Watch Report No.37 July 19, 2024
The NPT and the DPRK: The Governments of Japan and the ROK Should Use the Treaty Conference as a Forum for Resolving Issues, not Condemnation
From July to August
2024, the 2nd Preparatory Committee for the 11th (2026) Review Conference of
the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held in
Geneva. Almost a year ago, the first session of the Preparatory Committee was
held in Vienna. These regularly scheduled NPT-related conferences, if properly
utilized, provide a valuable forum for discussing regional nuclear weapon issues with a broad range of participating states.
The Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has declared that it has
withdrawn from the NPT and hasn’t attended these conferences of the States
Parties. (Hereafter, the review conference and
its preparatory committee are collectively referred to as the Treaty
Conference). Therefore, it is often thought that Treaty Conferences have
distanced themselves from North Korean issues, but in fact this is not the
case. Treaty Conferences still devote time to discussing the North Korean
nuclear issue. The North Korean issue has been the subject of discussions,
first, as an issue related with States Parties’ withdrawal stipulated in
Article X of the NPT, and second, as one of the major regional
non-proliferation issues.
This report discusses how North
Korean issues have been dealt with at recent Treaty Conferences and identifies
its challenges. It then considers constructive roles that Japan and South Korea, two neighboring non-nuclear-weapon states,
could play.
The
Status of the DPRK under the NPT
As is well known, the DPRK has twice
announced its withdrawal from the NPT.
The DPRK acceded to the NPT on
December 12, 1985, and the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA stipulated in the
treaty entered into force on April 10, 1992, much later than stipulated [1].
On May 4 of the same year, the DPRK submitted its initial declarations to the
IAEA based on the Agreement, however the IAEA and the DPRK became in conflict
with each other over inspections to verify the
initial declarations. The DPRK considered that the IAEA’s decisions were
strongly influenced by information provided by the US. Also, the Team Spirit
US-Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) joint military exercise, which had
been suspended under eased tensions after the Cold War, was resumed in 1993.
Against this background, on March 12, 1993, the DPRK declared its withdrawal
from the NPT on grounds of “extraordinary events” and “supreme interests of the
country being jeopardized,” the terms by which a state may withdraw from the
treaty under Article X. At that time, the DPRK notified the United Nations
Security Council of its withdrawal, but did not notify all
States Parties to the treaty, and thus didn’t fully follow the procedures as
required in Article X.
The withdrawal is to take effect three
months after notification, and urgent US-DPRK talks were held repeatedly to
dissuade the DPRK from withdrawing. On June 11, 1993, just before the deadline,
the two sides agreed on three principles, including US “assurances against the
threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons.” With that, the DPRK
“decided unilaterally to suspend the effectuation of the withdrawal,” and
withdrawal was avoided for the time being [2].
However, due to the US’s intentional
abandonment of implementation of the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization) process, based on the 1994 US-DPRK
Agreed Framework, on January 10, 2003, the DPRK declared its withdrawal from
the NPT for the second time, claiming that it would “immediately put into
effect the withdrawal from the NPT that was temporarily suspended in 1993.”
How did States
Parties to the NPT react to the DPRK’s move?
A few months after
the second declaration, the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the
2005 NPT Review Conference was held on April 28, 2003. At the beginning of the
session, the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Molnar (Hungary), made the
following remarks regarding the treatment of the DPRK at the Committee: “… I carried out these consultations, which revealed
diverging views on the status of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in
the NPT. It is my conviction that a debate on this issue would only serve to
the detriment of the purpose of the Preparatory Committee. ... In the light of
the above, the Chair has the intention, under his own responsibility, not to
open a debate on this issue and to retain the nameplate of the said country
[author’s note: referring to the DPRK] temporarily, in his custody. The Chair
has therefore asked the secretariat to hold the nameplate in the conference
room for the duration of the second session of the Preparatory Committee…”
[3].
The Preparatory
Committee agreed with the Chair’s remarks. The Chair’s factual summary attached to the Final Report
of the session describes the committee’s acceptance of Chair’s opening remarks
mentioned above regarding the treatment of the DPRK in the NPT as follows: “The
Preparatory Committee took note of a statement by the Chair at the first
meeting of the session related to the views of States parties on the DPRK’s
status in the Treaty” [4].
