raised by using nuclear weapons under international humanitarian law is hardly found, and thus a threshold for making the decision to use nuclear weapons appears to be extremely low. Just so there is no confusion, we don’t side with the argument that the DPRK and its leader are inhuman based on that low threshold. The fact that the DPRK has repeatedly called for indiscriminate and fair application of the UN Charter at the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council should compel us to use caution in labeling the DPRK as, for example, inhuman. Instead, we should try to find out the rationale for why the DPRK has embraced the idea of a low threshold on nuclear weapon use.

DPRK’s peculiar discourse regarding nuclear weapons comes from the history that the DPRK has kept fighting against overwhelmingly superior military powers for almost 70 years in order to maintain its regime. The US, ROK and Japan are military allies, and their combined military spending is more than 500 times larger than that of the DPRK. Such hopeless inequality of military power has led to the DPRK’s policy to emphasize the destructive power of nuclear weapons.

To resolve this hostile relationship peacefully is a goal that the international community should strive for. To do so, first of all, the existing risk of nuclear weapon use needs to be reduced. Then, it is necessary to put forward a path where efforts to reduce the nuclear risk would lead to a following diplomatic stage.

For those reasons, under the current circumstances, the immediate priority for the international community is to minimize the possibility of military conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. Such military conflicts create a risk that they could escalate to nuclear weapon use. To prevent this, the US and ROK should declare their intention to suspend their joint military exercises on and around the Korean Peninsula for the time being. At the same time, the US, ROK and Japan should cease any discourse which increases military tension on the Korean Peninsula and should make efforts to reduce tension.

It is expected that the DPRK will keep bolstering its military power, based on its five-year plan. Although it is undesirable, we have already learned that repeatedly putting military pressure and strengthening economic sanctions on the DPRK cannot prevent the DPRK from proceeding on that course.

Concerns that the DPRK has no intention of resuming diplomacy may be true for the time being, but not definitive. In his speech on September 8, 2022, Kim Jong-Un stated “There will never be such a thing as our abandonment of the nuclear weapons or denuclearization first, nor will there be any negotiations to this end” [15]. However, for instance, in 2017, Kim Jong-Un insisted, “the DPRK would neither put its nukes and ballistic rockets on the table of negotiations in any case nor flinch even an inch from the road of bolstering the nuclear force chosen by itself,” but it was under condition that “Unless the US hostile policy and nuclear threat to the DPRK are definitely terminated” [16]. In fact, in the next year, Kim Jong-Un agreed to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the Panmunjom Declaration between North and South, and the Singapore Joint Statement between the US and DPRK, in exchange for the US’s meeting this condition.

The DPRK has persistently called for the US and the ROK to stop their joint military exercises. To avoid military conflicts and the risk of use of nuclear weapon, to ease tensions and to lead to the next diplomatic step, the US and the ROK should declare their intention to impose a moratorium on their joint military exercises first. The recent announcement by the ROK Ministry of National Defense to expand the scale of the US-ROK joint military exercises next year [17] goes in the totally opposite direction from this, and we strongly call on them to reconsider this position. (Yosuke WATANABE & Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)

[1] “Law on DPRK's Policy on Nuclear Forces Promulgated,” KCNA, September 9, 2022.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[2] For example, on November 1, 2022, Park Jong-Chun, Secretary of the WPK Central Committee, said that if the U.S. and the ROK attempt to use armed forces against the DPRK, they will pay the most horrible price in history. Perhaps aware of this, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III stated in the joint statement issued on November 3, 2022 at a regular U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting that any nuclear attack against the US or its allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of the Kim regime.

[3] Phnom Penh Statement on Trilateral Partnership for the Indo-Pacific
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100421322.pdf

[4] “KCNA Commentary Slashes Japan’s Moves against DPRK and Chongryon,” KCNA, November 16, 2022. “Press Statement of DPRK FM,” KCNA, November 17. 2022.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[5] “Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted,” KCNA, April 1, 2013.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date. For a Japanese translation, see Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI’s book North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: a mirror reflecting the world, (in Japanese, Kobunken, September 2021), pp. 232-233.

[6] Many Japanese media reports refer to “first use (senko-shiyo or daiichi-shiyo in Japanese)” as “preemptive use (sensei-shiyo in Japanese)”. However, they are two different concepts and should be clearly distinguished.