In short, States
Parties decided to put the issue of the status of the DPRK in the NPT on hold,
seeing the debates on the issue would go nowhere.
The following year
(2004), at the third session of the Preparatory Committee, the Chairman of the
Committee, Ambassador Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia) decided not to discuss the DPRK’s status in
the NPT, giving the same explanation as the previous year, which was reported to
the 2005 NPT Review Conference [5].
At the 2005 NPT Review
Conference, the discussions at the Preparatory Committee were placed on the
record, and President Duarte (Brazil) reaffirmed the shelving of the issue of
the DPRK’s status under the NPT by Presidential decision [6]. At this time, it was
simultaneously agreed to put the issue of withdrawal on the agenda of the
Review Conference as a general discussion on Article X of the NPT which lays
out the withdrawal issue, separately from the
DPRK’s status issue.
Subsequent Treaty
Conferences no longer discussed the DPRK’s status under the NPT. The next
Treaty Conference after the 2005 Review Conference was the first session of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference held from April to May
2007. By the time of the first session, the DPRK’s nuclear issue had become an
important issue handled by the UN Security Council beyond the NPT Conferences,
because the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test (October 9, 2006) and the UN
Security Council imposed its first sanctions against the DPRK (October 14,
2006).
This said, the issue
of the DPRK’s status in the NPT has never been resolved. Although more than 20
years have passed since the second declaration of withdrawal, at the present
time, the DPRK’s name continues to appear as a
States Party on the Treaty Conference financial table which provides
information on the amounts owed by States Parties, with a note in the margin
that states, “The status of the membership of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea is uncertain” [7].
Additionally, the
website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, which serves as
the secretariat of the NPT, states as follows: “On 10 January 2003, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced its withdrawal from the Treaty in a public
statement. States parties to the Treaty continue to express divergent views
regarding the status of the DPRK under the NPT” [8]. In summary, even today, the status of the DPRK under
the NPT remains unsettled.
In contrast, the DPRK itself recognizes that it withdrew from the NPT
with the withdrawal notification on January 10, 2003.
In a
statement refuting what a G7 Foreign Ministers
Communiqué of April 2023 mentioned about the DPRK, North Korean Foreign
Minister Choe Son-hui stated, “Taking this opportunity, I courteously remind
the G7 foreign ministers once again that the DPRK is free from any NPT
obligations as it legally withdrew from the treaty 20 years ago in accordance
with the withdrawal procedures specified in Article 10 of NPT” [9]. Additionally, in August of the same year, during the
first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference,
the DPRK permanent mission to the UN Office and international organizations in
Vienna stated, “Its stand on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is
clear…it had legally withdrawn from the NPT 20 years ago according to the right
of a signatory specified in the treaty, but concentrate efforts on finding
solutions to the major challenges facing the treaty” [10], and “Signatories to the NPT should not take issue
with the DPRK over its legitimate exercise of sovereignty [author’s note:
referring to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons development policy].”
Discussions
on the Withdrawal Clause
As already noted, in
response to DPRK’s announcement of withdrawal, new discussions on the operation
of Article X, which stipulates withdrawal from the treaty, began at the 2005
NPT Review Conference.
Numerous States
Parties reaffirmed the importance of the right to withdraw from the Treaty in
circumstances of extraordinary events which “jeopardize the supreme interests
of its country” as stipulated in Article X, as well as the obligation to give
three months’ notice of withdrawal – including a statement of the extraordinary
events – to all other Parties to the Treaty and the UN Security Council, as a
matter of course. Then, the conference discussed, among other things, measures
to ensure that withdrawal doesn’t become a means of excusing treaty violations,
as well as ways to address the international security implications that would
result from withdrawal.
Regarding the NPT
Treaty Conferences where their decision process is
based on consensus, the only agreed upon document
on substantive issues adopted after 2005 is the final document of the 2010 NPT
Review Conference [11]. However, the draft final
document of the 10th NPT Review Conference, which was postponed due to the
COVID-19 pandemic and held in 2022, is a document that is assumed to have been
adopted had it not been for Russian Federation’s objection to the clauses related
to Ukraine [12]. Therefore, it is safe to
assume that there are these two unanimous
agreements on the view of the States Parties on Article X.