[7] “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes,” KCNA, October 10, 2022.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[8] A close-range ballistic missile is a ballistic missile with a range of 0-300 nautical miles as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense.
"United States Government Compendium of Interagency and Associated Terms"
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/dictionary/repository/usg_compendium.pdf?ver=2019-11-04-174229-423

[9] A short-range ballistic missile is a ballistic missile with a range of 300-600 nautical miles as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense. See note [8] for source.

[10] An intermediate-range ballistic missile is a ballistic missile with a range of 1500-3000 nautical miles as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense. See note [8] for source.

[11] See note [7].

[12] See note [7].

[13] See note [7].

[14] “North Korea’s missile that passed over Japan was a ‘new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile’ (tentative title in English),” NHK, October 10, 2022 (in Japanese).
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20221010/k10013854001000.html

[15] “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at Seventh Session of the 14th SPA of DPRK,” KCNA, September 10. 2022.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[16] “Kim Jong Un Supervises Test-launch of Inter-continental Ballistic Rocket Hwasong-14,” KCNA, July 5, 2017.
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.

[17] “S. Korea, U.S. to develop 'realistic' training scenarios on N.K. nuke, missile threats,” YONHAP NEWS, December 21, 2022.
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221221004700325?section=news

Watch Report No.35

 Watch Report No.35   　July 29, 2022

International Efforts Should be Made to Make Use of the 2018 Agreements on the Korean Peninsula. US and Chinese Initiatives toward Resumption of the Six-Party Talks are Required

Have the 2018 Agreements Lost?
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea)’s test launch of ICBM missile on March 24, 2022, putting aside the question of whether the ICBM was a new type or not, was a political event marking a significant milestone. It can also be safely assumed from the declamatory writing style of the Korean Central News Agency’s report on the test launch that it was not merely a single test launch of a strategic missile, but DPRK’s move with political intentions [1]. The announcement stated:

“The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un gave a written order to conduct the test-lunch of the new type ICBM of the DPRK strategic forces on Wednesday. He visited the launch ground on Thursday and personally guided the overall process of the test-launch of the new type ICBM Hwasongpho-17.

With his deep insight into the ever-changing international political situation, the root cause of the daily-escalating military tension in and around the Korean peninsula and the long-term demand of our revolution that stems from the inevitability of the long-standing confrontation with the US imperialists accompanied by the danger of a nuclear war, the General Secretary put forward the Juche-oriented defence development strategy and the policy of bolstering in a sustained way the nuclear war deterrence at the historic 8th Congress of the WPK.”

This official announcement on the test launch of the ICBM missile clearly states its political and strategic intention, meaning the DPRK has explicitly abandoned its moratorium on ICBM test launches and nuclear tests that it had self-imposed since April of 2018 as diplomatic trust-building measures.

As early as January 19, a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) “gave an instruction to a sector concerned to reconsider in an overall scale the trust-building measures” and to “promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporally-suspended activities” [2]. It was March 24 when the results of the instruction were displayed.

Does this mean that the DPRK has returned to its brinkmanship diplomacy of 2017? Probably not. Ever since its test launch of a hypersonic missile was conducted at the beginning of the year, on January 5, the DPRK has repeatedly launched tactical guided missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and other missiles at an unprecedented pace. Some news reports suggest that these launches are to put pressure on the US to bring it back to negotiations to ease economic sanctions on the DPRK. However, that series of missile launches, of course, although they are undesired, should be regarded calmly as DPRK’s stance implementing its policy of bolstering war deterrence adopted at the WPK Congress, as it anticipates that US-DPRK and North-South relations are unlikely to improve for the time being [3].

The 8th WPK Congress held in January officially acknowledged that, “the five-year strategy for the national economic development” adopted in 2016 had failed to realize social construction that should have been evidenced by improved standard of living, and thus, adopted “the five-year plan for the national economic development.” The new five-year plan also sets concrete goals for bolstering military power including, “making nuclear weapons smaller, lighter and tactical,” “production of super large nuclear warhead,” “developing hypersonic gliding flight warhead,” “developing inter-continental ballistic rocket with the use of underwater or ground solid-fuel engine,” “possessing nuclear-powered submarine and underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon,” “operating reconnaissance satellite for military purposes,” and “developing reconnaissance drones” [4]. These developments are regrettable, but we have to reluctantly accept that the DPRK keeps bolstering its military power as long as tension remains high because of the failed diplomacy between US and the DPRK, as well as between North and South on the Korean Peninsula. The logic working behind this build-up is just similar to that of nuclear weapons modernization programs by nuclear states, such as the US.