It is noteworthy
that in these agreements, the right of States Parities to withdraw from the
treaty was again strongly asserted [13], where it can be seen that the majority of States
Parties are wary of and check the dominant influence of the major powers,
including the nuclear weapon states. As well, there were also legal arguments
to reduce the benefits that would accrue to a withdrawing state by its
withdrawal. As a result, it was confirmed that such withdrawal would not affect
any right, obligation or legal situation between the withdrawing State and each
of the other States parties created during the execution of the Treaty prior to
withdrawal (including those related to the required IAEA Safeguards), and that
non-proliferation legal obligations exchanged under the Treaty would remain in
force after the withdrawal [14].
Regarding what to do
when an intention to withdraw from the Treaty is declared, it is stated, as
numerous States Parties view, that States Parties should undertake
consultations immediately, as well as regional diplomatic initiatives. In
particular, numerous States Parties reaffirmed their understanding that Article
X entrusts the Security Council with responsibilities for dealing with the
withdrawal issue [15].
Perhaps, the most important role of diplomatic
consultations and the Security Council efforts described above is to make
efforts to remove the reasons that compel a state being forced
to declare its withdrawal from the NPT.
Numerous States Parties also recognize this point. The Draft Final Document of the 10th NPT Review Conference, in
Para.187, which lists future efforts of States
Parties, recommends addressing the withdrawal issue, while taking into
consideration that the withdrawal issue cannot be separated from security
concerns of States Parties involved, as follows:
“102. The Conference encourages all State parties to undertake
consultations and exert every diplomatic effort to persuade a withdrawing State
to reconsider its decision, addressing the legitimate security needs of parties
directly involved” [16].
In the session of the most recent Treaty Conference discussing the
withdrawal issue in 2023, Japanese Ambassador Ogasawara extended this point and
stated,
“…Japan considers it important to give State
Parties incentives to remain under the Treaty. To this end, tangible progress
needs to be made in the implementation of the NPT obligations and the
commitments adopted in the past NPT review process, including the 2010 action
plan” [17].
In short, Ogasawara’s understanding is that the entire outcome of
the implementation of the NPT is being questioned in the withdrawal issue.
Certainly, major mutually enforcing pledges under the NPT, particularly past
NPT agreements relating to security, such as nuclear disarmament,
non-proliferation, and negative security assurances, would be fundamental issues
that should be questioned in the withdrawal issue.
How
Northeast Asian Regional
Issues are Discussed
These basic arguments that have been discussed in the
withdrawal issue are, of course, also fundamental issues in the “universalization of
treaty,” which encourages states that have withdrawn to rejoin and non-member
states to join the NPT. From this standpoint, Japan and the ROK, which are
non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT in close vicinity to the DPRK and
seriously affected by its withdrawal, should play a role in stimulating necessary discussions and actions on the Northeast Asia regional
non-proliferation issue at the Treaty Conferences. Unfortunately, they haven’t
done so.
Recent discussions on the issue of DPRK’s nuclear
weapons are summarized in Para. 173 to 177 of the 10th NPT Review Conference’s
draft final document [18], including calls and claims such as “support for the complete,
verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) of the Korean Peninsula and
stressing the importance of the full implementation of the Security Council
resolutions” (Para.173), “condemnation of DPRK’s nuclear tests and prohibition
of further nuclear tests” (Para.174), “call on the DPRK to return to the NPT as
non-nuclear-weapon state,” (Para.175), “call on the DPRK to immediately cease
ongoing nuclear activities and to take concrete measures to abandon all its
nuclear weapons” (Para. 176), and “encouraging the resolution through negotiations
and diplomacy, and call on all parties concerned to resume dialogue and reduce
tensions” (Para177). Besides these agreements, at every Treaty Conference, more
than 50 States Parties have issued joint statements with titles similar to
“Addressing the North Korean nuclear challenge,” and continue to call
for stronger
condemnation to DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs and violation of Security Council resolutions, and
stronger enforcement of sanctions imposed by Security Council resolutions
[19]. Overall,
in terms of regional non-proliferation
issues in Northeast Asia, it is safe to say that the Treaty Conference has
become a forum for merely repeating demands
and condemnations of the DPRK and strict
implementation of Security Council sanctions, rather than discussing solutions
to these issues.
It is important to note that outside of the Treaty Conference, both
Japan and the ROK have repeatedly acted in violation
of the spirit of past NPT agreements. For instance, at the 2010 NPT Review
Conference, they agreed that, “All States parties commit to pursue policies that are
fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without
nuclear weapons,” and “Nuclear States…further diminish the role and
significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts,
doctrines and policies.” Nevertheless, South Korea and the US declared in their
2023 Washington Declaration that “the United States
will further enhance the regular visibility of strategic assets to the Korean
Peninsula, as evidenced by the upcoming visit of a U.S. nuclear ballistic
missile submarine to the ROK” [20]. In particular, the Yoon
administration of South Korea is rushing to establish concrete nuclear cooperation guidelines that include the process of using nuclear weapons [21]. Additionally, after the
2023 Camp David Trilateral Summit, where the US committed to protect Japan and
South Korea through extended deterrence by the full range of US capabilities,
including nuclear, they agreed for the first time to conduct regular annual
trilateral combined military exercises, which had been taboo since the end of
the World War II [22]. All these moves have strengthened the role and significance of
nuclear weapons in the regional security cooperation, in violation of past NPT
agreements.
If Japan and South Korea are forced to act contrary to these
agreements, while deeply committed to the NPT, they should consider that their policies to address
regional non-proliferation issue are highly problematic.
Middle East Issues as an Example
There is a precedent for
using the NPT Treaty Conferences as a forum for resolving regional
nuclear issues instead of merely voicing
criticism. Initiated by Egypt, Middle Eastern
countries have been using the NPT Treaty Conferences as a forum to resolve
regional non-proliferation issues.
On July 1, 1968, Egypt signed the NPT, however, it is
well-known that Egypt didn’t ratify it for some time, because Israel refused to join the treaty [23]. Subsequently, in 1974,
Egypt supported Iran’s proposal to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the
region of the Middle East and worked
for the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution entitled, “Establishment of a nuclear
weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,” which was adopted on
November 9, 1974 for the first time [24]. Laying the groundwork for
regional non-proliferation by repeatedly proposing the UN resolution every year
since then, Egypt ratified the NPT on February 26, 1981. It is acknowledged that it took 13 years for
Egypt to set the conditions for its NPT ratification. In 1990, Egyptian
President Mubarak expanded the scope of the Middle East nuclear-weapons free
zone into the Middle East weapons of mass destruction free zone, and Egypt’s initiative
to realize this resulted
in adoption of the “Resolution on the Middle East” at the 1995 NPT Review and
Extension Conference.
At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Egypt
submitted two working papers. One is “Article VII Nuclear Weapon Free Zone” [25], calling
for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass
destruction. The other is “Security Assurances to Non-nuclear Weapon States” [26], arguing
that
the establishment of such a zone would constitute an
important contribution towards the removal of threats to regional and
international peace and security. As can be seen, Egypt’s intention is to achieve security in the Middle East
by means of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons free zone, especially
given Israel being suspected
of having nuclear weapons. Moreover, we can see excellent political insight in the
fact that Egypt attempts to realize it through the framework of the NPT, a
highly universal treaty in which the majority of the world’s states participate.
At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, these
efforts made the US, Britain and Russia submit “The Resolution on the Middle
East,” and this resulted
in a remarkable outcome in that the resolution was adopted as a document strongly tied
to the key decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. The resolution states
that the Middle East peace process and efforts towards establishment of a
nuclear-weapons free zone are closely linked, by stating that, “(The Review Conference)
endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and
recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute
to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other
weapons of mass destruction,” and calls upon all States Parties to the NPT
including the nuclear-weapon states “to extend their utmost efforts with a view
to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone
free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems.”
The Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East
Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction which held
its first session in November 2019, following the Resolution on the Middle East, has today become an annual conference hosted by the United
Nations. Although Israel continually declines to
participate in the Conference, the existence
of an internationally agreed framework for pursuing denuclearization and peace
in the Middle East is extremely significant.