However, at the same time, two points regarding decisions made at the 8th WPK Congress should be recalled. First, the top priority of the five-year plan is not a military buildup, but rather economic buildup, which will lead to a higher standard of living. Second, DPRK policy toward the US, which will be prerequisite for its economic development, is “to call for the US to withdraw its hostile policy toward the DPRK and to approach the US on the principle of power to power and goodwill to goodwill.” In other words, the possibility of exploring diplomacy is clearly stated [5].

On the other hand, DPRK’s frequent missile tests are considered to relate to the intrinsic nature of the military sector under the five-year plan for national economic development. Originally, in industrial sectors, such as farming, which are closely related to a higher standard of living, it is not easy to demonstrate tangible intermediate achievements in the short term. Additionally, under difficult circumstances due to natural disasters caused by climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and prolonged economic sanctions, the Kim Jong Un regime would have difficulty managing the implementation process for the five-year plan to result in success. As it is easier to demonstrate its interim achievements in the military technology development sector, there is the possibility that the sector has been prominently treated in the Party’s organizational management.

Actions of the US and the ROK under the Yoon Administration
In May 2022, the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) President Moon Jae-in who played a leading role in the Heads of States agreements in 2018 left office and conservative Yoon Suk-yeol assumed office, which is expected to cause significant changes to the fate of those 2018 agreements.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol criticized the Moon administration’s conciliatory stance toward the DPRK during the presidential election campaign. On May 21, right after his inauguration, at the summit with US President Biden held in Seoul, it became clear that US and ROK policy toward the DPRK has explicitly changed in their joint statement [6].

First, it should be noted that there is an important point that is absent from the joint statement. Just one year ago, on May 21 of 2021, in Washington DC, the US-ROK leaders’ joint statement by US President Biden and President Moon Jae-in was released, in which both leaders explicitly expressed that they would follow the 2018 summit agreements as follows [7].

“We also reaffirm our common belief that diplomacy and dialogue, based on previous inter-Korean and US-DPRK commitments such as the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and Singapore Joint Statement, are essential to achieve the complete denuclearization and establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

In contrast, the joint statement of President Biden and President Yoon didn’t mention anything about the 2018 summit commitments. The new joint statement is, briefly speaking, a return to policies before the 2018 summits, namely increasing international pressure through economic sanctions and military pressure by the combined US and ROK forces.

On the military side, the joint statement stated detailed measures for bolstering deterrence, including reactivating the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group, initiating discussions to expand the scope and scale of combined military exercises, and reaffirming commitment of the US to deploy strategic US military assets in a timely manner as necessary.

In line with these agreements, tangible changes have already taken place. The ten-day joint military exercise conducted in April was a command post training and didn’t mobilize field troops. However, the Carrier Strike Group exercise in early June was conducted with the ROKS Sejong the Great (DDG-991) Aegis destroyer joining the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) aircraft carrier homeported at Yokosuka, Japan, as a major combatant ship. Additionally, the US and ROK have started to demonstrate US-ROK combined force capabilities to respond quickly with a military counterattack if the DPRK launches missiles. They responded to DPRK missile launches not only by launching their own missiles, but also by escalating with a show of force by air strikes by the air force, which is overwhelmingly superior to that of the DPRK [8].

Regarding economic sanctions, the joint statement states that, “both leaders condemn the DPRK’s escalating ballistic missile tests this year…as clear violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions,” and, “urge all UN Member States to fully implement all United Nations Security Council resolutions” [9]. This statement merely repeats policy that has been historically proved a failure, based on the hope that if all UN Member States implement all UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, the severest sanctions in history, the DPRK will give in.

Viability of UN sanctions is weakening with the UNSC’s Resolutions Punishing the DPRK
As will be discussed later, originally, UN Security Council Resolutions that impose sanctions against ballistic missile launches don’t have a persuasive basis. Furthermore, the increasing political division within the Security Council caused by the Russian military invasion of Ukraine has made it more and more difficult to implement UNSC resolutions regarding sanctions.

On May 26, the UN Security Council voted down a draft resolution (S/2022/431) tabled by the US by a vote of 13 to 2 that would have strengthened sanctions against the DPRK, as China and Russia vetoed for the first time in a series of sanction resolutions, and their explanation for vetoing was consistent with their recent positions. In response, on June 8 and 10, for the first time in history, the UN General Assembly held a debate on Security Council’s veto. A formal meeting of the UN General Assembly to hold a debate on a veto was institutionalized in response to the situation in which the Security Council held a meeting on February 25 to address the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but couldn’t take any actions due to the veto. On April 26, the General Assembly decided that, “The President of the General Assembly shall convene a formal meeting of the General Assembly within 10 working days of the casting of a veto by one or more permanent members of the Security Council, to hold a debate on the situation as to which the veto was cast” [10]. The sanction resolution against the DPRK became the first such case.

At the General Assembly, the DPRK, along with China and Russia, expressed their own views [11]. For instance, China argued that the Peninsula situation has developed to what it is today due to US policies’ disregard for the reasonable concerns of the DPRK, and the US needs to actually show its willingness to have a dialogue with the DPRK by means of actions such as easing sanctions and postponing joint military exercises. The majority of participating states that made statements at the Assembly criticized the DPRK for repeatedly violating past UNSC resolutions and demanded that UN Member States implement the UNSC resolutions. Nonetheless, when considering their arguments dispassionately, it is difficult to deny that explanations by Russia and China that the proposed draft resolution to strengthen the sanction is not an effective means to resolve the issue are convincing to a certain extent. In the future, if new sanction resolutions related to DPRK’s further missile launches are repeatedly voted down by the Security Council’s veto and every time such debates are held by General Assembly, it can be reasonably expected that more states will come to the conclusion that sanction resolutions are ineffective.

Originally, in today’s international community, imposing sanctions against missile launches based on UNSC resolutions has limitations. Because, unlike issues of development of nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, there is no universally accepted normative international agreement to regulate the missiles themselves [12].

Generally, the control of missile weapons in the international community has been limited to those related to delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, this is an oversight within the missile control regime at present. The well-known Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) are also within this limited framework. The MTCR states that the purpose of its Guidelines is to “limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons” [13]. HCOC states “comprehensively to prevent and curb the proliferation of Ballistic Missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction [14]”, as its principle. Therefore, UNSC resolutions regulating missile launches must be in accordance with those limitations.

Regarding UNSC sanction resolutions against the DPRK, generally, all 10 resolutions from Resolution 1718 (2006) to 2397 (2017) [15], are in this context. All resolutions state at the beginning that, “reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,” and thus, establish the context for resolutions as a whole.

However, in the case of resolutions against the DPRK, out of this context, their operative clauses leading to the imposition of sanctions were adopted against missile launches in general without considering whether they are delivery systems of nuclear weapons or not. This became possible probably because criticism against DPRK’s nuclear tests and missile launches was skillfully interwoven. Diplomatic initiatives by the US and Japan might have worked behind the scenes.

The context that automatically imposes sanctions against any missile launch was established by two UNSC resolutions. Both were triggered by the DPRK’s nuclear tests, not by its missile launches. The contents of the other eight resolutions that were adopted, were informed by those two resolutions.

The first resolution is Resolution 1718 (2006), adopted in response to DPRK’s first nuclear test. It demands that, “the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile.” This established the future trend to ban general ballistic missile launches. The second resolution is Resolution 1874 (2009) the adoption of which was triggered by DPRK’s second nuclear test. This time, it expands the scope of the ban by stating, “demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology,” which established the rationale to make any launches using ballistic missile technology, including launches of space rocket, subject to sanctions.

It is necessary to scrutinize the validity of unconditionally banning only a certain nation from activities that are not banned, and generally tolerated in international community. In the case of missile launches, when imposing sanctions against them, a fair mechanism to judge whether these missiles are meant to deliver weapons of mass destruction or not is required, even given that this is a difficult task.

As is well known, to maintain or restore international peace and security, the Security Council shall…decide “what measures shall be taken” (Article 39, Charter of the United Nations), including “measures not involving the use of armed force” (Article 41) or “such action by air, sea, or land forces” (Article 42), and the Member States “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council” (Article 25). The integrity of decisions made by the UNSC, which has such powerful authority, has a significant impact on not only sanctioned states, but also on the international community as a whole. Therefore, decisions by the UNSC should be fair and consistent with current norms shared by the international community and should not be distorted by convenience of great powers or the motivation of certain interested states.

In addition to fundamental problems regarding the validity of missile test ban described above, inconsistencies in the real world have surfaced.