Initiatives in the Middle East utilizing the NPT Treaty
Conference contain many useful lessons for efforts to pursue denuclearization and
comprehensive peace in Northeast Asia. The leadership of Egypt can be regarded as
a valuable example for Japan and South Korea to follow.
DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT should serve as an impetus to make the regional
denuclearization and comprehensive security issues in Northeast Asia the
subject of the NPT Treaty Conference. Various studies and proposals have
already been published in the academy and civil society, on a comprehensive
security framework centered around a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon free zone
[27]. The
conditions are ripe for the Japanese and South Korean governments to utilize
the NPT Treaty Conference as a forum for pursuing this initiative. (Ichiro
YUASA and Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI)
[1] IAEA, “Factsheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards”
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards
[2] For more on this history, see Hiromichi Umebayashi, “North Korea’s nuclear weapons – A mirror reflecting the world,” (Koubunken, 2021) pp.53-58, or Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman and Robert L. Gallucci, “Going Critical – The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” (Brookings Institution Press, 2004) Chapter 1 to 3
[3] NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/SR.1 Para. 9
[4] NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/50, Annex II Para. 28
[5] NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/SR.1 Para. 9
[6] NPT/CONF.2005/1 Para. 11 or NPT/CONF.2005/57(Part III), p. 9, Para. 38
[7] For the latest example, NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/5
[8] “Declaration, statements, reservations and notes on NPT,”
Website of United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs,
https://treaties.unoda.org/t/npt/declarations/PRK_moscow_ACC
(accessed on
February 12, 2024)
[9] “Press
Statement of DPRK Foreign Minister,” KCNA, April 21, 2023
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[10]
“Press Release by DPRK Mission to UN Office and Int’l Organizations in Vienna,”
KCNA, August 5, 2023
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm Search for the article by date.
[11] 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document Volume I Part I
NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I) May
28, 2010
[12], 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Working paper of the President on the
Final Document of 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/WP.77 August 26,
2022
[13] See note [12], Para.186
[14] See note [11], Para.119 or See note [5], Para. 186
[15] See note [11], Para.120
[16] See note [12], Para.187, Item.102
[17] “Statement by Ambassador OGASAWARA Ichiro, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of Japan to the
Conference on Disarmament, At
the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review
Conference – Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions
of the Treaty” August 9, 2023
https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom23/statements/9Aug_Japan_2.pdf
[18] See note [12]
[19] For instance, NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.36(2023), NPT/CONF.2020/60(2022)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/13(2019),
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/9(2018),
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/13(2017)
[20] “Washington Declaration,” The White House, April 26, 2023
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/
[21] “Joint Statement by President Joseph R. Biden of the United
States of America and President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea on
US-ROK Guideline for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean
Peninsula,” The White House, July 11, 2024
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/11/joint-statement-by-president-joseph-r-biden-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-president-yoon-suk-yeol-of-the-republic-of-korea-on-u-s-rok-guidelines-for-nuclear-deterrence-and-nuclear-operations-o/
[22] “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the
Republic of Korea, and the United States,” the White House, August 18, 2023
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/
[23] Speech of Mr. Karem of the Egyptian Delegation, NPT/CONF.1995/32（Part III）p.253
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/221469
[24] A/RES/3263(XXIX)
[25] “Working paper submitted by Egypt”
NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.13, April 27,1995
NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part II), p.359
https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/1995_FD_Part_II.pdf
[26] “Working paper submitted by Egypt”
NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.4, April 28, 1995
NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part II), p.289
https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/1995_FD_Part_II.pdf
[27] For instance, Michael Hamel-Green, “Nuclear Deadlock, Stalled Diplomacy: The
Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Alternative - Proposals, Pathways,
Prospects,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol.4, NO.51, 2021,
pp201-233
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2021.1875285
or, UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi, SUZUKI Tatsujiro, NAKAMURA Keiko &
HIROSE Satoshi, “Proposal: A Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free-Zone,” (Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki
University, March 2015)
https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/Proposal_J_honbun.pdf