As already mentioned, in response to DPRK’s short-range missile launches on May 25 and June 5, the US and South Korea launched the same kind of missiles and demonstrated combined forces capabilities to respond quickly. And on September 15 of last year, the same day when the DPRK launched short-range missiles, the ROK conducted a test launch of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile. Why are DPRK’s missile launches sanctioned and those by the US and South Korea on the Korean Peninsula tolerated? Calls for fair criteria for judgement in the international community will inevitably intensify. It is expected that imposing sanctions against DPRK’s missile launches will keep losing its persuasiveness.

Efforts for Regional Common Security is a Lesson Drawn from Ukraine
So far, regarding DPRK policy, both the Biden and Yoon administrations have announced policies of only economic sanctions and military pressure that are destined to fail. President Yoon has emphasized an audacious plan that will vastly strengthen North Korea’s economy. However, he has attached the condition that North Korea “genuinely embarks on a process to complete denuclearization” [16] first. It is difficult to expect that this heavy-handed approach will change the DPRK. Although President Yoon and President Biden have emphasized that the path to dialogue remains open toward peaceful and diplomatic resolution with the DPRK [17], the DPRK has argued that it is the US’s turn to demonstrate good faith in return for DPRK’s trust building measures. For example, the DPRK imposed its moratorium on ICBM test launches and nuclear tests, as this Watch Report has repeatedly stated (for instance, Watch Report 32 & 33). Given these circumstances, it seems difficult to realize meaningful dialogue. Consequently, it is expected that the DPRK will continue to strengthen its nuclear deterrence for the purpose of self-defense.

Now, in terms of next steps, let us pay attention to a clue found in the ROK-US leaders’ joint statement. It is the phrase stating that, “President Yoon and President Biden reiterate their common goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and agree to further strengthen the airtight coordination to this end” [18]. At first glance, this looks like just an ordinary phrase. However, the joint statement doesn’t use a phrase of “complete denuclearization of the DPRK” but “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” which has important implications. President Yoon used a phrase of “complete denuclearization of the DPRK” in his inauguration speech and at NATO’s Madrid summit [19], and never set the goal of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Nonetheless, the reason why the joint statement uses the phrase of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” can be safely said that it reflects US opinion.

If the DPRK continues to strengthen its nuclear forces, there is a growing risk that conservative groups behind the Yoon administration will intensify their calls for developing ROK’s own nuclear weapons and its public opinion may lean toward this possibility. This kind of development has the risk of triggering the nightmare of a nuclear domino scenario, which will spread to Japan. For the Biden administration to prevent such development, it is necessary to compel the Yoon administration to commit to “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” which includes South Korea.

If “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” is a goal to be achieved, it is crystal clear that the 2018 agreements in which the US, and North and South Korea agreed upon toward that goal at summit level should be the foundation as a basis for future progress.

The summit agreements have not been abandoned by any of the parties --- US, the ROK and the DPRK. All it takes are new ideas and initiatives which make use of the agreements.

Taking the Russian military invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity, in East Asia, arguments about the possibility of a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan have been enflamed and efforts to strengthen military capabilities and increase military budgets have been intensifying. However, at the same time, there are growing arguments that it is the theory of alliance, which brings together military powers to defeat opponents, is the root cause of the war in Ukraine. In East Asia, before the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, encirclement of China led by the US and its allies had already started and it is undeniable that US policy toward the Korean Peninsula has been affected by it. Considering this, it is possible to recast the 2018 agreements as valuable tools to prevent not only tension on the Korean Peninsula, but to prevent regional tension from further escalating and thereby, to establish common security system that all state parties can accept.

We again propose here that all state parties move toward the establishment of a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) based on the 2018 summit agreements. Configured on a three-plus-three scheme in which the territorial area, including the Korean Peninsula and Japan, becomes a nuclear weapon free zone and the surrounding three nuclear weapon states -- US, Russia and China -- provide security assurances, many experts have developed innovative ideas regarding comprehensive approach to realize the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ [20].

Considering that all state parties concerned are also the participants of the 2003-2008 Six Party Talks, many would agree that the Six Party Talks is the best framework to discuss this subject. Additionally, the history of cooperation in 2010 to 2011 between the US under the Obama administration and China to resume the Six Party Talks is a lesson worthy to be recalled. At that time, China negotiated with South Korea under a conservative administration and the DPRK respectively, in spite of high tensions between North and South Korea as a result of serious military incidents, and tried to set a course for them to rejoin the talks through three step processes [21]. Still today, we have high expectations of US or Chinese initiatives for such cooperation, if we follow history, especially Chinese initiatives.
(Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI, Hajime MAEKAWA, Yosuke WATANABE)

[1] “Striking Demonstration of Great Military Muscle of Juche Korea: Successful Test-Launch of New-Type ICBM,” KCNA, 25 March 2022
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article by date.

[2] “6th Political Bureau Meeting of 8th C.C., WPK Held,” KCNA, 20 January 2022
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article by date.

[3] For instance, “North Korea launches a missile, ninth time this year (tentative title in English),” Asahi Simbun Digital, 6 March 2022 (in Japanese)
https://digital.asahi.com/articles/DA3S15224936.html

This argument can also be found in researcher’s circles. Richard WEITZ, “The Military Logic Behind North Korea’s Missile Medley,” 38 NORTH, 14 March 2022
https://www.38north.org/2022/03/the-military-logic-behind-north-koreas-missile-medley/?utm_source=Stimson+Center&utm_campaign=6c5556ec9b-38N_RSS_AUTOMATED&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_15c3e20f70-6c5556ec9b-46317501&mc_cid=6c5556ec9b&mc_eid=6cb0bb0a89

[4] “Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory,” KCNA, 9 January 2021
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm  Search for the article by date.

[5] See note [4].

[6] “United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement,” The White House, 21 May 2022
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/

[7] “U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement,” The White House, 21 May 2021
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/

[8] In response to the North Korean missile launch on 25 May 2022, thirty ROK Air Force F15Ks performed an elephant walk with a full load of bombs and missiles on the same day.

David Choi & Hana Kusumoto, "US, South Korea respond to North Korea’s latest missile tests with launches of their own," STARS AND STRIPES, 24 May 2022
https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2022-05-24/north-korea-ballistic-missiles-launch-6118170.html

Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Launches Suspected ICBM and Two Other Ballistic Missiles,” New York Times, 24 May 2022
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/world/asia/north-korea-ballistic-missiles.html

Also, in response to the North Korean missile launch on 5 June 2022, 16 ROK Air Force strike-fighters (F35A, F15K, and KF16) and four US Air Force F16s flew in combat formation over the Yellow Sea on 7 June.

David Choi, “Allied fighter formations show resolve in wake of North Korean missile tests,” STARS AND STRIPES, 7 June 2022
https://www.stripes.com/branches/air_force/2022-06-07/us-south-korea-fighter-jets-6259171.html

[9] See note [6].

[10] A/RES/76/262

[11] “General Assembly Holds Landmark Debate on Security Council’s Veto of Draft Text Aimed at Tightening Sanctions against Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, GA/12423, 8 June 2022
https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12423.doc.htm

“Highlighting Strong Link between Multilingualism, Multilateralism, General Assembly Adopts Resolution Urging Parity among United Nations Six Official Languages,” UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, GA/12425, 10 June 2022
https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12425.doc.htm

[12] For instance, “The issue of missiles in all its aspects -- Report of the Secretary-General,” (A/57/229, United Nations, 2003, p. 13) concludes: “at present no universally accepted norms or instruments to deal specifically with missile-related concerns in all their aspects exist.”
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/494729

[13] https://mtcr.info/guidelines-for-sensitive-missile-relevant-transfers/

[14] https://www.hcoc.at/background-documents/text-of-the-hcoc.html

[15] There is a table of UN Security Council Sanctions Resolutions against North Korea in Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI’s book North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: a mirror reflecting the world, (in Japanese, Kobunken, September 2021), pp. 147-149.

[16] Yoon Suk Yeol, “Inaugural Address by President Yoon Yeol,” ROK Office of the 20th President, 10 May 2022
https://eng.president.go.kr/sub/inaugural.php

[17] See note [6].

[18] See note [6].

[19] Lee Haye-ah, “Yoon calls for int’l resolve to denuclearize N. Korea,” YONHAP NEWS, 30 June 2022
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220630000600315

[20] Michael Hamel-Green, “An Alternative to Nuclear Deadlock and Stalled Diplomacy – Proposals, Pathways, and Prospects for the Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone,” A Working Paper presented to the 75th Anniversary Nagasaki Nuclear-Pandemic Nexus Scenario Project, October 31–November 1, and November 14–15, 2020 (Japan Time)
https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/Hamel-Green_Nagasaki_WP_20201016_final.pdf

[21] See note [15], pp. 138-139.